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Islamic economics and finance emerged as a post-colonial counter-hegemonic attempt to develop a new 
economic paradigm based on Islamic normative principles and substantive morality, which could 
address the observed developmentalist failures of Muslim societies in a period where old colonial 
legacies had remained overwhelmingly shaping socioeconomic institutions in decolonized Muslim 
lands. It, hence aimed at redefining the meaning and function of human agency, land, labour and capital 
as well as the extended stakeholders in the Islamic social framework to generate a participatory and 
sharing economy. In doing so, Islamic economics is envisaged to eliminate the dependence upon 
capitalist formation of economic life and help to construct a new social formation of Muslim societies, 
beyond only economics and finance as single projects, in the light of Islamic ontology and 
epistemology. 
In parallel with the normative aspects, Islamic finance and banking institutions were established as a 
peculiar mode of finance which is motivated by a religious concern of facilitating an alternative 
financial system that is constructed by Islamic principles, values and norms. According to such a 
construct, Islamic financial institutions (IFIs), therefore, are envisaged to circumvent social imbalance 
triggered by interest issue and generate particular modes of production by positing ‘profit and loss 
sharing’ and ‘risk-sharing’ operations of financing within the umbrella of ‘sharing and participative’ 
nature of Islamic moral economy paradigm through redefining capital through the Islamic financial 
prohibitions and screenings. 
This research aims at developing a critical perspective in examining the performance of Islamic banks 
in terms of development promises and outcomes as essentialised by Islamic moral economy. It also 
aims to extent the analytical perspectives on the factors and paradigms preventing such consequences 
to be borne out of Islamic finance such as financialisation, as an operational consequence, and miss-
defined maqasid al-Shari’ah, as an underlying methodological premise. In responding to the general 
aims of this research, three essays are developed.  
The first essay aims to go beyond essentialising growth-based economic theories and explores the 
economic development impact of Islamic banking through discursive and empirical analyses. It aims, 
hence, to unearth to what extent aspirations of Islamic economics match up with its practical outcomes, 
which essentialises developmentalism as an objective and Islamic financial institutions as 
institutionalised forms of epistemological knowledge. Together with the discursive analysis in 
generating ‘Islamic developmentalism’, an empirical analysis is employed with a quantitative 
methodology through measuring and comparing performances of Islamic banks with an unbalanced 
panel of 21 cross section of countries observed during the period 2003-2014.  
The second essay takes account of divergence from developmentalist ideals of Islamic economics 
empirically examined in the first essay, and hence delves into the dimensions of social failure of Islamic 
banks. As a response, among others, it relates the observed failure of Islamic banking in relation to the 
imagination of Islamic moral economy to ‘financialisation’ phenomenon. As the idea of Islamic 
economics was burgeoned at this stage of capitalist world system with the essentialisation of Islamic 
finance, this study argues, is a product of post-colonial discourse between religion and finance that was 
inspired by financialisation phenomenon. This chapter, therefore, aims to challenge the observed and 
developing financialisation of Islamic financing as an attempt that is invariably fictitious in nature 
leading to further disembeddedness and expansion of capitalist hegemony under the Islamic guise. 
Accordingly, it deploys a critical discourse analysis on financialisation within Islamic political economy 
frame by giving particular attention to the exploration of Islamic financialisation. In doing so, Polanyian 
understanding of embeddedness is adopted to address how Islamic financialisation impacts on social 
formation of Muslim societies by creating commodification and disembedment through Islamic finance 
operations. Upon elaborating on the theoretical construction of Islamic financialisation and its 
discursive analysis in a comprehensive manner, subsequently, an empirical analysis is conducted by 
witnessing the practical aspects of Islamic finance as a financialising activity within Islamic economics 
paradigm. Thus, the empirical part evidences how Islamic finance engenders a financialised view of 
(Islamic) economics through its operations. Specifically, it examines the impact of the ascendance of 
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Islamic finance on financialisation trajectory of entire economy, with a panel of 14 Muslim-dominated 
countries covering the period of 2002-2014, to ascertain whether operations of Islamic finance, by and 
large, strengthen real economy or contribute to further financialisation in economies where domestic 
market share of Islamic finance reaches medium or high systematic importance. 
Third essay argues that the social failure of Islamic finance in relations to fulfilling developmentalist 
outcomes and its negations of moral expectations is highly a methodological problem, not just an issue 
bounded with practical realities of the field. This essay, therefore, aims to suggest maqasid al-Shari’ah 
as the fundamental knowledge creation methodology for the theorisation of Islamic moral economy 
through which Islamic developmentalism conceptualised and transformed into public policy making. 
However, it criticises market-oriented understanding of maqasid as a fiqhi construct, which is 
extensively applied in Islamic finance as a legitimisation tool leading up to a new moral code of conduct 
for economic activities. In responding to this, this essay develops an authentic approach towards 
maqasid al-Shari’ah based on substantive morality beyond the instrumentalised meaning of maqasid 
and morality. 
Based on the theoretical discussion and empirical findings, this research suggests that the objective of 
Islamic banking and finance should not be ensuring of the dominance of capital but rather to ensure that 
capital is working within the objectives of society whereby capital is de-centred. Considering that most 
of the Muslim societies and developing countries are in dire need of development, therefore, it is 
important as to how Islamic finance and banking can work to produce development and essentialise the 
interest of extended stakeholder as suggested by tawhidi paradigm. Therefore, this research expands the 
scope of non-developmental expansion of Islamic finance and its capital fundamentalism through the 
introduction of the notion of Islamic financialisation. It, accordingly, suggests Islamic 
developmentalism, founded in the theoretical framework of Islamic moral economy, as an embedded 
form of establishing distributive justice that facilitates paradigmatic shift towards an authentic theory 
of development, which can be facilitated by Islamic finance working within the ‘essential goals of the 
society’. In achieving this, maqasid al-Shari’ah is essentialised as the fundamental knowledge creation 
methodology for the theorisation of Islamic economics through which Islamic developmentalism 
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1.1. RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
The narrative of economic history constructed beyond Eurocentric perspective evidences that 
the characteristics of pre-modern formation of social life were shaped by moral dynamics 
including shared values, norms and beliefs, which resulted in embedding the functioning of 
social, economic, political and cultural institutions. The established and functioning 
embeddedness had thwarted the emergence and prevalence of self-regulated institutions 
reckless to the moral concerns raised by individuals; instead, it had paved the way for the 
essentialisation of societal development with moral concerns remaining at the centre of 
economic relations. In doing so, human interchange, and economic life in particular, had 
submerged in social relations, and society had organically enveloped its institutions, including 
economic policies and financing practices. The embedded economy, in this manner, we are 
told, had existed since archaic times, particularly in premarket system societies. 
With the emergence of economics as a positive science and modern life including modern 
economic practices that brought out the market economy system, later, economic institutions 
substantially gave way to modern forms in which morality has been dislocated from the core 
of economic activities which ultimately bred a value-free notion of economics resulting into 
dis-embeddedness. As the transformation from value-loaded to value-free character of 
economy is adopted, economic objectives have also been exposed to some contextual 
alterations in order to bring them into conformity with the new aspirations of ‘positive 
economics’. In doing so, essentialisation of capital as a factor of production and capital-
intensive growth policies, nurtured by the Eurocentric approach, superseded developmentalist 
policies, which meant a narrowing shift from normative to positive dealing of the concept of 
development. The issues of poverty, unemployment, wealth generation, equitable distribution 
of income and wealth, and improvements in many spheres of public life, thereupon, have been 
tackled around this scant form of development. 
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The transition from moral economy understanding to self-regulated market economy derived 
from positivist ideology led to a counterhegemonic discourse by Western academics in the 19th 
century Europe, which later opened up the literature on moral economy and its use as a strong 
critique to capitalist economic system. The social protectionist movements emerged as a 
counter hegemony in the post-war period in the 20th century to respond to the unregulated 
nature of market economies resulting in, for example, the emergence of welfare state. Muslim 
scholarship, amid these developments, responded to capitalist penetration resulting in 
disembeddedness in a different manner in their attempt to reconstruct their societies in that the 
debates on Islamic morality and its articulation on modern economic institutions remained 
peripheral. However, the emergence of Islamic economics movement also coincides the global 
search for alternatives in different part of the world including in the West. 
As the Muslim societies were facing a great deal of challenges, including international political 
power decline, prevalence of nationalist movements, an ever-increasing stream of liberal and 
secular worldviews and the effect of globalisation on the role of nation states in the 20th century, 
they strived either for adopting capitalist mode of production through imposition to establish a 
particular social formation that is alien to their respective societies (resulting a hybrid everyday 
practice with formal economy dominated with market rules at the centre while informal 
economy carried the traces of tradition in the periphery and semi-periphery), or they searched 
for an authentic Muslim identity that rejects Western values and norms, but contrarily, enables 
Muslims to reconstruct their own worldview in the modern era.  
Although it was expected that the overcoming challenges and the aspirations of establishing 
authentic Muslim identity would bring the issue of Islamic morality into the centre of academic 
debate and everyday practice of economy and finance, it rather worked the other way around 
and culminated in a hybrid and malaise understanding of economic system which ruled out the 
flourishing of Islamic moral economy in the Muslim thought. The impacts of hybridity which 
has later been shaped by ‘mimicry’ and even ‘mirroring’, consequently, shaped the theory and 
practice of Islamic economics and finance in the modern Muslim world. As a result, Islamic 
finance as part of the Islamic economic movement, contrary to its claim, could not authenticate 
itself to be a novel outcome of Islamic ontology, for it became a variant of mainstream financial 
reality situated in the Western epistemological frame. In this, this study attempts to reconstruct 
Islamic economics affected by the same trajectory as it has mostly remained ‘Islamization’ of 
the concepts and theories of neo-classical economics, such as the utility vs Islamic utility 
regardless of re-defining if Islam suggests utility or perhaps such an intent can better be 
explained through falah process and falah function. 
 3 
1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT: EVOLUTION OF THE IDEA OF ISLAMIC 
ECONOMICS 
Despite the state of art in Islamic economic modelling shows no way other than being an 
unfinished project and its Islamic finance arm showing social failure, the origins of Islamic 
economics initially envisaged a completely different system proposition. In this sense, the idea 
of Islamic economics burgeoned as a post-colonial counter-hegemonic attempt to address the 
observed developmentalist failures of Muslim societies in a period where old colonial legacies 
had remained overwhelmingly shaping socioeconomic institutions in decolonized Muslim 
lands. Since the prevailing legacies are considered to impede emancipation and empowerment 
of Muslim identity, which is the main objective function of Islamic methodology, obliterating 
their traces was seen an essential concern in developing an authentic meaning of economy and 
society as part of their identity search. Thus, Islamic economics emerged as a project to develop 
a new economic paradigm based on Islamic normative principles and substantive morality, 
which could respond to the challenges Muslim individuals and societies face with the 
mainstream materialistic and performing understanding of economy. Therefore, it aimed at 
redefining the meaning and function of human agency, land, labour and capital as well as the 
extended stakeholders in the Islamic social framework to generate a participatory and sharing 
economy.  
Considering the ideational mismatches between Islamic and secular worldviews, Islamic 
economics is envisaged to be functioning to eliminate the dependence upon ‘capitalist 
formation of economic life’1 and help to construct a new social formation2, beyond only 
economics and finance as single projects, of Muslim societies in the light of Islamic ontology 
and epistemology. In achieving this, in the short-run, utmost importance was given to public 
policy oriented developmentalist agenda with the objective of eliminating underdevelopment, 
eradicating impoverishment and weak politico-economic structures, while in the long-run an 
attempt was considered in developing Islamic social formation in which economic practice is 
considered to be submerged in a nexus of social relations.  
                                                        
1 Capitalist formation of economic life refers to the organization of social and economic life through capitalist 
motivations in the sense of essentialising capital accumulation and centring capital and maximisation of 
shareholder value. 
2 Social formation is defined as “totality of instances articulated on the basis of a determinate mode of production” 
(Althusser and Balibar 1970:207), which is a Marxist concept used to describe the conditions for the existence of 
particular mode of production in constituting the social formation of the society. It simply implies the organisation 
of society which includes organisation of economics resources in generating a particular mode of production 
(Asutay, 2018). 
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The theoretically defined aspirations of Islamic economics are invariably welcomed and 
encouraged to put into practice, yet the historical evidence showed that the institutionalisation 
process has been limited to banking and financial activities with an unsophisticated and non-
theoretical making of Islamic finance. The general trend of Islamic economic studies has thus 
been moving towards finance and bank centred view of Islamic economics in which financial 
operations constitute the pivot of economic activities. This is construed as divergence from 
ideals to the mimicry of conventional finance through representing hybrid financial services 
(Asutay 2007b, 2012). 
The emerging need of an Islamic financial system had surfaced in the late 1940s when 
decolonization took place after the World War II. With this new stage of political history, 
previously colonized countries were allowed to design their own institutional structure without 
any political interference of colonial powers. From inner perspective, Muslim societies’ 
confrontation with the existing social, cultural, political and economic articulations of Western 
worldview now transformed into a different phase where direct applications of Western 
strategies on Muslim lands were interrupted after the decolonization.  
While boundaries of these lands are no longer invaded by Western colonialist powers and the 
ways of democratization and nation building has been expedited and ‘liberalised’, old colonial 
legacies have still been prevailing and shaping social and economic structure of these 
underdeveloped world. This has caused a particular form of dependence that was 
conceptualised with ‘neo-colonialism’ – a term coined by Nkrumah (1965) - under which the 
former economic and cultural relationships of direct colonization period are maintained 
through different means in disguise of economic cooperation, global culture, development etc. 
Islamic economic movement and its finance articulation, under such circumstances, emerged 
to play an important role in authenticating Muslim nation building in economics and public 
sphere through the advantages of decolonization; however, it had to come up against the 
prevalent economic structure in the following years of its establishment. 
Along with the historical and political effects rooted in its emergence, technically speaking, 
Islamic finance and banking, the main institutions emerged from Islamic economics 
movement, embraces a peculiar mode of finance which grounds its theoretical underpinnings 
to Islamic economics paradigm, and hence, undertakes to operate within the ambit of Islamic 
legal rules and moral obligations. As can be inferred, it is motivated by a religious concern of 
facilitating an exclusive financial system that is constructed by Islamic principles, values and 
norms. Contrary to the interest-based nature of global financial system through which 
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exorbitant profits are realised at the expense of impoverishing rest of the world, Islamic 
financial institutions (IFIs) aim to circumvent social imbalance triggered by interest issue and 
generate particular modes of production by positing ‘profit and loss sharing’ and ‘risk-sharing’ 
operations of financing within the umbrella of ‘sharing and participative’ nature of Islamic 
economy paradigm. The prohibition of riba, in this sense, refers to a new mode of production 
within Islamic social formation, in which the dominance and hegemony of capital is removed; 
instead, capital is treated equal with the rest of the stakeholders (Asutay 2018). In other words, 
the removal of interest from economy is nothing but the rule against the domination of capital 
in terms of unfair return of capital leading to preserve each stakeholder’s right in the production 
process and financial area. This, hence, creates opportunity space for other stakeholders to 
flourish, emancipate and empower through providing equal opportunities (see: Asutay 2017); 
and hence the entire process aims at multidimensional development. Therefore, Islamic 
political economy features profit and loss sharing and risk sharing in the form of equity 
financing in shaping Islamic finance as the main thrust of expanding stakeholder for 
development by providing accessibility to resources (Asutay 2013). 
Established over four decades ago and proliferated in a short span of time across the globe, 
Islamic finance, at its state of art, is extolled for its performance to show an unprecedented 
success in achieving a continuous growth in terms of asset size, and for its financial services 
reaching an overall total value of $1.893 trillion as of 2016 (Islamic Financial Services Board 
(IFSB) 2017:7). Despite the share of Islamic financial assets ($1.893 trillion) remains only 1% 
of the global financial market of $127 trillion (Ernst and Young (E&Y) 2016), IFIs are 
increasingly becoming part and parcel of the global financial system. This, in return, leads to 
the expectation that the momentum gained with Islamic finance should accompany with 
economic wellbeing across its operating fields due to the fact that financial development would 
necessarily foster economic growth and generate welfare in a wider sense. 
While Islamic finance secures its position in the global financial order by introducing new 
products and permeating through un-tapped fields, its distinguishing feature of being a religion-
based proposition – rather than self-regulated market system - engenders some challenges in 
integrating into global, secular, modern and capitalistic characteristics of mainstream finance. 
This is due to the reason that Islam attaches certain principles to financial activities such as 
prohibitions of riba, gharar (excessive uncertainty) and maysir (gambling), whereas 
conventional financial markets trust self-regulation without reliance on divine knowledge to 
lead its activities. This obliges Islamic finance scholars to adopt either an authentic but 
necessarily non-globalised financial practice within the boundaries of Islamic law, or hybrid 
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practices and institutions that mimics conventional finance but performs relatively more 
efficient with its dubious activities in terms of being complaint with Islamic legal and moral 
rulings. 
Remembering ethical principles embedded in its foundational premises of Islamic economic, 
Islamic finance emanating from such a source is also expected to generate developmentalist 
consequences in such a challenging atmosphere. Developmentalism as a social objective in 
financial activities of Muslim societies was mainly essentialised by the founding fathers of 
Islamic economics, who consider Islamic finance to be value (ethically) and norms (morally) 
driven industry that has to exhibit thriving ‘social performance’ as well as financial 
performance (see: Mannan 1970; Chapra 1979; Zarqa 1980; Siddiqi 1981; Choudhury 1986; 
Ahmad 1994; Naqvi 2003 amongst others). Examining its economic performance over the 
years, it can be somewhat asserted that IFIs are financially performing moderate (Hassan and 
Aliyu 2018); however, while developmentalist contributions are reckoned with, they lag far 
behind the aspired level as identified by Islamic moral economy and failed to accommodate 
enhancing social good for which they were initially considered. As Islamic moral economy 
aims at re-defining capital and its role in economic and financial activity, Islamic finance has 
taken the capitalist or neo-classical definition of concepts and forms of practice. Therefore, it 
is claimed that Islamic finance has given up the equity-based formulation of Islamic moral 
economy for ‘efficiency of capital’ based paradigm of neo-classical economics and 
financialised practices. 
1.3. RESEARCH AIMS, QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
As discussed in the preceding sections, this research aims to deconstruct and analytically 
explore some of the essential issues mentioned. The essays in this research, thus, aims at 
developing a critical perspective in examining the performance of Islamic banks in terms of 
development promises and outcomes as essentialised by Islamic economics. It also aims to 
extend the analytical perspectives on the factors and paradigms preventing such consequences 
to be borne out of Islamic finance such as financialisation, as an operational consequence, and 
miss-defined maqasid al-Shari’ah, as an underlying methodological premise. 
Since this research is presented in three-essay-based format (two empirical and one discursive), 
the aims, objectives, research questions and methodology for each essay are presented as 
follows: 
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Essay 1: Islamic Banking and Development:  Revisiting Developmentalist Promises of Islamic 
Economics 
In an attempt to critically evaluate conventional notion of economic growth and development 
with the resultant imbalances it creates, the first essay aims to go beyond growth based 
economic theories and explores the economic development impact of Islamic banking through 
discursive and empirical analyses. It aims, hence, to unearth to what extent aspirations of 
Islamic economics match up with its practical outcomes, which essentialises developmentalism 
as an objective and Islamic financial institutions as institutionalised forms of epistemological 
knowledge.  
In line with the stated aims, initially, a conceptual framework for Islamic developmentalism is 
constructed to identify the distinctions and dimensions of development, thereby, 
‘developmentalism’ is brought out as the essential operational model of Islamic banking as 
envisaged in the emergence of Islamic economics and finance discourse. This is followed by 
an empirical analysis by employing a quantitative methodology through measuring and 
comparing performances of Islamic banks with an unbalanced panel of 21 cross section of 
countries observed during the period 2003-2014; thereby, it seeks potential contributions of 
Islamic banks on economic development trajectories of Muslim-dominated countries based on 
the predefined notion of ‘Islamic developmentalism3’. The underlying assumption, here, is that 
Islamic financial performance should not be confined to financial area only, as due to their 
moral construct they should be subjected to ‘social evaluation’ in the sense that Islamic moral 
economy locates Islamic banks as institutions of contributing to the social good or ihsan. 
In relation to the aims and objectives, following research questions are developed: 
RQ1: Why does going through finance-growth nexus remain incapable in exploring the impact 
of finance on socioeconomic goals of countries? 
RQ2: What is the particular imagination of Islamic moral economy in relation to development 
paradigm? 
                                                        
3 This study recognizes the value-loaded definition of ‘developmentalism’. However, it also recognizes that 
Islamic aim is not only economic development but multi-faceted development within the parameters of adalah, 
ihsan, rububiyah and tazkiyah in the context of tawhidi paradigm (Asutay 2013). Hence, developmentalism is 
redefined within Islamic normativeness by essentialising human-centred development by re-defining individual 
as Islamic economics “aims at the study of human falah achieved by organising the resources of earth on the basis 
of cooperation and participation” (Khan 1984:54). In this context, re-defined developmentalism is objected 
towards emancipation and empowerment in every aspect of life within the ihsani social formation. 
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RQ3: In what ways does ‘banking-development nexus’ differ from ‘banking-growth nexus’? 
RQ4: What are the most appropriate indicators accounting for Islamic banking growth and 
economic development?  
RQ5: To what extent does Islamic banking sector contributes to the developmentalist objectives 
in Muslim countries? 
Based on the results produced in this essay, the following two essays aim to empirically and 
discursively address the sources of ‘development impact’ related failure of Islamic banking by 
locating it in the financialisation as an operational choice and misapplication of maqasid as a 
methodological base. 
Essay 2: Financialisation and Disembeddedness in Islamic Banking: Critical Discourse and 
Empirical Analyses on Performing Banking and Finance vs. Islamic Moral Economy 
The second essay takes account of divergence from developmentalist ideals of Islamic 
economics empirically examined in the previous essay, and hence delves into the dimensions 
of social failure of Islamic banks. As a response, it relates the observed failure of Islamic 
banking in relation to the imagination of Islamic moral economy to ‘financialisation’ 
phenomenon – a flourishing concept in the heterodox literature - which represents a systemic 
transformation of capitalist economies during the last few decades that brought about a sharp 
divergence between economic and financial activities in favour of dominance of finance in the 
face of performing productive economy as part of the shift towards finance-led capitalism. As 
the idea of Islamic economics was burgeoned at this stage of capitalist world system, its 
essentialisation of Islamic finance, this study argues, is a product of post-colonial discourse 
between religion and finance that was inspired by financialisation phenomenon. Thus, one 
cannot expect developmentalist objectives from Islamic financial institutions in an 
environment of financialised economy, for financialisation is itself a project of eliminating 
human in economic relations through submerging human interaction in a nexus of financial 
relations. 
It is argued, hence, that the emergence and systematic institutionalisation of modern Islamic 
finance industry in 1960s was not a coincidental development, but rather highly influenced 
from the essentialisation of finance dominated economic system. Thus, Islamic finance could 
only become an in-paradigm alternative within debt-based economic environment. This 
chapter, therefore, aims to challenge the observed and developing Islamic financialisation as 
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an attempt that is invariably fictitious in nature and is a government-led top-down process in 
most of the countries where Islamic finance is visible, rather than an outcome of bottom-up 
demand for Islamic social services. 
Along with this, it suggests an Islamic political economy approach to financialisation through 
which the nature, evolvement and burdens of financialised economies together with its 
implications on individual and social life are reconsidered in the light of Islamic ontology and 
epistemology. Accordingly, it deploys a critical discourse analysis on financialisation within 
Islamic political economy frame by giving particular attention to the exploration of Islamic 
financialisation. In doing so, Polanyian understanding of embeddedness is adopted to address 
how Islamic financialisation impacts on social formation of Muslim societies by creating 
commodification and disembedment through Islamic finance operations.  
Upon elaborating on the theoretical construction of Islamic financialisation and its discursive 
analysis in a comprehensive manner, subsequently, an empirical analysis is conducted by 
witnessing the practical aspects of Islamic finance as a financialising activity within Islamic 
economics paradigm. Thus, the empirical part would evidence as to how Islamic finance 
engenders a financialised view of (Islamic) economics through its operations. Specifically, it 
examines the impact of the ascendance of Islamic finance on financialisation trajectory of 
entire economy, with a panel of 14 Muslim-dominated countries covering the period of 2002-
2014, to ascertain whether operations of Islamic finance, by and large, strengthen real economy 
or contribute to further financialisation in economies where domestic market share of Islamic 
finance reaches medium or high systematic importance. Accordingly, it employs a quantitative 
methodology and makes use of secondary data with an unbalanced panel data analysis. A range 
of econometric techniques are utilised including pooled OLS, random effect and system-GMM 
estimators to address heterogeneity, over-identification and endogeneity issues. 
In relation to the aims and objectives, the following research questions are developed: 
RQ1: What are the historical dynamics behind the emergence of Islamic finance as a hybrid 
financial product and institution instead of an authentic alternative to global financial system? 
RQ2: In what sense does Islamic finance fail to operate beyond market economy understanding 
and becomes invariably disembedded and financialising economic practice? 
RQ3: What are the theoretical boundaries and scope of Islamic financialisation? 
RQ4: What are the institutional and practical implications of Islamic financialisation? 
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RQ5: To what extent Islamic banking has contributed to financialisation in the countries it has 
certain presence?   
Essay 3: Re-embedding Maqasid al-Shari’ah in the Essential Methodology of Islamic 
Economics 
Based on the first two essays, third essay argues that the social failure of Islamic finance in 
relations to realising developmentalist outcomes and its negations of moral expectations is 
highly a methodological problem, not just an issue bounded with practical realities of the field. 
This essay, therefore, aims to suggest maqasid al-Shari’ah as the fundamental knowledge 
creation methodology for the theorisation of Islamic economics through which Islamic 
developmentalism conceptualised and transformed into public policy making. However, it 
criticises market-oriented understanding of maqasid, which is extensively applied in Islamic 
finance as a legitimisation tool leading up to a new moral code of conduct for economic 
activities. In responding to this, this essay aims to develop an authentic approach towards 
maqasid al-Shari’ah based on substantive morality beyond the instrumentalised meaning of 
maqasid and morality. 
Beyond instrumental and eclectic approaches, this essay argues that the theoretical grounds of 
Islamic economics should be re-examined in the light of proactive maqasid al-Shari’ah 
framework with its nine dimensions, beyond the traditional Ghazalian maqasid, elaborated in 
the related section. By doing so, the rationale behind the failure of realising Islamic 
developmentalism in post-colonial Muslim nations can better be explained, since proactive 
maqasid envisages a totally different methodology and approach towards developmentalist 
considerations when compared to existing applications of maqasid based on methodological 
individualism. Morality, here, plays a central role on the entire process of knowledge 
authentication through maqasid al-Shari’ah, while the current use of maqasid in Islamic 
banking and finance demonstrates that it has been relegated to fiqhi injunctions and used as an 
instrument to legalise particular product and operation in a legalistically rational manner. Thus, 
substantive morality should be embedded through maqasid in the theoretical underpinnings of 
Islamic economics to generate substantive nature of Islamic moral economy in line with 
maqasid expectations as a distinct system of economy. This requires interpersonal and social 
relations not to be merely relegated to economic relations or relations between ‘things’, but 
economics and finance should be embedded into norms and values of society through locating 
ethico-economic relationship across each system so that morality can be articulated beyond 
impersonal market environment to generate Islamic moral economy. 
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Based on the aims and objectives, this essay raises the following research questions: 
RQ1: How should maqasid be designed in order to deliver an authentic and functional 
methodology for Islamic economics? 
RQ2: In what sense the prevailing maqasid perspective in Islamic finance facilitates its 
divergence from the aspirations of Islamic economics? 
RQ3: What are the consequences of the prevailing Ghazalian maqasid framework in relation to 
Islamic moral economy expectations? 
RQ4: What is the nature and constituents of an effective maqasid to embed Islamic morality in 
definition and operations of Islamic economics and finance? 
1.4. RESEARCH MOTIVATION AND SIGNIFICANCE 
Islamic finance is a significantly growing industry within the global financial system. 
Considering the motivation behind its emergence, it was institutionalised to fulfil the objectives 
of Islamic economics paradigm, and, hence, embraces a value-loaded character beyond the 
logic of conventional finance, which is driven by the market system with a value-free notion 
of efficiency and with the dominance of capital. Islamic finance is, hence, envisaged to generate 
both financial and social performance to contribute to the development trajectories of Muslim 
societies so that financing becomes an embedded activity in the process of producing social 
good. By doing so, Islamic financial sphere becomes submerged in a nexus of social relations 
and the accompanying ultimate goal of developmentalism. 
The motivation of this research stems from the fact that Islamic banks, having the majority 
share in the Islamic financial sector, diverged from the initial aspirations and paradigm of 
development-oriented mode of financing elaborated above, and have converged towards 
mainstream financial system in the operational level, leading up to disembeddedness between 
finance, economy and society in a Polanyian sense. A thorough elaboration and systemic 
analysis about the hybridity of Islamic financial products and the mimicry of conventional 
financial framework, as the state of art in Islamic banking sector manifests, is required to shed 
light on the political economy dynamics of Islamic banking as a disembedded industry from 
the objectives of Islamic economics. In doing so, this research goes beyond the classical 
approach towards financial development, which takes accounts of growth-based dimensions of 
banking activities such as financial depth, access, efficiency and stability as observed in the 
World Bank perspective. Instead, this research takes the debate to one stage further by 
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evaluating Islamic financial performance through its developmentalist contributions that 
necessarily consider social implications and articulations of financing. This study, therefore, 
suggests that the objective of Islamic banking and finance should not be ensuring of the 
dominance of capital but rather to ensure that capital is working within the objectives of 
society. Considering that most of the Muslim societies and developing countries are in dire 
need of development, therefore, it is important as to how Islamic finance and banking can work 
to produce development and essentialise the interest of extended stakeholder as suggested by 
tawhidi paradigm. 
The recognition of the social failure, inductively, leads us to relate it to the notion of 
financialisation. In this manner, financialisation is considered to be the latest form of capitalist 
stage, and the emergence of Islamic finance together with its rise of ‘financing’ within Islamic 
economics paradigm has been influenced from such a political economy atmosphere. As 
finance has been dislocated from economic sphere, it gained an autonomous sphere with its 
own objectives devoid of real economy and in need of developmentalist perspective. Islamic 
finance, similarly, mimics the prevailing structure and the institutional logic of conventional 
finance and gives rise to the financialisation of Islamic finance through favouring ‘finance as 
the ultimate objective’ instead of ‘finance for social good’, the difference of which is clarified 
extensively in the following words of (Shiller 2012:7): “finance is not about ‘making money’ 
per se. It is a ‘functional’ science in that it exists to support other goals – those of the society. 
The better aligned a society’s financial institutions are with its goals and ideals, the stronger 
and more successful the society will be”, which echoes Chapra’s position (2009). 
Based on such historical developments of Islamic finance, this research suggests a proactive 
maqasid understanding based on substantive morality embedded in the theoretical 
underpinnings of Islamic economics to function as a substantial methodology in deriving 
developmentalist oriented public policy making. Thus, the theoretical grounds of Islamic 
economics and its articulation of Islamic banks are re-examined in the light of the proactive 
maqasid al-Shari’ah framework with its extended dimensions. This research argues that the 
roots of social failure of Islamic banks is a direct consequence of a more substantial problem 
related to methodology. Therefore, the neglect of methodology in theory making, in the case 
of articulating Islamic economics into policy level, sparked off the emergence of Islamic 
financialisation and hence brought dissociation of finance from Islamic developmentalism. 
Thus, due to being concerned with the observed convergence towards further financialisation 
of Islamic banking, this study aims to identify the process of financialisation and brings 
attention to the nature of financialisation taking place in Islamic banking. 
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The evaluation of the historical rise of Islamic finance industry from the Polanyian view of 
embeddedness makes this research significant, for it paves the way for considering practical 
aspects of Islamic economics beyond neoclassical discourse by bringing developmentalist 
consequences into question. It also conceptualises ‘Islamic financialisation’ as a broader 
phenomenon for development that needs to be addressed multifariously. With equal 
importance, this research makes contribution to the methodological issues around the 
theorisation of Islamic economics by introducing a new methodological approach based on Ibn 
Qayyimian understanding of public policy-oriented consequence. In doing so, this research 
argues that maqasid al-Shari’ah should be located as the essential methodology of Islamic 
economics. Thus, due to observing that the maqasid utilised in the practice of Islamic finance 
and banking would not produce development as a consequence, this research has taken up the 
task of re-defining maqasid and its constituents. 
Considering that the developments in Islamic banking and finance have indicated its 
convergence towards conventional financial practices, this research should be considered as a 
novel attempt to identify the underlying reasons for such convergence through two particular 
sources: market forced financialisation and methodological incompleteness of the emergence. 
1.5. OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS 
In Chapter 2 – Islamic Banking and Development:  Revisiting Developmentalist Promises of 
Islamic Economics, the term ‘development’ is dissected thoroughly in a conceptual manner, 
and its impact on socioeconomic life is discussed where multifacetedness of developmentalism 
is pinpointed. The conventional understanding of growth and the wider concept of development 
is contrasted and compared with Islamic moral economy perspectives on developmentalism. 
After making a clear distinction between growth and development, developmentalism is 
accepted as the remedy for the unequal consequences and imbalanced growth orientation of 
many countries. Therefore, growth paradigm is critically analysed to suggest Islamic moral 
economy’s developmentalist essentialisation. In doing so, some references are also given to the 
social failure of Islamic finance to reveal Islamic moral economy’s vision for 
developmentalism. 
After presenting a conceptual and theoretical discussion, an econometric analysis is conducted 
to explore the relationship between Islamic banking growth and economic development. In 
doing so, possible explanations for the impact of growth of Islamic banking industry on the 
quantitative aspects of developmentalist oriented aims is sought through the empirical analysis 
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with an unbalanced panel of 21 cross section of countries for the period of 2003-2014. A 
development index highlighting the quantitative parameters is considered to test the 
performances of Islamic banks with regard to their promotion towards individual wellbeing 
and social welfare. For the outcome, the resulting trends show that Islamic banks do not have 
significant effect on economic development patterns of countries, implying a poor performance 
that necessarily resulting into social failure. 
Chapter 3 – Financialisation and Disembeddedness in Islamic Banking: Critical Discourse 
Analysis and Empirical Evidence on Performing Banking and Finance vs. Islamic Moral 
Economy – is based on the consequences of discursive and empirical analyses in Chapter 2. 
The econometric analysis in the first essay is expected to expose the observed developmentalist 
failure with regards to Islamic banks’ performances. In an attempt to reveal underlying causes 
of development or social failure, the phenomenon of financialisation is examined both in 
conceptual and empirical aspects to relate the failure with the ascendance of finance centred 
view of economy, which shows the most recent phase of capitalist mode of production. It is, 
therefore, argued that social failure of Islamic finance pertains highly to financialisation and 
hence to the domination of capital. 
Together with the distinguishing aspects of financialisation discussed by various approaches, 
this chapter goes beyond Marxist understanding and expansion of the concept and hence 
constructs its own view with a Polanyian perspective based on morality and embeddedness 
issues. Similar to the first chapter’s method, here also, conceptual exploration is supported with 
an empirical analysis wherein the extent to which Islamic finance contributes to financialisation 
of an economy is discussed in length. The empirical analysis evidenced that Islamic 
financialisation exacerbates the condition of overall financialisation in the economy, or 
alternatively, it fails to strengthen real economy through diluting financialisation trend. 
Chapter 4 – ‘Re-embedding Maqasid al-Shari’ah in the Essential Methodology of Islamic 
Economics’ – aims to explain why aspirations of Islamic economics and realities with Islamic 
financial practice contradict each other, and a divergence has emerged in consequence. Thus, 
this chapter attempts to pinpoint the knowledge creation methodology-oriented reasons for the 
observed failure whereby the importance of methodology in theory building and transforming 
knowledge into policy making is emphasized. Maqasid al-Shari’ah, therefore, is suggested as 
an essential methodology for Islamic economics and articulation of Islamic morality in 
everyday practice. In doing so, the prevailing view towards maqasid by modern scholars is 
criticised; instead a proactive maqasid understanding is constructed with its nine dimensions 
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to stress the importance of methodology in the theorisation of Islamic economics. In this 
manner, the instrumentalised view of maqasid highly adopted amongst scholars of Islamic 
finance is seen as the root cause of mimicry and hybridisation within Islamic finance, which, 
as argued, should be replaced by policy oriented extended maqasid understanding. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ISLAMIC BANKING AND DEVELOPMENT: REVISITING 




The course of time evidences that the economic history of pre-modern societies embodies the 
‘moral economy’ characteristic through which socioeconomic parameters, value systems and 
norms are embedded and preconditioned in the theoretical framework of an economy (see: 
Polanyi 1944). The embedment of morality in economic life and institutions allowed societal 
development to remain at the centre of economic relations and expedited the process of 
eliminating potential distortions among society through its masterminding role in all 
socioeconomic issues within a developmentalist perspective.  
With the emergence of market economy, by contrast, economic institutions substantially gave 
way to modern forms in which morality is disembodied from the core of economic activities 
which ultimately bred a value free notion of economics. Along with the market economy, also 
due to the emergence of positive economic theory, the transformation from value loaded to 
value free character of economic settings are located; consequently, economic objectives were 
exposed to some contextual alterations in order to bring them into conformity with the new 
aspirations of ‘positive economics’. In doing so, capital-intensive growth policies, nurtured by 
the Eurocentric4 approach, superseded developmentalist policies implying a narrowing shift 
from normative to positive dealing of the concept of development. The issues of poverty, 
unemployment, wealth generation, equitable distribution of income and improvements in many 
spheres of public life, thereupon, have been tackled around this scant form of development. 
As a result of dominance of market economy, the approach towards individual wellbeing, 
social welfare and prosperity is dealt, in the hegemonic economic thought, under the concept 
of ‘economic growth’. Socioeconomic issues such as eradicating poverty, low economic 
                                                        
4 Eurocentrism is a particular worldview that pursues European interests and benefits at the expense of the non-
European world despite it claims to serve for universal beneficence (Mehmet 1999:10). It is the hallmark of 
Western economic development theorising in which capitalisation of almost everything is taken as the overriding 
objective in bringing material prosperity to the West. 
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performance, underdevelopment and inefficiency are all considered to be tackled as a result of 
economic growth. Adam Smith (1976) [originally published in 1776], one of the founding 
fathers of economics, emphasises the importance and scope of growth in his classical book ‘An 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations’ by stressing that the engine of 
growth is implicit in the division of labour, in the accumulation of capital, and in the 
technological progress. This materialist approach, notably spearheaded by capital 
accumulation with canonisation of GDP per capita, has penetrated every policy sphere of 
Eurocentric economic thought in dealing with developmentalist needs of individuals and 
societies. However, in practice, the inferiority of such growth policies, first implemented in the 
classical period, ended up with a great economic gap from which many countries, mostly those 
rooted in developing countries including the Muslim populated countries, have been suffering 
dramatically. The rationale for this growing inequality between countries as well as within 
countries has led to the reconsideration of the validity of mainstream economic theories and 
paved the way for the emergence of economic development or generally developmentalist 
theory and policy making. 
Despite acknowledging the inferiority of conventional growth theories, especially after the 
Second World War, the fashioning of ‘development’ as a new phenomenon and prescription 
for underdeveloped nations could not go beyond becoming an unsophisticated extension of 
growth theories, for it failed to accommodate and endogenise societal, environmental, moral 
and humanitarian aspects –as well as the issues related to power allocation and income 
distribution. Consequently, economic development theories have remained to substantiate 
capital accumulation, leading to deepen the great competence amongst global powers to exploit 
world resources while it instrumentally included the fulfilment of basic needs of individuals as 
an objective. These theories, hence, could not respond to the question as to why some countries 
perform better than others and some cannot develop despite the fact that they use the same 
development strategies. Instead, the economic development theorising in the Western world 
has generated some development indicators such as Human Development Index, OECD Better 
Life Index, World Happiness Index, Genuine Progress Index, Inclusive Wealth Report, Global 
Sustainable Development Report, and Global Competitiveness Report to emphasise the 
difference in development trajectories by ranking countries accordingly. Although each index 
was expected to constitute a distinct alternative to growth-based indicators – mainly GDP per 
capita – and hence aimed to be a novel benchmark for the universal objective of 
developmentalism, they remained limited with particularistic approaches, far beyond reflecting 
multifaceted aspect of developmentalism. 
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In fact, the uniformity of Eurocentric theorisation of economic development with regard to its 
adoption to the same ontological and epistemological backdrop did not allow the proliferation 
of alternative views, which are distinct in their nature and fundamentally differ from 
conventional theories. It should, therefore, be recognised that questing intra-paradigm 
alternatives to mainstream theories cannot produce authentic solutions; hence, it is necessary 
to search for alternative economic development models and relevant strategies, which are 
substantiated beyond economics realm. This study, accordingly, suggests Islamic 
developmentalism, founded in the theoretical framework of Islamic moral economy, as an 
embedded form of establishing distributive justice that facilitates paradigmatic shift towards 
an authentic theory of development.  
The emergence of Islamic economics in the post-colonial period in the modern times should 
be considered as a response to the overwhelming hegemony of market economy by embedding 
economy/economics and finance within the normative world of Islam and its value proposition. 
While in the initial discourse there were references to re-constructing the economic system of 
Islam by responding to the observed development failure in the Muslim world through the 
ontological construct of Islam, the main development out of this discourse has been the 
emergent pattern of Islamic banking and finance (IBF). In the initial consideration, IBF is 
considered to finance the economic development needs of Muslim societies within the 
imagined world of Islamic economics, the progress in the sector has demonstrated that it has 
not fulfilled the expectations yet as it has moved into conventional realm and operates within 
capital accumulation and financialisation terms. Therefore, in terms of transactional 
developments, Islamic finance and banking has been successful, while, as opposed to the 
expectation, it has failed to fulfil the developmentalist outcomes or transformational change in 
the Muslim societies. This study therefore aims at examining the impact of Islamic banking on 
development objectives beyond the essentialised economic growth objectives, as Islamic 
economics and economic development as an objective has withered away in the operations in 
the field as well as in academic research in the Muslim world. 
2.1.1. Aims, Objectives and Research Questions 
In an attempt to critically evaluate conventional notion of economic growth and development 
with the resultant imbalances it creates, the first essay aims to go beyond growth based 
economic theories and explores the economic development impact of Islamic banking through 
discursive and empirical analyses. It aims, hence, to unearth to what extent aspirations of 
Islamic economics match up with its practical outcomes, which essentialises developmentalism 
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as an objective and Islamic financial institutions as institutionalised forms of epistemological 
knowledge.  
In line with the stated aims, initially, a conceptual framework for Islamic developmentalism is 
constructed to identify the distinctions and dimensions of development, thereby, 
‘developmentalism’ is brought out as the essential operational model of Islamic banking as 
envisaged in the emergence of Islamic economics and finance discourse. This is followed by 
an empirical analysis by employing a quantitative methodology through measuring and 
comparing performances of Islamic banks with an unbalanced panel of 21 cross section of 
countries observed during the period 2003-2014; thereby, it seeks potential contributions of 
Islamic banks on economic development trajectories of Muslim-dominated countries based on 
the predefined notion of ‘Islamic developmentalism’. The underlying assumption, here, is that 
Islamic financial performance should not be confined to financial area only, as due to their 
moral construct they should be subjected to ‘social evaluation’ in the sense that Islamic moral 
economy locates Islamic banks as institutions of contributing to the social good or ihsan. 
In relation to the aims and objectives, following research questions are developed: 
RQ1: Why does going through finance-growth nexus remain incapable in exploring the impact 
of finance on socioeconomic goals of countries? 
RQ2: What is the particular imagination of Islamic moral economy in relation to development 
paradigm? 
RQ3: In what ways does ‘banking-development nexus’ differ from ‘banking-growth nexus’? 
RQ4: What are the most appropriate indicators accounting for Islamic banking growth and 
economic development?  
RQ5: To what extent does Islamic banking sector contribute to the developmentalist objectives 
in Muslim countries? 
In overall, this study aims to provide a critical analysis as to why sole growth-oriented 
indicators for performance measurement of Islamic banks are inappropriate, mis-specified, 
dysfunctional and also inconsistent with IME’s aspirational paradigm and hence with the 
realities of Muslim societies, which requires a value-oriented proposition. Therefore, it aims to 
bring out ‘developmentalism’ as the essential operational objectified model of Islamic banking, 
which was envisaged in the emergence of Islamic economics and finance discourse. 
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The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses, to a large extent, Islamic 
approach towards economic development with an overview of critically reviewing the 
accumulated literature in the mainstream developmentalist attempts. By locating the Islamic 
notion of development and its theoretical framework, Islamic social welfare institutions and 
their role on realising development throughout Muslim history are explained in detail. Whilst 
Section 3, delves into the role of finance in the conventional literature over economic growth 
performance, Section 4 and Section 5 render discursive and empirical evidence on the potential 
contributions of Islamic banking sector on economic development performances of countries. 
2.2. ISLAM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
As identified above as well as in Chapter 1, the emergence of Islamic economic movement is 
highly related with development objectives within the ideal objective of generating an 
economic system of Islam together with its economic development paradigm. In this, Islamic 
financing, as opposed to Islamic financial, is considered as an instrument to facilitate the 
development objectives by helping to mobilise resources for development. This is due to the 
fact that ‘Islamic financing’ corresponds to the everyday practice of finance surrounded by the 
principles and values of Islam, while ‘Islamic financial’ refers to a particular financial regime 
wherein finance has superior position in the economy with values and norms subordinated to 
the efficiency of the financial system (Asutay 2018). Therefore, it is important to understand 
the background of this emergence and the envisaged economic development nature of Islamic 
economics movement. This section aims at debating the development studies with an attempt 
to locate the Islamic economic development paradigm. 
2.2.1. A Brief Survey of the Post-war Development Studies 
The concept of development has been praised enthusiastically in the post-colonial period by 
leading exponents of Western progressive ideology as a way-out policy for newly independent 
nation states to disentangle from their ‘backward state’ in socioeconomic and political spheres. 
In line with this, development-oriented studies proliferated under a new modernist discourse 
known as ‘development economics’ with the motivation of crystalizing the roots of uneven 
development and its consequences resulting into social imbalance and inequality (Pieterse 
2010). 
Conceding that mainstream growth theory fails to reckon with wider implications of material 
prosperity such as distributional and welfare outcomes, and hence can only reflect “the shadow 
of real problems” (Hicks 1965:183), development economists emphasised multidimensional 
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aspects of growth by claiming the possibility of multiple paths to achieve growth and 
development. It was admitted, therefore, that a universal theory of growth was nothing but a 
far-fetched illusionary idea in the sense of dressing up different bodies with a standard clothe. 
In line with this, Gerschenkron (1962:7), for instance, stressed that ideologies, policies and 
organisational structures of developing countries vary significantly; therefore, the scope of 
development policy based on industrialisation process should consider these factors to achieve 
success. 
In light of the multidimensionality of development process, the interaction between developed 
and developing world is examined under two contrasting views of ‘mutual benefit’ and ‘zero-
sum game’ (see: Singer 1952; Prebisch 1959; Hirschman 1981). The former approach emanates 
from Smith’s seminal work of The Theory of Moral Sentiments (originally published in 1759). 
Accordingly, Smith [1759] (2010) argues that economic development and social change can 
be realised so long as individuals adopt moral values such as sense of duty, sympathy for others, 
self-love, cooperation and self-interest, and take them to the market as an enabling mechanism. 
This is expected to create a balance between self-interest and social interest, which, in return, 
would manifest the omnipotence of ‘invisible hand’. In parallel with this, successors of this 
view claimed that there is a harmony of interest between advanced and developing countries, 
hence policy recommendations on how to develop and prosper for a developing country are 
mutually beneficial for both parties (for further details see: Hirschman 1981; Streeten 1985). 
Contrarily, zero-sum view suggests that there is a deeply-rooted conflict of interest in the 
development process of countries (Myrdal 1956:28) wherein comparatively advanced 
countries exacerbate the growing inequality under the guise of development policies 
recommended by international bodies (mostly Bretton Woods institutions) such as the 
liberation of international trade. 
Criticisms towards the prevailing understanding of economic growth and development based 
on failed experiences, which later relegated and turned out to be statistical records, were 
signalling the emergence of a new discourse of ‘alternative development’ in the 1970s. No 
matter it be an intra-paradigmatic solution within mainstream economics, the continuous 
emphasis was, with one voice, on the need for structural change over economic systems of 
underdeveloped countries with a rationale of eradicating poverty, ameliorating income gap and 
help benefit the advantages of technological innovation. In doing so, a research programme 
was propagated mainly by World Bank, ILO and other international agencies to initiate ‘basic 
needs strategy’ as a developmentalist goal for both rural and urban economies, which puts 
heavy emphasis on the satisfaction of minimum human needs including health services, 
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sheltering, supply of clean water and education, and essential public services with the efficient 
use of technology as the indicators of economic development (Evans 1976). However, it was 
recognized later that the application of structural change in an economy should go beyond basic 
needs strategy; instead, it hinges on political economy factors beyond Smithian understanding 
of natural harmony of interests argued under the ‘invisible hand’. In other words, behind the 
retarding effects of development lie the conflicting interests of different stakeholders of society 
composed of privileged and disadvantaged groups (Olson 1982:55), which is in stark contrast 
to Smith’s mythical view of the harmony between self-interest and social-interest. 
The nature of interaction, either conflictual or mutually beneficial, gave way to the role of 
institutions on development process in 1980s with the rise of New Institutional Economics. 
Despite falling into structuralist position but in more sophisticated way, North (2003) criticized 
in general that the growth understanding of neoclassical economics based on the assumption 
of efficient markets does not account for differences in institutional structures amongst 
economies; hence, they fail to observe hindrances and de-incentivising motives to the 
development process caused by prohibitive institutional structures. 
Similar to political economy approach but with a more micro level, Sen (1999) broadened the 
frontiers of development studies beyond structuralism and institutionalism through 
essentialising ‘functioning’ and ‘capabilities’ of individuals. In his view, development 
transcends the considerations of per capita GDP and institutional factors. Therefore, the 
objective with development should not be measured with ‘being’ of some goods sufficient in 
an economy, but rather ‘having’ it by stakeholders through enabling them to achieve its 
functioning (Sen 1999:190). Furthermore, human wellbeing or the quality of life cannot only 
be measured by observing the functioning individuals have. Beyond this, it is important to 
know what opportunities, freedom and advantages they could have achieved if their capabilities 
are enlarged. Sen (2003), thus treated development as ‘capability expansion’. His views, then, 
inspired the emergence of ‘human development’ encapsulating education, health, poverty, and 
income inequality as the integral components of development. 
The attempts to reveal a ‘just’ development process, surveyed above, uncloaked the importance 
of distributional issues. In this manner, in contradistinction to the utilitarian understanding that 
trusts on market mechanism to establish justice at the intersection point over which supply and 
demand meets, Rawls (1971) developed a counter argument under a social contract theory, 
wherein the assumption of ‘veil of ignorance’ paves the way for redistribution in the society 
with a free choice of individuals to constitute a rule of distribution. 
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2.2.2. Critical Approach towards Western Developmentalism and Its Applications 
The evolution of the idea of post-war development within Western discourse unearths that the 
frontiers of growth understanding has to be expanded by re-examining developmentalist 
consequences of socioeconomic policies. However, it was recognised later that developmental 
articulations emerged out of the same epistemological knowledge failed to generate human-
centred developmentalist policies. This is evident in the social and economic conditions of 
underdeveloped and developing countries together with challenging issues in the global 
environmental, health and educational areas that constitute a serious threat for future 
generations. It is hard, therefore, to claim that studies on development in the West paved the 
way for improvement in individual wellbeing and social welfare. Contrarily, development 
theories were constructed in such a way to fit into the historical progress, such as post-war 
experience, of advanced countries so that backward societies would follow their footsteps to 
reach the level of high development. In this sense, developmentalist prescriptions should be 
seen as a new way of organizing world politics to preserve nationalist interests. Otherwise, the 
long debate on development would show improvement in global equity and distributive justice 
as promised in discursive analyses. 
A political economy approach towards the role of international institutions on development 
patterns of countries sheds light on the roots of developmentalist failure. It is argued, hence, 
that the experts at the World Bank, IMF and United Nations constitute the intelligentsia of 
development, and impose one correct answer against underdevelopment as free market 
ideology (Easterly 2009). Poverty, for instance, is relegated to a pure technological problem 
that can be overcome by the introduction of improvement in technical facilities, as projected 
for the underdeveloped African countries, such as improving communication technologies, 
efficient use of machines, breast-feeding education, and environmental friendly equipment, all 
of which neglect the hindering factors rooted in the domain of economics, sociology and 
politics (Easterly 2009).  
On the practical side, when developmental policies, named as ‘structural adjustment 
programmes’, failed dramatically, the blame is put on mostly on the recipient countries’ 
structural imperfection, therefore development ideology itself has never been questioned. 
However, Western development project in the post-colonial period is in fact built on 
industrialisation process with pro-capital and technology intensive growth strategies. This 
meant that development has never been a universally applicable value-free notion, but rather 
at odds with the values of non-capitalist formation of societies due to a particular mode of 
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production generated at the end. However, developing countries convinced that 
industrialisation, capital accumulation and technology are all transferable phenomena that have 
nothing to do with the existing social and economic formation. This view suggests that 
development can be achieved primarily through import-substitution, export promotion, 
technology transfer and foreign aid. Although the belief on development ideology still persists, 
it exacerbated economic problems in the last 30 years such as unemployment, inflation, 
stagnation, undernourishment, illiteracy, diseases, environmental threats, poverty, and 
distributive injustice in general.  
Along with such destructive impacts, a new discourse has been attempted in the 1990s to 
respond multifarious dimensions of developmentalist failures caused by conventional policies 
and the underlying understanding. By essentialising sustainability in growth and development, 
some global goals related the spheres of earth’s life, society and economy have been set up to 
constitute ‘Sustainable Development Goals’ (SDGs). One of the rationales behind SDGs 
mainly stems from the fact that short-run economic development strategies and policies 
successively pursued by developed nations in the post-war era turned out to result in 
developmentalist failure in the long-run due to the temporality of these achievements and 
temptation of short-run profit maximisation blurring the reality of slowing down of economy 
signalling a serious catastrophe in the future. In attempting to bridge the gap between short-run 
and long-run consequences of economic policies, SDG paradigm seems targeted mainly the 
relatively wealthy nations to reorganise the world ecosystem and social atmosphere in the light 
of global justice and humanitarian understanding (Kumar, Kumar, and Vivekadhish 2016; 
Sachs 2012). The active role was given to the rich countries, since the subject matter of 
development goals are settled to eradicate the economic catastrophes caused mainly by most 
capitalist societies. As the SDGs aim to gain a new approach towards world ecosystem, 
economy and society, it is hard to claim the existence of significant change in these areas. On 
the contrary, new issues have emerged rapidly, which widen the scope of threats. 
2.2.3. Islamic Developmentalism 
Islamic economics, as elaborated before, emerged to address the challenge of establishing an 
authentic development theory based on Islamic values and principles envisaged by Islamic 
system of economics so that the objective of distributive justice can be achieved. Founding 
fathers of Islamic economics, in this sense, invariably pondered upon the ways to realise 
Islamic developmentalism as a value-oriented activity in the modern era and hence made their 
contributions to eliminate the catastrophes of underdevelopment in Muslim regions. As the 
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emergence of Islamic economics coincides with development crisis of Muslim world in the 
post-colonial era, an authentic developmentalist approach thrived as substantial alternative to 
the Western development theories and its failed applications over the poor parts of the world. 
2.2.3.1. Theoretical framework 
IME5, one of the most critical to the conventional economic understanding, has shined out as 
a response to the so-called backwardness of Muslim societies with claiming its authentic 
nature, distinctive ontology and epistemology. Contrary to the market economy system, which 
confines itself with material development or economic growth due to its value or ethics free 
understanding, IME constructs development as a theory with the purpose of expanding human 
potential, functioning and capability in order to facilitate the ways to reach falah or human 
salvation in this world and the hereafter, which also constitute two-dimensional utility or falah 
function leading to society oriented ihsani function (or beneficence in the form of socialisation) 
in an Islamic framework. This approach necessitates a paradigm shift while pondering upon 
development issue so that Islamic development can articulate its multidimensionality by going 
beyond pure consideration of material aspects of social life through envisaging a harmony 
between spiritual, material and moral development as well as individual and social 
development (see, for instance, Ahmad 2000:17; Askari, Iqbal, and Mirakhor 2011:312; 
Chapra 2008; Siddiqi 2010). In its imagination, IME aims at re-defining factors of production, 
agencies, and institutions so that human, land, labour, capital and other stakeholders should be 
rescued from the ’exploitation’ of the hegemonic systems to reach emancipation and 
empowerment aimed at Islam as a teaching and way of life. 
The Islamic concept of development, hence, is considered to expand developmentalism and its 
practice into territories, which mainstream economics could not carry it into effect. For 
instance, Islamic developmentalism reveals, by nature, socioeconomic and socio-political 
change while needed. However, mainstream concept of development remains bounded with 
the cycle of quantitative category and unable to have substantial impact on such issues of 
justice, welfare, equity and peace. Accordingly, mainstream development strategy surrounded 
by capitalist interests misses the ‘change factor’ for individual, institutions and society, and the 
                                                        
5 Before carrying the discussion forward, the distinction between IME and Islamic economics should be clarified. 
Since the term, economics, is already a neoclassical construct that has been subjected to serious backlashes by 
Islamic scholars, concatenating ‘Islam’ and ‘economics’ - as Islamic economics suggests - produces a conceptual 
inconsistency with Islamic teaching since Islamic economic model would seem otherwise as one of the variants 
of Western economics. Therefore, it is more convenient to use IME in responding to the aspirational system 
understanding of Islam with its aspirational proposition, as IME relates to an embedded system of economy rather 
than market dominance. 
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‘qualitative growth’ that is articulated through spiritual and moral aspects (Ghazali 1990). 
Thus, the Islamic vision discontents with growth alone and authenticates the concept of 
development with all its comprehensiveness and multifacetedness. 
In concluding, this study recognises the value-loaded definition of ‘developmentalism’. 
However, it also recognises that IME’s aim is not only economic development but multi-
faceted development within the parameters of adalah, ihsan, rububiyah, khilafah and tazkiyah 
in the context of tawhidi paradigm (Asutay 2013). Hence, developmentalism is redefined 
within Islamic normativeness by essentialising human-centred development through re-
defining individual, as Islamic economics “aims at the study of human falah achieved by 
organising the resources of earth on the basis of cooperation and participation” (Khan 1984:55). 
In this context, re-defined developmentalism is objected towards emancipation and 
empowerment in every aspect of life within the ihsani social formation. In doing so, capital 
and its dominance is ‘de-centred’. 
2.2.3.2. Axiomatic approach in constituting Islamic development 
In developing the theoretical framework of Islamic economic development theory and 
paradigm, the axiomatic approach is helpful, since axioms constitute the parameters of theory 
construction. Axiomatic approach also helps to expand the operational aspects of Islamic 
developmentalism.  
The first and foremost axiom of Tawhid, for instance, reflects complementarity and unitarity 
between material and moral aspects of individual life since both are considered integral to each 
other that avoid dichotomous improvement. In addition, everything in the universe is 
considered to be linked in a stakeholder manner; thereby, none of the stakeholders can be 
sacrificed in the name of development of others in the sense that the interest of each of the 
expanded stakeholders has to be sought. For example, environment or natural resources, in this 
manner, cannot be exploited with a rationale of profit maximisation in the economic sphere. 
Similarly, human, capital, labour and land have mutual contributions upon production process; 
hence, none of them should have superiority over others. Tawhid, in general, applies a moral 
filtering mechanism through its principles to preserve an equilibrium between different 
stakeholders’ rights observed in the relationship between individuals, individual-environment, 
individual-state, individual-society and individual-Allah. Thus, each of the stakeholders 
complements the other within unity. Consequently, at the core of Islamic economic 
development theory lies tawhid, as it arranges the political economy mechanism of 
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development in terms of establishing the nature of the relationships between various 
stakeholders. 
Following the Tawhid axiom, al‘adl wal iḥsan (justice and beneficence) reflects the “horizontal 
dimension of equity” (Sirageldin and Anwar 1995:464). As Islam broadens and pinpoints the 
objectives of development through reckoning with the realm of akhirah or ‘hereafter’, 
individual development is redefined in terms of its success to reach falah (salvation) both in 
this world and akhirah. This view constitutes a great contrast with the idealised 
homoeconomicus individual prototype whose entire struggle is to maximise pleasure and 
minimize pain in this world. Therefore, human self-development can also be conceptualised as 
‘rushd’ or ‘wisdom’ process’ (Askari, Iqbal, and Mirakhor 2014:317), which paves the way 
for making progress on the path towards perfection. Human beings, accordingly, is treated as 
ends, rather than means of development in human-centred development (Ghazali 1990). The 
understanding of human-centred development does not necessarily purport an adoption of 
humanist philosophy as essentialised in the Western perspective. The claim that man is at the 
hearth of development process and hence should be treated as ends rather than means should 
be understood in the context of falah and ihsan. In doing so, ihsani process necessitates the 
fulfilment of others’ falah; thereby, individual centricity in development is an articulation of 
social development through ihsan. Therefore, an equilibrium function is attached to ihsan 
(Naqvi 1994), as those reached falah is expected to help to elevate the falah level of others who 
have not reached such a level. In other words, while self-development in the Islamic framework 
is accepted as an objective to fulfil, it has to be in harmony with social-development. In other 
words, individual falah should accompany with the establishment of ihsan (beneficence) in 
societal level. The internalisation of ihsani process eventually paves the way for Islamic 
developmentalism through articulating al’adl wal ihsan axiom. As can be inferred, two 
concepts falah and ihsan play a central role in revealing the nature and mechanism of 
development process. 
A fundamental presumption of development process is related to the axiom of rububiyyah 
which is translated as divine arrangement for nourishment implying that Allah keeps providing 
continuously the ways and means of reaching perfection of both self and social development 
through divine guidance; as every creature is created with a potential of perfection. Therefore, 
social Darwinist explanations under ‘survival of the fittest argument’ (see for the discussion; 
Chapra 1992:30) give way to direct involvement and shaping of divine knowledge in the 
Islamic framework. As rububiyah axiom suggests that everything created with a 
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developmentalist path to reach their perfection, and hence, it is the duty of the Islamic political 
economy to remove barriers preventing each stakeholder to reach to such level (Asutay 2018). 
The emphasis on indivisibility of moral-material and self-social development is also reflected 
in the axiom of tazkiyah, which is described as ‘purification plus growth’. This axiom clarifies 
that development is a process of purification of attitudes and relationships at the end of which 
all stakeholders in the universe are endowed with harmonious growth and gain mutual 
beneficence as contrast to zero-sum dealings of economic activities. In other words, as 
suggested by tawhid, each of the stakeholders’ interests have to be considered in the 
development process as fitrah can only be achieved with balance through purification. For 
example, wealth has to be purified through returning the right of the society to society by 
paying zakat; and in the production process, for example, the right of the labour and 
environment has to be considered through the tazkiyah process so that the complementarity of 
tawhid should not be infringed. 
Amanah (trust) and khilafah (viceregency), similarly, imply that everything in the universe is 
a trust from Allah given to individuals as trustees of Him, hence they have to be treated in the 
best way to reconstruct (i’mar) social environment through developmentalism. Individuals, as 
khalifahs, have a duty to transform epistemological knowledge of divine guidance in the form 
of developmental policy outcomes by involving as active agents of development process. This 
should bring social solidarity and unity amongst the society by ensuring moral dynamics 
embedded in the theoretical framework of economy. 
The Islamic normative proposition, shaped by such axioms as the foundational and operational 
knowledge, aims at individual emancipation and empowerment for development at individual 
as well as societal level. Thus, a unique paradigm of developmentalism is suggested by IME, 
which questions the entire status quo for a fair, sharing, participatory and distributive economy 
in an embedded sense. 
2.2.4. Social Welfare Institutions on the Way towards Islamic Development 
The normative dimensions of Islamic development model based on its axiomatic framework 
had been institutionalised over the course of history. Muslim societies established authentic 
institutions to sustain social balance and improve welfare conditions of individuals. Therefore, 
Islamic developmentalism had always been practised by social welfare institutions, which 
produced social policies for individual self-development and social development in a 
stakeholder manner. However, these institutions emerged out of a demand from society and, to 
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a large extent, were organised by civil society, rather than functioning as state apparatus to 
reallocate resources and redistribute income in favour of the privileged group with an active 
and central planning under the objectives of nation state. In this manner, shared values and 
norms had been embedded in these institutions’ organisational framework in line with the 
aspirations of Islamic moral economy. 
Although great number of institutions can be addressed here to exemplify the ways to realise 
Islamic development in Muslim societies, it is ample to mention only outstanding ones here. 
Zakat and waqf institutions, for instance, have mostly been referred in Islamic economics 
literature as examples of social development entities (see: Ahmed 2004; Chapra 2008; Kahf 
1989, 2004; Siddiqi 2006; Mohieldin, Iqbal, Rostom, and Fu 2011; Sadeq 1996, amongst 
others). Whilst it constitutes micro foundations of developmentalism and encourages the 
wealthy to feel spiritually accountable for purifying their wealth, social development based on 
zakat had hardly been institutionalised and systematised throughout the history due to the 
difficulties in monitoring and organising the collection of zakat funds. Thus, the impact of 
zakat on formal economy has not been observed in a historical sense. However, 
notwithstanding this non-systematisation, zakat has a critical role on establishing redistributive 
justice by directly deterring the ambition of capital accumulation. As traditionally zakat accrues 
on idle money and therefore individuals are expected to channel their wealth in circulation 
within real sector, one of the wisdoms of zakat is to encourage active agents of Muslim 
entrepreneurs, investor, savers and consumers for circulation of their capital in the economy in 
order to generate value. Otherwise, capital accumulates in the few hands, and hence production 
process slows down. Income generation, later, hinges on alternative ways such as profit through 
interest-based system. The abolition of interest, similarly, can be considered as the rule that 
discourages people not to possess unfair profit through capital accumulation. Not only limited 
with this, zakat also encourages people to redistribute general wealth and contribute to social 
equilibrium by sharing certain amount of money with needy. 
Awqaf institutions (waqf – singular), similarly, emerged from the demand for ensuring material, 
moral and spiritual development within society. As contrast to zakat, it had had macroeconomic 
implications and influence area over different aspects of social life. Mostly, it functioned as an 
institution for social policy making by active involvement of each stakeholder in the society 
over the process of Islamic development. It is important, here, to clarify that the era, in which 
waqf institutions were widely effective and considerably powerful, reflects pre-modern 
formation of societies. Thus, the omnipotent and all-encompassing modern state understanding 
was not present, as the primary role of state was on ensuring peace and security within its 
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boundaries. This is evident in the Ottoman era in particular, since social policy making was 
extensively left to waqf institutions to deliver societal development (Kozak 1985). By keeping 
power in political sphere and preventing decentralisation of power, Ottoman sultans paved the 
way for social development through enabling waqf institutions. However, today, waqf is 
considered only to function as help and nurture the poor, provide sheltering for the homeless 
etc. (for a detailed role of waqf in the Muslim heritage, see: Boudjellal 2008; Cizakca 2000, 
2002, 2011; Haneef, Pramanik, Mohammed, Dahiru, and Amin 2013; Kozak 1985; Kuran 
2001; Mohsin et al. 2016; Zuki 2012). It should also be noted that waqf system is heavily 
romanticised in relation to its past history; as awqaf were available mainly in the main cities as 
well as capital cities around the power house of sultans, while Muslim periphery did not have 
access to the richness of awqaf system. However, this does not negate the positive impact of 
awqaf system within the larger environment they operated, neither this denies the enormous 
potential role it has in responding to the current poverty and underdevelopment in the Muslim 
world. 
In addition to zakat and waqf institutions, there are some other prominent institutional forms 
of knowledge that articulate Islamic developmentalism in the history. Amongst them, ‘crafts 
and guilds organisation in the Ottoman empire’ (Faroqhi 2009; Inalcik 1969; Islamoǧlu and 
Keyder 1977; Lewis 1937) had reorganised society in fulfilling development in the economic 
realm. Mainly composed of three fields as agriculture, economic transactions in urban and rural 
areas, and general trade, economic activities in the Ottoman society were more or less 
controlled and organised by the crafts and guilds organisation to prevent unfair competition 
and capital accumulation in the few people’s hand. This way of organising society and 
economic sphere forestalls leaving individual in the market alone; on the contrary, each 
member of these organisations had relative power during the competition in the market. Thus, 
harmonious growth, or tazkiyah, was established by thinking of economic activity as collective 
action.  
Hisbah institution, in the medieval Islamic era, played another major role on regulating market 
in the light of developmentalist objectives (Islahi 2006; Khan 1982; Lewis 2005; Oran 2010). 
Mainly based on the notion of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil, hisbah institutions 
aimed to establish social justice within market playground.  
Lastly, the institution of akhi organisation (akhism-Islamic brotherhood) in Ottoman period can 
be mentioned as another example of social welfare institutions in Muslim history, which were 
practised between the 13th and 20th century with the aim of establishing professional ethics in 
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business environment through cooperation, solidarity, tolerance and integrity (Çaha and 
Karaman 2006; Güneş and Güneş 2012; Şahin, Öztürk, and Ünalmış 2009) in an embedded 
manner by having business, religious practice, religious education and apprenticeship to 
develop an embedded society in the moral norms of Islam. 
As evident in the history, Islamic development had always been a central issue in both society 
and state level. In responding to fulfilling social and economic development, a large number 
of institutions, dissected in length above, were established. Modern period, especially the 20th 
century, gave birth to Islamic finance idealised as authentic form of developmentalist 
institution that responds to underprivileged situation of Muslim nation states. The following 
sections discuss, to a large extent, the normative dimensions of the emergence, ascendance and 
role of Islamic banking and finance over the development trajectories of countries. 
2.2.5. Islamic Finance and Development 
The multifaceted phenomenon of development had always been a central concern for 
individual, society and state during the course of time in different eras. Muslim societies, in 
this manner, responded to developmentalist needs by establishing authentic institutions as 
elaborated in the previous section. The substantially changing politico-economic environment 
in the modern period, however, complicated the emergence of such institutions and hence 
obstructed the flourishing of alternative institutions that would play a pivotal role in 
constituting social justice and welfare by essentialising falah and ihsan oriented development 
project. 
Since the traditional institutions could not bring into compliance with modern social formation 
of Muslim societies, Islamic banks and financial institutions have emerged and have been 
established and popularised as a value-oriented financial proposition that aims to facilitate 
paradigmatic shift against the overwhelmingly hegemonic character of self-regulated market 
economy understanding. Whilst market economy foundations and its global impositions inhibit 
development process in Muslim lands through creating tension between human well-being, 
land, labour and money that results in social injustice, Islamic finance is believed to partake in 
endogenising humanitarian, social, economic, environmental and moral aspects of Islamic 
developmentalism. Thus, rather than transactional development, IBF institutions were initially 
envisaged to bring about transformational development so that paradigmatic change towards 
an Islamic system of economy can be established. 
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The role of Islamic finance over the idealised transformational development, which does not 
only hinge on the success of IBF but also requires other institutional contributions, was shaped 
to ameliorate distributive justice through enhancing power and resource allocation leading to 
wealth distribution, respectively, in the society, and to develop capabilities and functioning of 
individuals through capability expansion. In the light of this, Islamic finance, in an aspirational 
sense, is equated with social impact finance, and hence, its social performance was prioritised 
over financial performance. For this reason, the experiences with Mit Ghamr and Tabung Haji 
(explained in following sections), have always been yearned and commemorated to improve 
Islamic financial industry performance since its inception. 
The aspirations with Islamic finance necessarily break the traditional boundaries of financing, 
such that conventional finance with its intermediation role was replaced with the idea of 
considering Islamic finance as business model (this issue is explained in section 2.4). This is 
due to the fact that the asset backed, and equity-based nature of Islamic finance completely 
differentiate its operational structure from conventional financial system, which, therefore, no 
longer pursues mere financial intermediation but directly takes share in value-adding in real 
economy. Based on such features, Islamic finance aimed to constitute an embedded 
institutional form of participatory economy through essentialising the idea of ‘development 
with sharing’. 
The development and capacity building propensity of IBF proposition is related to redefinition 
of capital and its ownership. As explained by Asutay (2018), according to the tawhidi 
paradigm, the prohibition of riba aims to determine a new modes of production within Islamic 
social formation, in which the dominance and hegemony of capital is removed; instead, capital 
is treated equal with the rest of the stakeholders. This, hence, creates opportunity space for 
other stakeholders to flourish, emancipate and empower through providing equal opportunities 
(see: Asutay 2017); and hence the entire process aims at multidimensional development. 
Therefore, Islamic political economy features profit and loss sharing and risk sharing in the 
form of equity financing in shaping Islamic finance as the main thrust of expanding stakeholder 
for development by providing accessibility to resources (Asutay 2013). 
The essentialisation of profit-loss sharing and risk sharing principles of Islamic finance is 
highly associated with two important legal maxims of (i) ‘gaining is by accountability’ (al-
ghunm bi al-ghurm) and (ii) ‘income is bound by assured obligation’ (al-kharaj bil-daman) 
(see: Ahmed et al. 2015:12; El-Din 2013:147). These two legal maxims are derived from the 
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Prophetic ahadith the former is derived from the hadith6 that: “A pledge should not be blocked 
from the one who provided it, as the provider deserves gaining (ghunm) from it and bears 
accountability (ghurm) towards it”. The second maxim, al-kharaj bi al-daman, is derived from 
a hadith7 of the Prophet implying that “if the borrower of money or any fungible good (for 
instance, rice, wheat or cement) deserves the income (that is, the kharaj) generated from the 
loan in whatever form (for instance, productive growth, trade profit and food) against the 
assured obligation (the daman) to pay back the loan to the lender” (El-Din 2013:147). 
Accordingly, in every Islamic financial contract, the entitlement of gain must incorporate 
responsibility, and financial return has to accompany certain degree of risk. This necessarily 
requires the adoption of sharing principle in generating profit or bearing some risk and loss. 
Such principles of IBF are also expected to produce a participatory society in general, which 
is again an essential part of the Islamic political economy’s imagination of development, as 
individual emancipation and development can only take place in a participatory society in 
which stakeholding through development is extended as substantiated by the tawhid axiom in 
the sense of complementarity. 
As part of the participatory financing in the form of profit-and-loss sharing and risk sharing, in 
fulfilling the institutional logic of IME and its modes of production, IBF institutions are 
expected to concentrate more on partnership-based instruments (such as mudarabah and 
musharakah) as opposed to constituting debt-based financing model with of Islamic metaphors 
and methods in modern period (mainly murabahah and tawarruq) with an aim of minimising 
(or even removing in some contracts) risk and profit and loss sharing, which is required by the 
capitalist institutional logic.  
Although the modern fiqhi positioning has no reservations on the use of debt-based Islamic 
financial instruments, IME understanding evaluates these instruments according to their 
potential contributions and consequences in relation to the real economy through generating 
value-added. In this sense, murabahah can be considered as permissible in the fiqhi area by 
arguing that the basic framework in the transactions is ibahah or permissibility, but the 
consequentialist approach necessarily discourages any debt-based instrument that gives rise to 
unproductive economic outcomes by exacerbating indebtedness in the society. It is also 
important to distinguish debt-based modes of financing as fiqh structure in a historical sense as 
opposed to the debt-based financialised economy. The constitution of fiqh in a histrocial sense 
                                                        
6 Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs (1994), Al-Mawsu’a Al-Fiqhiyyah, vol. 19., p. 259. 
7 Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs (1994), Al-Mawsu’a Al-Fiqhiyyah, vol. 19., p. 261. 
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refers to debt-based transactions used as part of the business model, while in the modern times 
the use of fiqh in referring to debt-based modes relates to financialised economy, which had 
not been the reference point of fiqh in its historical formation. 
IME also shapes Islamic financing in the form of real economy related financing to ensure 
embeddedness; and therefore, financing is constructed through instruments which essentialises 
asset-backed structures. In line with this, therefore, fictitious commodities and their financing 
is not considered which aims to prevent the emergence of toxic financing instruments that 
prevails in the conventional finance. Real asset-backed financing is an essential part of Islamic 
development in terms of extending stakeholding and capacity building as well as developing 
productive economy which can help job creation (Asutay 2013, 2018). In line with this, 
financial markets are not essentialised as investment areas, since they do not represent real 
economy. 
The emergence of Islamic capital markets such as sukuk is also considered as an important 
resource mobilisation for infrastructural development leading socio-economic development 
(see: Bacha and Mirakhor 2013). The recent debate on green sukuk as well as infrastructure 
financing should be considered as important aspects of development-oriented financing aspect 
of Islamic finance. 
In line with this, IBF is expected to direct its resources to value creation oriented economic 
activity in real economy, socially beneficial investment, infrastructure financing, financing 
education, research and development which can address global concerns in relation to 
developments in the form of environmental, social and governance (ESG), sustainable 
development goals (SDGs), corporate governance and corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
(see: Ahmed, Mohieldin, Verbeek, and Aboulmagd 2015). 
An important micro dimension of Islamic finance being development oriented is financial 
inclusion which is also an essential thrust of SDG paradigm. Islamic finance aims to overcome 
financial exclusion due to religious choices such as Muslims being excluded from the 
conventional financial system due to ribawi transactions. The expansion of IBF has provided 
an opportunity for individual Muslims to have access to riba-free and Shari’ah compliant 
financing for financial inclusion (Iqbal and Mirakhor 2013b). However, as Asutay (2014) 
argues, Islamic finance aims to go beyond simple ‘bank account holding’ oriented financial 
inclusion; but rather Islamic finance, as part of IME, aims to empower individual for capacity 
building through financial inclusion so that development of individual and society should be 
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achieved. Therefore, it is suggested that Islamic finance should consider expanding into micro-
finance and crowdfunding as well as SMEs financing areas to enhance capacity building 
oriented nature of Islamic finance by essentialising equity-based financing options including, 
but not limited to, mudarabah, musharakah, qard al-hassan. 
Another important dimension of Islamic finance is its link with the traditional social welfare 
institutions. In other words, the normative dimensions of Islamic finance were envisaged 
extensively to address individual and social development in the modern period, that was once, 
achieved by traditional institutions including waqf and zakat. With the burgeoning of IBF, 
traditional institutions such as zakat and waqf, has found new opportunity spaces for expanding 
their contribution for social welfare of Muslim societies; as it has been now possible to bring 
the properties owned by waqf is a profitable environment through Islamic financing so that 
further social activities can be undertaken (Karim 2010). In addition, with developing financing 
understanding, zakat funds have been developed beyond zakat giving so that capacity building 
can be expanded for development to take place in Muslim societies. 
Apart from the direct implications of the distinguishing features of Islamic finance within the 
financial sphere, it can ideally generate social implications and wider articulations. Therefore, 
the existence and considerable share of Islamic banking in a certain economy necessarily 
address the distributional issues of income inequality, poverty alleviation and reducing 
unemployment through, for instance, zakat and awqaf funds (Ahmed 2004b; Chapra 2009; 
Cizakca 1998). Likewise, unemployment can be reduced by generating self-employment 
opportunities through SME financing, qard hasan funds and microfinance (Abdul Rahman 
2007; Ahmed 2004a; Aysan, Disli, Ng, and Ozturk 2016; Huda 2012; Mohieldin et al. 2011; 
Wilson 2007). 
As the global era imposes on the advancement in technological area, Islamic banks can lead 
the promotion of education, research and development activities in different fields including 
technology as observed in Islamic Development Bank. Islamic developmentalism can also be 
articulated in the bank level through authenticating and reconceptualising environmental, 
social and governance criteria (ESG) or sustainable development goals (SDGs) through Islamic 
values. Based on these features, Islamic banks can be an embedded part of development process 
by mainly functioning as participatory and responsible finance together with the understanding 
of community banking, which “serve to community not markets” (Asutay 2007b:8). 
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In sum, IME considers financing as a facilitator for development, as “finance is not about 
‘making money’ per se. It is a ‘functional’ science in that it exists to support other goals – those 
of the society. The better aligned a society’s financial institutions are with its goals and ideals, 
the stronger and more successful the society will be” (Shiller 2012:7). As part of the same 
wisdom, Islamic worldview aims to develop individual and society in line with the axioms 
identified; and considers Islamic finance as one of the instruments for such a purpose. 
The authenticity and aspirational facets of Islamic finance, however, could hardly be 
accommodated in the practical field (due to many reasons explained in great detail in Chapter 
3. The prevailing understanding of market economy permeated through Islamic financial 
sphere and normativeness has been sacrificed at the expense of profit maximisation and 
efficiency orientation. Thus, expectations on fulfilling developmentalist objectives gave way 
to sacralisation of economic growth through the essentialisation and expansion of financial 
markets, which is discussed in a later section in this chapter as well as in the following chapters. 
2.3. LITERATURE REVIEW ON FINANCE, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND 
POLITICAL ECONOMY: LOCATING THE GAP 
An intensive debate on finance-growth nexus corresponds to the 19th century in economic 
history when finance proclaimed its independence and superiority from ‘economy’ through a 
heavy financialisation of economic institutions, which engendered a substantial rearrangement 
in political, economic and social relations. Such a transformed paradigm in relation to the pre-
modern moral economy paved the way for stimulating discussions about impacts of finance on 
economic growth. As consequences of these discussions, following issues have been raised 
exhaustively by many scholars since then:  
(i)  indicators of financial development and economic growth;  
(ii)  the role of financial institutional bodies on economic growth;  
(iii) causality and linearity-nonlinearity issues between financial development and 
economic growth;  
(iv) noneconomic parameters including institutional and legal environment encompassing 
finance-growth nexus; and  
(v) the role of financial liberalisation and financial repression policies on the nexus.  
In understanding the orientation of the debate in finance-growth nexus, a selection of seminal 
empirical studies of the last five decades related to finance-growth nexus are tabulated in the 
appendix (see from Table A.2.1 to Table A.2.6). These studies are classified expressing 
particular focus areas and the key findings develop in this study. In reviewing empirical part 
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of the literature, these tables are referenced and evidenced in order to shed light on the debate. 
Theoretical discussions on finance-growth nexus in the existing literature, on the other hand, 
are introduced and explained in detail in the next section. 
2.3.1. Economic Factors 
A highly-intensified debate on finance-growth nexus has given rise to two opposite views about 
the role of finance over economic growth. Schumpeter (1911), as an early contributor to the 
debate, argued that sophisticated financial systems could breed technological improvement, 
increase productive capacity and, hence promote economic growth. In addition to this, 
Schumpeter (1911) specifically underlined the need for credit markets in providing credit for 
entrepreneurs’ investment projects and in facilitating their adaptation to technological 
improvements through attaching a critical role to banks about the intermediation of financial 
operations. Robinson (1952), responding to this, proposes a counter argument by favouring 
finance in promoting economic growth wherein he understates functions of financial 
institutions by attributing them a passive role and, further, equates financial development 
(henceforth FD), with one of the necessary outcomes of rapid industrialisation. He maintains, 
with his assertion, that economic growth requires finance because of a simple need; that is to 
meet the demand in the market (Robinson 1952). This view implicitly emphasises a reverse 
direction about the link between FD and economic growth by centring growth into the core 
while placing FD as necessary process and outcome of growth effect.   
After the World War II, studies on finance-growth nexus contrasted on two prominent views 
together with the contributions of Schumpeter (1911) and Robinson (1952). Financial 
repressionist view, based on theoretical studies of Keynes (1937) and Tobin (1965), advocates 
the need for government interference in financial system and control on credit market through 
“interest rate ceilings, high reserve requirements and directed credit programmes” 
(Demetriades and Andrianova 2004:49). By doing this, it is believed that “financial repression 
reduces the demand for money in favour of productive capital, thus raising the capital/labour 
ratio and accelerating economic growth” (Eschenbach 2004:6). In their empirical study, 
Demetriades and Luintel (2001) find evidence that financial repression in South Korea 
positively affected its FD leading to economic growth. However, as most empirical studies 
evidence, repressionist approach makes holding money less profitable and credit less available 
for investors. Eventually, banking system together with other financial institutions became 
dysfunctional and ineffective in fuelling economic growth within this approach. 
 38 
Consistent with the Schumpeterian line, financial liberalisation view has advanced by some 
many contenders including Gurley and Shaw (1955), Goldsmith (1969), Hicks (1969), 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) in response to the Keynesian idea of financial repression. 
The main contributions of these contenders are that financial repression policies should be 
challenged by allowing interest rates to act freely and abandoning high reserve ratios and 
decontrolling government interventions, since they all impair the dynamics of growth through 
immobilisation of savings, inefficient allocation of resources and technological inertia. 
Goldsmith (1969) was the first contributor who conducted a meritorious econometric study on 
finance-growth nexus with a cross-section analysis wherein is deduced that size and efficiency 
factors in investments make significant contributions to economic growth. On the other hand, 
McKinnon (1973) contends, with his ‘complementarity hypothesis’, that investment can be 
materialised as long as banks hold enough saving accounts, while Shaw (1973), with his theory 
of ‘debt intermediation’, contributes to the debate by stressing the role of borrowing and 
lending as an instrument for increasing investment and output. 
1980s accompanied with neoclassical critical to McKinnon-Shaw model of financial 
liberalisation. Stiglitz (1989), for example, advocated some impairing aspects of financial 
liberalisation upon economic growth with exemplifying market failures resulted by free credit 
markets. Stiglitz (2000) also adds that periodical financial crises are in high correlation with 
the liberalisation of countries’ financial systems. Taylor (1983) and Van Wijnbergen (1983), 
on the other hand, asserted that financial liberalisation policies are less likely to foster 
economic growth when there are efficient working curb markets (non-institutional credit 
markets) in the market. The role of government, among critics, was stressed by Mankiw (1986) 
who supported government intervention in order to alleviate market failures through regulating 
credit allocation. 
Emerging in 1990s, the endogenous growth model theoreticians re-criticised McKinnon-Shaw 
model by claiming that financial intermediation should not target maximisation of the volume 
of investment primarily, but rather it must prioritise the attainment of efficiency. Further, 
endogenous models highlight that finance and growth exhibit binary relationship in which these 
two reciprocate each other (Ang 2008:542). By the same token, Greenwood and Jovanovic 
(1990) emphasised this bidirectional relationship by asserting that financial institutions 
eliminate the informational problems and risks related to them, thereby allowing for growth; 
while growth, in turn, prepares necessary instruments in order to create efficient financial 
structures. 
 39 
The adaptation of liberal financial policies in economic institutions, ultimately, brought about 
a debacle, especially on developing countries in 1990s. This led the contenders in the field to 
modify their premises about favouring financial liberalisation without taking country specific 
factors into account. Within the new approach, it is asserted that formation of a proper 
regulatory framework is indispensable within financial liberalisation in order to foresee and 
avoid potential financial crisis (De Gregorio and Guidotti 1995; Stiglitz 2000). However 
overall, a gradual financial liberalisation  through correct sequencing of reforms (McKinnon 
1991) was seen a remedy in overcoming the detrimental effects of financial liberalisation 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998). 
An authentic debate, in the last twenty years, has set in to compare market based and bank 
based financial systems (see: Allen  and  Gale 2000; Chakraborty and Ray 2006; Demirgüç-
Kunt and Levine 2001; Levine 2002; Uzunkaya 2012). It can easily be observed that a bank 
based financial system is more widespread in developing countries, where banks, within their 
monitoring role, have primary functions of allocating resources and providing finance to firms 
which have very few shareholders with large stakes. A market based financial system, on the 
other hand, is less dependent to the banking sector with regard to fund allocation (Khan and 
Senhadji 2003:92; Rajan and Zingales 2003:12), as in such environment financial markets are 
found to be dominant over fund allocation process. In financially developed countries, such as 
the USA and the UK, financial system is consisted of large number of shareholders with 
relatively small stakes. In close relation to this debate, effects of stock markets, beyond a bank 
based financial system, are considered whether it supports economic growth within a market 
based financial system. Keynes (1937) criticised stock markets in their role on delivering 
economic growth and stated that the existence of stock market produces too much speculation 
which eventually results with destabilisation of economy. Similarly, but more fundamentally, 
Singh (1997) and Harris (1997) argued that stock markets in developing countries inhibit 
economic growth since financial sector in these countries suffer from informational problems 
dramatically and, hence, it leads to create more fragile markets. Therefore, in general, 
efficiency of stock markets hinges on an environment where informational asymmetries are at 
minimum level, stock prices are not volatile, and prices are stable, as they cannot be easily 
manipulated. The economy, having these features, reveals more powerful financial system with 
stock markets (Arestis, Demetriades, and Luintel 2001). 
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2.3.2. Multidimensional Factors 
Investigating a relationship between two or more variables thoroughly requires 
multidimensional approach in order to capture multiple impacts amongst each variable. In the 
same manner, comprehensive evaluation of a particular study in certain field necessitates 
looking from a broad perspective which also incorporates other factors into analysis. Thus, 
causes or leading factors of a certain phenomenon should be sought within such a wider 
context. In the case of FD-economic growth nexus, if determinants of FD, its interaction with 
economic growth or driving forces of growth are narrowed by considering them a mere 
financial issue through abstraction of other factors from the analysis, then problem detection 
and possible prescriptions cannot be addressed in a right way. In order to evade such an 
outcome, FD should not be confined to economic explanations, but rather it must be associated 
primarily with politics and history (Morck and Steier 2005:50), as economic and financial 
events are also affected by larger political, social, legal and anthropological factors. Thus, a 
political economy perspective on FD-growth nexus can help to expand the explanatory power 
of any economic model. This section, therefore, aims to discuss such factors affecting FD and 
economic growth nexus. 
2.3.2.1. Political economy factors 
The way of political actors’ involvement in economic decision-making process has 
significantly evolved during the last decades. Notably with the contributions of public choice, 
it is no longer considered that policy makers undertake the role of ‘benevolent social planners’ 
because their political incentives stimulate them to act as ‘self-interested agents’ (Pagano and 
Volpin 2001:503). As such, choices of political and financial powers – both are interest groups 
acting in concert to exert their power over economic and political institutions - move away 
from that of the dispersed groups in the economic system which results in favour of the former 
group. Therefore, one of the important reasons for economic underdevelopment addresses the 
transformation of the role of policy makers. Along with this, Rajan and Zingales (2003) stress 
political factors with its potential benefits; the idea that enhancing FD in an economy can 
induce and facilitate economic growth. Through such a lens, they introduce ‘an interest group 
theory of financial development’ which emphasises two interest groups directing an economy’s 
financial system into a certain structure. In this approach, there are two distinct groups: 
‘financial incumbents’ and ‘industrial incumbents’ who resist FD through hampering financial 
liberalisation and openness of an economy, since it is believed that FD accompanies with 
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competition which, then, threatens the prevalence and power of these incumbents in a financial 
system. 
Industrial incumbents, in such a financial system, have privileged position in reaching financial 
opportunities, so they seize the biggest portion of financial sector. Without any permission and 
implicit approval of industrial incumbents, it is not possible to have a position or make large-
scale businesses in the financial system. Similar to this, financial incumbents form 
‘relationship-based’ financing where cartel financiers construct a network/relationship within 
those who have penetration upon firms, thereby they get firm-specific information through 
informal ways and compel firms to get finance from these cartels. As a result, they subjugate 
financial sector and become monopolies in the economy (Rajan and Zingales 2003:18). 
In an economic system within the existence of these incumbents, FD becomes possible “only 
when the country’s political structure changes dramatically, or when the incumbents want 
development to take place” (Rajan and Zingales 2003:21). However, more fundamental 
solution to cease the prevalence of the incumbents in a financial system, according to Rajan 
and Zingales (2003:18), is to allow capital flows, international trade and developing “better 
disclosure rules and enforcement”. 
Together with the contributions of Rajan and Zingales (2003), the role of ‘political incumbents’ 
in delivering economic growth through proper FD process should also be included into the 
analysis. In this sight, political incumbents engross whole financial sector by exerting their 
parliamentary power or by derivation of laws in line with their interests. Subjugation of the 
financial sector, then, requires existence of a special elite class to which a certain portion of 
the surplus is distributed as a result of their interest pool with the political incumbents. This 
kind of environment, however, breeds a system where a minority group unproductively and 
inefficiently operates financial sector, which necessarily eventuates economic 
underdevelopment. 
A critical approach to the works of Rajan and Zingales (2003) can be raised through examining 
the role of global incumbents on FD and growth. This way of thinking comes up with the idea 
that a minority interest group has significant dominance upon global financial sector through 
enjoying large shares. These players are closely involved in the decisions about financial 
markets and use their global financial institutions (MNCs etc.) to control capital flows in 
underdeveloped and developing countries. Therefore, these countries are not able to get 
economic freedom to achieve sound financial systems as long as their financial systems are 
 42 
exposed to global financial powers’ exploitation. Resultantly, financial liberalisation and 
openness as part of FD policy, contrary to Rajan and Zingales (2003), might not lead to 
economic growth. 
Beside the work of Rajan and Zingales (2003), the role of politics in achieving FD and 
sustainable economic growth is also addressed by Haber (2002) from a different angle. He 
underlines that economic activities must be approached within impact of political institutions 
upon them rather than envisaging an insulated market understanding, which assumes no 
involvement of noneconomic factors in market activities. Based on this line, it can be said that 
the presence of competitive markets with regard to the satisfaction of requirements for strong 
financial systems and for robust growth policies can only exist in an environment where there 
is an effective working political competition. Otherwise, financial modernisation would be 
prevented by the entrenched political powers through, for instance, inappropriate regulative 
policies of governments which lead banking system to work inefficiently (Haber 2002:39). 
Institutions as dynamic factors for FD and economic growth should be given much emphasis 
since there is a general misunderstanding about the causes of economic growth which sees 
capital accumulation, technology, education and other factors as the underlying causes of 
economic growth. However, in fact, they should be considered as the reflections of growth, not 
the true causes of it. The leading factors and explanations of FD and growth, indeed, have to 
be sought in the structure of institutions, which influences whole economic activities in a given 
society (North and Thomas 1973:2). By acknowledging this, it can be stated that different 
institutional structuring in an economy elucidates rationale for the existing dissimilarity of 
growth performances among countries, and it also allows for the acquirement of advancing 
growth levels. Financial institutions, in the light of this explanation, exhibit a catalyst role to 
achieve this advancement. 
A general enquiry as to which type of political regime supports FD and fosters economic 
growth in a best way is, generally, associated with democratic and authoritarian regimes. Some 
contenders, including North (1990) and Olson (1991), approach to the debate from the point of 
property rights, which is believed to be a strong cursor for economic growth, and they conclude 
that democratic regimes, by their very nature, protect property rights stronger than other 
regimes.8 In line with this, democratic systems have great potentials to eliminate substantial 
problems stemming from dictatorial or authoritarian rulings. For instance, the existence of 
                                                        
8 Przeworski and Limongi (1993:52) oppose to this assertion and argue that “the idea that democracy protects 
property rights is a recent invention, and we think a far-fetched one”. 
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transparent institutions and the attitude of disclosing political and economic activities in 
democratic governments help fundamentally to minimise corruption in the society. In contrast 
to democratic view, some other scholars (such as: de Schweinitz Jr 1959; Galenson 1959; Rao 
1984) argue that democratic systems compel individuals to consume more and save less which, 
then, leads to decreased investment activities and hence slows down FD. In response to the 
second view, Przeworski and Limongi (1993:56) suggest that there must be some isolated 
institutions in order to evade and resist such an implicit exploitation, and give the example of 
Asian states by stating that “the key to the superior economic performance of the Asian ‘tigers’ 
is ‘state autonomy,’ defined as a combination of the ‘capacity’ of the state to pursue 
developmentalist policies with its ‘insulation’ from particularistic pressures, particularly those 
originating from large firms or unions”. Within a similar approach, Kurth (1979) is explicitly 
eager to justify dictatorship solution against democratic alternatives with regard to its 
facilitation of economic growth through restraining power of labour unions and moderating 
wages. Durham (1999), contrary to popular belief, utilises from Gerschenkron’s (1962) 
thoughts9 by stating that poor economies can grow faster than more advanced countries which, 
in turn, puts authoritarian governments of backward countries at the core of rapid 
industrialisation process, since “the greater the initial backwardness, the greater the required 
state intervention necessary to affect industrialisation” (Durham 1999:82).         
In general, however, scholars agree on the idea that state autonomy can easily transform to the 
dictatorship model which always tends to result in inefficient solutions and does not distribute 
resources smoothly whereas democratic regimes are supposed to serve for the general interest 
through providing a participatory environment.  
2.3.2.2. Legal and societal factors 
Differences in legal systems provide another standpoint for the explanation of FD and 
economic growth interaction. Other than economic variables, legal structures of countries can 
also establish a ground for sound financial systems and robust economic growth. Pertaining to 
this, Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), aimed in their seminal study to 
explore the effect of common law and civil law on financial performance of countries. In terms 
of providing legal protection to shareholders, private investors and external entrepreneurs, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) asserted that common-law countries are 
                                                        
9 Gerschenkron (1962:8), far from traditional approach, states that economically backward countries are more 
advantageous than other countries in performing faster growth since they embody cheap labour, ‘greater backlog 
of technological innovations’ and ‘borrowed technology’ which allow for quick industrialisation.  
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respectively more successful than civil-law countries, as common-law generates an opportunity 
space for development beyond the codification of civil law. Further, legal sanctions were 
observed to be stronger in the common-law countries as well. These imply that a financial 
system with a strong legal system, which safeguards all financial agents against any kind of 
illegal circumstances through protecting their property rights, can complete its FD process 
efficiently and hence foster economic growth. 
In the relevant literature, it is argued that efficient working financial regulations, as associated 
with legal systems, primarily strengthens banking system of an economy and paves the way 
for growth-leading capital market liberalisation (Pagano and Volpin 2001; Stiglitz 2000). The 
positive role of financial regulation is conceptualised by Kroszner (2000) as ‘the public interest 
theory of regulation’. This view suggests that regulations in financial and banking sector help 
to alleviate market failures and protect those consumers who suffer from information 
asymmetries, then ultimately lead to maximise social welfare (Kroszner 2000:26). 
Notwithstanding this, regulatory structures are also exposed to political pressure groups’ and 
lobbying groups’ manipulations which can be explained by ‘the private interest theory of 
regulation’ (Kroszner 2000), wherein the two groups aim to retard financial reforms because 
the existing regulatory framework is constructed in favour of them (Pagano and Volpin 
2001:517). Deregulation policies, by the same token, are considered by those groups as 
deviations which undermine their financial interests through creating more competitive 
environment (Kroszner and Strahan 1999:1444). FD, thus, cannot be carried out in such an 
environment where recently mentioned incumbents control regulatory bodies and designate the 
content of regulatory structure.  
Corporate governance is, in a similar manner, an important dimension of the finance-growth 
nexus. If the power between stakeholders (shareholders, managers and employees) can be 
balanced and governed in a fair manner by companies, a cooperative environment exists in that 
company which, then, contributes to FD process of an economy positively (see: Kraakman and 
Hansmann 2000; Pagano and Volpin 2005; Roe 1994; Tirole 2001). Otherwise, managers 
would tend to preserve shareholders’ interests only and do not put much concern for the rest of 
stakeholders’ interests. A stakeholder model has, thus, strong connections with the legal origins 
of countries. Specifically, if a legal system protects every stakeholder’s rights through relevant 
laws and encourages them to participate in corporate governance, financial system can, then, 
be further strengthened. In this, political power is considered to be a key, since they create 
corporate structures through legislating laws about protection of rights. 
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Beside the pervasive effects of diverse legal systems on FD-growth nexus, societal factors, 
more precisely cultural factors, should not be underestimated in supporting this nexus, and they 
should be regarded as complements to legal factors. The fact that values and norms shape 
economic behaviours of individuals in their everyday life, including their financial activities, 
implies that societal factors derived from these values and norms have an indirect decisive role 
on the FD and economic growth process. For instance, ‘trust’ can be a key factor for alleviating 
problems pertaining to FD, which are not, at the same time, possible to be coped with by legal 
institutions (see: Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004; Inglehart, Basanez, and Moreno 1998; 
Knack and Keefer 1997). Similarly, societal norms as informal institutions can trigger stock 
market development through shareholder protection and lead to accelerate economic growth 
through banking development and protecting creditors’ rights (Garretsen, Lensink, and Sterken 
2004:173). To demonstrate this, Garretsen, Lensink, and Sterken (2004) conducted an 
econometric analysis in which they derived societal indicators by utilising Hofstede’s work 
(1980) in order to explore the effects of societal factors on FD and economic growth and 
compared the outcome with the work of Porta Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) 
who searched for the effects of legal factors on FD. 
After elaborating on the societal factors, one should summarise that there are many factors 
moulding developmentalist patterns of countries, which cannot be deduced only from 
economics realm, since non-economic factors have also determining roles to a large extent. In 
our study, hence, we take into consideration the political economy, legal and societal factors 
along with commonly referred economic factors. Accordingly, an empirical study is conducted, 
in the next section, by considering the relevant literature to determine the most appropriate 
indicators of Islamic banking development and economic development nexus, which, in return, 
is expected to provide an original study. Prior to this, a brief literature on Human Development 
Index or HDI-related studies should be reviewed here (Table A.2.7 is created in the appendix 
listing HDI-related studies in detail) for it gives us the opportunity to compare and contrast the 
main motivation for including HDI as dependent or independent variable in empirical growth 
studies. By doing so, it is possible to authenticate this study’s contribution to the literature 
through placing HDI into the agenda of Islamic banks’ developmentalist goals. 
2.3.2.3. Human development as an exclusive factor 
As mentioned before, this study aims at deploying HDI as a benchmark for economic 
development in an attempt to examine the performances of selected Islamic banks with regards 
to their contribution to developmentalist trajectories of countries. In the entire literature, 
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however, HDI is scarcely chosen either for the variable explaining economic growth, or 
dependent variable that is explained by some combination of different factors. It is this study’s 
novel attempt that neither of the studies attempted to consider HDI to include as the dependent 
variable in Islamic banking performance studies. 
Once looking at the relevant literature, HDI is mostly associated with financial development in 
order to empirically examine the impact of the growth of financial sector in certain economies 
on HDI (see: Asongu and Nwachukwu 2015; Monacelli, Iovino, and Pascucci 2012; Ostojic, 
2013). In these studies, it is unanimously found that financial development has strong positive 
relationship with human development, implying a substantial role attached to financial sector 
in fostering economic development. 
There are also two particular studies considering HDI as one of the control variables for the 
dependent variable of financial development (see: Filippidis and Katrakilidis 2015; Outreville 
1999). The results, in each study, suggest that HDI contributes to financial development 
significantly. 
A time series study is conducted by Sehrawat and Giri (2014) to determine the direction of 
causality between financial development and human development in India between the period 
1980-2012. It is concluded that there is a unidirectional relationship between these variables 
running from financial development indicators to human development index. 
As evident from the discussed empirical contributions, human development aspects are hardly 
incorporated in the finance-development literature hitherto. Acknowledging this gap in the 
related literature, this study introduces a novel approach to finance-development studies by 
examining Islamic banking and human development nexus. By doing so, the so-called superior 
notion of GDP as the ultimate benchmark for economic growth is replaced by HDI, which is 
believed to reflect relatively more appropriate measure of social welfare despite the debated 
nature and contested contents of HDI. 
2.4. ISLAMIC FINANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN FINANCE-
GROWTH AXIS: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE 
As discussed in the preceding section, the nature, direction and implications of finance-growth 
nexus have been debated thoroughly for the last couple of decades in the conventional 
literature. Except some critical approaches by heterodox schools of economic thought, 
advancement in financial sphere is generally posited to accompany economic growth and 
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development. With the significant ascent of neoclassical thought and its permeation through 
the global economy in 1980s, the potential of finance over economic performance has further 
been essentialised in that finance has gained an autonomous sphere within the economy (which 
is discussed in great detail in the next chapter, Chapter 3, under financialisation debate), and 
the overall economic development hinged on improvements in the financial sphere. Once the 
idea of finance-intensive policies of economic development was adopted, it accompanied the 
identification of parameters of global financial development with the measures of financial 
depth, access, efficiency and stability (Čihák et al. 2012). As a consequence of such dialectic 
as part of neo-liberal policies, every country has been conditioned to follow and apply the 
agenda of global financial development so long as it aims to enhance its economic condition.  
Recalling the political economy debate on the role of Bretton Woods institutions, the post-
modern phase of universal development ideology stipulated a finance-centred economic 
development understanding. The essentialisation of finance, therefore, is not a coincidental 
emphasis imposed on developing world, but rather a new form of preserving world income and 
resources in the hands of financial incumbents through transnational institutions. Global 
economy, in this sense, has been reorganised around the pursuit of financial profits in the wake 
of profitability crisis suffered within real economic activities (Lapavitsas 2013:2; Tauss 
2012:55). Thus, financial sphere has been expanded to exacerbate redistributive injustice. This 
is evident in the statistical records of world income distribution and profits generated through 
financial transactions. In addition, the gap between the size of real and financial assets in the 
global economy (Epstein 2005; Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990) affirms the convergence 
towards finance-led growth theories. 
Banking system, amid the ascendance of finance, plays a crucial role in financialised economy, 
since an economic system dominated by the ambition of generating financial profits necessarily 
shapes banking sector and its operational structure. Therefore, conventional banks, from its 
outset, were organized in pursuit of shareholder value maximisation through concerning and 
engaging in most profitable and efficient economic activities. Their contributions towards 
social aspects of economic life are taken as granted and hence have scarcely been examined 
within mainstream debate. Even worse, the neo-classical paradigm does not consider social 
impact as evident in Friedman’s famous magazine article titled as “the social responsibility of 
business is to increase its profits” (Friedman 1970). In this view, financial development is 
believed to generate good society as long as economic activities become subservient to 
financial profits and efficiency dominates economic and financial activity. 
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Islamic finance emerged and flourished, not by chance, in the 1970s wherein finance-led 
growth theories beset and influenced alternative views and perspectives of economic 
understanding beyond mainstream economics. Contrary to the conventional system and its 
autotelic objectives ignoring the notion of ‘social impact finance’, as explained above, Islamic 
banks manifested to play an important role over contents, goals, substance and achievements 
of the development process in Muslim-dominated countries. Thus, as the detailed discussion 
above identified, Islamic banks have been charged with the realisation of the theoretical 
conceptualisation of IME in delivering Islamic development objective, with an imagined role 
to have high impact on both individual well-being and social welfare.  
In considering the performance throughout the forty years since its inception in 1975, beside 
the aspirational dimensions of IME, initial objectives attached to Islamic banking have been 
challenged entirely by market oriented professionals and some scholars of Islamic finance on 
the grounds that to what extent it is possible to differentiate the financial logic of Islamic banks 
from its counterparts and hence can gain authenticity by reforming its organisational structure 
as a social banking system. As the term ‘bank’ cannot be translated into any language other 
than pronounced as ‘bank’ in every language, similarly, the organisational structure, aims and 
functions of banks are kept substantially similar in different societies. Thus, the objectives of 
banks around the world, regardless of being Islamic or conventional, should necessarily 
respond to the maximisation of profit and adaptation upon the competition rules of market 
system. This argument explicitly asserts that, an Islamic bank would, at best, generate social 
impact in an eclectic and auxiliary manner as by-product rather than the impact emerged as a 
natural outcome of embedded part of economic system. 
Throughout forty years after its inception, Islamic banking and finance is now critically 
examined due to its divergence from developmentalist promises and converging towards non-
developmental expansion of its activities in parallel with the prevailing global financial system 
(Abdul-Baki and Uthman 2017; Asutay 2007b, 2012; Cebeci 2012; Mansour, Ben Jedidia, and 
Majdoub 2015; Platonova 2013). Finance, like any other system in economy, is expected to 
generate social good in order to achieve good society (Shiller 2012); otherwise, it would cause 
disaster not only in economic sphere, but also in social, political and cultural areas such as the 
case with the global financial crisis in 2007. Islamic finance is, now, similarly, critically 
approached to bring back the value-driven motivation behind its emergence (see: Al-Jarhi 
2005; Iqbal and Mirakhor 2013a, 2017). If it had operated in line with its normative 
characteristics, Islamic finance would have now been considered as a strong financing system 
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that can respond to the globally raised issues in the wake of the recent social failure of 
mainstream financial system.  
Recalling of Islamic developmentalism, after recognising the social failure of IBF, ensured that 
Islamic finance should abandon trusting only on contractual level analysis, and bring forth the 
social implications in harmony with fiqh and morality. Its main contribution to development as 
a development-oriented institution, hence, should be on serving as community banking for 
individuals and societies, rather than markets (Asutay 2007b). By the emphasis on such 
characteristics of Islamic finance, the preceding section surveys conventional literature on the 
relationship between finance and economic growth to provide a comparative analysis by 
exploring how mainstream finance is envisaged to impact economic growth, whilst, on the 
other hand, Islamic finance would make significant difference by contributing to the fulfilment 
of developmentalist objectives. 
The justification of Islamic banks’ social failure in terms of not contributing to social good in 
an embedded manner through such an argument stems from the espousal of a universal 
understanding of finance and banking system, which, in fact, captivates and hampers the 
emergence of alternative views on how finance should be dealt in everyday practice to generate 
developmentalism beyond its prevailing function. It should, thus, be recognised that the 
modern financial system is a socially constructed reality that has been shaped throughout the 
modern period to constitute a new form of capital accumulation in the age of ‘finance 
capitalism’. In acknowledging this, an alternative approach upon financial sphere is argued for 
irrespective of existing mainstream financial structure. Therefore, this discussion in this section 
urges, first, to consider the activities of Islamic banks not as simple financial intermediation, 
but rather business models, as historical applications of Islamic financing modes were business 
ventures and not financial modes. The replacement of intermediation with business 
stakeholding gives some responsibilities to Islamic banks, as active agents, in evaluating the 
consequences of contracts in terms of their contribution to value-added in real economy. In a 
simple murabahah contract, for instance, bank should reckon with its role in value adding 
through the potential benefits of contract upon economy and society, rather than confining 
itself with providing financial intermediation. Once performances of Islamic banks are re-
examined from this angle, their success or failure in generating social impact would no longer 
remain beneath the surface; thereby, it paves the way for examining Islamic financial 
contribution. 
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The construction of financing activity in Islamic paradigm, secondly, necessitates approaching 
finance as an everyday practice rather than a self-proclaimed and sophisticated mechanism 
resulting in commercialised and financialised economy. In doing so, simple function of 
financing becomes subservient to the whole idea of development with the pursuit of creating 
‘good society’ (Shiller 2012). Financial activities, in this manner, should not only be subject to 
financial performance; instead, their social performance should also be examined to what 
extent Islamic financing activities are conducive to generate good society. 
While the applications in the sector evidence that Islamic finance is a hybrid financial 
proposition basically operates with the same motivational frame of its conventional 
counterparts (Asutay 2012), the objectives of Islamic banks in spurring economic development 
were identified in such a developmentalist manner in the initial literature. Thus, the early 
contributions in the 1980s invariably extolls the experience of Mit Ghamr as a social bank 
based on profit and loss sharing (see the related studies: Asutay, Aysan, and Karahan 2013; 
Chachi 2005; El-Gamal 2007; Hegazy 2006; Kahf 2004; Mayer 1985), and hence, emphasises 
its role in generating an economic uplift in the conditions of the poor through expanding 
capabilities and capacities as envisaged by IME. Thus, the authentic institutional logic of 
Islamic principles relating to economy and finance refers to an organic emergence of Islamic 
institutions which can be a reflection of the Islamic order and worldview. The latter refers to a 
particular economic paradigm and modes of production within tawhidi world defined by the 
actualisation of Islamic economic axioms. Such actualisation by definition implies that any 
institution shaped by such features has to be stakeholder oriented with the aim of developing 
participatory economy through risk-sharing and profit-and-loss sharing. Consequently, an 
Islamic bank is expected to work within such an institutional logic in essentialising the Islamic 
modes of production in order to be authentic and emergent (see: Asutay 2018). 
Amongst the developmentalist features of Islamic finance, direct attention is given to its asset-
backed and equity-based nature as part of linking to productive or real economy, profit and loss 
sharing, promoting risk sharing through trading and diversifying risks, mobilising and pooling 
of savings for investment, improving access to financial services, resilient finance through 
ensuring stability of banking sector and financial markets, avoidance of non-permissible 
transactions such as alcohol and pornography (see: Asutay 2010, 2015; Hassan and Lewis 
2007; Iqbal and Mirakhor 2013; Kettell 2010; Syed Ali, Shirazi, and Nabi 2013; Warde 2010, 
amongst others). These can be considered as characteristics of Islamic finance that have 
implications within the financial sector.  
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As mostly been emphasised, based on such features, Islamic banks are ideally expected to be 
driven by the motivation of profit and loss sharing and risk sharing so that a participatory nature 
of finance would come into existence as contrast to interest-based financial system that poses 
inequalities in the societal level. Similarly, Islamic financing transactions have to be backed by 
an asset to relate it with real economy. In other words, every Islamic mode of financing has to 
add value upon the economy through capital transfer and its circulation in Shari’ah compliant 
ways. It is also expected that the savings are pooled in Islamic banks to be allocated and 
channelled into socially beneficial investments, which, in return, would encourage Islamic 
entrepreneurship. Islamic banks aim to reach everyone irrespective of income level so that 
financial access and inclusion should lead to development in both individual and societal level. 
Despite these aspirations were associated with Islamic banking and finance, the applications 
reveal a great divergence between ideals and realities that culminates in hybridity and mimicry. 
As Islamic finance is relegated to and considered within contractual level, its social 
implications are neglected without consequentialist manner by emphasising form over 
substance. Maslahah (public interest) instead, has taken the role of integrating Islamic finance 
into global financial system through fiqhi process as evidenced in tawarruq contracts, as 
delusional maslahah has instrumentalised the Islamic morality in justifying the mimicry. As 
the thorough examination regarding the divergence from social aspirations of Islamic finance 
is addressed in the next chapter (Chapter 3) under Islamic financialisation, this chapter in the 
next section examines whether the observed developmentalist failures is evidenced through 
empirical study. 
2.5. ISLAMIC BANKING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT NEXUS: 
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
Based on the discursive analysis presented in the preceding sections, this section aims to 
develop and test an empirical model to examine as to whether Islamic banking contributes to 
multi-faceted economic development as aspired by IME. 
This section attempts to assess the relationship between Islamic banking growth and economic 
development through an empirical analysis by constructing a panel data analysis of 21 
countries with observed Islamic banking presences over the period of 2003-2014. Since 
developmental outcomes can only be observed over a long-run period, we opted for using 
yearly data instead of averaged data such as 3-year or 4-year intervals, as interval-based data 
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smooth distribution of time dimension and hence may miss out short-term influences of 
development trajectories. 
The structure of this empirical part is inspired by Imam and Kpodar (2016) in which potential 
contributions of Islamic banking growth on economic growth is examined empirically by 
including several aspects of the relationship with different econometric applications. In parallel 
with this structure, in the empirical model in this chapter, first, the baseline regression aims to 
examine the relationship between Islamic banking growth and economic development wherein 
three alternative indicators of Islamic banking growth regressed separately and a standard 
proxy for overall banking development is used as one of the explanatory variables. 
In the second stage, a number of alternative empirical analyses were conducted to test 
robustness of the relationship. In specific, alternative variables are selected for overall 
banking/financial system development, and the impact of Islamic banking growth is re-
examined. Additionally, we changed the sample size based on the share of Muslims in 
population of country and proceed with another regression. Lastly, sample size is reorganised 
once again to include only oil rich countries with the aim of observing the impact of oil factor 
over Islamic banks’ growth and performance.  
It should be noted that data availability constrained the general sample size and the selection 
of variables, as Islamic banking data is quite limited and scattered in various databases with its 
basic indicators. 
The following section describes the variables of the model in relation to the Islamic banking 
growth and economic development, the information set and basic summary statistics and 
correlations. Then, the next section provides a thorough explanation of the research 
methodology where several econometric techniques are explained, and regression results are 
interpreted. 
2.5.1. Variable Definition and Model 
Beyond a standard growth model with a set of mostly used measuring of banking/financial 
development and growth,10 this study aims to locate development-oriented indicators for 
dependent, independent and control variables. Further to the data sources shown in Table 2.1, 
the variables and their identification are listed and explained below: 
                                                        
10 To give an example of generally used indicators of financial development and economic growth in the 
mainstream literature, we constructed Table A.2.9 in the appendix. 
 53 
(i) Economic Development: Human Development Index (HDI)11 is chosen to measure 
economic development, since it seems to be the most appropriate indicator amongst very 
limited alternatives which goes beyond growth perspective. Not just appropriateness but also 
the data availability of selected countries was a concern to choose HDI, as we would otherwise 
tend to consider other development-oriented variables such as Inclusive Wealth Index, OECD 
Better Life index, Sustainable Development Index, World Development Index, World 
Happiness Index, Inequality-adjusted HDI, Multidimensional Poverty Index, GINI index and 
so on.  
Despite the fact that HDI is hardly chosen in the finance-development literature and this makes 
our study an original attempt, the rationale behind the selection of HDI coming out of the lack 
of better alternative indicator for economic development, accompanies with some serious 
limitations in reflecting economic development. For instance, it is widely emphasized that HDI 
omits some important dimensions of development on both individual and societal level, 
environmental and safety issues with some further micro dimensions such as housing quality, 
pollution, crime rates, unemployment, quality and of goods and services, quality of education.12 
In addition, it can be argued that financial institutions cannot have a direct impact on HDI, 
since its components of education and health are hardly affected by financial sector. Therefore, 
the attempt to attach Islamic banks a role to contribute to HDI may sound irrelevant. However, 
as the endogenous growth theories implicitly evidence, financial institutions can have great 
impact on social aspects of economic life, since financing health and education is no longer 
depended upon the public sector entirely in developing countries, but rather became investment 
areas to seek profit especially after the privatization process. Furthermore, Islamic banks within 
the aspirational paradigm are expected to contribute to human-centred development and 
therefore their presence in social areas such as health and education is by definition is expected. 
Thus, when choosing HDI as dependent variable as a proxy for economic development, we 
acknowledge all these problems and register our reservations on HDI. This fact is also 
considered for the interpretations of the variables and their impact on human development.  
                                                        
11 HDI, as a composite index, aggregates country level attainments in life expectancy and education, as well as 
income. From 2010 onwards, two of the three dimensions of HDI has altered. Accordingly, life expectancy 
remained unchanged, while gross national income (GNI) has replaced GDP and literacy and the gross enrolment 
rate -as used in the old HDI- have been replaced by mean years of schooling and the expected years of schooling. 
From 1990 to 2009, the HDI gave equal weights to three functions of its core dimensions for health, education 
and income. However, from 2010, instead of using arithmetic mean HDI values is calculated by using geometric 
mean. The rationale for this change is due to allowing for imperfect substitutability between the HDI’s three 
components. 
12 For a brief history of HDI critiques, see UNDP review paper by Kovacevic (2010). 
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(ii) Islamic banking growth: Since financialised view of economy is widely taken for granted 
in empirical research areas, most of the researchers consider the extension of loans/financing 
by Islamic banks as the indicator for Islamic banking growth (Bashir 2003; Gheeraert and Weill 
2015; Goaied and Sassi 2010; Grassa and Gazdar 2014). However, in line with theoretical 
suggestions, the amount of credits/loans/financing given does not guarantee the productivity 
of economy, for these loans might be spent unproductively. More sophisticatedly, unregulated 
loans and credits extended to individuals can culminate in high indebtedness of households and 
corporations, which, in return, can create a debt society through the destruction of social 
balance and harmony at the expense of capitalist interests. 
In the light of this aspect of credit extension, we consider ‘total financing values of Islamic 
banks divided by nominal GDP’ as the indicator for Islamic banking growth. In addition, 
alternative indicators are considered as ‘total assets of Islamic banks to nominal GDP’, ‘total 
deposits of Islamic banks to nominal GDP’, and lastly ‘total investment of Islamic banks to 
nominal GDP13’. 
More sound variables could be constructed if there was no data availability and disclosure 
problems within Islamic banking sector. In acknowledge of this, selected indicators examine 
to what extent ethics-based mode of Islamic financing contributes to economic development 
through facilitating risk sharing, enhancing financial stability and strengthening real sector. We 
assume that performance of Islamic banks should render no significance over development 
process as they invariably mimic conventional banking understanding that aims financial 
performance with negligence of social performance. 
(iii) Development of the overall banking sector/financial system: Similar to the variables of 
Islamic banking system, overall banking and financial system development is measured by 
credits, assets and deposits of conventional banks as a share of nominal GDP. In this regard, 
‘credit by deposit money banks to the private sector divided by GDP’ is used as an indicator 
of overall banking development for the baseline regression. Furthermore, the alternative 
variables are ‘assets of banks and other financial institutions to GDP’, ‘private credit by banks 
and other financial institutions divided by GDP’, and ‘financial system deposits to GDP’ are 
used in different regressions as benchmark for financial system development. 
                                                        
13 As mentioned before, Islamic banking data availability is an important task that needs to be overcome. In 
relation to this, we could only find these variables in a website called ‘IBIS online’ which operates under Islamic 
Research and Training Institute. However, the problem is that the data does not cover the periods after 2013. Thus, 
we confine ourselves with the available data. 
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Table 2.1: Definitions and Sources of Variables 
Variable Definition Source 
HDI Human Development Index United Nations 
Development Programme 
(UNDP) 
Islamic Banking Growth (i) Financing by Islamic banks to 
GDP 
Islamic Banks and 
Financial Institutions 
Database (IBIS Online) 
(ii) Assets of Islamic banks to GDP 
(iii) Deposits of Islamic banks to 
GDP 
(iv) Investment of Islamic banks to 
GDP 
Overall Banking Growth Credit by deposit money banks to the 
private sector divided by GDP 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Levine (2000); 2013 
Financial Development 
and Structure Dataset Overall Financial Development (i) Private credit by banks and other 
financial institutions divided by GDP 
(ii) Financial system deposits to GDP 
(iii) Financial system assets to GDP 
GDP per capita Change in the ratio of real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) divided by 
the size of the population. 
World Bank (Word 
Development Indicators) 
Trade openness The sum of exports and imports of 
goods and services measured as a 
share of GDP. 
Oil rent Oil rents are the difference between 
the value of crude oil production at 
world prices and total costs of 
production as a share of GDP. 
Rule of Law The confidence of citizens in law, 
and the extent that they abide by the 
rules of the society, such as contract 
enforcement, property rights, police, 
and court. 
World Bank (World Bank 
Governance Indicators) 
Political Stability Perceptions of the likelihood of 
political instability and/or politically-
motivated violence, including 
terrorism. 
Industrialisation Manufacturing value added as a 
share of GDP 
United Nations Industrial 
Development 
Organisation (UNIDO) 
As most of the heterodox schools critically approach, the effect of conventional banking system 
over economic development patterns of countries is somewhat contested issue in the sense that 
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the growth of total asset, credit and deposit values of conventional banks can be considered as 
the implications of non-developmental expansions of banking system, which can be interpreted 
as insignificant impact on HDI values of countries. It is further criticised that conventional 
banking would also have negative consequences on HDI due to the detrimental effects of 
financialisation process in which real economy does not fulfil its role in contributing to income 
smoothing or alleviating poverty amongst the poor. 
After identifying the main variables, the control variables are defined as follows: 
(i) GDP per capita growth is used to reflect the extent of material output or total income that a 
particular country distributes to its citizens; and generally accepted as perfect indicator for 
evidencing the advancement of countries. Therefore, an increase in the GDP per capita growth 
would make high positive impact on HDI through boosting the material wealth of individuals. 
However, in fact, the calculation of GDP per capita values predicates on mathematical 
measurement; thereby an increase in GDP, including its per capita and growth dimensions, 
does not guarantee improvement in wealth distribution in the population in practice.14 This 
implies that the increase in GDP per capita would give negative implications for human 
development in countries where GDP growth widens the gap between the poor and the rich 
through its accumulation in the hands of few riches.  
On the practical side, it is obvious that some countries are falling behind in the HDI ranking at 
a certain period of time while they perform significant increase in GDP levels in the same 
period. For example, Qatar has top ranking in GDP per capita (PPP) terms in 2016, while it has 
33rd position in the HDI ranking (United Nations Development Programme 2016). 
In recognition of this, we normally expect a positive impact of GDP per capita growth on 
economic development; however, considering the distributional issues being problematic in 
the selected sample lead us to assume adverse effect of the variable on HDI. One way to shed 
light on distributional relationships in countries is to employ GINI variable as an indicator for 
the degree of income inequality. However, the relevant data is quite limited with advanced 
countries, thereby we are unable to locate GINI data for our sampled countries. 
(ii) Trade openness: Defined as the sum of imports and exports of goods and services measured 
as a share of GDP, advantages of an open economy are heatedly debated in the literature. 
According to the proponents of financial liberalisation (see, for instance, Goldsmith 1969; 
Gurley and Shaw 1955; Hicks 1969; McKinnon 1973; Shaw 1973), trade openness would make 
                                                        
14 For a thorough explanation of GDP, its political economy and historical significance, see: Coyle (2014). 
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great impact on growth and development, since it leads to benefit from economies of scale in 
production in an efficient manner. Nevertheless, mainly Marxist theorists and dependency 
approach assert that this argument is valid only for advanced countries, for they can easily 
integrate in the global economy and enjoy economies of scale through their multinational 
corporations’ (MNCs) activities of import and export. Less developed countries, on the other 
hand, are highly vulnerable to external shocks and crisis since their economic stability is fragile 
and high economic performance hinges on global economic trends. In favour of this approach, 
trade openness is assumed to reveal negative consequences for economic development. 
(iii) Oil Rent: Oil production and its rent play a significant role in our sample countries such 
that a large portion of income accumulates in the sample countries from oil money or 
petrodollars. Thus, it is normally expected that oil rent expands the capacity of domestic 
economy through providing capital for domestic investment opportunities, and an increase in 
total wealth with the effect of oil money should enhance individual wellbeing and social 
prosperity. However, positive correlation between oil richness and income inequality 
evidences that oil production makes gains exclusively for upper class or royal families in the 
case of Middle Eastern and GCC countries. The regression results, under this assumption, aims 
to demonstrate the extent to which oil rent contributes to HDI through increasing overall 
economic performance and total income. 
(iv) Industrialisation: When the dynamics of economic development are considered in modern 
economies special importance is given to industrial performance due to a strong relationship 
between industrialisation and economic wealth. Developing world, in this manner, follow the 
footsteps of advanced countries to replicate the development process through industrialisation. 
Whilst we keep our reservations about potential adverse impacts of industrialisation on 
socioeconomic life and moral character of economy, it is still valid argument that 
industrialisation and its share in GDP is an essential concern for material development since it 
deals with real economy and produces value as compared to financialised economy wherein 
finance remains standalone sector in the overall economy and has nothing to do with real 
economy. Due to such a reason and considering the weight given by HDI components to 
material aspects of wealth, we expect a positive effect of industrialisation on economic 
development. 
(v) Rule of Law: Based on the statement that development is a multifaceted concept, there 
should be non-economic parameters influencing development trajectory of countries. Amongst 
many others, rule of law reflects one of the political economy aspects of development and 
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captures perceptions on rules and social contracts and its enforcement and regulation of social 
life. It might be perplexing that rule of law has close affinities with legal systems. However, in 
fact, rule of law takes into account the consequences of the application of laws that prevailing 
in the national law system irrespective of the adopted legal system such as British and Dutch 
legal system. In other words, as a variable, rule of law, captures the perceptions and confidence 
of citizens on rules and social contracts and its enforcement and regulation of social life 
irrespective of the adopted legal system. In this manner, it is expected to have positive and 
significant relationship with HDI. 
(v) Political Stability: This variable helps crystalize the impact of political stability/instability 
on the developmentalist objectives of countries. The nature of political regimes is worthy to 
note, for political instability or unrest can have a positive developmentalist impact in non-
democratic regimes through enabling justice in redistributive channels, which may tend to 
close the gap between the poor and the rich (for the studies searching for the impact of political 
regimes on economic growth, see: Table A.2.6 in the appendix). Thus, political reform can 
redesign wealth distribution in a best way by weakening the power of financial or political 
incumbents and uplift the socioeconomic conditions of middle and lower class. 
Based on the variables defined, the baseline regression is formulated as follows: 
!"# = 	& + 	()*+,"# + -.,"# + /0"# +	1" +	2"# +	3#     [2.1] 
where H is the Human development index values; ISBD is the indicator for Islamic banking 
development; FD is the measure of overall financial development; X is the set of control 
variables described above; u is the country-specific effect, 2 the error term and v is the time-
specific effect.  
Table 2.2: Country Sample & Share of Islamic Banks in National Economy* 
Bahrain 13% Kuwait 39% South Africa 1% - 2% 
Bangladesh 19.5% Lebanon 0% - 1% Sudan 100% 
Bosnia 0% - 1% Malaysia 23.8% Tunisia 5.5% 
Egypt 8% Pakistan 12% Turkey 5.5% 
Indonesia 5% Palestine 11% United Arab Emirates 19.6% 
Iran 100% Qatar 26.6% United Kingdom 0% - 1% 
Jordan 15.2% Saudi Arabia 51.1% Yemen 30% 
Note: * The shares are transformed into numerical values from the graph provided in IFSB Stability 
Report (2017:8). 
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2.5.2. Empirical Process and Method 
In the light of the aim of developing a distinct analysis to developmentalist consequences of 
Islamic banking expansion, this study employs a quantitative methodology to examine the 
developmentalist contribution roles of Islamic banking, if any, on development trajectories of 
countries through measuring and comparing performances of Islamic banks. Thus, an attempt 
is made to explore the relationship between Islamic banking growth and economic 
development through an unbalanced panel data analysis15. It is true that a vast number of 
empirical studies examine the relationship between Islamic banking growth and economic 
growth; however, this study aims to take the debate one stage further by bringing 
developmentalist consequences of Islamic banking into question in line with the IME 
expectations.  
Since this research is based on econometric study, it makes use of historical statistical data. 
Through interpretation of the data, possible explanations for the impact of growth of Islamic 
banking sector on the quantitative aspects of developmentalist oriented aims is sought by 
sampling Islamic banks from 21 countries. In carrying out the analysis, a development-oriented 
index (HDI) highlighting the quantitative parameters is considered and this enables us to test 
performances of each Islamic bank with regard to their promotion of individual wellbeing and 
social welfare. For the outcome, resulting trends of Islamic banks can verify or falsify if they 
comply with the aforementioned developmentalist objectives. 
Before presenting regression, the results and interpreting them, it should be highlighted that 
conducting a panel study on Islamic finance growth-development nexus incorporates several 
econometric challenges. Firstly, Islamic financial operations can be traced back to very recent 
times and the data availability is a well-known issue to be addressed; hence, a long-run project 
development can hardly be evaluated by analysing short-run time period with the limited data. 
Secondly, despite its distinctiveness, HDI does not constitute an ideal indicator for our study 
as it poses many problems (see, the related studies: Chowdhury 1991; Noorbakhsh 1998; 
Posner 2007; Ravallion 2012). However, it still seems to be the best indicator for empirical 
development studies. Thirdly, Islamic banking sector has limited share within the respective 
national financial system in some of the sampled countries. In addition, the size of Islamic 
banking sector is small in comparison to the conventional banking system in all cross-country 
                                                        
15 The rationale behind choosing panel data analysis comes from the fact that Islamic banking operations are 
present across many countries; thereby, instead of applying time series analysis with just one cross section of 
country, panel data allows us to include observations from different countries. By doing so, it is possible to 
examine wider applications of Islamic banking in different regions. 
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samples. Therefore, it might seem, at first glance, that we should not expect a significant impact 
from Islamic banks on the overall economy. However, IFSB (2017:8) clearly asserts that “those 
[countries] that satisfy the criterion of having a more than 15% share of Islamic banking assets 
as a proportion of their total domestic banking sector assets … are categorised as systemically 
important”. Based on this argument, half of our sample countries seem to have Islamic banking 
sector that is systemically important in their financial system, as illustrated in Table 2.2. 
Although the rest of the countries are unable to reach systemic importance, considerable growth 
of the sector in these countries should give some implications about its contributions to the 
development trajectories of the respective countries. 
It might be tempting econometrically to apply two different system-GMM regressions by 
splitting data into two categories, one of which takes only those countries that have Islamic 
banking shares over 15% within the national economy; and those countries that could not reach 
systemic importance, hence remain below the 15%. Based on the rule of system-GMM, which 
states that the cross-section dimension (N) has to be larger than the time dimension (T), we 
have only 10 countries that have Islamic banking shares over 15% within the national economy. 
Thus, maximum 9 years can be considered for the empirical analysis, which, in return, makes 
our dataset consisting of 90 observation. Since 90 observation is not sufficient in applying 
system-GMM as the rule suggest to get reliable results, the idea of conducting two different 
regressions by including only countries with systemic importance is given up. 
A range of econometric techniques is utilised, by acknowledging these challenges, including 
pooled and fixed effects estimator that enables us to control country specific effects, and the 
system-GMM estimator to address endogeneity bias through controlling it. Together with 
interpreting the results, the next section provides rationale for choosing these estimators to 
compare, and also the econometric advantages and disadvantages of each estimation technique. 
2.5.3. The Results of Econometric Estimation 
Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 respectively present summary statistics and correlation matrix for the 
variables used in the econometric analysis in this study for 21 countries observed during the 
period 2003-2014. 
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As can be seen in Table 2.3, a relatively wide gap between the minimum and maximum values 
of variables16 is in evidence for Islamic banking growth, overall banking and financial 
development,17 trade and political economy variables, namely rule of law and political stability. 
This shows that Islamic banking performances vary significantly amongst the sample countries 
together with their political economy structures and trade openness. While the share of 
industrialisation does not differ much across the dataset over the years, oil rent as a share of 
GDP seems to constitute a considerable amount of national income. In addition, it can be 
deduced from the table that conventional financial system holds a considerable claim in the 
GDP of most of the sampled countries, which means that banking and financial institutions 
plays a central role in economy. 
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
Human development index 252     0.699     0.119     0.415     0.908 
Financing by Islamic banks/GDP 252     0.081     0.106     0.000     0.484 
Assets of Islamic banks/GDP 252     0.155     0.236     0.000 1.450 
Deposits of Islamic banks/GDP 252     0.100     0.129     0.000     0.854 
Investments of Islamic banks/GDP 252     0.114     0.171     0.000     0.905 
Assets of banks and other financial institutions/GDP 252 80.269 49.659 8.705 212.276 
Credit by deposit money banks to the private sector/GDP 252 50.836 35.485 4.106 202.200 
Private credit by banks and other financial institutions/GDP 252 56.674 40.424 4.106 202.200 
Financial system deposits/GDP 252 64.234 48.962 7.417 245.428 
GDP per capita growth 252 2.009 4.201 -15.038 15.952 
Trade openness 252 82.389 41.209 19.459 210.374 
Industrialisation 252     0.128     0.048     0.047     0.265 
Oil rent 252 10.639 15.139     0.000 60.236 
Rule of law 252 47.162 22.428 2.871 95.694 
Political stability 252 31.042 24.727     0.474 92.462 
The simple illustration of correlation matrix in Table 2.4 shows that HDI has high positive 
correlation with rule of law, political stability and credit by deposit money banks to the private 
sector to GDP ratio, all of which are close to but not exceed the level of 0.70, which is 
considered as rule of thumb for efficient estimations in empirical studies. Correlation of 
variables for Islamic banking growth with HDI, on the `other hand, remains between 0.20 and 
                                                        
16 It might be argued as to whether the empirical results give biased implications due to the potential outliers used 
in the dataset. Based on such a consideration, the data is winsorised by removing the potential outliers, and the 
regression is repeated. However, it is empirically evidenced that the results did not change after winsorisation. 
17 The relatively large maximum numbers for Islamic and overall banking development in the table is due to the 
significant share of Islamic banking assets in the GDP for particular years in the case of Bahrain, and financial 
development indicators in the United Kingdom that go beyond GDP values.  
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Table 2.4: Correlation Matrix 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) Human development index 1.000               
(2) Financing by Islamic banks/GDP 0.286 1.000              
(3) Assets of Islamic banks/GDP 0.278 0.894 1.000             
(4) Deposits of Islamic banks/GDP 0.200 0.957 0.855 1.000            
(5) Investments of Islamic banks/GDP 0.275 0.931 0.967 0.915 1.000           
(6) Assets of banks and other financial institutions/GDP 0.450 -0.035 -0.003 -0.075 -0.008 1.000          
(7) Credit by deposit money banks to the private sector/GDP 0.626 0.057 0.047 0.017 0.044 0.774 1.000         
(8) Private credit by banks and other financial institutions/GDP 0.550 0.060 0.090 0.016 0.087 0.863 0.920 1.000        
(9) Financial system deposits/GDP 0.452 -0.070 -0.063 -0.094 -0.070 0.781 0.728 0.610 1.000       
(10) GDP per capita growth -0.224 -0.182 -0.165 -0.139 -0.157 -0.170 -0.175 -0.170 -0.114 1.000      
(11) Trade openness 0.531 0.375 0.379 0.334 0.387 0.239 0.352 0.313 0.282 -0.158 1.000     
(12) Industrialisation -0.023 -0.043 -0.007 -0.038 -0.023 0.072 0.126 0.119 0.017 0.183 0.226 1.000    
(13) Oil rent 0.167 0.356 0.224 0.369 0.272 -0.285 -0.201 -0.196 -0.307 -0.144 0.095 -0.446 1.000   
(14) Rule of law 0.620 0.239 0.230 0.178 0.231 0.007 0.307 0.158 0.124 -0.148 0.562 -0.067 0.210 1.000  
(15) Political stability 0.692 0.167 0.105 0.098 0.118 0.275 0.457 0.451 0.138 -0.206 0.497 -0.046 0.261 0.651 1.000 
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0.30 as compared to that of overall banking and financial development variables standing 
between 0.45 and 0.60. It is quite interesting that GDP per capita growth has negative 
correlation with the rest of variables in the model without exception. Overall, there seems no 
problematic relationship amongst variables which would threaten the reliability of the model 
and weaken the trust on the regression results. 
2.5.3.1. Pooling and fixed-effects estimators 
Table 2.5 presents the results of pooled-OLS and fixed-effects regressions models, which 
covers the period 2003-2014 for 21 cross section of countries and the dependent variable is 
HDI. While the pooled-OLS estimator disregards country specific data by pooling available 
data in one basket and runs it accordingly, fixed-effects estimator, on the other hand, controls 
for unobservable country specific and time independent effects. In other words, it is a particular 
method to eliminate time invariant unobserved effects in a regression model.  
As can be seen in Table 2.5, the models 1 to 6 show the results of pooling estimation, while 
the rest of models (6 to 12) show that of fixed-effects estimation. The baseline regression model 
in each estimation (model 1 and 5) is run only with the control variables, which are determined 
as GDP per capita growth, trade openness oil rent, industrialisation, rule of law and political 
stability. Then, overall financial development variable is controlled in model 2 and 8 and the 
regression is re-run to observe how the results alter after adding the new variable. Lastly, 3 
variables of Islamic banking growth are sequentially introduced in models (3 to 6) and (9 to12) 
to control the effect of these variables over the model. 
Initial findings in the pooled-OLS regression suggest that Islamic banking growth variables are 
all positively significant – except for Islamic bank deposit to GDP - over HDI, and the 
coefficients are quite high as compared to other variables. Overall banking development is, on 
the other hand, invariably significant in all models, yet its impact on HDI remains limited with 
0.14% while that of Islamic banking growth has 11.5%, 6.8% and 8.5%. Thus, the models 
imply that both Islamic and conventional banking growth stimulate economic development 
with the former having superior impact. Looking at the macro variables, it is seen that rule of 
law, political stability, oil rent and trade openness show positive significance nearly in all 
models with small impact on HDI ranging between 0.03% to 0.22%. Amongst them, trade 
openness is in parallel with the findings of finance-growth literature and suggests further 
financial liberalisation to increase development. Nevertheless, the effect of GDP per capita 
growth and industrialisation is negative and insignificant, weakly implying a counter result to 
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the expected relationship of these variables with HDI. The first model helps explain 55.6% to 
68.3% of the variability in economic development rates. 
It should be noted, here, that the overall results of pooled-OLS estimator rendered in our 
dynamic panel data model may not be reliable, since OLS approach does not account for 
simultaneity bias or unable to control for country fixed effects in such regressions. For this 
reason, we also conducted fixed-effects regression model and the most superior technique of 
system-GMM to get more robust and reliable results. The rationale behind choosing fixed 
effect model instead of random effect in our regression analysis comes from the results of 
Hausman test, which is applied to ascertain about the right estimation method for the data. 
Table A.2.10 in the appendix shows the results of Hausman test. The p-value of 0.000 means 
that the null hypothesis is rejected, and hence fixed effect model is, as a result, considered 
appropriate for our model. 
The right-hand side of Table 2.5 shows six different models estimated with fixed-effects 
method. It is hard to claim that the results of each variable hold similar coefficients and 
significance levels with that in the pooled-OLS estimation results. Contrarily, conventional and 
Islamic banking growth turns out to be insignificant over economic development trajectories. 
In the same vein, rule of law and political stability becomes no longer significant, and the latter 
weakly implies an adverse effect on HDI. However, the relationship between industrialisation 
and HDI turn out to show parallel with our initial expectations in that the sign of the coefficient 
changes to positive. Other variables remain mostly the same, only oil rent keeps its significance 
but with a negative impact, which can be understood as oil richness does not guarantee 
economic progress and human development as the HDI levels of the GCC countries prove. 
Overall, the models help explain 10.9% to 15.4% of the variability in human development 
ratios. 
2.5.3.2. System-GMM estimator 
In addressing the endogeneity issue, this study trusts the panel system-GMM estimator18 
developed by Blundell and Bond (1998), which uses both the difference panel data and the data 
from the original levels specification that eventually enables us to produce dramatic increases 
in both consistency and efficiency. As an alternative to system-GMM estimator, difference-
GMM could be adopted; however, it raises the serious problem within its estimation that 
                                                        
18 A useful guide for the application of the system-GMM estimator on growth models can be found in Bond, 
Hoeffler, & Temple (2001). 
 65 
includes (i) the elimination of the cross-country relationship and focusing only on time 
differences, (ii) the suffer from imprecision and potentially biased estimates in small samples 
(Alonso-Borrego and Arellano 1999; Blundell and Bond 1998), and (iii) exacerbating biases 
by decreasing the signal-to-noise ratio (Griliches and Hausman 1986). 
Mostly, two main variants of the system panel estimator, one-step and two-step system-GMM, 
are preferred in econometric studies. While one-step system estimator assumes homoscedastic 
errors, two-step estimator constructs heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, and thus 
asymptotically accepted to be more efficient relative to the former (Arellano and Bond 1991). 
Nonetheless, two-step estimator becomes a poor guide for small samples that has large number 
of instruments, as it raises overfitting problem and may produce standard errors that are biased 
downwards, which is evident in most of the Monte Carlo experiments (Beck and Levine 
2004:426). Due to this, we choose one-step system estimator and use robust standard errors as 
common in most studies. 
The consistency of system-GMM estimator hinges on the validity of two main assumptions; 
(i) the error terms do not exhibit serial correlation, and (ii) the instruments must be valid. In 
addressing these issues, we use two common specification tests suggested by Arellano and 
Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). The first is the 
Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions,19 which tests the validity of instruments used in 
the regression. 
                                                        
19 As we applied robust standard errors in each model, instead of Sargan test, Hansen test results are provided to 
address the validity of instruments. 
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Table 2.5: Islamic Banking and Human Development: Pooling and Fixed Effect Regressions 
 Pooling Effect Fixed Effect 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
GDP per capita growth 
-0,002 -0,0007 -0,0004 -0,0003 -0,0006 -0,0004 -0.0007** -0,0004 -0,0004 -0,0004 -0,0004 -0,0004 
[0.0013] [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] 
Trade openness 
0.0005*** 0.0003** 0,0002 0,0002 0.0003* 0,0002 0.0001 -0,0001 0.0001 -0,0001 0.0001 0.0001 
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0002] 
Oil rent 
-0,0003 0.0009** 0,0006 0.0006* 0.0007* 0,0006 -0.0009** -0.0008* -0.0010* -0.0008* -0.0009* -0.0009* 
[0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0005] 
Industrialisation 
-0,0854 -0,051 -0,0644 -0,0561 -0,0608 -0,0561 0,2339 0,2385 0,292 0,2497 0,2647 0,2543 
[0.1256] [0.1228] [0.1274] [0.1259] [0.1265] [0.1257] [0.3963] [0.3840] [0.3774] [0.3774] [0.3731] [0.3755] 
Rule of law 
0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0,0004 0,0003 0,0002 0,0002 0,0002 0,0002 
[0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] 
Political stability 
0.0022*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0014*** 0.0013*** 0.0014*** -0,0006 -0,0005 -0,0004 -0,0004 -0,0004 -0,0004 
[0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0005] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0005] 
Overall banking 
development  
 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0014***  0,0004 0,0004 0,0004 0,0004 0,0004 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]  [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] 
Financing by Islamic 
banks/GDP 
  0.1157**       0,0569     
  [0.0512]       [0.0488]     
Assets of Islamic 
banks/GDP 
   0.0681***       0,0161    
   [0.0158]       [0.0269]    
Deposits of Islamic 
banks/GDP 
    0,0539       0,0299   
    [0.0497]       [0.0275]   
Investments of Islamic 
banks/GDP 
     0.0853***      0,0262 
     [0.0249]      [0.0317] 
Constant 
0.5509*** 0.5024*** 0.5055*** 0.5057*** 0.5038*** 0.5059*** 0.6770*** 0.6641*** 0.6566*** 0.6609*** 0.6602*** 0.6603*** 
[0.0228] [0.0222] [0.0224] [0.0220] [0.0225] [0.0221] [0.0675] [0.0707] [0.0677] [0.0693] [0.0684] [0.0687] 
N 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 
R2 0.556 0.669 0.677 0.683 0.671 0.680 0.109 0.139 0.154 0.144 0.149 0.147 
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The second test, AR2 test, examines whether error terms are serially correlated or not. 
Similarly, Wald test, known as F-test in small samples, examines the joint significance of 
whether two or more variables should be included in the regression jointly. The results of each 
test pose no problem of applying system-GMM and joint significance of variables. The values 
of Hansen and AR2 test results are given at the bottom of each table. 
Table 2.6: Islamic Banking and Human Development: Dynamic Panel System-GMM 
Estimations  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP per capita 
growth 
0,0001 0,0001 0,0002 0,0002 0,0001 0,0002 
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0001]        
Trade openness -0,0001 0.0001 -0.0001* -0.0001* -0,0001 -0.0001* 
[0.0001] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]        
Oil rent 0,0001 0.0002* 0.0001* 0.0002* 0,0001 0.0001* 
[0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]        
Industrialisation 0.0436* 0.0378* 0.0387** 0.0422** 0.0389** 0.0412** 
[0.0228] [0.0205] [0.0186] [0.0177] [0.0181] [0.0171]        
Rule of law 0.0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]        
Political stability -0,0001 -0,0001 -0,0001 -0,0001 -0,0001 -0,0001 
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]        
Credit by deposit 
money banks to 
the private 
sector/GDP 
 0,0002 0,0002 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 
 [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] 




  0,0101    
  [0.0078]    
       
Assets of Islamic 
banks/GDP 
   0,007   




    0,0083  
    [0.0098]  




     0,0093 
     [0.0067] 
       
Constant -0,0152 0,0151 0,0145 0,0142 0,0144 0,0138  
[0.0309] [0.0229] [0.0216] [0.0231] [0.0237] [0.0229] 
Number of obs. 231 231 231 231 231 231 
Hansen-prob. 0.373 0.168 0.181 0.133 0.151 0.122 
AR2-prob. 0.672 0.633 0.621 0.744 0.677 0.708 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
AR(2): Arellano and Bond test of second order autocorrelation. 
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In applying the one-step system-GMM, the variables for overall financial development, Islamic 
banking growth, political stability and oil rent are treated as endogenous, and first and second 
lags of them are incorporated in the regression model. Theoretical and practical considerations, 
mentioned in the literature review, suggest treating GDP per capita growth, trade openness, 
industrialisation and rule of law as exogenous variables. 
Table 2.6 presents the findings of system-GMM estimator. In parallel with the fixed effect 
model, the results suggest that Islamic banking growth has insignificant effect on economic 
development in all of the four different regression models with the coefficients ranging 
between 0,007 and 0,01. This ensures that the transactional growth in Islamic banking sector 
observed throughout the decades could hardly bring about transformational achievement in the 
development processes of countries. In other words, the expansion and growth of Islamic 
banking sector in the financial system through its assets, deposits and investments has long 
way to generate developmentalist outcomes. It should be noted that in such a conclusion, the 
present relatively small size of Islamic banking sector within the national financial systems of 
the sampled countries has been considered. 
As depicted in Table 2.6, the overall banking growth, likewise, has no significant effect on HDI 
which is in parallel with our theoretical explanations. Since conventional banking system can 
hardly go beyond debt-based mechanism by concentrating on credit financing in developing 
countries and their fragile economies, sharing and participation dimensions of 
developmentalism in investment activities have been sacrificed to get exorbitant profits 
through creating riskless debt. In a more sophisticated way, it is apparent that conventional 
banking system is a product of capitalist economic system, which is transformed into a 
particular form, in its recent history, through a substantial pattern of financialisation. As part 
of the objective of creating financialised economy, conventional banks serve mainly for 
monopolistic multinational corporations (MNCs) to provide fund for their investment activities 
so that capital accumulation process is maintained within particular financial ways. The entire 
operations of such an economy is called as ‘monopolised capitalist economy’ (Foster 2007:3) 
wherein a huge amount of surplus is created by a very few number of MNCs. Capital, in such 
forms of economic systems, functions as speculative pursuit instead of long-term investment 
projects in the real economy. Therefore, there is no longer a direct connection between 
productive investment and financial assets. As such, societal implications of conventional 
banking assets bring adverse effects, since it contributes in making of a ‘casino society’, a term 
that was used first by Bianco (1985:78).   
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While fixed effect results suggest weak significance of a negative impact of GDP per capita 
growth on HDI, it now turns out to show insignificant but positive results in system-GMM 
results. This finding is surprising for most of the empirical researchers, because it is a rule of 
thumb in growth studies that a rise in GDP per capita should infer fostering economic growth. 
However, by taking into account the distribution issue, we expect such an inverse or weak 
positive relationship between GDP per capita growth and HDI, mainly for the countries in 
which an increase in total GDP exacerbates the income distribution gap through benefiting rich 
while leaving the poor unaffected or negatively affected. That means a good income smoothing 
is imprisoned in the abstract mathematical calculations rather than reflecting the real 
performance. 
This result necessitates re-examining the contemporary function of GDP and its historical 
evolution towards being an irrevocable benchmark for economic growth studies that aim to 
provide some evidences for economic wellbeing and social welfare. Accordingly, one must say 
that the very concept of GDP is a product of market-oriented thinking (Sandel 2012), which 
assumes all goods and services in an economy to be commensurable and translated into a 
particular measure. Therefore, its proponents claim that GDP is able to measure wellbeing or 
welfare. However, in fact, GDP does not mean anything beyond national income, as it is a 
made-up entity that dates back only to 1940s and constructed from an ambition of measuring 
national output during wartimes, since financing warfare was the motivation for GDP to rise 
in order to measure productive capacity to use scarce resources and labour in a most efficient 
way (Coyle 2014:9). Thus, GDP has never been intended to measure wellbeing and social 
welfare in a historical sense; for it naturally does not consider the consequences of economic 
growth. To give an example, the proliferation of scientific activities and technological process 
between 1940s and 1970s accompanied with a substantial increase in GDP; however, at the 
same period, the world was suffering from various socioeconomic problems including social 
revolts, protests and student movements, anarchy and conflict all around the world during the 
period in question. This means that wellbeing is not perfectly correlated with GDP per capita, 
as the consequences matter in shaping its boundaries. 
The role of trade openness in fuelling economic development does not meet the expectations 
due to its small but negatively significant effect. Thus, the implications of open trade in the 
sampled countries are in contradiction with the assumptions of neoclassical economics, which 
stipulates trade liberalisation for economic progress and hence essentialises free-market 
understanding derived from laissez-faire ideology. On the contrary, the findings match up with 
the Wallersteinan understanding of centre-periphery relations (Wallerstein 1974) in which 
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open trade is considered to be in favour of developed countries at the expense of impoverishing 
the rest. Therefore, global expansion of trade activities is accompanied with an adverse effect 
on development process of domestic economy. 
The influence of oil rent on economic development is somewhat contested issue, since, on the 
one hand, oil rich countries take advantage of its rent and inflow of petrodollars; while on the 
other hand, the lack of appropriate channels or desire to direct oil money into investable areas 
annihilates its potential to step those counties forward. In this circumstance, the future of oil 
rich countries, especially GCC region, hinges on the ways to reduce dependency to oil income 
and create, instead, knowledge-based economy understanding (see: Peterson 2009; Weber 
2011). However, oil rich countries today do not display, in general, productive economies, 
rather they inefficiently consume their sources and enjoy the advantages of oil richness 
amongst few riches. In recognition of this, system-GMM results suggest a poor but positive 
impact of oil rent over economic development. This is meaningful in the sense that the great 
potential of oil in expanding the frontiers of economic wealth is not fully realised due to 
political economy factors in oil rich countries such as the monopoly of oil revenue in the hands 
of few royal families; thereby, it only demonstrates a side effect over society, as shown in the 
coefficient of 0.01 and 0.02% in Table 2.6. 
As the results depicts in Table 2.6, industrialisation matters for economic development in all 
models, implying that the real economy side - especially manufacturing - should be 
strengthened to achieve welfare and prosperity in the national level. The coefficients in each 
model ranging between 3% and 4% evidences that the most contributing dimension of 
economic development comes from industrial development. 
The political economy factors, rule of law and political stability, do not seem to affect economic 
development significantly. Drawing special attention on it, political stability has a weak 
negative relationship with HDI based on the all models in Table 2.6. This can be interpreted in 
a way that either authoritarian or democratic regimes in the observed countries are unable to 
advance human development. Thus, this result suggests that redistributive justice mechanism 
must be located in the sample countries through reform or destabilisation in political sphere, 
which hence necessitates redistribution of political power. 
In crystalizing the nexus between Islamic banking growth and economic development, system-
GMM results imply that Islamic banking and finance has still a long-time to grow and expand, 
and, therefore, it should recourse to the developmentalist objectives in its development 
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trajectory identified by founding fathers of Islamic economics as signified by IME by operating 
within a system based on real asset backed financing and risk sharing nature rather than 
mimicking conventional financial system.  
2.5.3.3. Robustness analysis and alternative specifications: testing different variables for 
overall financial development 
After using different variables for Islamic banking growth to evidence to what extent the results 
are robust to the alterations in the conditioning information set and different variables, in this 
section, alternative measures for overall financial development is employed and the impact of 
Islamic banking growth on economic development - with the same indicators - is examined 
empirically. As the results in Table 2.7 demonstrates, in the first three model, private credit by 
bank and other financial institutions to GDP is used as an indicator for overall financial 
development instead of previously used private credit by deposit money banks to GDP. When 
the overall financial development is controlled for, Islamic banking growth variables show no 
difference with the previous results and indicates an insignificant impact on economic 
development. These three models show more or less the same results with the results in Table 
2.6. However, the rule of law turns out to have positive and significant effect in the first and 
third models. 
Model 4 and model 5 measures development of both Islamic banking and conventional 
financial system respectively by their asset and deposit size. Not differently, these two 
variables remain insignificant, and other variables and their statistical significance levels 
mostly do not alter. These results suggest once again that Islamic banks should reconsider its 
potential contributions to developmentalist objectives by giving more emphasis on risk and 







Table 2.7: Alternative Variables for Overall Financial Development: System GMM 
Estimations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GDP per capita 
0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0002 0.0001 
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0002] 
Trade openness 
-0.0000** -0.0000* -0.0001** -0,0001 0.0001 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0001] [0.0000] 
Oil rent 
0.0002* 0.0002** 0.0002* 0,0001 0.0003* 
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Industrialisation 
0.0428*** 0.0452*** 0.0442*** 0.0546* 0.0717** 
[0.0137] [0.0141] [0.0127] [0.0300] [0.0326] 
Rule of law 
0.0002* 0,0001 0,0001 0.0001 0.0002* 
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Political stability 
-0,0001 -0,0001 -0,0001 0.0001 -0,0001 
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Overall financial 
development 
0,0001 0,0001 0,0001    
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]    
Financing by Islamic 
banks/GDP 
0,0068      
[0.0089]      
Assets of Islamic 
banks/GDP 
 0,0021  0,0071   
 [0.0077]  [0.0072]   
Deposits of Islamic 
banks/GDP 
  0,0031  0,0067 
  [0.0050]  [0.0049] 
Financial system 
assets/GDP 
   0.0001   
   [0.0001]   
Financial system 
deposits/GDP 
    0,0001 
    [0.0001] 
Constant 
0,0161 0,0162 0,0133 -0,0141 0,0216 
[0.0201] [0.0246] [0.0215] [0.0200] [0.0261] 
N 231 231 231 231 231 
Hansen-prob. 0.111 0.107 0.080 0.110 0.201 
AR2-prob. 0.524 0.555 0.550 0.959 0.586 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
AR(2): Arellano and Bond test of second order autocorrelation. 
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2.5.3.4. Sensitivity analysis 
Further to conducting robustness analysis through alternative measures, conducted first with 
the variables of Islamic banking growth, and then that of overall financial development, Table 
2.8 illustrates sensitivity analysis based on the change in sample composition through the share 
of Muslim population above 50%20 and 65%21, and net oil exporter countries22. By doing so, it 
would be possible to assess whether the effect of Islamic banking on economic development 
substantially differ in countries with high share of Muslim population. In addition, another 
regression was undertaken by sampling only net oil exporter countries to empirically examine 
if Islamic banks perform relatively better in oil rich countries. In the case that the results 
confirm such a significance, then we would infer that oil money helps contributing economic 
development through their efficient use by Islamic banks. 
The first sample is constructed by considering those countries that have more than 50% Muslim 
population share, while in the second sample the percentage was increased to 65%. In both 
regression results as depicted in Table 2.8, Islamic banking growth, overall financial 
development and trade liberalisation present no significance over HDI, whereas GDP per 
capita, oil rent and industrialisation imply positive effect at least 1% significance level. 
Interestingly, political economy factors become an important determinant of economic 
development in the sample constructed by the condition of Muslim population share above 
65%. It should be noted that the signs of each variable are in line with our theoretical premises. 
Lastly, regression results, by using the sample constructed with the net oil importer countries, 
suggest that industrialisation and oil rent do matter for economic development, whilst the rest 
of variables are far from fuelling development trajectories of countries. 
2.6. CONCLUSION 
The entire debate on finance-growth nexus enriched with the explorations of empirical studies 
surfaces the inferiority of mainstream approach towards human wellbeing, growth and 
development issues particularly in a world where finance is drastically being disembedded 
from economy (the bifurcation of finance and economy). As the incontestable prevalence of 
                                                        
20 After applying this condition, we excluded Bosnia, South Africa and the United Kingdom from the dataset, and 
hence number of countries decreased to 18. Also, as the sample size decreases, we only used the first lag of 
endogenous variables since, otherwise, the number of instruments were exceeding the number of groups. 
21 Here, we had to make further exclusions of Lebanon and Malaysia in addition to Bosnia, South Africa and the 
United Kingdom. Therefore, we only had 16 countries in the cross-section data. Similarly, the first lags are taken 
into account for the endogenous variables. 
22 As mentioned before, the structure of robustness analyses is inspired by the work of Imam & Kpodar (2016). 
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growth concept against development is evident in the theoretical discussions and empirical 
studies, almost every discursive study and quantitatively empirical research refer to growth in 
order to elucidate the impact of finance-related institutional and non-institutional effects on 
individual, society and whole economy. 
In a similar vein, with the evolvement of economies into a heavy financialisation pattern which 
necessarily accompanies with a substantial change in the goal of economic activities, the role 
of finance has been sacralised in accomplishing the exigencies of economic growth with a basic 
motivation of establishing finance-intensive policies of economic development. 
However, finance has no longer been deemed to reveal developmentalist consequences through 
improving individual’s capabilities and functions, and necessarily enhancing economic 
performance, but the aim with the financialisation process is rather to employ an opportunity 
space, independent from the objectives above, where various incumbents, pressure groups and 
rent seekers aim to financiate and commodificate values and things through various financial 
institutions (multinational companies, stock markets, banks and etc.) and instruments, whereby 
these can be sold in the market as a commodity which allows for the interest groups to make 
private gains from them. 
Through comprehension of the substantiation of finance-growth nexus subrogating 
developmentalist objectives, it becomes clear why financial development and its impacts on 
socioeconomic life are narrowly dealt by mainstream economists with such indicators of 
capital, savings, investment, technology and so on. These indicators incommensurately show 
one side of the coin which explains finance-based economic growth models irrespective of 
touching upon social, political and cultural dimensions of economic activities. A distinction 
between growth and development, hence, is not subject to extensive concern from a 
conventional point of view in regard to effects of finance on different aspects of life. The utmost 
concern is the growth of investment activities and the proliferation of capital as reflected 
through the idea of ‘capital fundamentalism’ (King and Levine 1994), so that finance would 
become more widespread all over the world, which consecutively leads to spurn 
developmentalist aims of economic activities. 
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Table 2.8: Sensitivity Analysis: Change in Sample Composition (System GMM Estimations) 
  Muslim population share above 50%   Muslim population share above 65%   Net oil exporter countries 
  (1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3) 
GDP per capita 
0.0002* 0.0003** 0.0002*   0.0002* 0.0002** 0,0002   0,0001 0,0002 0,0001 
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]   [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]   [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Trade openness 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001   0.0001 0.0001 0.0001   -0.0000* -0.0001* 0.0001 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0001]   [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]   [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Oil rent 
0,0001 0.0003* 0,0001   0.0001* 0.0002** 0.0001**   0.0003** 0.0003*** 0.0004*** 
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]   [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]   [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Industrialisation 
0.0745** 0.0758*** 0.0723**   0,0415 0.0431* 0,0441   0.0711*** 0.0722*** 0.0731*** 
[0.0305] [0.0283] [0.0320]   [0.0344] [0.0254] [0.0300]   [0.0196] [0.0198] [0.0197] 
Rule of law 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001   0,0001 0.0001** 0.0001**   0,0001 0.0001 0,0001 
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]   [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]   [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Political stability 
-0.0002* -0,0001 -0,0002   -0.0001** -0.0002** -0.0002***   -0,0001 -0,0001 -0,0002 
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]   [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]   [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Overall financial 
development 
-0,0003 -0,0001 -0,0003   -0,0001 0.0001 -0,0001   0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
[0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0002]   [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]   [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Financing by Islamic 
banks/GDP 
0,0212     0,0067     0,0249    
[0.0144]     [0.0070]     [0.0176]    
Assets of Islamic 
banks/GDP 
  0,0071     0,0006     0,0214   
  [0.0085]     [0.0039]     [0.0250]   
Deposits of Islamic 
banks/GDP 
  0,01     0,0031     0,0096 
  [0.0082]     [0.0029]     [0.0094] 
Constant -0,0353 -0,0264 -0,0384   -0,0111 -0,006 -0,0091   -0,004 -0,0108 0,0021 
  [0.0356] [0.0277] [0.0348]   [0.0122] [0.0108] [0.0093]   [0.0167] [0.0189] [0.0146] 
N 198 198 198   176 176 176   176 176 176 
Hansen-prob. 0.234 0.220 0.312   0.172 0.097 0.123   0.476 0.458 0.405 
AR2-prob. 0.576 0.718 0.611   0.827 0.844 0.852   0.653 0.606 0.714 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. AR(2): Arellano and Bond test of second order 
autocorrelation.
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Beyond growth orientedness, development reflecting the dynamic analysis above transcends 
economic considerations and stimulates a substantial change in the existing functioning of 
economic, social, legal and political institutions. In this manner, as IME envisages, 
development can be defined as a continuous process which paves the way for an equilibrium 
amongst improvements in different structures (social, economic, political, cultural and etc.) 
through the embedment of morality at the core of whole development agenda, so that any 
potentially contradictory situation between these structures is nipped in the bud by the moral 
mechanism. This approach necessitates that financial structure of an economy should be 
substantiated with the above-defined developmentalist perspective, which also reflects the 
aspirations of Islamic developmentalism, as rububiyah and tazkiyah concepts essentialise 
development as a core objective within emancipation and empowerment objectives of Islam. 
Thus, finance-development nexus, which is essential to be explored from this point of view, 
has barely been undertaken in conventional and heterodox economic systems in a systematic 
manner. What have already been studied extensively in the entire literature is finance-growth 
nexus as response to the basic question about the role of finance on the development of human, 
society and economy; therefore, hardly any study has attempted to ‘go beyond the box’ in 
delving into ‘finance-development nexus’, which, hence, has created a significant gap in the 
mentioned literature.  
This study argues that Islamic finance industry has experienced a similar transformation in its 
objectives through the influences of conventional theoretical underpinnings and practices of 
financing, although the emergence and existence of Islamic finance initially relates to 
‘developmentalist’ objectives and ‘substantive morality’ of IME as advanced, in a modern 
meaning, since 1960s. This argument is evidenced empirically by examining the relationship 
between Islamic banking growth and economic development; accordingly, the results show 
that Islamic banking has no significant impact on human development standing far away from 
developmentalist trajectories of countries, albeit founding fathers of Islamic economics 
institutionalised Islamic banking to serve for both financial and social development 
harmonically as tazkiyah axiom suggests. As Islamic finance could not fulfil such an objective 
due to the gradual convergence towards mainstream finance, it must be concluded that as long 
as Islamic finance mimics the conventional financialisation trend, empirical studies that 
examine Islamic banking-development nexus would not have any implications other than 
stating the failure and evidencing this through different estimation models. 
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This study, therefore, aims to fill this gap by incorporating Islamic developmentalism into the 
debate within expanding and growing Islamic finance. By the same token, it suggests a re-
examination of the role of Islamic finance on economic, social, legal and political structures 
through breaking the finance-growth link and offering a finance-development relationship 
instead, through which financialisation is avoided by considering ‘financing’ as part of 
embeddedness. This study, hence, aims to think ‘beyond the box’ by essentialising an 
embedded nature of finance through developmentalism in the form of human well-being 
instead of considering and stigmatising everything around us as ‘capital’ (such as ‘human 
capital’, ‘social capital’, ‘intellectual capital’ etc.). This neo-classical fallacy of re-constructing 
everything as ‘capital’ is not considered to be the frame of analysis in this study, as it aims to 
deconstruct the notion of ‘capital’ being attributed as the source of ‘growth and development’; 
and therefore, aims to use ‘moral economy frame’ to assess the ‘financing and development’. 
As opposed to such an imagination, in the current practice, IBF favours capital domination 
within Islamic banks as evidenced in its operational areas including modes of finance, sectorial 
distribution of financing, and governance structure. For this reason, Islamic banks has never 
brought about momentous changes in development trajectories of countries wherein they keep 
operating. The ihsani process, essentialised in Islamic developmentalism, is not addressed in 
the Islamic financial area as a profit and loss sharing activity, but rather individualist and self-
maximisation motives have taken place at the core of financial transactions. Thus, self-
development has never been accompanied with societal development. In this manner, for 
instance, Islamic banks intensify their financing modes on fictitious products that resemble 
conventional financial transactions, such as the case with organised tawarruq, which is 
considered to be both un-lawful and immoral as the fatwa of International Fiqh Academy of 
OIC states but practised by Islamic banks under market pressure and capital efficiency. In a 
similar manner, in the corporate level, Islamic banks’ shareholder value-oriented governance 
structure is at odds with the ideal Islamic corporate governance, as the statistical records 
measured for shareholder value orientation evidence.  
These examples explicitly demonstrate that market system and price mechanism push its own 
self-regulated nature on Islamic finance and shape its current and future practices not to diverge 
from capital-oriented activities of finance whereby it gains global recognition. More broadly, 
Islamic finance is kept within the boundaries of old norms shaped by capital predominance, 
and hence it is not allowed to constitute an alternative to the prevailing financial system by 
submitting to the established capital forms and norms rather than re-defining capital as Islamic 
economics suggests. However, as Islamic developmentalism suggests, Islamic finance would 
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emerge as a bottom-up demand from society to meet financial needs of individuals under a 
simple but functional role of ‘financing’ vis-à-vis a self-proclaimed ‘finance’ understanding 
constructed by mainstream economics. Nevertheless, it could not position itself within a moral 
economy understanding and has always targeted to shine out as an alternative market segment 
within global financial system. The gradual process of diverging from moral economy 
perspective is elucidated through historical facts and conditions of Muslim world surrounded 
by a new regulation of world financial system in the post-war period. In this sense, Islamic 
banks borrowed the existing regulations and standards of mainstream financial system to apply 
over their banking system such as (LIBOR); thereby, it was implicitly accepted that the 
challenges in legal issues, risk natures and operational model can be resolved through 
conventional prescriptions. 
The next chapter, accordingly, expands the scope of non-developmental or financial expansion 
of Islamic finance and its capital fundamentalism through the introduction of the notion of 
Islamic financialisation, which has barely been associated in the literature of Islamic economics 
due to an unwitting negligence of the term by practitioners and theoreticians. Therefore, it 
argues that the social failure roots in, to a large extent, the adopted financial logic borrowed 
from mainstream economics whereby the utmost importance is given to financial sector to take 
place and substantialise at the core of economic activities. In evidencing Islamic 
financialisation, the chapter also conducts some econometric analysis whereby Islamic 
financial operations are examined thoroughly.  
In furthering and crystallising the debate, Chapter 4 associates the elaborated challenges and 
failures of Islamic finance with methodological obscurity in defining the objectives of Islamic 
economics. In other words, both developmentalist failure of Islamic finance and the 
financialisation process ascertained that the initial concern with theory making should be on 
methodological issues, for knowledge can only be authenticated through a rigorous 
methodology. Considering maqasid al-Shari’ah as the methodological base of Islamic 
economics and finance, Chapter 4 identifies that the observed developmentalist challenges as 
evidenced in this study relates also the way maqasid al-Shari’ah is considered and interpreted 
by academics, practitioners as well as Shari’ah scholars in IBF. In search for addressing 
methodological dimension, in a response, hence, Chapter 4 develops its proactive maqasid al-
Shari’ah framework as the essential methodology of Islamic economics so that the 
consequences of IBF can be moderated in favour of economic and social development, as even 
the conventional banks and financial institutions are given the task of fulfilling SDGs. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FINANCIALISATION AND DISEMBEDDEDNESS IN ISLAMIC 
BANKING: CRITICAL DISCOURSE AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 





Islamic finance, as the phrase implies, embraces a peculiar mode of finance which grounds its 
theoretical underpinnings to Islamic economics paradigm, and hence, operates within the ambit 
of Islamic legal rules and moral obligations. As can be inferred, it is motivated by religious 
concern of facilitating an exclusive financial system that is constructed by Islamic principles, 
values and norms. Contrary to the interest-based nature of global financial system through 
which exorbitant profits are realised at the expense of impoverishing rest of the world, IFIs aim 
to circumvent social imbalance triggered by interest issue in their original imaginations – as 
Qur’an (2: 278-9) prohibits riba (interest) – by positing ‘profit and loss sharing’ and ‘risk-
sharing’ operations of financing within the umbrella of ‘sharing and participatory economy’ 
paradigm. 
3.1.1. Problem Statement 
Established four decades ago and proliferated in a short span of time across the globe, Islamic 
finance, at its state of art, is extolled for its performance to show an unprecedented success in 
achieving a continuous growth in terms of asset size, and for its financial services reaching an 
overall total value of US$1.893 trillion as of 2016 (Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) 
2017:7). Despite the share of Islamic financial assets ($1.893 trillion) remains only 1% of the 
global financial market of US$127 trillion (Ernst and Young (E&Y) 2016), Islamic Financial 
Institutions (henceforth, IFIs) are increasingly becoming part and parcel of the global financial 
system. This, in return, leads to the expectation that the momentum gained with Islamic finance 
should accompany with economic wellbeing across its operating fields due to the fact that 
financial development would necessarily foster economic growth (see: King and Levine 1993; 
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Demetriades and Luintel 1996; Rousseau and Wachtel 1998; Beck, Georgiadis and Straub 2014 
amongst others) and generate economic and social welfare in a wider sense. 
While Islamic finance secures its position in the global financial order by introducing new 
products and permeating through untapped fields, its distinguishing feature of being a religion-
based model –rather than self-regulated market system- engenders some challenges in 
integrating into global, secular, modern and capitalistic characteristics of mainstream finance. 
This is due to the reason that Islam attaches certain principles to financial activities such as 
prohibitions of riba (interest), gharar (excessive uncertainty) and maysir (gambling), whereas 
conventional financial markets trust self-regulation without reliance on divine knowledge to 
lead its activities. This obliges Islamic finance scholars to adopt either an authentic but 
necessarily non-globalised financial system within the boundaries of Islamic law, or a hybrid 
system that mimics conventional finance but renders relatively more efficient performance with 
its quite often questionable activities in terms of conforming to the essence of Islamic legal and 
moral rulings. 
Remembering ethical principles embedded in its foundational premises, Islamic finance also 
aims to reveal developmentalist consequences in the form of social good in such a challenging 
atmosphere. Developmentalism as a social objective in financial activities of Muslim societies 
was mainly essentialised by the founding fathers of Islamic economics, who considered Islamic 
finance to be ethically driven industry that has to exhibit thriving ‘social performance’ by 
‘contributing to development’ as well as financial performance (see: Mannan 1970; Chapra 
1979; Zarqa 1980; Siddiqi 1981; Choudhury 1986; Ahmad 1994; Naqvi 2003 amongst others). 
Examining at its economic outlook within its experiment over the last forty years, it can be 
somewhat asserted that IFIs are financially performing moderate (Hassan and Aliyu 2018); 
however, while developmentalist contributions are reckoned with, they lag far behind the 
aspired level and failed to accommodate social performance. The observed developmentalist 
failure is evidenced in the previous chapter (Chapter 2), where an empirical analysis on whether 
Islamic banking contributes to economic development patterns in selected Muslim dominated 
countries is presented. By selecting Human Development Index (HDI) as the proxy for 
economic development, and the total financing and total asset values of selected Islamic banks, 
as opposed to the expectations and aspirations, the study concluded that Islamic banking has 
poor contributions to economic development trajectories of the sampled countries. Such a poor 
social and developmentalist contribution or weak transformational performance is labelled as 
‘social failure’ in relation to the aspirations, while the current practice is conceptualised as ‘the 
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second-best solution’ (Asutay 2012, 2007b). This study relates the observed social failure of 
Islamic banks (IBs) to and argues that one of the sources of such a failure is the 
‘financialisation’ phenomenon in the sense of centring ‘finance’ in the form of ‘financial’ in 
economic activities.  
As a flourishing conceptualisation - of the practice of the historical trajectory of finance - in 
the heterodox literature, financialisation represents a systemic transformation of capitalist 
economies during the last few decades that brought about a sharp divergence between 
economic and financial activities in favour of booming finance in the face of performing 
productive economy as part of the shift towards finance-led capitalism. As the idea of Islamic 
economics burgeoned at this stage of capitalist world system, this study argues that Islamic 
finance emerged as a product of post-colonial discourse through negotiation between religion 
and finance, the trajectory of which has, however, been shaped with the inspiration from 
financialisation phenomenon resulting into convergence.  
Financialisation of Islamic finance, therefore, represents the significant rise of modern debt-
based Islamic financial instruments within the real sector, which dilute risk and profit-loss 
sharing objectives of Islamic finance significantly and has scarce impact on productive aspects 
of economy. It may seem misleading at first that there should not be a clear delinking of finance 
from economy in the case of Islamic finance due to its asset-backed feature that implies having 
strong ties with the real sector. However, in fact, the asset-backed characteristic is used 
instrumentally to appear within the frontiers of Shari’ah compliant financial activities. Thus, 
the consequential aspects of modern debt-based Islamic financial transactions show broad 
affinities with conventional financial system. The difference between conventional and Islamic 
financialisation, hence, emerges out of the impossibility of a total elimination of asset-backed 
feature of Islamic finance due to Shari’ah considerations, albeit this feature has limited 
implications for productive economy. Once the consequence-oriented evaluation is adopted, 
most applications of debt-based instruments such as murabahah, tawarruq and sukuk should 
be reconsidered in light of their long-run impacts on economy and society. For instance, while, 
on the one hand, murabahah relates to the real economy through financing consumer durables, 
the long-run impacts would be the proliferation of debt within the economy that resembles the 
experience in the Western countries in terms of giving rise to devastating crisis whereby IFIs 
yield the same financialisation consequence as conventional finance. 
Based on such a positioning, one cannot expect developmentalist objectives from IFIs in an 
environment of financialised economy, for financialisation is itself a project of eliminating 
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human element in economic relations through submerging human interaction in a nexus of 
financial relations, which enunciates the dominance and power of capital over other 
stakeholders, while riba prohibition refers to questioning the overwhelming hegemony of 
capital over other stakeholders including human (Asutay 2018).  Therefore, Polanyi (1944), 
considers the emergence of social protections movements as rescuing human, land, labour and 
capital, which has recently been echoed by Pope Francis (2015) in his call for ending hegemony 
of techno-economic paradigm to free human. This research, hence, aims at developing a critical 
perspective on Islamic finance through the lens of political economy of financialisation to 
explore as to how Islamic finance has converged towards financialisation objective away from 
Islamic aspirational claims of authenticity. 
3.1.2. Aims, Objectives and Research Questions 
In an attempt to develop a critical discourse analysis on the notion of financialisation from the 
Islamic Political Economy perspective and substantiate it with some empirical evidence, this 
study aims to reconsider both achievements and social failure of Islamic finance under the 
context of ‘financialisation of Islamic finance’, and hence reorient entire debate into political 
economy realm. It is argued, hence, that the emergence and systematic institutionalisation of 
modern Islamic finance industry in 1960s was not a coincidental development, but rather highly 
influenced from the essentialisation of finance dominated economic system (amongst the 
studies emphasising political economy aspects of Islamic finance and its relationship with 
finance-dominated global economic system, see: Pollard and Samers 2007; Azarian 2011; 
Rethel 2011; Mohamad and Saravanamuttu 2015; Hoggarth 2016). Thus, Islamic finance could 
only become an in-paradigm alternative within debt-based economic environment. This 
chapter, therefore, aims to challenge the observed and developing Islamic financialisation as 
an attempt that it is invariably fictitious in nature and is a government-led top-down process in 
most of the countries where Islamic finance is visible, rather than an outcome of bottom-up 
demand for Islamic social services. 
Along with this, it suggests an Islamic Political Economy approach to financialisation through 
which the nature, evolvement and burdens of financialised economies together with its 
implications on individual and social life are reconsidered in the light of Islamic ontology and 
epistemology. Accordingly, it deploys a critical discourse analysis on financialisation within 
Islamic Political Economy frame by giving particular attention to the exploration of Islamic 
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financialisation.23 In doing so, Polanyian understanding of embeddedness is adopted to address 
how Islamic financialisation impacts on social formation of Muslim societies by creating 
commodification and disembedment through Islamic finance operations.  
Upon elaborating the theoretical construction of Islamic financialisation and its discursive 
analysis in a comprehensive manner, subsequently, an empirical analysis is conducted by 
examining the practical aspects of Islamic finance as a financialising activity within Islamic 
economics paradigm. Thus, the empirical part evidences as to how Islamic finance engenders 
a financialised view of (Islamic) economics through its operations. Specifically, it examines 
the impact of the ascendance of Islamic finance on financialisation trajectory of entire 
economy, with a panel of 14 Muslim-dominated countries covering the period of 2002-2014, 
to ascertain whether operations of Islamic finance, by and large, strengthen real economy or 
contribute to further financialisation in economies where domestic market share of Islamic 
finance reaches medium or high systematic importance. Accordingly, it employs a quantitative 
methodology in the second half of the research and makes use of secondary data with an 
unbalanced panel data analysis. A range of econometric techniques are utilised including 
pooled OLS, random effect and system-GMM estimators to address heterogeneity, over-
identification and endogeneity issues. 
In line with the aims and objectives of this study, following research questions are developed: 
RQ1: What are the historical dynamics behind the emergence of Islamic finance as a hybrid 
financial product and institution instead of an authentic alternative to global financial system? 
RQ2: In what sense does Islamic finance fail to operate beyond market economy understanding 
and becomes invariably disembedded and financialising economic practice? 
RQ3: What are the theoretical boundaries and scope of Islamic financialisation? 
RQ4: What are the institutional and practical implications of Islamic financialisation? 
RQ5: To what extent Islamic banking has contributed to financialisation in the countries where 
it has certain presence? 
                                                        
23 In this study reference to ‘Islamic financialisation’ should not be understood in the form of Islam suggesting or 
resulting into ‘financialisation. This simply means ‘financialisation of Islamic banks and financial institutions’. 
However, in order to prevent the usage of definition (financialisation of Islamic banks/financial institutions), in 
this chapter occasionally the term ‘Islamic financialisation’ is used instead of ‘financialisation of Islamic finance’. 
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While the study aims to respond to these research questions, the rest of the chapter is organised 
as follow: Section 3.2 presents a foundational ground on the concept of financialisation by 
exploring its emergence and historical development through shedding light on the political 
economy atmosphere of the 20th century. Section 3.3 elaborates different approaches towards 
financialisation consisting of mainstream and heterodox economics understandings. Section 
3.6 develops a moral economy approach upon financialisation phenomenon by examining 
Islamic finance industry in particular. However, before doing this, it necessarily addresses the 
nature, function and dimensions of moral economy understanding in Section 3.4, while the 
historical evolution, identity formation, substantive morality and the crosschecking system of 
Islamic moral economy is dissected in Section 3.5. After debating financialisation of Islamic 
finance in theoretical manner, an econometric analysis is conducted in Section 3.7 to examine 
whether theoretical argument is evidenced by econometric application. 
3.2. FINANCIALISATION: A CONCEPTUAL EXPLORATION AND HISTORICAL 
TRAJECTORY OF ITS EMERGENCE 
It is evident in the mainstream literature that the concept of financialisation had drawn little 
attention amongst academics until the 2007 global financial crisis. Heterodox economists, on 
the other hand, have explored and examined the concept more intimately, though still limited, 
for decades by considering the significantly rising share of finance in the whole economic 
activities to be a besetting factor against social justice, equity and development. While, in the 
aftermath of the crisis, mainstream economic theorists have hardly recognised the devastating 
effects and predatory character of financialisation, political economy theorists, economic 
sociologists and other schools of thoughts put more attention on the phenomenon and made 
significant contributions to crystallise the dangers of finance-led projects of economic growth. 
The literature on financialisation, hence, is slowly but substantially expanding with such 
contributions. 
In this section, firstly, a brief overview about economic and political developments in the last 
century is discussed to contextualise the shift in the economic activities by the emerging 
dominance of financial activities and its movement towards the centre of economic operations. 
Then, acknowledging the historical roots of financialisation, the emergence and ascendance of 
the concept, multifarious definitions and approaches towards financialisation, key institutional 
players of financialisation, and its detrimental effects are addressed with a critical perspective. 
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3.2.1. The Way towards Financialisation 
In the last century, some concepts have been widely propounded to describe certain 
transformations and shifts that took place in the recent history of the world. As such, 
globalisation, internationalisation, neoliberalism, post-colonialism – and many others having 
at the end of the word ‘-ism’ or ‘-ation’ as suffix – point out a particular series of evolutionary 
or direct changes in patterns, habits and functioning of individuals, institutions and society in 
general. Financialisation is such a term used to describe roughly somehow the profound rise of 
finance in the gravity of economic activities. In a more sophisticated way, financialisation 
signifies the transformation of mature capitalist economies into a new direction. In order to 
elaborate more on the concept, it is essential first to explore the economic and political 
environment in which financialisation has emerged and has been permeating through different 
spheres during the last few decades. 
Resting on the Enlightenment philosophy, mainstream economic understanding, namely neo-
classical economics, in the 20th century pursues the premises of positivist rationality and 
materialist worldview rejecting all metaphysical ideas and approaches by massing them in the 
basket of ‘superstition’ resulting into withering of religious knowledge and also ethical 
positioning.24 In this regard, it relies on market mechanism to function as a social institution 
that regulates and determines the whole process of production, distribution and exchange. 
Besides, market system is conceived to function as the principal subject of fulfilling common 
good or public interest. Thus, both political and economic institutions are designed to be 
subservient to the idealised markets. The historical rise of finance in the 20th century represents 
this logic of idealised markets, as discussed in detail in the following sections. 
3.2.1.1. The post-war boom 
If the overall trajectory of the ascendance of finance is split into periods, the first period should 
last from the World War II to the 1970s, while the second period is still proceeding for the last 
four decades. The first phase of the financialisation process is termed multifariously, such as 
‘the thirty golden years’ (Dembinski 2009), ‘the era of Fordism’ (Boyer 2000) or ‘the post-war 
boom’ (Tauss 2012). In concomitance with the end of the war, a new way of organising 
economic and social relations is adopted in this period that is characterised by the Fordist model 
of accumulation, the Keynesian welfare state and the Bretton woods system (Tauss 2012:54). 
                                                        
24 For an extensive approach towards neoliberal economics and its reconceptualization of ethics and well-being, 
see the works of Sen (1985, 1990, 1993).  
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Fordism, originating in the US, basically introduced new production methods to increase 
productivity and efficiency (Holman 1993:221). However, not limited with the economic 
aspect, it has had impact of reorganising the society by imposing the American consumption 
model and lifestyle (Dembinski 2009:15) on the ‘rest’ through the booming new technical and 
cultural innovations such as mass motorisation, the aircraft industry, new media of mass 
communication (TV and radio), the markets for mass consumer durables (washing machines, 
refrigerators etc.) (Deutschmann 2011:377).  
Together with the Fordist model, Keynesian welfare state policies fostered Europe’s industrial 
growth that was once interrupted by the war. These policies, further, brought along low 
unemployment though inflation was rising, relative increase in real mass income, and notable 
decrease in income inequality compared to the period between wars (Phillips 2002). Along 
with the improvement and expansion of the higher education, a number of developments were 
observed in the conditions of working class. Due to the paid employment becoming widespread 
and rising standard of living, working class became aware of ‘cultural embourgeoisement’ (see: 
Bulmer 2016; Goldthorpe, Lockwood, Bechhofer, and Platt 1968). As the international labour 
markets were developing, career opportunities in international institutions emerged; which in 
return, provided a chance for social mobility from working class into the new middle class 
(Breen 2004). 
The Bretton Woods system, on the other hand, was established as an institutional framework 
for the post-war world economy. Its main function was to provide a particular monetary and 
regulatory framework for the world economies as an intergovernmental system. This 
framework aimed to develop international trade mechanism through gradually reducing trade 
barriers, provide the convertibility of the US dollar into gold at $35 to the ounce, hence 
allowing for a currency system based on fixed exchange rate regime, and invest more on 
research and development programs. These objectives would be fulfilled by establishing some 
international institutions such as World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Until its collapse, the Bretton Woods system 
prevailed as the cornerstone of world economic system. 
3.2.1.2. Post-Fordist era 
The second phase in which finance took more profound effects is labelled as ‘the euphoric 
years’ (Dembinski 2009) or ‘the era of post-Fordism’ (Amin 1994). The apparent feature of 
this period lies on the shift from Keynesianism (in the central economies) and import 
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substitution industrialisation (in the peripheral economies) towards neoliberalism as a 
dominant economic policy making (Radice 2005:91). 
It is argued that under the neoliberal ideology “human well-being can be best advanced by 
liberating individual entrepreneurial freedom and skills within an institutional framework 
characterized by strong property rights, free markets, and free trade” (Harvey 2005:2). As can 
be inferred, the application of neoliberalist economic policies has paved the way for free 
movement of capital in the form of goods and services without any boundary lines, which 
eventually tightens the interdependence of diverse economies and breakdowns economic 
barriers. Additionally, Kotz (2010:3) explains the economic consequences of neoliberalism as: 
a withdrawal by the state from the role of guiding and regulating economic activity; 
privatisation of state enterprises and public services; the slashing of state social programs; a 
shift to regressive forms of taxation; a shift from cooperation between capital and labour to a 
drive by capital, with aid from the state, to fully dominate labour; and the replacement of co-
respective behaviour among large corporations by unrestrained competition. Neoliberalism 
has an associated ideology of worship of the so-called “free market” along with a denial of 
any positive role for the state apart from its coercive functions. 
In the light of these developments, liberating the market by removing obstacles – trade barriers, 
the state apparatus, pro-labour policies etc. – has transformed the class structure and social 
formation of societies through which capital owners hold mainly their wealth in the form of 
financial assets, while the majority of managerial class derives profit in the form of wage/salary 
and bonuses (Duménil and Lévy 2005). 
It is an undoubted fact that the embedding of neoclassical policies in the economic activities 
ignited rapid economic globalisation and internationalised method of production and 
distribution. However, the early 1970s unearthed another fact that most of the mature 
economies were suffering from a significant decline in their economic growth levels and 
concomitant falling profit rates. As the ramifications of this, advanced economies were now 
facing a substantial slowdown of capital accumulation, multiplication of inequality gap and 
more frequent and sharper crisis potential (Lapavitsas 2013:2). Based on these effects, the 
decline of growth, accumulation crisis and profitability crisis were all associated with the 
subversive stagnation within the productive sector. It is, hence, important to detect underlying 
causes of stagnation in the productive sector. 
Together with the effect of rising inflation between 1960s and 1970s, one of the rationale for 
the slowing down of global economy was related to the increasingly competitive environment 
in the industrialised markets. The competition progressively intensified due to capital owners’ 
pursuit of surplus extraction through technological advancement and new machinery 
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equipment. This, in return, brought over-capacity and additional costs, which eventually result 
in decrease in investments and profits (Tauss 2012:55). The developments in the labour market, 
on the other hand, were also significant in the 1960s. In the course of the economic boom, trade 
unions became more powerful by organising themselves well in the negotiations of labour 
wage. Subsequently, enforcing employers to compromise on high wage levels, profitability 
declined further and deepened the crisis (Harvey 2010). 
The withering away of economic boom and the crisis of Fordist model of accumulation reached 
to its peak with the oil shock of 1973 and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. Beside 
the oil price shock, as extensively elaborated in the previous section, the end of Bretton Woods 
system meant that the dollar was no longer convertible to gold and fixed exchange rate regime 
gave its way to instable exchange and interest rates. Trusting on the neoliberal policies, a new 
era in the functioning of economic system has been commenced in the wake of the collapse of 
the Bretton Woods system, known as post-Fordist era. Stagnated production and the 
profitability crisis had been overcome by mainly deregulating international finance and rising 
private banking. In other words, the exorbitant profits brought back to capital owners not 
through boosting production and investment activities in the real sector, but rather through 
investing on financial markets by some abstract sophistications. Therefore, in general, the 
expansion of financial sector was a response to the economic downturn (Epstein 2005), and 
post-Fordism has changed the function of finance from being an ordinary facilitator of 
accumulation process to be the catalyst behind economic growth (Duménil and Lévy 2005:13).  
The new institutional setting is designed by “proliferation of securities markets, risky 
derivatives trading, massive speculation, the rise of hedge funds” (Tauss 2012:69), “the growth 
of private financial assets, the rise of financial services, mutual funds and institutional 
investors” (Deutschmann 2011:377). The money, hence, moved into financial markets to be 
used in these sectors in order to make abnormal profit. It can also be asserted that the gravity 
of economic activity shifted into financial sphere, and henceforth “economies are increasingly 
driven by movements in the price of real estate and financial assets” (Stockhammer 2012:40). 
At this juncture, the role of information and communication technologies should not be 
underestimated in terms of their contribution to the expansion of finance (for more details see: 
Dembinski 2009:24). 
In the new setting, two revolutionary changes have taken place; ‘corporate revolution’ and 
‘managerial revolution’. The former “refers to the formation of large corporations, backed and 
controlled by finance” (Duménil and Lévy 2001:582). Enjoying largely from the liberalisation 
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of capital movement which necessarily creates international debt relations, these transnational 
corporations operate within the monopolistic and oligopolistic market structures and stand at 
the centre of economic activities by aiming at extracting financial profits in lieu of engaging in 
productive activities that brings relatively lower profits. The shift from production to finance 
as the main wealth generating mechanism within the corporate revolution necessarily 
accompanied with rising inequality and social polarisation of income levels. More concretely, 
inequality and income polarisation worsened by the result of firms’ reluctance in investing in 
productive activities, since profits are often accrued from financial investments, which goes 
back to financial activity to make more profit. The low levels of productive activities, in return, 
caused stagnation of real wages; thus, wage earners’ indebtedness increased (der Zwan 2014). 
As the financial sphere seemed shining in the sense of efficiency and profit making, employees 
in the financial sector received salary much higher than employees in other jobs. Thus, “the 
rapid distribution of national income towards capital owners and away from labour” (Wade 
2005:4), and income generated through financial investment are found to be one of the most 
important contributors of income inequality and social polarisation (Nau 2013). 
Managerial revolution, on the other hand, denotes the transformation of firms, now managed 
by staffs of managerial and clerical personnel (Chandler Jr 1993). In this new form of 
management understanding, the gap between workers and their means of production widened, 
and also the working task being defined by other salaried personnel (Duménil and Lévy 
2001:582). 
This short survey on the transformation of the role of finance in the last century might seem, at 
first sight, the synopsis clarifying the transformation of advanced capitalist economies, 
especially the Anglo-Saxon economies, amongst which the US is predominantly spearheading. 
However, in fact, developing countries also follow a similar pattern of financialisation logic, 
albeit it can be conceptualised as ‘subordinate financialisation’ (Lapavitsas 2013:42). The 
subordinate character of developing countries’ trajectory of financialisation emanates from the 
project of promoting development in the poor countries. The aim with this project, speciously, 
seemed to integrate domestic economies into international capital markets under the objective 
of providing capital flow from rich to poor countries. Nonetheless, the reverse flow of capital 
took place through the establishment of foreign banks, opening of capital accounts and the 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves in the domestic economies. At the end, finance in 
domestic economies acted as subordinate to the financialisation in the advanced countries 
(Lapavitsas 2013:43). 
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The process of subordinating domestic finance to advanced economies is conceptualised by 
Becker et al. (2010) as ‘peripheral financialisation’. Accordingly, some peculiarities of 
financialisation emerged in the peripheral economies as part of the objective of sustaining 
financialisation in the economies of the centre. Typically, peripheral economies give strong 
role on interest bearing capital by trusting on banks and keeping interest rates high, rely mostly 
on capital inflows and targets over-valued currency; however, sustainability of these policies 
depends upon the existence of over-liquidity in the centre (Becker et al. 2010:231). The new 
international division of labour has also deepened the subordinate character of periphery by 
concentrating technological development and innovation in the centre, whilst physical 
production of goods was left to peripheral economies through some control mechanisms 
located in the centre (Cox 1980:384). 
Financialisation, regardless of calling it subordinate, peripheral or hegemonic, is expansive 
across the globe. As argued by Dore (2002:116–17), its hegemonic power manifests in: 
the increasing dominance of the finance industry in the sum total of economic activity, of 
financial controllers in the management of corporations, of financial assets among total assets, 
of marketed securities, and particularly of equities, among financial assets, of the stock market 
as a market for corporate control in determining corporate strategies, and of fluctuations in the 
stock market as a determinant of business cycles. 
This is also evident in some statistical records. Baker et al. (1998:10), for instance, show that 
the share of funds raised in global financial markets in the overall world exports was 0.5% in 
1950, whilst it rose to 20% in 1996. Likewise, the ratio of global financial assets to global GDP 
rose at least three times (Blankenburg and Palma 2009) in the last three decades. Considering 
also the growth of debt markets from US$33tn to US$90tn and stock market from US$49tn to 
US$66tn between 2000 and 2013 (Ro 2014), the control of US corporate equities by money 
managers (Porter 1992), the rise of the percentage of pension funds in total business equities 
(Ghilarducci 1992), it can be claimed, without no reservation, that the bulk of the world 
economic activities are maintained by large-scale expansion and proliferation of financial 
market operations in the 21st century, which brings finance at the core of economy and wealth 
generation and changes the entire social formation of contemporary societies, namely centres 
‘finance’. 
3.3. APPROACHES TO FINANCIALISATION: POLITICAL ECONOMY 
PERSPECTIVES 
In this section, various definitions of financialisation are introduced and discussed by also 
considering the historical rise of finance as elaborated above. In this lens, different approaches 
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towards financialisation is examined through a critical analysis by comparing and contrasting 
them within a political economy understanding. 
In recognition of the fact that intense debates on financialisation phenomenon is yet to burgeon, 
particularly gained momentum in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007, a distinct 
categorisation of the approaches is still possible to construct here to give a comprehensive 
picture of the existing literature. Prior to this, it should be mentioned, first, that most of the 
theories on financialisation have somehow benefited from the language of Marxist political 
economy discourse in rendering the transformative role and gravity of finance in contemporary 
capitalism. Thus, the influences of Marxist terminology and concepts are explicit in each 
category. Having said that, approaches towards financialisation can be divided into six 
categories: 
(i) Mainstream approach; 
(ii) Marxist political economy approach; 
(iii) Post-Keynesian approach; 
(iv) Regulationist approach; 
(v) Varieties of capitalism approach; 
(vi) Cultural economy and heterodox political economy approaches. 
The following sections provide brief explanation on each of these approaches to develop a 
robust understanding of the issues. 
3.3.1. Mainstream Approach 
The notion of financialisation has not been used by mainstream economists as a specific 
phenomenon that has detrimental effects on the functioning of economy and society in a 
broader sense. Instead, they have reflected with positive view upon the remarkable ascent of 
finance within economic system. Accordingly, it is believed that the proliferation of financial 
markets would hasten financial development and hence foster economic growth (see, amongst 
others: Ang 2009; Beck et al. 2014; Cheng, Ho, and Hou 2014; Levine 1998). Since the 
declining rates of growth in the 1970s put most economies into economic difficulties, 
mainstream economists prescribed financial development as the central objective for 
regeneration of economic boom. Thus, the economic debate has been pursued within such a 
narrow perspective that confines financialisation to a particular attempt for regaining economic 
prosperity without taking its social, political and other implications into consideration. 
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The debates, in particular, seek any causal relationship between financial development and 
economic growth through large number of empirical studies repeating similar findings in the 
literature. In line with this, determining robust indicators for financial development and 
economic growth (Estrada, Park, and Ramayandi 2010; Hachicha and Ben Amar 2015; Hassan, 
Sanchez, and Yu 2011; Wu, Hou, and Cheng 2010), the role of bank-based or market-based 
financial systems on economic performance (Chakraborty and Ray 2006; Levine 2002; 
Uzunkaya 2012), the direction of causality (Christopoulos and Tsionas 2004; Gould, Melecky, 
and Panterov 2016; Hsueh, Hu, and Tu 2013; Luintel and Khan 1999) and the impact of 
financial repression or liberalisation (Demetriades and Luintel 2001; Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 
1992; Rousseau and Wachtel 2011) have constituted the primary concern associated with the 
rise of finance. 
While the role of finance has been essentialised in the side of mainstream literature, the break 
out of global financial crisis starting in 2007 disenchanted most economists with regards to 
their trust in finance-led growth regime. However, a systemic challenge of prevailing neoliberal 
form of financialisation has never been debated in the mainstream literature. The critical 
perspective, on the contrary, was addressed mainly by heterodox schools of thought rendered 
below. 
3.3.2. Marxist Political Economy Approach 
The early writings on the subject of financialisation, within Marxist perspective, were placed 
in the socialist journal of Monthly Review in the 1970s mainly by Paul Sweezy, Harry Magdoff 
and Paul Baran. In their approach, financialisation is conceived to be a new form of capital 
accumulation introduced by rentier class in the presence of systematic stagnation faced within 
industrial capitalism (Magdoff and Sweezy 1987). Three underlying trends were observed in 
the new accumulation regime: (i) the slowing down of the rate of growth, (ii) proliferation of 
monopolistic multinational corporations (MNCs), and (iii) financialisation of the capital 
accumulation process (Foster 2007:2).  
As the substantial slowdown of global economy was evident in the 1970s, as explained in the 
previous section, MNCs kept generating more surplus that could not be absorbed in the 
productive sector. In the world that is dominated by monopoly capital, the realisation of surplus 
has mainly been done through corporations’ involvement in bond and equity trading in stock 
markets. Monopoly capital was, therefore, no longer depended on banks to circulate, for MNCs 
engage in financial activities on their own accounts (Lapavitsas 2011:620). This should not be 
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construed as the loss of importance in the side of banks; contrarily, banks remained the 
cornerstone of contemporary finance (Lapavitsas 2013:5). However, they restructured 
themselves to adapt to the new international economic setting. Accordingly, banks diversified 
their profits mainly through (i) increasing income shares from client services within service-
oriented activities (payment services, expertise, advice, asset management) (Dembinski 
2009:46), (ii) borrowing (mortgages, general consumption, education, health), and (iii) 
expanding financial assets (housing, pensions, insurance, money market funds) (Lapavitsas 
2011:620). The overall effect of MNCs and banks, however, led eventually to stagnation in the 
production sphere, and capital was moved into financial activities to extract surplus principally 
through speculative ways (Lapavitsas 2011:612). 
A more sophisticated approach on financialisation is advanced by Brenner (2004) within the 
lines of classical Marxism by stressing the impact of over-accumulation and falling profit rates. 
In this approach, it is argued that the post-war boom accompanied with an expansive over-
capacity in the productive sector, which exacerbated competition and lowered profit rates 
consequently. As a response to the low profitability, the rise of finance was essentialised to 
generate new exorbitant profits to relieve stagnation (Brenner 2006).  
In contrast to the perspective of the Monthly Review, which puts ‘surplus absorption’ at the 
centre of financialisation debate, Brenner (2004) views the rate of profits to fall and harsh 
competition amongst the capitalists as the underlying cause of the rise of finance in the 1970s. 
Meanwhile, Brenner never used the notion of financialisation to address the new accumulation 
regime based on finance driven industry, whilst others explicitly use it in their analyses. 
Having strong affinities with Marxist theory, Arrighi’s view on the issue is also of special 
importance, for he systematically discusses financialisation in the context of his theorisation of 
‘long cycles of capitalist development’, rather than treating it as newly emerged phenomenon 
or final stage of capitalism (Arrighi 1994). In his long cycles approach, Arrighi (1994) claims 
that the world capitalist order passed through four cycles since the 13th century as follows: the 
Genoese cycle between the 15th century and the early 17th century; the Dutch cycle from the 
late 16th century till the 18th century, the British cycle between the second half of the 18th 
century and the early 20th century; and the US cycle of the 19th century to the present. 
Transition from one cycle to the next takes place due to a global crisis of accumulation, which 
weakens the present hegemonic power and leads to another hegemon coming to power, and 
hence, starting a new cycle of capitalist development (Arrighi and Silver 1999). One of the 
most important characteristics of the transition is that financial expansion taking place around 
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the hegemonic power starts to decline and results in crisis. Therefore, in this perspective, 
financial expansion is not considered as the final stage of capitalism, but rather a repeated 
pattern at the end of each cycle during the long history of capitalism (Orhangazi 2008:43). 
Arrighi’s theory is very much reminiscent of Braudel’s analysis of capitalism in which financial 
expansion in the history are treated as ‘the sign of autumn’ that shows the maturity of certain 
stage of capitalist development (Braudel 1984). More precisely, Braudel’s insight on the 
recurrent rise of finance corresponds, in Arrighi’s understanding, to the financialisation of 
mature capitalism, which basically functions to protect American hegemony in the world 
politics, but at the same time signals the autumn of US hegemony (Arrighi 1994). 
Critiques to Arrighi mostly address some basic issues such as “the vagueness in the 
mechanisms of switching to a new hegemonic regime” and “the rationale behind high rates of 
return in the financial markets comparing to low profits in the real sector due to over-
accumulation crisis” (Orhangazi 2008:48), “the uncertainty of identifying new hegemonic 
regime replacing the current hegemon of [the] US” (Lapavitsas 2013:20), and the ambiguity in 
identifying the scope of ‘wealth redistribution’ (Deutschmann 2011:367), which, once cannot 
be sustained in economic, social and political spheres, leads to termination of financialisation 
process (Arrighi and Silver 1999:273). Despite Arrighi’s theory has some flaws as identified 
by a number of contenders, it has influenced many studies by bringing the hegemonic power 
of US at the core of financialisation process of world economies. Gowan (2009), for instance, 
associates the rise of finance with the dollar being a world money in the control of Wall Street. 
Similarly, Panitch and Gindin (2009) equates financialisation with the ‘Americanisation of 
finance’ that paves the way for universalizing and intensifying the power of US hegemony. 
Lastly, and more recently, Lapavitsas (2013, 2011, 2003, 2005, 2012) contributes to the debate 
on financialisation from his Marxist perspective. In his approach (Lapavitsas 2013:3–4, 
2011:611–12) financialisation is  
posited as a systemic transformation of mature capitalist economies that comprises three 
fundamental elements: first, large non-financial corporations have reduced their reliance on 
bank loans and have acquired financial capacities; second, banks have expanded their 
mediating activities in financial markets as well as lending to households; third, households 
have become increasingly involved in the realm of finance both as debtors and as asset holders.  
As can be inferred, Lapavitsas puts much emphasis on the transformation of the functions of 
economic institutions within the financialisation stream. The financialisation process, in this 
regard, allows finance capital to dominate economic activity, and generate enormous profits 
through financial markets regardless of considering the potential outcome of global crisis 
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(Lapavitsas 2013:1). The extraction of financial profits, in this manner, is provided out of the 
revenue of workers and other social layers, and hence gives birth to a new set of relations, 
called ‘financial expropriation’ (Lapavitsas 2013:39). Financial expropriation does not only 
confine with exploiting workers, but also entrepreneurs by private asset holders (Deutschmann 
2011:382). 
3.3.3. Post-Keynesian Approach 
Having common ground with some strains of Marxist theory, post-Keynesianism relates 
financialisation with poor performance in the production sphere that necessarily makes the real 
sector stationary, while financial sector expands significantly. Similar to, but more substantial 
than the Marxist view, post-Keynesians put much emphasis on the concept of ‘rentier’ in 
identifying financialisation process (see: Crotty 1990; Epstein and Jayadev 2005; Pollin 2007 
amongst others).  
Rentier is defined by Keynes (1936), in his book of General Theory of Employment, Interest 
and Money, as the parasitical entity that derives profits because of exploiting the scarcity-value 
of capital, and hence lowers the returns of production and investment, and constraints profit 
making activities for capitalists. The rise of rentier class, thanks to the adoption of neoliberal 
economic policies, allowed financial profits to become widespread at the expense of industrial 
profits; hence financialisation induced a substantial slowdown in the real economy (Pollin 
2007). The regulation of financial sector is necessary, for this reason, to stimulate productivity, 
investment, income levels and employment (Crotty and Epstein, 2009). 
Crotty (2005), in a more precise expression, argued that the consequences of neoliberal policies 
posed an important paradox. While, on the one hand, the decrease in global aggregate demand 
and the intense competition accompanied with low profitability; non-financial corporations 
(NFCs), on the other hand, became more eager to invest in financial markets wherein real 
interest rates were raised to make gains in the short-term. Therefore, long-term growth 
objective adopted by financial markets was superseded by short-termism (Fine 2010:14) for 
the sake of compensating deleterious effects of competition and slowdown of aggregate 
demand, which, at the same time, led NFCs to acquire financial assets by using their investment 
funds, or creating financial subsidiaries (Crotty 2005:34). 
The divergence between financial sector and real sector is also addressed, within the post-
Keynesian perspective, by Epstein (2005:3) who defines financialisation as “the increasing role 
of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the 
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operation of the domestic and international economies”. Based on this definition, it can be 
claimed that Epstein concentrates only on the scope or extent of financialisation, since he does 
not specify the impacts of financialisation on society, nor does he give any geography and time 
period in which it takes place (Sawyer 2013:6). Although lacking precision, this definition still 
shows pervasive character of financialisation, that might be why it has largely been adopted 
and cited in the literature. 
Epstein’s approach towards financialisation is usually compared with Krippner (2005, 2011); 
yet she is mainly influenced by Arrighi’s views rather than favouring post-Keynesian view of 
financialisation. The comparison is made mostly for delineating the distinction between 
definitions of financialisation that is limited with the transformation in the last decades and 
those that can be applicable any time and place without mentioning precision. Krippner 
(2005:174) favours the first type of definition and states that financialisation is reflected as “the 
growing weight of finance in the American economy”. By essentialising the US economy and 
its policies in the process of financialisation, she affirms the Arrighian view of the long cycles 
of capitalist development. She also presents alternative definition of financialisation, but this 
time more evocative of Braudel’s perspective, “as a pattern of accumulation in which profits 
accrue primarily through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity 
production” (Krippner 2005:174). As such, non-financial firms rely more on financial 
investments to derive revenues therein in spite of applying traditional productive activities 
(Krippner 2011:34). What makes Krippner’s approach distinct is her success of providing a 
ground for theoretical claims of Arrighi, Monthly Review and others by empirically evidencing 
the growing weight of financial profits both for financial and non-financial sector within the 
economy (Lapavitsas 2013:20). 
Along with Krippner, Stockhammer (2004) also provides empirical support to the 
financialisation of NFCs investment. Adopting a post-Keynesian view on financialisation, he 
primarily sees financial deregulation and polarisation of income distribution as the root causes 
of economic crisis (Stockhammer 2012). Along this line, his empirical analysis shows how a 
rise in investment in financial assets gives rise to slowdown of the accumulation of physical 
assets, at the end of which NFCs become more rentier-like (Stockhammer 2004:719). 
As last remarks on post-Keynesian view of financialisation, Orhangazi (2008:6) should be 
mentioned, who invariably considers financialisation as the proliferation of the size and 
significance of financial markets and institutions, with particularly stress on the changing 
relationship between NFCs and financial markets. Drawing a sequential pattern of 
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financialisation, he starts with an accumulation crisis in the 1970s, which subsequently 
welcomed financial market liberalisation and deregulation. Accordingly, the crisis has 
worsened corporate performance and NFCs’ profitability, which eventually enforced them to 
increase their investment on financial markets. Resultantly, long-term growth strategies were 
replaced by short-term oriented financial investments, and finance prominently centred at the 
core of economic activities (Orhangazi 2008:74). 
The post-Keynesian approach, elaborated above, deals with the performative aspects of real 
economy reshaped after the significant rise of financial markets. In doing so, the debate is 
pursued mainly around the motivation behind generating financial profits by NFCs in the short-
term, while long-run investment projects are abandoned in the real sector that culminated in 
slowdown of economy.  
3.3.4. Regulationist Approach 
Originally emerged from the Marxist tradition, and later referring to the post-Keynesian and 
institutionalist theories, regulationist approach basically addresses the ways to stabilise 
tensions of capitalist economy that periodically bring about inherent crisis and contradictions.25 
In responding to this, regulationist approach suggests some sets of regulatory structural forms 
such as wage relations, monetary and ecological restrictions (Jessop and Sum 2006). However, 
regulation is considered, here, to be much broader concept than state intervention or technical 
understanding of regulation and encompasses social norms as well (Becker et al. 2010:226). 
The regulationist view of financialisation proclaims the end of Fordist era in the 1970s, which 
at the same time harbingers a new regime of accumulation based on financial dominance. The 
characteristics of the Fordist regime were mass production, increased wages and productivity, 
whilst post-Fordist regime is commemorated with the ascendance of finance as a particular 
regime of accumulation. Boyer (2000) adopts the concept of ‘finance-led growth’ to describe 
the new regime of accumulation wherein Fordist capital-labour compromise collapsed and gave 
way to decentralisation and individualisation of labour wages and contracts. In addition, 
previous forms of oligopolistic competition broke down in the aftermath of financial 
liberalisation policies that allowed opening of domestic markets to foreign competition. A 
subsequent change in wage-labour nexus, eventually, ended up with favouring the interests of 
                                                        
25  The most recent and severely devastating crisis are (i) the oil crisis in 1974-1975, (ii) the debt crisis in the 
peripheral countries in 1982, (iii) the U.S. stock market crash in 1987, (iv) the savings and loan crisis between 
1985 and 1990, (v) the Asian financial crisis in 1997, (vi) the ‘millennium economy’ crash in 2000, and (vii) the 
global financial crisis in 2007 (see: Altvater 2009; Toporowski 2005). 
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creditors and shareholders. The new economy based on high technology and the intensification 
of service industry for consumers is now governed and encompassed by the power of 
shareholders, which, in return, reduces market share and profitability (Boyer 2000:143).  
Boyer’s finance-led growth model, though providing an authentic view of financialisation, has 
been subject to some criticisms. For instance, it is expressed that Boyer’s model is set “in the 
context of a closed economy and do not contain a theory of firms’ financial policies and 
financial asset price determination” (Van Treeck 2009:919). More substantially, Becker et al. 
(2010) and Becker and Jager (2010) argue that Boyer (2000) proposes an abstract model of 
finance-led growth regime that approaches accumulation process one-dimensionally. This, 
hence, makes the new growth regime is only applicable to the US and the UK economies as 
claimed by Boyer (2013). However, Becker and Jaeger (2010) provide a multidimensional 
approach to accumulation process by which the impact of financialisation in the peripheral 
economies is acknowledged. Accordingly, they suggest three typological axes of 
financialisation: first, productive/financialised accumulation; second, extensive/intensive 
accumulation; third, introverted/extroverted accumulation (Becker and Jäger 2010). Explaining 
not only the financialisation process of central but also that of peripheral economies, four types 
of financialisation are postulated based on (Lapavitsas 2013:23): (i) based on ‘fictitious’ 
capital, by which is meant inflation of financial prices; (ii) based on interest-bearing capital, 
meaning expansion of banks; (iii) ‘elite’, implying the involvement of the bourgeoisie and the 
upper middle class; (iv) ‘popular’, indicating that workers have also been drawn into financial 
operations”. 
Regulations view concentrates more on the political economy roots of financialisation that are 
characterised by accumulation crisis. Not substantively different from the previous approaches 
but more on the policy level, this approach suggests regulatory adjustments upon the prevailing 
financial structure to avert the implications of accumulation crisis. 
3.3.5. Varieties of Capitalism Approach 
As can be inferred from the notion of ‘varieties of capitalism’, this approach evaluates 
financialisation in the context of changing characteristics of capitalism in its various phases. 
Similar to others, the approach has broad affinities with the Marxist and regulationist 
perspectives on financialisation. Accordingly, the shift in the last century, from Fordist to post-
Fordist regime of accumulation, is hypothesized as transition from productionism to ‘coupon 
pool’ or financialised capitalism under the varieties of capitalism view (Froud et al. 2000, 2001, 
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2006; Froud, Leaver, and Williams 2007). While capital markets simply have an intermediation 
role between household savings and investing firms in the productionist form of capitalism, 
coupon pool capitalism, contrarily, structures capital markets to regulate both household and 
firm behaviour. In doing so, the regulatory role is given to ‘coupons’, which are known as 
“different kinds of financial paper (bonds and shares) traded in the capital markets” (Froud, 
Johal, and Williams 2002:126). 
The significance of changing role of capital markets from intermediation to regulation shines 
out with the rise of shareholder value maximisation, which is induced by a fundamental change 
in corporate strategy. In this vein, the change was triggered with NFCs’ renouncement from 
‘retain and reinvest strategy’ that aims at long-term profitability towards ‘downsize and 
distribute strategy’ wherein corporate labour force was downsized, and a higher share of 
earnings were distributed to shareholders (Lazonick and O’sullivan 2000). This process 
commenced initially with declining corporate profits, low stock prices and increased power of 
institutional investors and mutual funds in the 1970s, and later accompanied with increased 
shareholder pressure on management through forcing managers to give more response towards 
shareholder value maximisation (Useem 1993). Beyond their usual role of skilled 
professionals, managers were now coerced to act as agents of shareholder interests.  
Shareholder value orientation eventually ended up with the loss of social basis of prosperity, 
albeit the efficient market hypothesis contrarily claims that social welfare is maximized when 
all firms in an economy maximize total firm value (Davis and Kim 2015:209–10). It has also 
caused the fade away of economic dynamism due to short-term decisions of financial markets 
(Orhangazi 2008:63). 
Beside the corporate dimension, financialised capitalism also shows its distinctiveness through 
“massification of household savings …, a dramatic growth in the group of financial 
intermediaries and feedback effects on the calculations of firms and households” (Erturk 
2008:26). As a result of strengthening of finance through continuous appreciation of financial 
assets such as pensions, mutual funds, share portfolios and etc. (Aalbers 2008), corporations 
are subject to ongoing effects of financial market pressures in the new economic structuring 
(Feng et al. 2001). 
The most detrimental effect of coupon pool capitalism, within the perspective of the varieties 
of capitalism, is that the economy is much vulnerable to economic turmoil and unable to 
generate long-term financial security in the financialised regime (Erturk 2008:29). 
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3.3.6. Cultural Economy and Heterodox Political Economy Approaches 
While economy wide macro implications of financialisation were addressed in the previous 
five approaches, cultural economists primarily seek the influences of finance-dominated 
economic structuring on some spheres of everyday life (see: Aitken 2007; Dore 2000; Fine 
2010; French and Kneale 2009; Haiven 2014; Jameson 1997; Langley 2008; Leyshon and 
Thrift 2007; Martin 2002 amongst otheres). In this lens, financialisation is defined as a 
phenomenon that culminates in everyday life practices of people encompassed by and 
subordinated to the objectives of financial world (Martin 2002). Accordingly, “the home is 
increasingly seen as a real estate investment, personal relationships get infused with monetary 
concerns and decisions are taken with an eye on their credit rating implications” (Pellandini-
Simányi, Hammer, and Vargha 2015:734). In the individual scale, traditional hard work ethic 
withered away under the influences of market populism and new cultural ideology of hedonistic 
and post-materialistic value orientations, which raised the aspirations of immediate way to 
acquire unlimited financial wealth (Deutschmann 2011:362). Everything around us, therefore, 
is redefined with financial terminology and filtered with some cost-benefit analysis and 
portfolio selection that necessarily accompanies a financialised worldview permeating through 
every sphere of individual life and creating financial identities. 
The creation of financial identities is, in particular, of special importance since it is closely 
associated with the process of financial subject formation in the neoliberal era. Specifically, 
financial identities are idealised in the 1980s under the neoliberal discourse of personal 
responsibility and efficiency within the financial area to create everyday investors appearing 
as “artifacts of, not architects in, processes of change” (Langley 2007:73). The embedding of 
investor practices in everyday life is also reflected by Harmes (2001) with the influence of 
Gramscian accounts of power. Harmes (2001:103) points the importance of making investor 
identities and the emergence of a broad investment culture that strengthens the hegemonic 
power of finance capital. 
The existing literature is abundant in some studies on everyday life financialisation. These 
include the social meaning of money (Zelizer 1997), cultural economy of finance (Pryke and 
Du Gay 2007), the contribution of life assurance to the financialisation of everyday life (French 
and Kneale 2009), Walmart’s role on financialisation through a cultural idiom of securitisation 
(Haiven 2014), coffee industry and financialisation (Newman 2009), financialisation of micro-
credit (Aitken 2013), and financialisation of water (Bayliss 2014). Specially focusing on the 
case of housing, in the modern period, households no longer consider houses primarily to 
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function as homes to shelter and live with family members, but they rather see acquiring houses 
as an investment, “something to put equity into and take equity from” (Aalbers 2008:152). 
Investment, in return, necessarily brings about risk; however, this time risk is borne in the realm 
of everyday practice. 
The rationale behind households’ excessive involvement in financial activities is addressed by 
Martin (2002) who emphasises the retreat of Keynesian state and its social support system, 
which transferred its functional role to private initiative. Similarly, Dore (2000) argues that the 
market economy paradigm operating under the notion of invisible hand withdraws state and its 
social support system from the public realm and lets individuals alone with overcoming their 
economic problems in disguise of free entrepreneurship. This, hence, forces households to 
invoke financial institutions against their economic troubles. While Martin (2002) and Dore 
(2000) adopt a Keynesian state perspective in obviating household financialisation, it is 
important to note that despite rendering an essential role to it, state should be seen as the 
facilitator of financialisation in the modern period. It should be, for this reason, recognised that 
modern nation states are not victims of financialisation process in a sense of losing their 
exertive power over economic institutions; contrarily, financialisation depends on states by 
their active and continuous intervention on the economy such as regulating financial system 
and capital adequacy, managing risks and rules of competition among financial institutions, 
intervention to underwrite the solvency of banks, and providing enough liquidity and etc. 
(Lapavitsas 2013:3).  
Notwithstanding their essential role in designing the structure of domestic economy in the 
interests of financial ascendance, the traditional function of states has weakened and 
transformed in the international scope due mainly to financial globalisation, which paved the 
way for establishing supranational states with their own rules, actions and influence areas. In 
this new international setting or the global order, states are becoming societies with no power 
base; instead, international institutions –such as World Bank, IMF, OECD and WTO- lead the 
world economic system through financial markets and mammoth business undertakings 
(Ramonet 1997). The old state apparatus, hence, remains under the pressure of financial 
institutions. As an articulation of this, investors gain profit from rising interest payments on 
state bonds, investors’ capital never remains idle due to their pressure on governments to open 
new outlets, and states act as private financial corporations operating in the financial markets 
(Deutschmann 2011:361).  
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Financialisation has also been debated under some heterodox political economy perspectives. 
In delineating its significance, Dembinski (2009:6) argues that “financial thinking has 
gradually permeated and transformed behaviour patterns, mechanisms and structures, and 
extended its control over society to the point where it is now one of its main organizing 
principles, or indeed the dominant one”. This process is referred, in his words, as 
‘financialisation’ through which economy and society – primarily in the Western world –are 
reorganised around the search for financial efficiency.  
In its state of art, finance, as the main organizing principle, replaced the network of 
relationships in the society with a stunning display of transactions26 (Dembinski 2009:138). 
The evaporation of relationships within the society, therefore, culminated in the construction 
of ‘portfolio society’ in which “the investment idiom becomes a dominant way of 
understanding the individual’s place in society” (Davis 2009:6). The notion of ‘common good’ 
(Bovée 2008) loses its basic function in the portfolio society from being ‘each individual’s 
contribution to the solidarity and harmony of society’ and turns out to be some compensatory 
and regulatory changes initiated by governments in the name of ‘public good’. Once the 
common good is taken from the sphere of civil society and made subservient to the aspirations 
of financial world, “the market, like the rest of society, became a battlefield where all the 
players are out to maximize immediate efficiency – remuneration as spoils of war – and then 
swiftly transfer it to the private sphere in order to build a fortress of lonely individual 
happiness” (Dembinski 2009:65).  
The altering effect of finance on existing relationships within the society is, likewise, addressed 
by Fimbel et al. (2015:76) through essentialising the notion of ‘demateriality’, which he defines 
“as a substratum creating new conditions for relationships within the social fabric”. In this 
regard, while initially currency, credit and securities were dematerialised; subsequently, 
traditional relationships based mainly on proximity and loyalty had been broken up for the sake 
of forming new economic relationships between producers, consumers and suppliers. 
Consequently, not only society has been embedded within the economy; but economy has also 
been embedded within finance, which together signify ‘double embedding’ (Fimbel et al. 
2015:78). The process of double embedding, however, is identified, in Fimbel et al.’s (2015) 
understanding with ‘marketisation’ that establishes structuring role of demateriality. Since the 
process of embeddedness is signified by economy and finance, this constitutes dis-
                                                        
26 The shift from relationships to transactions is discussed in the next section by also emphasizing the role of trust 
in the new transaction society. 
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embeddedness in Polanyian discourse, which is an important consequence of financialisation 
within political economy context. 
In reflecting the approaches to financialisation discussed above, they all propound certain 
explanations for the remarkable rise of finance in the gravity of economic activities. It is 
obvious that the main focus with the first five approaches is primarily towards exploring 
macroeconomic effects of financialisation within the economy by stressing particularly on the 
changing roles and flourishing of new financial institutions, and the emergence of new financial 
ways of profit making. The wider societal consequences of financialisation and its effect on 
individual behavioural pattern and cultural aura, however, have been given limited attention 
throughout the debates. Cultural economy and some heterodox political economy approaches 
to financialisation, though very limited, fill such an important gap in the literature. 
Following sections render a critical perspective on the financialisation theories elaborated 
under six different approaches above. In doing so, it develops a moral economy understanding 
to crystallise the nature and dimensions of financialisation. However, before doing this, recent 
empirical studies on financialisation is surveyed in the next subsection to elaborate on to what 
extent theoretical dimensions of financialisation throughout six categories has been empirically 
examined. This gives us some particular evaluation techniques of financialised economies in 
an econometric analysis. 
3.3.7. Review of Recent Empirical Studies on Financialisation 
While the theoretical literature on financialisation is considerably limited but comprehensively 
dealt with, empirical studies mostly concentrate on certain dimensions and implications of 
financialisation on economy and society. In this lens, widely used indicators of financialisation 
in the existing literature is rendered in the Table 3.1. As financialisation phenomenon is 
associated with the rise of financial sector against the decline in the real sector performance, 
some studies empirically examine this relationship by using country-level and firm level data. 
Demir (2009), for instance, analyses real investment performance of firms in three emerging 
markets in the existence of rate of return gap in financial and fixed investment areas. Therefore, 
the study finds that short-term financial sector investment alternative is chosen by most of 
firms, which, in return, reduces the real economy performance. Similar to Demir (2009), 
Orhangazi (2008) explores the firm level interest upon real investment areas in the US 
economy. The empirical examination consisting of a sample of non-financial corporations 
between 1973 and 2003 reveals an adverse relationship between US financialisation and real 
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investment, due to mainly the expansion and profitability of financial investment areas, which 
in return, changes the incentive mechanism of firm managers to invest more on financial sector. 
Another firm-level panel data analysis on financialisation is conducted by Tori and Onaran 
(2015) on the UK economy. Accordingly, empirical evidence suggests that the selected non-
financial corporations are less likely to engage in physical investment due to the high rates of 
return in financial sector investment so that productivity and growth in economy replaces with 
stagnation and fragility. 
Financialisation is also linked in the relevant empirical literature to the socioeconomic 
parameters. Amongst them, distributional issues such as income inequality and share of 
employment in the financial sector have been mostly preferred indicators of financialisation. 
Using panel data analysis for the OECD countries, Assa (2012) analyses the impact of 
financialisation on inequality, unemployment and growth. The empirical evidence strongly 
suggests that the financialisation trend negatively effects these three variables by causing slow 
growth rates of GDP, exacerbating employment opportunities and increasing economic 
inequality. Another study on OECD countries and their positioning against financialisation 
trend is addressed by Dünhaupt (2014), who assumes that the changing corporate governance 
understanding with neoliberal policies brought about shareholder value orientation, which, in 
return, increased income inequality. The results suggest that the top income shares are 
positively affected from stock market capitalisation and dividend payments. Golebiowski et al. 
(2017), similarly, examines the relationship between financialisation and income inequality, 
and find that income inequality and unemployment factors are widely determined by the 
orientation towards financialisation. Hyde et al. (2018) deals with inequality issue in most 
developed capitalist societies. By dividing inequality into three categories as market-generated, 
state-mediated and distributional inequality, Hyde et al. (2018) found that financialisation in 
the form of (i) finance, insurance, and real estate employment; (ii) credit expansion; and (iii) 
financial crises all negatively affect three categories of inequality. 
Apart from the approaches above, financialisation is also considered in the developments of 
the rise of financial sector variables. Particularly focusing on emerging markets rather than 
taking advantage of widely disclosed data of firms in advanced countries such as the US and 
the UK, Karwowski and Stockhammer (2017) compares the degree of financialisation in 
advanced and emerging market by looking at some indicators including stock market influence, 
capital inflows, private sector and household debt. The study concludes that financialisation is 
more pervasive in the advanced countries than that in emerging economies. Raza et al. (2015) 
reckons with financial depth, credit growth and deposit liabilities of the financial sector as the 
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indicators of financialisation. Their results indicate that the trade openness deepens 
financialisation in the observed countries due to the fact that it increases foreign rentiers’ profit. 
In examining financialisation in the case of an emerging economy, Tellalbasi and Kaya (2013) 
empirically examines the financialisation of companies listed in the Istanbul Stock Exchange’s 
Industrial Index. By dissecting financial payments, debts and profits of these companies, they 
conclude that financial benefits have an adverse effect on the number of real investment 
activities. 
Financialisation is associated, alternatively, with the size of financial profits generated by firms 
and other institutions. Alexiou and Nellis (2016) sheds light on the motivations behind 
investing on industrial profits and financial profits. They conclude that the investment decisions 
under the temptation of capital accumulation pave the way for opting for financial profits, 
which in most of the case, provide higher returns than industrial profits. In a similar line, 
Krippner (2005) investigates the financialisation trend in the US economy in the post-1970 
period in his seminal work. It is suggested that the rise of finance shapes accumulation patterns; 
thereby, the role of state on investment areas has been totally changed in the face of 
globalisation together with the rise of new economic powers of modern corporations. 
The relationship between financialisation and economic growth is also examined in the relevant 
literature quite recently. Assuming that non-financial corporations should trigger more 
economic performance than financial corporations, Tomaskovic-Devey et al. (2015) argue and 
evidence that the financial investments of non-financial corporations lead to stagnation in 
economic growth due to the decline of value-added caused by financialisation. 
The short survey on the literature of financialisation invariably evidences that the 
financialisation phenomenon has destructive effects on social and economic life, particularly 
on distributional issues and macroeconomic dimensions. Since the empirical investigation of 
everyday life in the presence of financialisation has not been dealt yet, the literature can be 
expanded by locating this aspect into the analysis. 
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Table 3.1: Widely Used Measures of Financialisation 
Studies Indicators of Financialisation 
Alexiou and Nellis 
(2016) 
Industry’s value added as % of GDP 
Manufacturing value added as % of GDP 
Employment in industry (% of total employment) 
Assa (2012) 
Value added in finance as a percentage of total value added 
Employment in finance as a percentage of total employment 
Tomaskovic-Devey et 
al. (2015) 
Financial assets divided by total assets 
Dünhaupt (2014) 
Stock market capitalisation, i.e. the value of listed shares as a share of 
GDP.  
Net dividend payments of nonfinancial corporations related to their value 
added 
Freeman (2010) 
Financial sector’s share of profits,  
The ratio of financial-sector profits to the wages and salaries of all 
private-sector workers, 
The ratio of financial assets divided by GDP 
Golebiowski et al. 
(2017) 
The contribution of the financial sector (FIRE) to total value added 
The proportion of the employed in the FIRE sector in the total 
employment 
Private debt to GDP ratio 
Stock market capitalisation to GDP ratio 
Haruna (2012) 
Turnover ratio (valued trade/market capitalisation) 
Value traded ratio (value traded/GDP) 
Hyde et al. (2018) 
FIRE employment (finance, insurance and real estate) measured as the 
percent of the labor force employed in FIRE industries 
Credit expansion measured as the stock of domestic credit provided by 
financial institutions to the private sector as a percent of GDP. 
Kedrosky and Stangler 
(2011) The size of the financial sector as a percentage of GDP 
Krippner (2005) 
Portfolio income of non-financial firms 
Profits of financial vs. non-financial firms 
Kus (2012) 
Financialisation index created by averaging the standardized scores of 
three major indicators (bank profitability, value of total stock traded, and 
securities under bank assets) 
Raza et al. (2015) 
Stock of liquid liabilities, M3 to GDP  
Private credit to GDP 
Deposit liabilities of the financial sector 
Stockhammer (2004) 













 107  
3.4. MORAL ECONOMY UNDERSTANDING BEYOND MARXIST DISCOURSE: A 
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE LITERATURE 
The literature, surveyed in the preceding section, embraces different perspectives on the rise of 
modern finance in the gravity of economic activities, and its implications on economy, society, 
politics, culture and so on. Despite the fact that political economy aspects of financialisation 
have been addressed throughout the literature by also referring to the transformational role of 
finance as an ordinary practice of everyday life into an exclusive realm within the economy, 
the emphasis on the nature and detrimental effects of financialisation remain limited with the 
positivist and materialistic class-based understanding of Marxist political economy. In line with 
this, even alternative perspectives on the notion of financialisation have broad affinities with 
Marxist theory and its terminology that essentialises such concepts of accumulation crisis, 
surplus absorption, monopoly finance capital, rentier and so on. The single-perspective based 
approach on financialisation, hence, precludes the flourishing of alternative perspectives 
beyond Marxist paradigm. 
This study argues that financialisation is a broad concept that must be approached within 
political economy framework that does not necessarily bound with Marxist theory. Along this, 
it suggests an Islamic political economy approach to finance and hence financialisation through 
which the nature, evolvement and burdens of financialised economies together with its 
implications on individual and social life are reconsidered in the light of Islamic ontology and 
epistemology. The following two sections, accordingly, deploy a critical discourse analysis on 
financialisation within Islamic political economy perspective by giving particular attention to 
the exploration of financialisation of Islamic finance. In doing so, Polanyian understanding of 
embeddedness is adopted to address how financialisation within Islamic finance impacts social 
formation of Muslim societies by creating commodification and disembedment through Islamic 
finance operations.  
In order to provide a historical and theoretical base for the objectives above, first, the distinction 
between market economy and moral economy, and the Polanyian view of double movement –
the interaction between economy and society- is elaborated. Later, the definition, scope and 
characteristics of Islamic moral economy is discussed by giving particular importance to the 
paradigmatic distinction from others, which necessarily criticizes the mainstream functioning 
of finance and Islamic finance both, since the common logic behind these two takes their 
nourishments from the neoclassical economic paradigm.  
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3.4.1. Morality and Economy 
It should be kept in mind that the interaction between morality and other institutionalised 
settings of society –law, politics, religion, state and etc. – has continuous, transformative and 
transitive nature such that all the settings are intermingled and support each other, which in 
turn, lead us to ponder the notion of morality from a multifaceted perspective. When the 
interaction between morality and economy is considered from this perspective (see: Cowley 
2005; Hardin 1992; Sen 1990; Zamir and Medina 2010), it is evident, especially in the pre-
capitalist societies, that the productive and distributional objectives of the economic structure 
were derived from the values, norms, rights and responsibilities of a society. In other words, 
the functioning of economy was subordinated to the pursuit of a good life and societal 
beneficence, which corresponds to the two vital conceptions, falah and ihsan, in the Islamic 
moral economy literature that are discussed later. In this manner, it can be acknowledged that 
the pre-capitalist societies had portrayed moral economies in which moral norms played a 
constitutive role over the economic framework and hence economic activities and relations 
were not left to the determinacy of economic factors. Finance, in the same vein, was driven by 
the whole objective of establishing social welfare beyond its current role of dominating the 
entire economy with the purpose of changing social formation and creating financial identities. 
In the modern period, the advent of capitalism in concomitance with the Enlightenment process 
envisaged the notion of economics as an independent and self-proclaimed science, which has 
challenged the idea of moral economy (see: Palmer 2011) such that economics first digressed 
itself from the political economic outlook and later declared its autonomy and atomisation by 
breaking its bonds from social formation of society through claiming to be a value-free and 
self-regulating system. This gave rise to the critique of capitalist system of economics from the 
perspective of moral economy. 
3.4.2. Moral Economy, Market Economy and the Problem of Embeddedness 
Moral economy debates mainly concentrate its approach and critique towards the prevailing 
modern economic theorising on two aspects: the former essentialises conceptual distinction of 
moral economy from economics, and the latter examines the social formational outcomes or 
the consequentialist dimension concomitant with this conceptualisation, that is the aspirational 
embedded society against self-regulating, atomized or autonomous society (see: Götz 2015). 
To elaborate on the concept first, it can be stated that moral economy comprises a set of 
relationships, beliefs and norms that together constitute a certain way of socioeconomic life. It 
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embraces a particular kind of economy in which values and norms of society are embedded in 
the existing institutional structure, and social relations and behavioural patterns are not 
moulded or determined by merely economic factors, for moral norms play a constitutive role 
over the functioning of economy through non-economic factors (Etzioni 1988; Sayer 2007). In 
this respect, moral economists claim that market economy has ‘corrupting effects on society’ 
(O’neill 1998), since it dehumanises economic relations into mechanical operations by 
neglecting societal consequences of these relations through relegating the valuing of things, 
relationships and ways of life to only economic level. 
Moral economy debates in the 20th century have come into the fore with two distinct 
approaches, one of which essentialises moral economy to evaluate systemic and functional 
dimensions of exchange mechanisms (Booth 1994; Polanyi 1944), and the latter uses moral 
economy to evaluate the causes for rebellious and insurgent behavioural patterns of societies 
(Arnold 2001; Scott 1976; Thompson 1971). It is evident that the majority of the debates on 
moral economy are primarily indebted to Polanyi (1944), who with his seminal work of Great 
Transformation, has widen the horizons of political economists, sociologists and 
anthropologists. 
Polanyi centres his substantivist approach under the master concept of ‘embeddedness’ (for 
further reading on Polanyi and his concept of embeddedness, see: Block 2003; Gemici 2008; 
Hejeebu and McCloskey 1999). In this regard, he critiques market economy due to its 
disembedded nature which ignores noneconomic forms, such as values, moral norms, kinship, 
political and religious institutions to be the driving forces over the functioning of economic 
structure. In Polanyi’s ideal world of embedded society, human interchange, and economic life 
in particular, is submerged in social relations and society naturally envelops its institutions, 
including economy. The embedded economy, according to Polanyi (1944), hence, existed since 
archaic times until the emergence of premarket societies. However, in the disembedded 
economies, self-regulating and pervasive character of economy autonomously functions and 
carries its operations without subordinating its raison d’etre to establish a good life by 
accepting no superior factor to rule; hence, contrary to expectations, it envelops entire society 
through making social relations an epiphenomenon of market and exerts its iron rules externally 
over non-economic institutions and social relationships. The tendency of disembedding 
economy, by definition, has resulted in a totally different form of social formation, which 
necessarily leads to the malaise of society by creating fictitious commodities through 
commoditisation. The objective, according to Polanyi, must be to re-embed economy in society 
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by rescuing land, labour and money from the overarching stream of commoditisation and 
unregulated market forces or system. 
It should be noted that Polanyi never admits the existence of a fully disembedded and fully 
self-regulated economy to be successful hitherto, as he calls it “a stark Utopia” (Polanyi 
1944:3). Instead, he underscores that the classical economists aspired to create an autonomous 
society wherein economy is effectively disembedded. This objective was imposed on 
politicians to fulfil; however, it was impossible to achieve this goal. Otherwise, the fully 
disembedded economy would necessarily accompany with turning out everything to be 
fictitious commodities, which would destroy human beings and his surroundings into 
wilderness (Polanyi 1944:3). Polanyi (1944:136) identifies this view with his powerful 
argument of ‘double movement’ defined as:  
The social history of our time is the result of a double movement: The one is the principle of 
economic liberalism, aiming at the establishment of a self- regulating market; the other is the 
principle of social protection, aiming at the conservation of man and nature as productive 
organisation. 
With this double-movement term, Polanyi (1944) argues that there are two opposing 
movements in the market societies: the laissez-faire movement and the protective counter-
movement. While the former endeavours to engrave market understanding to the codes of 
society through disembedding economy from society, the latter resists the idea of disembedding 
by developing protective ways to rebalance the degree of embeddedness. The protectivist 
countermovement, contrary to the Marxist understanding, does not only compose of working 
class, but rather includes all layers of society. As can be inferred, the continuous conflict 
between these two movements settle a certain degree of embeddedness in the entire spectrum 
of various stability levels. Polanyi’s thesis of double movement is notable in the sense that 
there are no longer two strict choices of economic systems as market capitalism and socialism 
once looked from the perspective of embeddedness, for markets can be embedded in different 
degrees, which, in return, construes various possibilities beyond these two systems. 
Beside his repeatedly mentioning of the ‘utopia’, a closer and critical insight on Polanyi should 
be introduced here, though going deeper is beyond the scope of this study. Accordingly, 
Granovetter (1985) claims that the level embeddedness of economic behaviour in nonmarket 
forms of societies was lower than what substantivists - primarily Polanyi - claim, as modern 
period has changed this level less as contrary to the claims. Nevertheless, he suggests that this 
level is more substantial than those of formalists’ views. In this line, Granovetter emphasises 
the two extremes of undersocialised and oversocialised conceptions of human action where the 
former is adopted by utilitarian and Hobbesian view to claim that there is no relational and 
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structural social factor that has determinant role on production, distribution and consumption 
(modes of production). The latter approach of oversocialised human action is used mostly by 
sociologists and rests on the idea that individual behaviour is an outcome of the social relations 
in the society in which they always engage. Therefore, customs, norms and habits are followed 
mechanically, recognizing individual choice mostly shaped by these factors. Granovetter 
(1985) rejects both extremes and claims that, beyond adopting an atomized human action in 
undersocialised and oversocialised conceptions, human behaviour is embedded in networks of 
interpersonal relations (Granovetter 1985:504). 
A more fundamental critique to Polanyi was directed by Sayer (2007) by arguing that treating 
constitutive moral norms as forms of embedding necessarily abstracts its moral content, thereby 
it de-naturalises social relationships and leads to subjectivisation of values, which, in return, 
produces soft accounts of capitalism, albeit Polanyi claims the vice versa. Lastly, Booth (1994) 
composes some evidences to critically approach Polanyi such as the evidence of economising 
behaviour in nonmarket context in classical Greece, or seemingly nonmarket forms to be 
‘marketlike’ (firms, families and governments). Booth (1994:661), then, concludes that “there 
was indeed a great transformation, but it might be better expressed as a move from a community 
and its economy (heavily encroached upon by hierarchy and status) to a society in which a 
certain equality and autonomy were accorded primacy”. 
Another distinct approach focuses on observational studies on the causes for rebellious and 
insurgent behavioural patterns of certain societies to associate these causes with jeopardising 
moral economy nature and social consensus in that society. Thompson (1971), with his seminal 
work The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century examples the food 
riots of the early 18th century in Britain which were triggered off by such grievances of high 
food prices, unemployment, malpractices of dealers and a devastating dearth at the end. Since 
the social environment and the life of Trobriand Islanders, the rioters therein, were regulated 
by social norms and reciprocities beyond market exchange, these grievances were displeased 
under the umbrella of consensus through which legitimate and illegitimate behaviour in every 
sphere of life including market, politics and culture is identified. Thus, social norms and 
obligations constitute the moral economy of the poor (Thompson 1971). 
In proposing a comprehensive rationale for the riot behaviour, Thompson (1971) argues that 
the transition from moral economy to modern self-regulating market society accompanied with 
adopting cash-nexus in lieu of bread-nexus; hence, it caused a shift in social formation which 
was immediately rejected by existing consensus and communal legitimacy understanding of 
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embedded society. Therefore, riot behaviour was seen the remedy to circumvent the 
impositions of new social formation. 
With a similar approach, Scott (1976) analyses the peasant rebellions and their village economy 
structure in the twentieth century Burma and Vietnam. His main focus is to explain how the 
village economy is organized around the whole objective of securing peasants’ subsistence 
rights and needs, and how rebellious practices in these villages took place as a result of 
nonfulfillment of this objective. By doing so, Scott (1976) first argues that the village economy 
is subservient to or embedded in a moral universe which enshrines the establishment of justice 
amongst society, through securing subsistence rights for all society members, and the setting 
of just price. Hence, it becomes a moral expectation for peasant villagers to pursue their 
subsistence rights through a continuous redistribution process within the society. This approach 
is in great contrast with the materialistic welfare understanding which construes, from the entire 
story of village economy, a risk minimisation objective through securing subsistence rights and 
economising practice behind the rationale for peasant behaviour (Booth 1994:654). 
As observed in Thompson’s approach, Scott likewise constructs his discourse of moral 
economy from the perspective of conflict and resistance. In this lens, rebellious behaviours of 
peasants, according to Scott (1976), should mainly be regarded as the reflection of their 
insistence on rejecting the European colonialist circumscription which aims to extinguish the 
ancient ways of peasant life in order to restore a new social formation that allows for the 
maximisation of European interests at the expense of peasant rights. Therefore, the entire 
struggle is to preserve the “shared moral universe of peasants” (Scott 1976:167) from the toxic 
nature of market economy, which is sanctified to actualise European interests by trifling away 
the subsistence rights through letting the price mechanism and market exchange to rule and 
decide on it. The village economy, as part of shared moral universe, would, hence, embed its 
use of land, redistributive patterns and reciprocity into noneconomic norms and institutions. 
As Scott claims embedded moral behaviour of peasants in the village economy against pure 
materialistic and individualistic readings of it, critiques come mostly from this tension by 
arguing that the village economy still holds the economizing practice – through risk insurance, 
preserving from hunger and recognizing scarcity of means – so that economic reasoning is 
there and the functioning of the village economy can easily be evaluated from an economic 
analysis (Booth 1994:659). Also, the Granovetterian notions of undersocialisation and 
oversocialisation are widespread to use as a critique to Scott’s views. In addition, and beyond 
these particular issues, it is also subject to criticism that such political scientists can hardly 
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explain “the non-rebellious moral economies of market structured communities” (Arnold 
2001:89). 
As the discussion so far identifies, moral economy does not provide a particular deterministic 
role to ‘finance’ beyond being a source of intermediation, as the creation of value and the 
determinacy of surplus value is assumed to take place within the embedded nature of the 
economy. Hence, non-economic and non-financial forces, namely values and norms of society 
play a deterministic role in value creation and in the distribution of surplus value. In other 
words, in the modes of production purported by moral economy, finance is not considered as 
the source of value creation, unlike the financialised market economy in which finance is 
central to all economic system in determining surplus value. The next section, hence, takes the 
debate into a step further into Islamic moral economy, which aims to de-centre finance more. 
3.5. THE BOURGEONING OF ISLAMIC MORAL ECONOMY: A SHORT HISTORY 
Whilst the significant rise of capitalism was met by a counterhegemonic discourse by the 
Western academics in the 18th century Europe, which later opened up the literature on moral 
economy and its use as a strong critique to capitalist economic system, Muslim scholarship, on 
the other hand, responded to capitalist penetration in a different manner such that the debates 
on Islamic economic morality, which should be considered to be a subfield under the rubric of 
general theme of moral economy, and its articulation on modern economic institutions 
remained peripheral.  
As the Muslim societies were facing many challenges in the post-colonial period, including 
international political power decline, prevalence of nationalist movements, an ever-increasing 
stream of liberal and secular worldviews and the effect of globalisation, they strived either for 
adopting capitalist mode of production through imposition to establish a particular social 
formation that is alien to its society (for example Kemalist revolution and the establishment of 
Turkish Republic), or they searched for an authentic Muslim identity that avoids interacting 
with Western secular worldview and enables Muslims to construct their own social formation 
through the Islamic worldview in the modern era. Although it was expected that the 
overcoming challenges and the aspirations of establishing authentic Muslim identity would 
bring the issue of Islamic morality into the centre of academic debate, it rather worked the other 
way around and culminated in a hybrid and malaise understanding of economic system which 
ruled out the flourishing of IME in the Muslim thought. The consequences of hybridity and 
mimicry has given birth to the theory of Islamic economics in the modern Muslim world 
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operationalised only in the form of Islamic finance and banking institutions. Islamic economics 
and finance, in its current form, contrary to its claim, could not authenticate itself to be a novel 
system emerged from Islamic ontology, for it became a variant of mainstream economics and 
finance situated in the Western epistemological frame.  
The modern and postmodern streams have also encircled Islamic economics such that Islamic 
economics does not allow differences in theory making and universalises itself through 
proposing its peculiar centricity and rationality assumptions, which methodologically does not 
differ from the mainstream economics, for it likewise takes nourishments from Eurocentrism 
and Western rationality – rejecting heterodox economic schools. A particular example of 
modernist convergence approach is the critic directed to the use of ‘Islamic moral economy’ 
instead of Islamic economics, as it is claimed that the use of Islamic economics is already 
satisfactory to meet the normative dimensions of an ‘Islamic’ economy, thereby there is no 
need to use another expression to define it. However, it is obvious that the term Islamic 
economics is a social construct evoking a particular branch of economics beyond being 
normative as essentialists suggests.27 Thus, by the essentialist use of Islamic economics, it is 
alleged that there is only one economic system understanding, that is economics, and there is 
no way to define an Islamic economic system other than Islamic economics, which sounds like 
a by-product of ‘the end of history’ thesis by Fukuyama (1992). It is also a postmodern tradition 
that the divergence between economy and finance in the neoclassical economics has invariably 
been replicated in the trajectory of Islamic economics through the application of gradual 
‘financialisation of economy’, which, in turn, cherishes Islamic finance through banking 
activities, while neglecting theoretical underpinnings of Islamic economics. Therefore, this 
fashioning leads to investing on Islamic financial education without locating moral philosophy 
at the core of banking and financial activities. 
The concept of IME, due to these backlashes, has lagged behind in the Islamic economics 
literature as the mainstream was towards constructing Islamic economics and finance by 
embedding it into the neoclassical frame of economics without considering ontological and 
epistemological grounds in its theory making. Notwithstanding this, the concept is now yet to 
echo in the literature with the contributions of Asutay (2013, 2012, 2007a), Tripp (2006) and 
Utvik (2006). However, it should also be noted that the notion of IME still evokes nothing 
                                                        
27 Here, the Islamic economics positioning meets the essentialist vs social constructivist debate in which the author 
takes his side with the social constructivist approach. 
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beyond romanticism in the perceptions of Muslim scholars since the prefix ‘moral’ does not 
imply being a part of moral economy understanding. 
3.5.1. Islamic Moral Economy: A Conceptual Enquiry 
Once IME is explained in the context of moral economy debate – beyond linking its morality 
to its Islamicness as the general claim suggests that ‘if it is Islamic then it should be moral 
economy per se’ –, the definition achieves its authenticity. Accordingly, Islamic moral 
economy can be defined as a particular system encompassing all other systems (political, 
social, cultural etc.) inside the Islamic order in which values and norms derived from Islamic 
ontology are embedded in the institutional framework and operating system. Therefore, in IME, 
human provisioning and interaction is submerged in a nexus of social relations beyond 
confining it only to economic relations by explaining everything around us with economizing 
behaviour in the sense of maximisation, efficiency and effectiveness. In this regard, society 
envelops its systems including economy by making them subordinated to the whole objective 
of achieving a good life or hayat at-tayyibah within the objective function of Islam aims to 
emancipate and empower individual. 
IME, hence, aims to locate substantive morality into its economic theorising through 
constituting the substance of Islamic political economy, which functions under Islamic social 
formation as a framework by, hence, suggesting a particular mode of production, which, by 
definition, essentialises an Islamic norms-based production, consumption, exchange and 
distribution method. It also aims at bringing back the embedded nature of economy in the 
society by insisting on its constitutive moral norms and values that have determining and 
moulding roles over the institutional framework. In doing so, however, the re-embedding 
process in IME should not be identified with the Polanyian thesis of protective 
countermovement, albeit the concept of double movement is a good framework used by IME 
to explain social history and formation. This is due to the reflexive and protectivist features of 
countermovement that is contingent upon the existence of the laissez-faire movement. 
Therefore, in this respect, the centre determines the position of the subordinate, as self-
regulating market in the centre necessarily creates social protection as a countermovement. 
IME, however, emerges as a counter hegemonic movement against disembedded character of 
the economy not with the purpose of social protection as the main objective, but rather treats 
re-embededdness in a self-proclaimed and proactive manner.    
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Having said that, it is also crucial to state that IME is not a pure economic, political, 
sociological or anthropological category that can be theorised to substitute mainstream 
economics or other sciences mentioned. It rather removes the artificial border lines of Western 
scientific categorisation of knowledge, thereby there exists no theoretically visible boundary 
lines such that each branch of knowledge becomes a constituent of IME. Thus, it is more 
appropriate to treat IME as an ‘invisible economy’, which constitutes the central idea of an 
embedded economy as explained by Booth (1994:654): 
… invisibility of the embedded economy. Invisibility means roughly that core aspects of the 
economy (division of labour, patterns of distribution, agent motivations and purposes) are so 
intermingled with noneconomic values and institutions as not to constitute a distinct theoretical 
sphere. More exactly, it suggests that because there are no theoretically visible boundary lines 
demarcating that realm from its surrounding social locus, “to speak of ‘the economy’ of a 
primitive society is an exercise in unreality. Structurally, ‘the economy’ does not exist. Rather 
than a distinct and specialised organisation, the ‘economy’ is something that generalised social 
groups and relations, notably kinship groups and relations do. … What we take to be an 
economic category is there charged with a plurality of unquantifiable, incommensurable 
functions, among which the economic function is never isolated and constituted as such; 
consequently, it has a determination that escapes the realm of the economy and so cannot 
constitute a part of an economic discourse. 
As the economy becomes invisible through being embedded, there never appears distinct 
theoretical spheres, as evident in the modern Western thought, which interacts with each other 
only in an eclectic and instrumental way. Until then, moral economy goes beyond a subject 
area in which it is explained by ‘individual subjectivity’ – as sociologists popularized- or 
explained by ‘social convention’ – as anthropologists suggests. 
3.5.2. Identity Formation in Islamic Moral Economy 
As the foundational axioms set the framework of IME and provide its articulation in everyday 
practice, the debate on how Muslim identity is constructed and interacted with society in the 
IME framework brings important reflections on the degree of embeddedness and the practising 
norms and values in that society. In this respect, it is obvious that neoclassical theorists neglect 
social forces and structural regulation in shaping human actions, for they accept a mechanistic 
view of social progress which rests on the idea of methodological individualism and its 
accompanying generic notion of homoeconomicus. This notion does not allow any influence 
of social context or relations on human conduct; rather it essentialises individual and its actions 
without expanding the analysis to societal level. Similarly, behaviourists (such as: Skinner 
1953; Watson 1926) relegate human behaviour to stimulus-response sequence whereby 
behavioural outcomes are considered to be controllable by analysing individual’s motivational 
position, stimuli and environmental factors. Structuralists, such as Lévi-Strauss, (1971), on the 
other hand, takes an antipodal position to the previous ones by ignoring human potential and 
 
 117  
its agency role on the social context and change. Accordingly, structures determine human 
action by assigning no power to human agency. 
In relating human conduct to social forces, IME adopts a totally distinct approach against the 
neoclassical, behavioural and structural positioning. In this manner, a Bourdieusian perspective 
helps to identify an action-based identity formation in the context of IME. In this perspective, 
Bourdieu (1985:724) states that society consists of some fields (workplace, school, friends, 
family, religious areas, political environment etc.), and, while entering these fields, individuals 
have their own habitus which is the space in which individual has some amount and type of 
resources and capital. Each field also has its own rules or ‘doxa’, and once individual enters 
into the field, social groups and parties evaluate them through these rules and assign legitimate 
or illegitimate position for them. In rendering individual habitus and its negotiation with the 
field, Bourdieu’s (1985) field theory argues that there is a two-way relationship in explaining 
human action and its intersection with social relations and forces. More precisely, human action 
is, in some degrees, adaptive to and embedded in the field, which allows norms and values to 
reflect in the behavioural outcomes. However, these actions are not entirely determined by 
social structures and forces, for the field itself is constituted by human capacity through its 
agency role, which enables reproducing past learnings in the form of new ideas and approaches 
for present and future situations of the field (for further debate on the field theory, see: Hanappi 
2014:162). Therefore, while it is acknowledged that there is field effect on behavioural 
outcomes, human conduct has also constitutive role on the field through the dispositions of 
habitus that mediates field constraints and opportunities.  
The bidirectional relationship is defined, in the Bourdieu’s (1977) language, as ‘structuring 
structures’ and ‘structured structures’. This definition necessarily brings power relations within 
the field at the centre of the debate. As, on the one side, human action is forced to be structured 
by external rules and social surroundings (structuring structures), humans also struggle for 
power to advance their positions in the field, which allows a continuous reproducing of field 
structure (structured structures). This power struggle, is shaped through bargaining, negotiating 
or co-opting by the stock of capital that humans hold in their habitus to improve their position 
in the field. The stock of capital varies in its kind including economic capital, social capital, 
technological capital, cultural and educational capital and organisational capital. As long as 
individuals can exert their power in the field with the capitals they stocked, they would able to 
strengthen their field struggle (Boyer 2008). 
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When individual identity, its formation and interaction is explained in IME framework with 
Bourdieu’s field approach, an individual oriented homoIslamicus prototype is rejected as it 
evokes methodologically same approach with neoclassical notion of homoeconomicus. 
Therefore, it is more appropriate to transform homoIslamicus to an action-based identity. As 
now actions are considered within the context of its field, human conduct either conforms to 
each field’s doxa (structured structures) or challenges it through individual habitus surrounded 
by Islamic norms and values (structuring structures). What IME aims to realize is that there 
should be continuous struggle to realise the Islamic axiomatic framework in each field through 
reformulating individual habitus with the aspirations of Islam and its way of life (Shari’ah) 
indicating Islam’s ‘becoming process’. Thus, one of the most important capitals that habitus 
should reserve is considered to be ihsan (beneficence for equilibrium) – the social capital 
through which each individual’s falah or salvation is achieved, sustained and has implications 
for other’s falah as part of ihsan process. Once ihsan (beneficence) is accumulated as a social 
capital – together with other forms of capitals –, individual habitus shapes the existing field 
structure by gaining more power, which in return, allows for redefining doxa in the light of 
Islamic axioms, including tawhid, rububiyyah, and tazkiyah, which then contributes to each 
individual’s falah in the society. 
If the whole objective, in individual level, is to be defined as reaching falah in this world and 
the hereafter through accumulating ihsan as social capital in the society, then the entire struggle 
evolves to become transforming past structures into an ihsani framework and also to preserve 
the ihsani structured structures against the non-ihsani forms of field structures. Yet, in this 
world, the tension between the establishment of ihsani and non-ihsani structures never ends, 
for each field is subject to power struggle, which keeps changing in the course of time. 
Therefore, IME defines the whole trajectory of establishing ihsani structure as a becoming 
process which can be defined as the never-ending search for betterment and which hence can 
only be completed in the hereafter. 
As the action-based identity is adopted through Bourdieu’s field theory, the methodological 
individualist explanations of human behaviour remain insufficient to evaluate how social forces 
intersect with human conduct. Therefore, the introduction of field theory contributes greatly to 
the embeddedness debate. 
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3.5.3. Instrumental Morality vs. Substantive Morality 
As compared to the instrumental nature of moral roots of mainstream economic theorising, 
which mediates morality to perpetuate self-interested, utilitarian and pure economic goals, IME 
essentialises substantive morality to function and operate in its theoretical grounds and 
practical areas in an embedded manner. The difference between instrumental and substantive 
morality lies in their embedded character in the social formation of institutions and society 
overall. In particular to the experience with Islamic finance, this study argues that the moral 
dimension has been injected in the Islamic financial sphere only in an instrumental manner, 
which, in return, leads to no objection with the adoption of financialisation trend. In other 
words, while the temptations of prevailing financial system force its counterparts to establish 
no ethical authority over the functioning of financial system with the manifestation of self-
regulated market understanding converging towards financialisation, Islamic finance would 
have made use of substantive morality to resist against disembeddedness in terms of subtracting 
moral character from the core of financial activities. However, the experience has so far 
demonstrated that morality has been instrumentalised through a form-based understanding of 
Islamic finance. This section, hence, presents the identification and exploration of instrumental 
and substantive morality that play an important role over the financialisation survey of Islamic 
finance.  
Instrumental morality mainly rests on no ethical ground, and its conceptualisation corresponds 
to what Bauman (1994) states ‘self-founding morality’ or ‘ethically unfounded morality’ in our 
times. According to this, ethical principles in the postmodern period has been transformed into 
something that can only be validated and legislated in the hands of ethical experts, leaving no 
room for individual judgement for morality. Thus, when an individual faces ethical challenges, 
they leave their cognitions and reasoning aside and become ‘expert-dependent individuals’ 
(Bauman 1994:3), albeit in the pre-modern period we seldom need such ethical experts in our 
daily life. Islamic banking and finance (IBF) sector, and particularly the reliance on Shari’ah 
experts therein, is a good example evidencing the divergence between fiqh and morality as the 
outcome of instrumental morality. In this context, Shari’ah experts is situated in the Shari’ah 
boards of Islamic banks to be respondents and decision-makers of both fiqhi and moral 
challenges of contracts. As Islamic banking needs certain legitimacy in the form of compliancy 
from religious figures, who are ‘ethical experts’, to provide reconciliations against 
controversial issues of modern Islamic banking, while the moral consequences of contracts are 
neglected, for morality is considered only to be an instrument in the hands of Shari’ah experts 
who can decide on behalf of Islamic banking customers about the ‘halalness’ of the contracts. 
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As evident, the surrendering and subordination of ethics to experts necessarily breaks the very 
link between ethical code and moral conduct. This disenchantment eventually breeds the 
ethically unfounded morality, or in our term, instrumental morality, which suggests that there 
is no reason or cause for being moral (or immoral), implying that ethical guidance and the 
attempts to legislate morality is a futile and blind hope. This overarching ‘groundlessness’ that 
postmodern moral theories impose on us melts morality in the autonomous society through 
instrumenting and dwindling its essence. 
Substantive morality, on the other hand, challenges any form of instrumenting morality and its 
dissociation from ethical grounds, and claims an embedded nature of moral understanding, 
which covers an entire field including modes of production, social formation of society and 
institutional articulations of knowledge. IME, hence, essentialises substantive morality through 
its paradigmatic framework of political economy, value system, axiomatic approach and 
operational principles. In rendering its paradigmatic framework and value system, IME takes 
its nourishments from Islamic ontology, which defines ethical principles in its value 
proposition and aims to form Islamic value system and norms that constructs social structure. 
Ethically grounded Islamic moral values and norms are practiced, then, with the realisation of 
Islamic axioms. 
Substantive moral foundations of IME necessitate a systemic understanding of political 
economy. In doing so, it develops, for instance, a critical approach to developmentalism, which 
is generally accepted as a moral responsibility of global economic powers to minimize injustice 
and smooth development. IME’s critique to Western understanding and practice of 
developmentalism mainly rests on the idea that the roots of underdevelopment, poverty, 
unemployment, wars etc. stems from the socially constructed notion of ‘development’. As 
contrary to its appearing, development has been instrumentally misused to convince people 
that it is a moral desire to emancipate humanity by providing maximum happiness through 
increasing material gain and consuming more. However, in fact, developmentalism 
transformed into something that every nation has to follow its path to flourish, that is why the 
so-called developed nations share modern way of life, the same economic systems and cultural 
habits through the effects of globalisation. It is for that reason, we are now moving from 
“universal modernity to globalised modernity” (Bauman 1994), where moral sense has lost its 
ground and became an instrument to produce pseudo-facts, as in the narrative of 
developmentalism. 
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3.5.4. The Crosschecking System: Contemplation, Intention, Action, and Consequence 
The substantive morality is sustained through a crosschecking system wherein the 
complementary nature between contemplation, intention, action and consequence nourishes 
each other and enables to overcome form-substance dilemma in favour of the latter. In other 
words, the substantivity of moral character hinges on the coexistence of and harmony between 
each level. This also applies to the complementarity between morality and law; otherwise, any 
break in the whole chain (including morality and law) makes morality deficient and leads to a 
“shift from substantive morality to procedural rationality” (Tamanaha 2001:98). This is evident 
in the financialisation process through Islamic financial operations missing the consequential 
dimensions of transactions, whilst taking account of and satisfying with intention. However, as 
the axiom tawhid requires complementarity and unitarity between everything in the universe, 
this also applies in the behavioural aspect. In doing so, individuals start with contemplating 
(tafakkur) about their own soul, their physical environment, surroundings, and their 
relationship with the Creator as part of the ‘knowing process’. However, contemplation has to 
lead an action (or ‘doing process’) (see: Panikkar 1973), since Islam never treats contemplative 
and active lives divorced from each other as seen in the monastic or ascetic lifestyles due to 
the fact that Islamic methodology is based on the articulation of tawhid or complementarity 
and unitarity in every aspect of life. 
Between contemplation and action, there lies intention. Individuals intend to act in a certain 
way after their protracted or quick contemplations. Therefore, intention as an internal and silent 
phenomenon, and also definitive of actions (Powers 2015:43; see also Shaker 2013) is the 
outcome of contemplation that leads to trigger a particular action. Intentions accompany certain 
consequences if they realised into actions.28 Thus, in general, contemplation precedes every 
other step and keeps its activity through a continuous functioning. In other words, a person 
contemplates and acts accordingly; but he still continues contemplating to judge whether his 
action meets his intentions and produce desired consequences. 
Daily prayer in Islam is one of the best examples in rendering the harmonious relationship 
between these four constituents of the crosschecking system of IME: “Prayer, which in its 
highest form is contemplative and unitive, leads to salvation or deliverance of the soul from all 
bondage and imperfection and this in turn leads to correct action” (Nasr 1978:197). The act of 
prayer triggers contemplation at the end of which action is checked continuously until it serves 
                                                        
28 For an effective debate on intention and consequence, yet from the Islamic management perspective, see: 
Fontaine (2008). 
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best to contribute to salvation and beneficence in individual and societal level. Thus, the 
Qur’anic verse (29:45) “Indeed, prayer prohibits immorality and wrongdoing” shows how 
daily prayer leads to prevent evil and essentialise good action through the process that starts 
with contemplation and culminates in consequence. 
The complementarity nature of contemplation and action, together with the close relationship 
between intention and consequence, gain a distinct view to Islamic knowledge formation 
especially on nature; for individual contemplates on nature and its design, and then gradually 
objectivises it to understand and evaluate it in the best use of humanity. Through this, God’s 
purpose over nature for the service of humanity and its ideal relationship with human beings 
becomes explored. However, modern scientific thinking drove a wedge between human beings 
and their nature (Nasr 1978:203); and the wedge is today even exacerbating such that modern 
human beings become alienated from their environment by causing environmental crisis, 
corrupting lands, destroying crops and animals. 
The crosschecking system, elaborated above, helps create a substantive moral frame in 
reshaping Islamic financial operations, which so far have been relegated to contractual level 
analysis. Accordingly, newly developed products in Islamic finance industry were initiated 
with good intentions but were subjected to contract level analysis based on the considerations 
of fiqhi injunctions. However, the consequentialist evaluation of these products surfaced the 
dilemma between the prevailing constructed fiqh understanding and morality, in that the 
morally deficient outcome cannot be averted through the existing fiqhi knowledge domain. 
Thus, the crosschecking system developed in this section obviates such a dilemma by locating 
tawhidi methodology which asserts the unitarity and complementarity between intentions and 
consequences. Financialisation of Islamic finance, in this lens, reflects the failure to apply 
crosschecking system on the entire functioning of Islamic finance industry, mainly due to the 
societal outcomes caused by giving less importance to real economy related Islamic financial 
contracts that exacerbates the social disequilibrium and income inequality in the society. 
The following section sheds light on the historical trajectory of Islamic finance and its 
applications from the perspective of Islamic moral economy with particular examination of 
normatively defined notions of substantive and instrumental morality, the crosschecking 
system and Islamic identity formation. Thus, it paves the way for evaluating the current trend 
in Islamic finance in an authentic manner beyond the aim of observing and explaining (or even 
justifying) the reality. 
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3.6. FROM ASPIRATIONS TO REALITIES: THE ISLAMIC FINANCE PROJECT 
RECONSIDERED 
With the aim of elaborating on the notion of financialisation, its scope, and influence area, the 
literature on financialisation is surveyed thoroughly in the Section 3.3. By acknowledging the 
limitations of the existing debate, Section 3.4 expands it by introducing the Polanyian moral 
economy approach with the embeddedness discourse to gain a new insight on financialisation 
within the understanding of ‘social formation of society’. As this study aims to explore Islamic 
financialisation and its social formational outcomes, IME is discussed in the previous section 
as a theoretical framework, which delineates the normative dimensions of Muslim financing, 
and hence critically argues the emergence of Islamic finance as a hybrid sector that mimics 
conventional financialisation pattern.  
In explaining its theoretical boundaries, it is emphasised that IME emerges from Islamic 
ontology and aims to bring back the substantive morality to take root in its political economy 
framework, value system, axiomatic approach and operational principles. In doing so, it 
underscores the ontological differences in dealing with ethics and its moral outcomes, which, 
hence, shows the paradigmatic distinctiveness of IME. The value system, in the same vein, 
determines the framework and functioning of IME. 
Although it has rarely been used in the relevant literature, IME considers itself to be a subfield 
under the general theme of ‘moral economy’. Therefore, by nature, it addresses the issues 
around embeddedness, market economy, the positioning against anthropological and 
sociological interpretations of moral economy, and the identity formation that determines the 
role of human conduct in its interaction with social relations. In responding to these issues, as 
discussed, IME suggests a Bourdieusian approach around which identity is formed and the 
problem of embeddedness is transformed into a different sphere. In this, substantive morality 
is essentialised against instrumental morality. Further, the crosschecking system provides the 
entire process to achieve and sustain substantive morality. 
The entire aspirational or normative dimensions of IME aiming to generate a system 
understanding beyond ‘finance’ and ‘financialisation’ as elaborated above, nonetheless, has not 
been possible to put into practice in an ideal sense in the modern times. Although Islamic 
economics was intended to emerge as a counter movement and an authentic reflection of 
counter hegemonic philosophy, the only institution emerged in the modern era has been IBF, 
which reflected a non-disruptive emerging pattern in spite of being disruptive of the existing 
 
 124  
modes of production and establishing an emerging science, in an aspirational sense. This 
section, therefore, aims to critically examine the nature of Islamic finance and its positional 
stance in the political economy framework of IME through identifying the financialisation 
tension in its financial transformation in the societies it operates as part of the emerging 
disembeddedness and social formation debate.  
It is important, in this manner, to explore first the socioeconomic and political circumstances, 
which has influenced the emergence and global diffusion of Islamic banks and evolution 
towards Islamic financialisation; thereby potential sources of its developmentalist failure and 
disembeddedness can be broadly comprehended through critical examination of its initial 
objectives by introducing financialisation as an important aspect of hybridity of Islamic 
banking. 
3.6.1. Islamic Finance: A Post-colonialist Project 
The emerging need of an Islamic financial system had surfaced in the late 1940s when 
decolonisation took place after the World War II. With this new stage of political history, 
previously colonised countries are allowed to design their own institutional structure without 
any political interference of colonial powers. From inner perspective, Muslim societies’ 
confrontation with the existing social, cultural, political and economic articulations of Western 
worldview has now been transformed into a different phase where direct applications of 
Western hegemony were interrupted after the decolonisation.  
While boundaries of these lands were no longer invaded by Western colonialist powers and the 
ways of democratisation and nation building are expedited and ‘liberalised’, old colonial 
legacies were still prevailing and shaping social and economic structure of these 
underdeveloped world. Thus, it caused a particular form of dependence that was conceptualised 
with ‘neo-colonialism’ – a term coined by Nkrumah (1965) – under which the former economic 
and cultural relationships of direct colonisation period are maintained through different means 
in disguise of economic cooperation, global culture, development etc. Islamic finance project, 
in this circumstance, was intended to play an important role in authenticating Muslim nation 
building through advantages of decolonisation by providing financing for development 
constructed through Islamic political economy aspirations. However, it had to come up against 
the prevalent economic structure in following years of its establishment. 
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3.6.2. A Search for an Authentic Muslim Identity 
With the nation building process after the colonial period, an authentic Muslim identity was 
aimed to construct in the face of rationalist, individualist, secular and capitalist features of 
homogenising global identity. By forming the new identity, in macro perspective, it was 
expected that the old colonial legacies would be overwhelmed eventually by recalling and 
reconstructing Muslim legacies, which was also envisaged to decrease the contingence upon 
Western entrepreneurship in the economic activities in Muslim lands. Islamic finance was 
essentialised, outside the scope of colonial mind-set, to help generating social welfare and 
becoming a panacea for economic development in the long term. 
In order to face with the unrivalled system of economics inherited from the colonial era, first 
underlying critiques were concentrated around the issue of prohibition of riba, since its 
elimination from the existing economic systems in Muslim countries was also considered to be 
an important part of the whole objective of renewal in Islamic economic thought in the sense 
of constituting (new) Islamic political economy. Accordingly, Muslim scholars in the modern 
period, especially Mawdudi (1986), Qutb (1976) and Quraishi (1974), proposed a distinct 
alternative to capitalist economy primarily with the motivation of elimination of riba. While 
Mawdudi (1986) and Qureshi (1974) mainly constructed their argument around riba and its 
prohibition, Qutb (1976) was stressing on the immediate need for establishing social justice in 
resurging Islamic developmentalism. However, Mawdudi’s attention was more on behavioural 
aspects of societal change. Accordingly, his argument was that economic rules itself remain 
incapable of establishing an Islamic order; therefore, individuals should keep a strong moral 
sense to ignite societal development. As Qur’an strictly prohibits riba, since it produces 
injustices between different stakeholders in the Islamic modes of production, financial 
activities are believed to be maintained without interest so that ‘ihsan’ or equilibrium can be 
achieved between all the involved stakeholders whereby the dominance is de-centred (Asutay 
2018).  
With such an initial aspiration, the number of Islamic banks has proliferated and spread out 
significantly in a few decades as part of the objective of authenticating alternative mode of 
financing after the first commercial Islamic bank in 1975. By the institutionalisation of Islamic 
banking, it is expected to maintain economic activities in an ethically or Islamically driven 
industry wherein trading in real assets is prioritized against artificial financial products and a 
Shari’ah governance structure is employed inside the bank to avoid potential exploitative 
relations between financier and borrower. 
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The factors of forming an authentic Muslim identity and pursuing a non-interest based financial 
system had found its chance to be practiced in the Muslim states of Pakistan, Iran and Sudan. 
These countries organised their constitutions around fully-fledged Islamic principles including 
economic system and put their endeavour on the idea of Islamic economics to practice in the 
real world. It is for this reason that a great degree of theoretical studies in the literature of 
Islamic economics are contributed by Pakistani and Indian scholars. More precisely, the related 
publications that are written in English and Urdu language by Pakistani and Indian intellectuals 
and academics constituted bulk of the entire literature until 1990s (Philipp 1990).  
Iran, similarly, challenged the mainstream economic theorising and transformed every 
institution into Islamic ones including conventional banks. The project of Islamic finance in 
Iran, with these improvements, was seen an important tool for recourse to ‘good old times’ 
(Taleghani 1983). However, it was overlooked that the real challenge was to maintain Shari’ah-
compliant financial activities in an ‘Islamic’ country in the decade of highly globalised 
multipolar world financial system. In order to bring back the ‘good old times’ in this stage of 
history, there must be a back-shift in the social formation of societies, which is, in fact, 
impossible to conduct or realise. Instead of this romanticised view, a totally distinct social 
formation should be envisaged to emerge in this era in which Islamic norms and values are 
embedded in the economic system and economy is subordinated to whole society’s 
emancipation. 
3.6.3. Economic Impact of Oil Crisis in 1973 on Islamic Banking Growth 
If the dynamics of establishing Islamic banks are linked with certain motivations, pursuing a 
riba-free financial system can be considered as religious motivation, while forming a distinct 
Muslim identity would be a mix of social, cultural and political motivation. Although one 
cannot think of a pure economic reason for the emergence of Islamic finance, a highly 
substantial politico-economic factor is the 1973 oil crisis, which accompanies political and 
economic consequences for the entire Muslim geography. Standing at the middle of a series of 
energy crises between 1967 and 1979 in the Middle East, the oil price rise of 1973 – from $3 
per barrel to $12 – (Macalister 2011) and the subsequent embargo was a decision given to 
punish the USA and the West as a response to their support of Israel in the Yom Kippur war 
against Egypt. After the embargo, large amount of oil revenue flew into oil-wealth countries of 
Gulf states, which is known as ‘petro-dollars’, put into economic cycle of oil exporting 
countries through three different ways (Saeed 1996:11): 
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(i) by buying Western consumer goods, military hardware, industrial equipment and 
other goods; 
(ii) by investing their funds in development projects at home and abroad; 
(iii) by lending money through official and private channels to oil-less countries. 
King Faisal of Saudi Arabia played an important role, at that time, on cutting down the foreign 
control of global financial powers around the local oil industry in the Gulf region by 
channelling the idle funds (petro-dollars) into the benefit of financing needs of business sector. 
In line with this, King Faisal encouraged the establishment of Islamic banks through funding 
them by oil-linked wealth (Abdul-Rahman 2010:193; Saeed 1996:11). Therefore, one can 
conclude that Islamic finance was initiated mainly owing to the presence of oil money; 
otherwise it would have postponed its leap to late times, albeit the religious motivation was 
there to support.  
Acknowledging the importance of dramatic rise in oil prices and its significant impact on the 
establishment of Islamic banks, one can critically approach to this argument by claiming that 
the early contributions to the idea of Islamic finance and its initial applications had no link with 
Arab petro-dollars (Ahmad 1987:7) if one looks at the first banking examples in Malaysia’s 
Tabung Haji (1967), Egypt’s Mit Ghamr (1963) and Nasser Social Bank (1971), none of which 
was funded by oil money. As the cases of Mit Ghamr and Tabung Haji is explained in the next 
section, this claim has no significance once it is recognised that almost all Islamic banks 
established in 1970s was partly or totally funded by oil money or facilitated by the expansion 
of oil monies. This means that the main catalyst for the emergence, diffusion and expansion of 
Islamic banks is associated with the oil factor in 1973 (see: Imam and Kpodar 2013; Imam and 
Kpodar 2010). The initiatives of interest-free operations mentioned above, are individual and 
local attempts, which is far from reaching a generalisable idea. 
3.6.4. Wider Political Economy Factors Encompassing the Emergence of Islamic Finance 
As the preceding discussion clarifies the emergence of Islamic finance had taken its expansion 
and global diffusion from the religious concern of riba and the economic and political 
environmental restructuring in the post-colonial period. The initial attempts on operationalising 
a type of riba-free banking system is mostly referred by the special experiments of Mit Ghamr 
social banking and Tabung Haji saving institution. In fact, prior to these, there were some other 
micro level cases such as the loan cooperatives in Indian subcontinent in 1940s, or a particular 
form of riba-free credit network in Pakistan in late 1950s (Warde 2000).  
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3.6.4.1. Tabung Haji and Mit Ghamr 
Tabung Haji, basically functioning as Pilgrims Savings Corporation in Malaysia, was 
established in 1963 to help prospective pilgrims in performing their pilgrimage (hajj) through 
accumulating their savings. Thus, it has functioned as an investment project or company. Mit 
Ghamr, similarly, was a kind of savings/investment bank that was founded in 1963 by Ahmed 
al-Najjar. Inspired by German saving banks, Mit Ghamr succeed in mobilizing small savings 
from the rural areas of Egypt to create small amount riba-free loans to be used in productive 
areas through extending financing to small entrepreneurs. It also introduced the investment 
accounts on the basis of profit sharing. By appreciating these novel experiments, it is, however, 
hard to convince that the igniting motive behind the idea of Islamic finance is mainly derived 
from the operations of these two institutions, for they neither give explicit reference to religion 
in their activities nor become a part of certain Islamic movement (Haniffa and Hudaib 
2010:86). Mit Ghamr, aimed only to uplift economic conditions of the poor in the small region 
by introducing profit-sharing model, and did not envisage a long-time project of spearheading 
Islamic banking model. Another evidence, in the sense of them being non-systematic 
initiatives, is that they never considered to carry out commercial banking activities, which was 
essential to expand the industry. Contrary to the vested understanding, this study claims that 
all the previous experiments, in fact, encouraged people about the possibility of constructing a 
systematic formulation of Islamic banking that can be applicable within conventional financial 
system. In other words, it demonstrated that economic issues in the modern world can still be 
dealt under Shari’ah compliant ways (El Ashker and Wilson 2006). 
3.6.4.2. Petro-dollars and pan-Islamism 
Systematic construction of the frame of Islamic banking gained momentum in the aftermath of 
oil crisis, which also triggered the pan-Islamist strategy by King Faisal. Together with Nasser’s 
project of establishing Nasser Social Bank (1971) as part of the objective of unifying Arab 
world against the impositions of Western (neo)-colonialism (pan-Arabist ideology) and 
particularly of gaining Islamists’ sympathy against leftist groups in Egypt, King Faisal, 
likewise, organised regular gatherings for Muslim countries in the wake of the oil crisis to 
create a ‘consciousness on unity’ under the sacred objective of Muslim ummah. Later on, with 
these gatherings known as Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), they came up with 
the idea of establishing Islamic Development Bank (IDB) in 1974. Subsequently, the first non-
governmental Islamic bank was founded as Dubai Islamic Bank (1975) as a commercial bank. 
Based on their funding with petro-dollars, Islamic banks proliferated all over the Muslim region 
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between 1970s and 1980s, such as Kuwait Finance House (1977), Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt 
(1977), Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan (1977), Jordan Islamic Bank for Finance and Investment 
(1978), Bahrain Islamic Bank (1978), and International Islamic Bank for Investment and 
Development in Egypt (1980), Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (1982), Tadamon Islamic Bank 
(1983) and Sudanese Islamic Bank (1983). 
Through these developments, other early pioneers played a major role in boosting the number 
of Islamic banks through negotiation between businessmen, finance and banking professional, 
Shari’ah scholars, regulators and statesmen. Amongst them, Sheikh Saleh Abdullah Kamel, a 
Saudi businessman, and Prince Mohammed Al-Faisal founded respectively Al-Baraka Group 
and Dar Al-Mal Al-Islami (Khan 2017). As an overriding rational for its augmentation, Islamic 
banking was appealing to many parties to be a tool for spreading the idea of pan-Islamic 
identity, while some perceived as an opportunity to diversify their portfolios. 
Despite the economic conditions were satisfied by the presence of oil money in enhancing 
Islamic banking activities and hence spreading pan-Islamist ideas under the guise of resurging 
Islamic developmentalism in the Muslim world, the practical aspects of applying a non-ribawi 
banking system in a highly globalised financial world has so far demonstrated that there were 
many problems within the operations of Islamic banks in the sense of their conforming to 
Shari’ah rules and moral outcomes. Although Islamic law embraces basic principles regarding 
financing and a bulk of historical financial experiments were accessible to reach, the urgent 
need of establishing Islamic banks did not allow to deal with its theoretical underpinnings in a 
sophisticated way. Instead, the moral and legal challenges faced in the sector were met 
‘reflexively’ and ‘pragmatically’. From the perspective of public policy makers, Islamic banks 
had to proliferate to provide alternative ways of financing vis-à-vis mainstream finance. 
Therefore, its theory was relegated to secondary importance and redefined with the necessities 
of the industry. 
Adopting this approach, of course, posed some critiques on practitioners from legal and moral 
aspects. While the contracts were criticised, from a legal perspective, for their resemblance to 
conventional financial contracts, which violates some fiqhi principles, or even, in some 
contracts, harbouring riba component, the industry was also inculpated with its immoral 
consequences that violates the notion of social justice and Islamic developmentalism.  
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3.6.4.3. Universalising conventional finance  
By appreciating these critiques, however, the main sources of developmentalist failure of 
Islamic finance should be approached from a wider perspective by considering its religious and 
political economy determinants – mentioned above – under the umbrella of the social formation 
of societies. In this sense, it is essential to recognise how Muslim societies are forced, in the 
capitalist period, to form their social and economic relations subservient to financial interests 
of the capitalist system. Accordingly, the entire relations are relegated to and explained by 
economics terminology. For instance, people are believed to reflect ‘economising behaviour’ 
in their interpersonal relations, such as maximising their utility, thinking rationally and keeping 
their self-interest motives alive. Therefore, from individual and social aspect, morality is 
considered out of the context of economic life. Economic relations, hence, do not necessarily 
predicate on ethical principles and likewise produce moral outcomes. Instead, price mechanism 
is considered to be the sole determinant of social equilibrium and justice. 
Islamic finance, in such a construct, should renounce the objective of integrating into global 
financial system by mimicking conventional way of financing; instead, it should make use of 
the experiences and applications from the actual history of Muslim societies. However, 
contemporary Muslim scholars’ delusion and insist upon the observed mimicry emanates 
primarily from their naïve understanding, which identifies conventional way of banking as a 
value-neutral financing activity. In fact, conventional banks are value-loaded financial 
institutions implying a redesign towards disembedding existing institutions in the service of 
economic objectives. Further, as stated by Azarian (2011:262), these banks were “never 
stripped of moral dimensions and constraints”, implying that a universal understanding of 
finance immune to changing social factors in different societies is not admissible. Thus, the 
attempts to offer an alternative to conventional banking system out of the aspirations of Islamic 
economics should focus on reaching authenticity in establishing a development oriented 
financial system beyond mimicking conventional financial structure. Otherwise, once the 
structure is taken for granted, authenticity in Islamic finance will never be reached; but rather 
hybrid institutions will emerge as evident in the sector (see: Hall 1992:310).29 It should also be 
stated that attaching social objectives to Islamic banks as an emotional reaction without 
embedding them into the core of Islamic finance does not make these banks ‘Islamic’ in real 
sense; as the ‘institutional logic’ (see: Thornton and Ocasio 2008) of conventional banks 
                                                        
29 “People belonging to such cultures of hybridity have had to renounce the dream of ambition of rediscovering 
any kind of ‘lost’ cultural purity...” (Hall 1992:310). 
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shaped by the capitalist worldview such as the objectives which essentialise shareholder value 
maximisation and ‘capital’ as the hegemonic factor of production will inevitably be transferred 
into Islamic financial sphere. 
Mentioning that the expected authenticity has never been acquired in Islamic banking, its 
reflexive and market-dependent characteristics have shown parallels with the changes in the 
global political and economic dynamics. In this regard, the collapse of oil prices and the rise of 
liberal economic policies in the 1980s made Islamic banking more decentralised, deeply market 
driven, pragmatic and diverse. In the 1990s, where the new world order had been settled 
through Washington Consensus, politicians used Islamic banking as part of financial 
liberalisation as a tool for exerting political power and legitimating the dubious financial 
activities through state-dependent fatawa councils. At its state of art, throughout the trajectory 
of Islamic finance, it can be summarized that the sacred intentions are perplexed with secular 
goals (Haniffa and Hudaib 2010). Amongst its potential identifications, as Pollard and Samers 
(2007) argue, Islamic banking and finance could neither be an articulation of alternative 
economy nor of moral economy, but something hybrid influenced by the varieties of capitalism. 
The main influence, within the varieties of capitalism, is the financialisation phenomenon, 
which transformed the nature of finance as an everyday practice into something with which 
substantial changes in the goal of economic activities accompanied. According to this 
approach, finance is no longer considered to be a tool for improving individual’s capabilities 
and functions through enhancing economic performance, but the aim with the financialisation 
process is rather to employ an opportunity space, independent from the objectives above, where 
various incumbents, pressure groups and rent seekers aim to ‘financiate’ and ‘commodificate’ 
values and things through various financial institutions (multinational companies, stock 
markets, banks and etc.) and instruments. The following subsection, accordingly, provides a 
general picture under which financialisation of Islamic finance as the underlying cause for the 
developmentalist failure is considered. 
3.6.5. Islamic Finance: Disembeddedness and Financialisation 
Beyond its neoclassical interpretation within Islamic economics discourse, considering the 
emergence and progress of Islamic finance from moral economy perspective entails to treat 
Islamic financialisation as one of the repercussions of modernist social formation of Muslim 
societies. Thus, rather than being a matter of fact, the proliferation and global diffusion of IFIs 
heralds the disembedded character of economies in the Muslim dominated countries, implying 
 
 132  
the neglect of Islamic social formation and substantive morality in the financial sphere by 
sustaining the entrenched principles of neoclassical economic paradigm in its framework. The 
incorporation of Polanyian debate, hence, circumvents limitations of the existing perspectives 
on financialisation, which fits and can only explain the historical trend of mature economies at 
most whilst falling short of bringing a new dimension to the new economic orientation in the 
rest of the world. 
Despite the conceptualisations such as ‘subordinate financialisation’ (Lapavitsas 2013) or 
‘peripheral financialisation’ (Becker et al. 2010) crystalize the actual role of finance in 
developing economies, it only represents the contributions of such economic structures to the 
whole process of financialisation in the advanced economies. The internal dynamics of 
financial ascendance in the peripheral economies, however, cannot be explained with the 
existing approaches in the financialisation literature. As explained in detail above, Islamic 
finance, for instance, has subordinate and peripheral character in terms of its strong affinities 
with conventional financial structure; nevertheless, the aspect that locates Islamic finance 
within the context of financialisation is rather related with Polanyian debate of social formation 
and double movement.  
As reiterated in the previous sections, such a transformation of Muslim economies in the 
modern period has complied with the requisites of neoliberal economic paradigm. In this sense, 
the emergence of Islamic finance converged into Islamic financialisation over time, and 
necessarily produced a hybrid sector due to its failure in authenticating Muslim financing in 
line with the aspirations of IME. This assertion has also been examined through country case 
studies, where Islamic finance is systematically gaining significant importance in the national 
economy, however, at the same time, evolving into financialisation trap by following the global 
financial trend. Among scarce resources on the subject matter, Rethel (2010), in reflecting on 
the trajectory of development of Islamic finance in Malaysia, associates the rise of Islamic 
finance in Malaysia with financialisation of Malaysian economy. As Malaysian capitalism has 
been sophisticatedly evolving into financialisation stage through the development of capital 
markets, financing patterns -both conventional and Islamic - engendered a new politics of debt 
together with a sharp transformation in financial relationship, which ushered in the emergence 
of financialisation embedded in local structures and institutions (Rethel 2010:503). The 
previously state-led investment activities, amid this development, started to give way to quasi-
market capitalist initiatives through the dominance of financial investment. Islamic finance, in 
such an atmosphere, plays an intermediary role in bridging the state-led and market-pushed 
phenomenon of neoliberal financialisation (Rethel 2010:503). Similarly, Rudnyckyj (2013, 
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2017) critically examines the recent developments in Malaysian economy and associates them 
with the global neoliberal policies. Accordingly, the development of Islamic finance in 
Malaysia was first projected in the 1980s to create a Muslim middle class through envisaging 
a new identity formation (Rudnyckyj 2017:279). By doing so, financial inclusion policies 
accompanied with the integration of indigenous Malays into the national economy whereby 
Malaysian state has facilitated “the shift from financial inclusion to the construction of a new 
Muslim entrepreneurship in 2000s” (Rudnyckyj 2017:274) based on the neoliberal values that 
has been embedded in the financial sector through fashioning the debt-based instruments of 
Islamic finance. This process, on the other hand, elicited a new form of Islamically designed 
market reason and economic rationality understanding in the minds of Muslim Malaysian 
entrepreneurs (Rudnyckyj 2014:110). Financialisation process in Malaysia through Islamic 
finance, therefore, is closely linked with the political aspirations of Malaysian state to create 
an economic understanding resulting into neoliberal Islam. 
Similar to Malaysian case, the rise of financialisation in the 21st century Turkish economy was 
addressed by Apaydin (2015) with special focus on its impact on philanthropic activities of 
conventional and Islamic banks in Turkey. It was argued, hence, that the government led by 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) politically motivates and incentivises new Muslim 
business elites to involve in non-state social service provisions in return for allocating 
profitable financial investment areas primarily to these privileged groups, so that philanthropic 
activities would pave the way for political returns in the long-run (Apaydin 2015:461). In doing 
so, as Apaydin (2015) argues, Islamic banks also take part in this process of financial 
ascendance by increasing their role in the financial sector. Thus, as she identifies, while on the 
one hand financialisation rises in Turkish economy through the collaboration of political 
incumbents and financial constituency, Islamic banks are also given privileged position to play 
a contributory role on financialisation with a stipulation of engaging in philanthropic activities. 
While the state of art, including Malaysian and Turkish cases, evidences quite opposite, it was 
expected, originally, that Islamic finance would constitute a counter hegemonic alternative to 
the mainstream finance, for it aimed at essentialising equity-based financing, profit and loss 
sharing, risk-free returns and participatory investment alternatives to create collaborative, 
cooperative and shared environment in the financial sphere. By doing so, the commodifying 
logic of mainstream economics was aimed to be overwhelmed with particularly introducing 
the Islamic notion of ihsan, which ultimately aims to decommodify land, labour and money in 
a Polanyian sense to establish equilibrium in the society beyond justice by helping those who 
have not achieved to reach certain level of human well-being. 
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3.7. LOCATING FINANCIALISATION IN ISLAMIC BANKING AND FINANCE: AN 
EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION 
The preceding sections elaborated on the theoretical construction of embedded nature of 
Islamic finance and also the observed dis-embeddedness through financialisation in the sector 
through a critical discursive analysis in a comprehensive manner. This subsection, 
subsequently, aims to render empirical analysis by witnessing the practical aspects of Islamic 
finance as a financialising activity within Islamic economics paradigm. Prior to this, first, a 
descriptive analysis is provided to depict the current state of the industry from the aspects of 
size, scope, segment orientation and market share. Statistical data, then, are utilised to evidence 
the observed financialisation taken place within Islamic financial sphere by looking through its 
asset structure, the sectorial distribution of financing, and outstanding modes of finance. Lastly, 
an empirical analysis is conducted to evidence how Islamic finance engenders a financialised 
view of Islamic economics through its operations. 
3.7.1. Financial Performance of Islamic Banking Sector 
The latest developments in the industry demonstrate that Islamic finance attracts significant 
attention, with its promise of being an authentic mode of financing, in all over the world 
especially in the wake of global financial crisis of 2007 wherein an undoubted confidence on 
mainstream financial system that heretofore is weakened remarkably. In revealing a snapshot 
of its permeation area in the globe, Figure 3.1 shows the changing degrees of systemic 
importance of Islamic finance in various parts of the world.  
Figure 3.1: Islamic Finance Markets by Systemic Significance 
 
Source: IMF Staff Discussion Note (Kammer et al. 2015:13) 
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It is obvious in Figure 3.1 that Islamic finance, albeit still in its infancy, has managed to diffuse 
along many parts of the world except South America. In particular, Islamic financial markets 
hold systemic significance in Brunei, Iran, Malaysia, the GCC countries, the Sudan, and 
Yemen; while in other parts of the world such as North America, North Africa, Eastern Europe, 
Asia and Australia it has potential systemic importance in the medium term. It can, therefore, 
be deduced that Islamic finance has diffused all over the world rapidly in a short span of time 
and has been securing its position in different regions.  
Behind the objective of diffusion rest the idea that economic development would necessarily 
essentialise finance as a catalyst for economic growth, a claim that echoes mainstream 
approach to financialisation. In this regard, both Islamic and mainstream views avoid 
questioning the role given to finance and its function within economy; hence prefer 
concentrating on financial development regardless of its socioeconomic consequences. Figure 
3.1, hence, reflects such an essentialised view of finance-centred development despite the fact 
that IME aims at de-centring finance through its counter hegemonic character. 
Table 3.2: Selected Key Institutional Players 
Commercial 
Banks 
Al Rajhi Bank, Bank Maskan, Kuwait Finance House, Bank Mellat, Maybank Islamic 
Berhad, Bank Melli Iran, National Commercial Bank, Dubai Islamic Bank 
Standard Setters 
& Regulators 
Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), 
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), International Islamic Liquidity Management 
Corporation (IILM), National Regulators, International Islamic Financial Markets (IIFM), 
Islamic International Rating Agency (IIRA), Liquidity Management Centre (LMC), 
General Council of Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions (CIBAFI) 
Takaful 
Etiqa Takaful Bhd, The Company for Cooperative Insurance, Syarikat Takaful Malaysia 
Bhd, The Mediterranean and Gulf Cooperative Insurance and Reinsurance Co., Islamic 




Al Amal Microfinance, Alhukwat (Pakistan), Shekra, Kiva, Yomken 
Islamic funds SEDCO, BIMB Arabesque, AlAhli Saudi Riyal Trade, Al Rajhi Capital SAR Commodity, International Trade Finance Fd (Sunbullah SAR), Amana Growth Fund 
Waqf AlRajhi Endowment. Awqaf Saudi Arabia, Awqaf South Africa, 
Awqaf and Minors Affairs Foundation (AMAF) 
Sukuk Arrangers Emirates NBD, CIMB Group, Standard Chartered PLC, HSBC Holdings PLC, Saudi National Commercial Bank, National Bank of Abu Dhabi, Maybank 
Education & 
Research 
INCEIF (International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance), Islamic Research & 
Training Institute (IRTI) 
Source: Compiled from ICD-Thomson Reuters (2015, 2016); Askari et al. (2011), Asutay (2015) 
The spread and systemisation of Islamic finance has accompanied with institutionalisation 
process and hence proliferated the number of Islamic banks, regulatory bodies, standard 
settings, educational units and research studies (Asutay 2015). Accordingly, Table 3.2 shows 
a selection amongst the key institutional players within Islamic financial industry that emerged 
over time for dealing with the disputed issues in the grey areas created by hybrid nature of 
Islamic financial system. Looking exclusively on standards and regulations, it is seen that 
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Islamic finance keeps mimicking its conventional counterpart in designing a control 
mechanism strengthened with such standards and regulations that are framed in the global 
financial structure. Furthermore, it overlooks the fact that this frame is constructed against 
potential risks of financial crisis during the financialisation process. Therefore, the objective 
with designing such standards and regulations in the case of conventional financial system is 
to pursue pro-finance economic policies against the threats of chronic financial crisis. This 
assumption is taken for granted in Islamic finance without any consideration, but differently, 
the industry endeavours to justify it through its shallow fiqhi reasoning. 
As banking and insurance activities play a major role in conventional financial system, 
similarly, Figure 3.2 depicts the composition of the Islamic financial services showing the 
dominance of Islamic banking sector, where Islamic banks lead the entire sector with enjoying 
three quarters of the total industrial assets, and sukuk follows it with a share of 15%, looking 
promising for the future. This emanates from the peripheral character of Islamic 
financialisation, which depends entirely on banking sector to pursue financial activity. 
Figure 3.2: Composition of Global Islamic Financial Services Industry 
 
Data Source: Dubai Centre for Islamic Banking and Finance (DCIBF) (2015); 
Ernst & Young (E&Y) (2016) 
Bank based development of Islamic finance industry is also evident in both regional (see: Table 
3.3, Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4) and national (see: Table 3.4 and Figure 3.5) statistics. In the 
year 2015, for instance, the asset size of each segment, shown in Table 3.3, brings the GCC 
into forefront with heavy concentration on banking activities, while sukuk is gaining 
considerable importance in Asia with its proximity to banking asset size (US $182.7 and US 
$218.6 respectively). Figure 3.3 also confirms that the GCC have been leading the industry -
mainly due to the oil wealth as elaborated in the previous section, and MENA region follows 
it closely. Southeast Asia has also gained significant momentum in furthering Islamic finance 
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Asia 218.6 182.7 19.8 4.4 425.5 
GCC 650.8 115.7 23.4 11.7 801.1 
MENA (exc. GCC) 540.5 16.6 0.2 841 565.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa 26.6 1.9 1.5 0.6 30.6 
Others 56.9 2.1 11.2 - 70.2 
Total 1493.40 318.5 56.1 25.1 1893.10 
Source: IFSB (2017) 
 
Figure 3.3: Regional Islamic Banking Assets Size ($US in million) 
 
Data Source: The Banker (2014, 2015, 2016) 
In Figure 3.4, the comparison between Islamic and conventional banks in terms of their asset 
size within regions unveils the fact that the scope of Islamic banking is not sufficient yet to 
compete with conventional finance. However, Islamic banking asset size in the GCC and Asia, 
34% and 13% respectively, is expected to reach a considerable level and gain an edge over its 
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Figure 3.4: Regional Share of Islamic Banking Assets 
 
Source: Ernst and Young (E&Y) (2016:10) (*ROW: rest of the world) 
 
In the national level, the asset structure of various countries is shown in Table 3.4 with the 
percentages of each Islamic finance segment within a specific country. It is noteworthy to 
underscore that the dominant Islamic financial institution is banking in most of the mentioned 
countries with its share in the total Islamic finance sector ranging between 78% and 99%. Thus, 
the rest of Islamic financial service providing institutions can be considered as infant. However, 
Islamic banking in Malaysia and Indonesia has relatively medium level asset size with 
respective shares of 41.9% and 53.8%, where sukuk seems to be burgeoning to claim a large 
share. 
In order to acknowledge its impact in national and global level, each country’s share of global 
Islamic banking assets, and the market share of Islamic banking in total national banking assets 
are given in Figure 3.5. The regional concentration of Islamic finance on the GCC and MENA 
is also reflected here in the national scope, for the leading figures of the industry come from 
most of the oil reach countries with their high shares. Nonetheless, Malaysia, Indonesia, the 
UK and Turkey hold potential in leading the industry in the long-term, since their industry 
growth does not depend upon the oil factor, and more prominently, two different percentages 
of these countries in the figures are proportionally proximate to each other, implying that 
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Saudi Arabia 100 78,39 3,18 1,79 11,66 4,99 
Iran 100 87,40 2,42 6,35 0,94 2,90 
Malaysia 100 38,61 1,77 9,53 45,54 4,55 
UAE 100 79,22 1,11 2,99 16,40 0,28 
Qatar 100 83,61 0,53 0,73 14,89 0,23 
Kuwait 100 85,84 0,19 11,67 0,88 1,42 
Bahrain 100 92,62 0,46 0,98 5,92 0,02 
Turkey 100 80,63 0,00 0,00 19,35 0,03 
Indonesia 100 42,15 2,66 1,57 51,93 1,70 
Bangladesh 100 97,12 2,55 0,32 0,00 0,00 
Pakistan 100 68,22 0,79 11,76 13,18 6,05 
Egypt 100 96,59 0,00 2,04 0,00 1,37 
Sudan 100 99,10 0,39 0,52 0,00 0,00 
Jordan 100 95,53 1,32 1,78 1,27 0,08 
Global 100 72,43 1,88 5,31 17,07 3,32 
Data Source: ICD-Thomson Reuters (2016) 
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Data Source: IFSB (2017); Dubai Centre for Islamic Banking and Finance (DCIBF) (2015); Ernst and 
Young (E&Y) (2016) 
Along all these developments, it seems that the weight of Islamic banking in the overall Islamic 
finance industry will be much higher in a couple of years, as shown in Figure 3.6 with the asset 
size growth of each segment for the last four years with a projected growth until 2021. 
Figure 3.6: Global Islamic Finance Assets by Sector Growth (US$ billion) 
 
Data Source: ICD-Thomson Reuters (2016) 
As evident in the descriptive analysis in this section so far, the historical trajectory of Islamic 
finance embraces a considerable mimicry with conventional finance and its operational 
framework, which basically centres banking activity at the core by adopting debt-based 
financing with less consideration of contributing to real economy and neglecting the objective 
of social financing. In this regard, Islamic finance, too, follows the pattern of financialisation 
with its own idiosyncrasy, and instrumented its foundational aspiration of ‘profit and loss 
sharing’ at the expense of efficiency ethos.  
3.7.2. An Analytical Examination of Financialisation of Islamic Banking 
After critically examining the growth of Islamic finance sector within the global financial 
system through touching upon its global, regional and national records, this subsection aims to 
explore the institutional structure, organisation and operations of Islamic finance, and examine 
them within the context of financialisation that is dealt in six categories above. In doing so, it 
investigates as to what extent and through which ways Islamic finance meets the characteristics 
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It should be stated, at the outset, that the essentialisation of Islamic finance beyond the Islamic 
economics paradigm is indeed a clear and initial sign of Islamic financialisation, wherein 
financial sphere has exclusively gained an autonomous and constitutive role over the 
functioning of Islamic economic institutions, thereby Islamic financial development is 
objectified as the indispensable prerequisite for achieving economic development, an argument 
that has roots in the neoclassical framework of financialisation. Such an essentialist conduct is 
inherited from the mainstream approach of financialisation, which similarly stresses financial 
development in advancing global economic performance. Therefore, both views adopt a 
positive attitude towards the rise of finance and finance-centred understanding of economy by 
neglecting societal consequences of the process of disembedding finance from economic realm. 
Contrary to the positivistic approaches towards financial ascendance, Krippner’s (2005) 
definition of financialisation unravels an important aspect of financialisation of Islamic 
finance. Accordingly, the consideration of financialisation “as a pattern of accumulation in 
which profits accrue primarily through financial channels rather than through trade and 
commodity production” (Krippner 2005:174) is reflected, to a certain degree, in Figure 3.7, 
which illustrates the distribution of global Islamic financing to production and financial sector. 
It is evident in Figure 3.7 that Islamic banks’ funds primarily flow is directed towards financial 
sector. Despite the trajectory of development depicted in Figure 3.7 does not render global 
Islamic banks’ profits derived from financing different sectors, hence does not directly fit into 
Krippner’s content, it still helps to draw some important inferences for Islamic financialisation, 
since Islamic finance similarly strengthens financial channels rather than real economy by 
putting most of its financial services at the disposal of financial sector. 
Besides Krippner’s (2005) emphasis on ‘profit’ aspect in delineating financialisation, post-
Keynesian theorists’ focus on poorly performing ‘production’ post-Keynesian sector in the face 
of the expansion of financial sector crystallises another important dimension of financialisation 
of Islamic finance. In this respect, Figure 3.7, again, illustrates the divergence between 
financing of financial sector and production sector30 by global Islamic banks over sampled 
period of 2000-2013. The significance of divergence starts with the year 2005, and by suffering 
from the nightmarish times of the global financial crisis, the gap between the lines representing 
financial and production sector widens even further with the values of financial sphere doubling 
                                                        
30 While financing banks and financial institutions, consumer durables, and services are considered under financial 
sphere; financing the sectors of agriculture, manufacture and trading is opted for production sphere. For the 
discussion whether to categorise consumer durables under financial sphere, see the explanation provided in 
footnote 36. 
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that of production sphere in the last few years. Confirming the post-Keynesian claim, it is clear 
in the figure that financing production sector by Islamic banks falls into stagnation during the 
expansion of financial sector’s financing.31 
Figure 3.7: Financing by Sectors, Production and Financial, Islamic Banks Global, 
2000-2013 (in US$ thousand) 
 
Data Source: Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions Information, Ibisonline.net/IRTI 
The shrinking of production sector in conventional economic systems is due to relative decline 
of deriving profits therein, hence financial sector has shined out as an alternative sector to 
invest for higher profitability. This necessarily accompanied with short-term oriented financial 
investment against investing on long-term projects in the production area. In the Islamic side, 
a similar process is observed in the concentration of financing modes. Accordingly, despite 
participation based long-run contracts, such as mudarabah, musharakah, and istisna, are ready 
to invest to fulfil profit-and-loss sharing and risk-sharing natures of Islamic finance, 
murabahah (and to some extent ijarah) contract and recently tawarruq are adopted as a short-
term and relatively less risky trust-based mode of financing. With this, Islamic banks derived 
relatively higher profits with involving short-term debt-based financing alternatives (such as 
murabahah, tawarruq and sukuk), and hence avoid the burdens of participatory contracts as 
they are mostly long-run projects and embrace various financial risks albeit their return is 
proportionally high and stimulate real sector and productivity. In rendering some evidence, the 
nature of Islamic financing modes of (i) United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Saudi Arabia from 
                                                        
31 Unfortunately, the data between 2013 and 2016 is not available in IRTI’s website; hence we cannot show the 
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the Gulf Region (in Figures 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10), (ii) Pakistan, Bangladesh and Malaysia from 
the South Asia (in Figure 3.11, 3.12 and 3.13) are shown as short-termism and financialisation 
evidences, which invariably favour murabahah, sukuk and ijarah type fixed income Islamic 
financial contracts in their operations. Islamic banking in Indonesia, however, follows a 
different pattern by bringing the long-term oriented and profit-and-loss sharing natured 
financing of mudarabah and musharakah to the fore. Despite murabahah stays as an inevitable 
fact therein, ‘other’ labelled mode of finances also preserves significance; however, what 
constitutes ‘other’ financing modes is not disclosed. This is presumably related to the fact that 
there are different micro level financing modes widely used in Indonesia, hence cannot be 
incorporated into the analysis as a different category.   
 
Figure 3.8: Islamic Modes of Finance by Islamic Banks in United Arab Emirates, 
1990-2013 (in US$ thousand) 
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Figure 3.9: Islamic Modes of Finance by Islamic Banks in Qatar, 1990-2013 (in US$ 
thousand) 
 
Data Source: Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions Information, Ibisonline.net/IRTI 
 
Figure 3.10: Islamic Modes of Finance by Islamic Banks in Saudi Arabia, 1990-2013 
(in US$ thousand) 
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Figure 3.11: Islamic Modes of Finance by Islamic Banks in Pakistan, 1990-2013 (in 
US$ thousand) 
 
Data Source: Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions Information, Ibisonline.net/IRTI 
 
Figure 3.12: Islamic Modes of Finance by Islamic Banks in Bangladesh, 1990-2013 (in 
US$ thousand) 
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Figure 3.13: Islamic Modes of Finance by Islamic Banks in Malaysia, 1990-2013 (in 
US$ thousand) 
 
Data Source: Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions Information, Ibisonline.net/IRTI 
 
Figure 3.14: Islamic Modes of Finance by Islamic Banks in Indonesia, 1990-2013 (in 
US$ thousand) 
 
Data Source: Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions Information, Ibisonline.net/IRTI 
Acknowledging that Indonesian Islamic financing practice as a rare exception within the 
general trend, it can be claimed broadly that banks, in the new international economic setting, 
diversify their profits mainly through (i) increasing income shares from client services within 
service oriented activities (payment services, expertise, advice, asset management) (Dembinski 
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expanding financial assets (housing, pensions, insurance, money market funds) (Lapavitsas 
2011:620). Receiving its share from the new banking profile, Islamic banks similarly reorient 
their interest to these fields. Figure 3.15, accordingly, demonstrates the significant rise of 
financing service sector, consumer durables, real estate and construction, banks and financial 
institutions. It is, therefore, clear that Islamic banks have complied with the new international 
financial setting by adjusting themselves with the new structure through mimicry and 
hybridisation leading to financialisation.   
Figure 3.15: Financing by Sector, Islamic Banks Global, 2000-2013 (in US$ thousand) 
 
Data Source: Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions Information, Ibisonline.net/IRTI 
The convergence of Islamic finance towards conventional financial system does not confine 
itself with the banking area. In this regard, the rise of Islamic capital markets32 (Islamic funds, 
sukuk etc.) constitutes another dimension of financialisation of Islamic finance. Following the 
coupon-pool capitalism approach of financialisation, capital markets’ simple role of 
intermediation between household savings and investing firms in the productionist form of 
capitalism transformed into a new structure wherein capital markets regulate both household 
and firm behaviour through coupons. In the same vein, Islamic capital market instruments are 
getting dominant in the sector with the neglect of their shady aspects in terms of conforming 
                                                        
32 The size of major Islamic capital market instruments is shown in Figure 3.2, where the share of sukuk and 
Islamic funds totally reaches around 20% of total Islamic financial industry. Long-term projection in Figure 3.6 
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to the Shari’ah principles, since the nature of these instruments does not differ much from the 
conventional capital market instruments. Thus, the convergence towards adopting debt-based 
financing is consolidated even further through Islamic capital markets,33 and fictitious 
transactions have taken place through ‘Islamic coupons’ such as sukuk issuance, Islamic unit 
trusts, and Islamic mutual and investment funds. Muslim households’ income and Shari’ah 
compliant firms’ wealth are, therefore, pulled along the financial sphere in the form of Islamic 
coupons. 
Last remarks and some empirical support can be given to the position of financialisation of 
Islamic finance through the distinguishing concept of ‘subordinate’ financialisation. Lapavitsas 
(2013) argues that the subordinate character of developing countries’ financial systems traces 
back to 1970s, in which financial liberalisation was commenced as the new international 
economic policy that aimed at trade openness across borders. Washington Consensus of 1979 
aimed at liberalising economies and financial sector, later in the 1990s, cemented this policy 
by suggesting domestic economies to welcome international capital flows so that capital in rich 
countries would flow to the poor, and hence expedite their economic development process. In 
this regard, the export of capital from developed to the developing economies increased in the 
form of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the entry of foreign banks in the domestic economy 
(Lapavitsas 2013:245–46). However, in fact, a reverse capital flow has been generated from 
developing to the developed economies, thereby poor countries’ economic conditions were 
even worsened at the expense of strengthening financialised capitalism through capital 
exploitation. 
The implications of subordinate financialisation over Islamic finance are seen in opening 
Islamic windows at the conventional banks and the leading role of the UK as the new Western 
hub for Islamic finance. Capital transfer from domestic economies is mostly conducted through 
Islamic window banking (hybrid banks) and the London Metal Exchange (LME) to channel 
‘Islamic capital’ into the international financial system (for further information on the role of 
the LME on Islamic banking practice and operations, see: Schoon 2016).  
Despite the triad of Iran, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia running the biggest and largest Islamic 
finance markets, London aspires to get involved in the triad and to increase its share through 
                                                        
33 When sukuk market is analysed with sectors, it is seen that the funds raised by the financial services industry 
(30.96%) and government sector (42.87%) accounts for almost 74% of the total issued sukuk (see Chart 1.3.1.7 in 
the IFSB Stability Report 2017:20). Similarly, asset class breakdown of the global Islamic funds shows that money 
market (25%) and equity (43%) hold 68% of the total Islamic funds (see Chart 1.3.2.8 in the IFSB Stability Report 
2017:26). 
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issuing Islamic financial alternatives. LME plays a pivotal role in this in extracting capital from 
developing Muslim countries by offering a platform for Islamic banks’ liquidity management. 
Considering its size and operating fields worldwide, LME takes advantage of its monopolistic 
power and hence easily dominates Islamic finance industry by functioning as the major 
merchandise allowing its traded commodities to be used by Islamic banks globally. As the 
Islamic financial contracts must be backed by certain asset in principle to provide credit on it, 
commodities traded on LME are used to show as the underlying asset in such transactions. 
Thus, most of the commodities in Islamic contracts including commodity murabahah and 
tawarruq are referred to those traded on LME (Wigglesworth 2014). The function of LME 
benefits significantly in flowing Islamic capital into the UK, since it remains the only source 
for global Islamic finance. In recent years, Dubai, Luxemburg, Hong Kong and South Africa 
started to challenge the UK’s position by offering alternative platforms for murabahah and 
tawarruq trading in order to make a grab for some of the business (Torchia 2014); however, 
London still preserves its privileged position thanks to the LME. 
The flow of capital from developing world to leading developed countries, in the case of 
Islamic finance, is also sustained with Islamic window-based hybrid banking system, which 
aims to derive capital gains from Islamic finance industry that reaches nearly $2 trillion, a great 
potential for the financial world in crisis. The latest statistics depicts that the assets of IFIs by 
Islamic window banking amount 18% with the value of $284,785 million while fully-fledged 
Islamic banks enjoy 82% with $1,310,398 million (ICD-Thomson Reuters 2016:38). Figure 
3.16 illustrates how Islamic windows within conventional banking system masses in the 
pioneer countries such as Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and UAE. Both statistical records together 
with the substantial role of LME evidence capital transfer from Muslim developing world into 
the core economies by reflecting the subordinate character of financialisation through Islamic 
finance. 
Figure 3.16: Top 10 Countries in Islamic Banking Assets (US$ MN, FYE 2015) 
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Source: ICD-Thomson Reuters Islamic Finance Development Report (2016) 
 
Based on the articulation so far, and the descriptive study provided in this section, the following 
section presents an econometric analysis to examine the financialisation and Islamic banking 
expansion nexus. 
3.7.3. Searching for the Sources of Financialisation in Islamic Banking: An Econometric 
Estimation 
This section aims to present the findings based on empirical analysis with the objective of 
searching for the sources of the observed financialisation caused by the prevailing applications 
of Islamic finance. In doing so, first, a panel of 14 Muslim-majority countries covering the 
period of 2002-2014 is constructed to examine the impact of the ascendance of Islamic banking 
on financialisation trajectory of entire economy to ascertain whether operations of Islamic 
finance, by and large, strengthen real economy or contribute to further financialisation in 
economies where domestic market share of Islamic finance reaches medium or high systematic 
importance.  
3.7.3.1. Data, variable definition and model 
The selection of sampled countries is based on their market share of Islamic finance in the 
economy, as evidenced in Figure 3.5. The countries with relatively high percentage of Islamic 
finance market share is preferred, for it impacts is considered to be more on economic 
performance. Thus, the list of sampled countries for the econometric analysis in this study is 
given here with an alphabetical order: Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. 
Since this study assumes negative implications for Islamic finance on real economic 
performance, another empirical analysis is conducted under robustness analysis, with a sample 
of 13 countries covering the period 2003-2014,34 to examine the impact of the observed 
financialised economy due to Islamic finance over employment.35 Sample size in both 
                                                        
34 Due to data availability issues, we dropped one country (Palestine) and one year (2002) from the panel data 
when compared to the previous panel data analysis.  
35 Employment is one of the most preferred indicators of real economic performance in both empirical and 
theoretical studies on financialisation (see: Ashman, Mohamed, and Newman 2013; Batt and Appelbaum 2013; 
Svilokos and Burin 2017 amongst others). In particular, financialisation-employment nexus is stressed by post-
Keynesian approach. 
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empirical analysis is constrained by data availability issue, as data on IBF is highly limited and 
has only recently been systematised to make it more accessible. 
Table 3.5: Definitions and Sources of Variables 
Variable Definition Source 
Financialisation of 
economy 
(i) domestic credit provided by 
financial sector as a share of GDP 
(ii) share of finance, insurance and 
real estate sector (FIRE) in GDP 
- World Bank (Word Development 
Indicators); 
- Central banks of selected countries; 
- The Statistical Centre for the 
Cooperation Council for the Arab 
Countries of the Gulf (“GCC-Stat”); 
- Asean Development Bank Statistics; 
Open Data for Africa Database; 
Islamic 
financialisation 
(i) share of financial institutions, 
banks, real estate and consumer 
durables (FIRECO) in total 
financing values of Islamic banks 
(ii) share of shareholders’ equity in 
total asset values of Islamic banks’ 
(SVO) 
Islamic Banks and Financial 
Institutions Database (IBIS Online) 
Trade openness the sum of exports and imports of 
goods and services as a share of 
GDP 
World Bank (Word Development 
Indicators) 
Manufacturing value added in manufacturing as a 
share of GDP 
World Bank (Word Development 
Indicators) 
FDI net outflows net outflows of investment from the 
reporting economy to the rest of the 
world divided by GDP 
World Bank (Word Development 
Indicators) 
GDP per capita logarithm of the gross domestic 
product per capita 
World Bank (Word Development 
Indicators) 
Institutional quality ‘rule of law’ defined as: the 
confidence of citizens in law, and 
the extent that they abide by the 
rules of the society, such as contract 
enforcement, property rights, police, 
and court. 
Worldwide Governance Indicators 
Unemployment Unemployment, total (% of total 
labor force) (modeled ILO estimate) 
World Bank (Word Development 
Indicators) 
Considering that there is no academic study exploring financialisation of Islamic finance and 
its effects on real economy – neither discursive nor empirical, this study takes a pioneering role 
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and constructs its indicators with a meticulous selection to provide an effective reflection of 
financialisation. Accordingly, definition and data sources for each variable are depicted in 
Table 3.5, which also lists measures for dependent and explanatory variables and their 
identification. The rationale for their selection is explained below: 
(i) Financialisation of economy: Based on its various definitions and identifications in previous 
sections, we measure financialisation of an economy with ‘domestic credit provided by 
financial sector as a share of GDP’. Although this indicator is viewed in various World Bank 
working papers (see, for instance, Čihák, Demirgüç-Kunt, Feyen, and Levine 2012) as a 
measure of financial depth that would pave the way for financial (and then economic) 
development, we consider it an important sign of financialisation, which leads up to centre 
finance as an objective function per se rather than finance holding an instrumental function for 
social and economic development. We also employ alternative indicator for financialisation of 
economy as ‘the share of finance, insurance and real estate sector (FIRE) in GDP’, which 
gauges the degree of economy’s dependence on financial sector. A list of widely used measures 
of financialisation in the relevant literature is given before in the Table 3.1. Noticeably, plenty 
of alternative measures are ready to be used therein, yet the data availability issue constraints 
us to include in our regression analysis. 
 (ii) Islamic financialisation: Similar to the rationale for using FIRE sector to GDP in 
financialisation of economy, we measure Islamic financialisation with ‘the share of financial 
institutions, banks, real estate and consumer durables36 (FIRECO) in total financing values of 
Islamic banks. 
It can be argued that Islamic finance is an asset-backed financing, and hence deals with trading 
in goods with holding a real asset in its transactions rather than making profit out of monetary 
papers only. For this reason, there would not be a case for financialisation in Islamic finance. 
However, we argue that one of the underlying logics of financialisation is the idea of treating 
                                                        
36 There can be some controversies on consumer durables and its use as a measure of financialisation, for consumer 
durables can alternatively be thought contributing to the expansion of aggregate demand and hence contribute to 
real economy. In fact, most of the consumer durables are provided through consumer credits which strengthen the 
role of financial markets; as indicated by Lapavitsas’s thesis (2011), which argues that workers are involved in 
the process of financialisation by channelling their wages and salaries into financial system through having micro 
credits and bank credits for their consumption needs. The argument that consumer credit accelerates 
financialisation is also iterated by Watkins (2017:110) with his supporting evidences from real world experiences: 
“… consumer credit, however, accelerated during the period of financialization. The deregulatory movement 
following the demise of the Bretton Woods Agreement in the 1970s led to rapid innovations in consumer credit 
and increases in consumer debt”. Since it is mainly debt based on the non-existence form of income at the time, 
consumer credits create fictitiousness through the imbalance in the economy between available monetary means 
and consumption. 
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money as a subject matter of trade beyond its role of being a medium of exchange. In this 
manner, some trading contracts of Islamic finance today operates with this logic to generate 
huge profits similar to conventional way of profit making. The assets used during the 
transaction never adds significant value to the real economy since they are symbolically being 
purchased amongst a pre-determined group of people to generate money without burdening 
additional risk. This is evident particularly in bay’ul i’nah, tawarruq, commodity murabahah 
and certain sukuk types and issuances.  
The experience and the debate in the Islamic finance sphere indicates that a considerable 
number of Islamic finance practitioners have been trying to find ‘Shari’ah compliant’ ways to 
eliminate the burdens and responsibilities accompanied by adopting an asset-backed Islamic 
finance. The mentioned contracts above, hence, reflect such an attempt of converging Islamic 
finance towards conventional financial system. Acknowledging these factors, by using 
FIRECO as a measure of Islamic finance based financialisation, here, we aim to reveal the 
degree of concentration on financial and real aspects of economy by Islamic finance. 
An alternative indicator of Islamic finance based financialisation is chosen as ‘the share of 
shareholders’ equity in total asset values of Islamic banks’ (SVO). Based on the post-
Keynesian expression of financialisation as shareholder value orientation and also close 
relationship between shareholder value and employment, we prefer using this indicator as one 
of the exogenous variables for robustness analysis. 
(iii) Trade openness: Measured by ‘the sum of exports and imports of goods and services as a 
share of GDP’ and consistent with the prior literature, we consider trade to be an exogenous 
variable in our regression analysis. Following on the idea of subordinate financialisation 
conceptualised by Lapavitsas (2013), trade openness is expected to have adverse effect on 
economic development trajectories of developing countries and hence strengthens the degree 
of financialisation. 
(iv) Manufacturing: We use ‘value added in manufacturing as a share of GDP’ to examine how 
productive side of economy impacts financialisation. The debates on pre-mature 
deindustrialisation (see: Cecchetti and Kharroubi 2015; Dasgupta and Singh 2007; Palma 2014; 
Rodrik 2016 amongst others) suggests that industrialisation process of developing countries 
was interrupted due to the transition from industrial capitalism towards finance capitalism. 
Policy makers in such countries have left industrialisation process pre-matured; as, instead, 
they shifted to concentrate on financial markets and directed investments on this area. Thus, 
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finance gained utmost importance while neglecting productive fields such as manufacturing 
and trade. We, therefore, expect that variation in manufacturing sector should have negative 
effect on financialisation. 
(v) FDI net outflows: In order to assess the effect of globalisation on financialisation, Dünhaupt 
(2014) uses ‘FDI outflows as a share of GDP’ defined by net outflows of investment from the 
reporting economy to the rest of the world divided by GDP. This indicator is considered as one 
of the exogenous variables since it should reckon with the attraction of global financial markets 
to invest and generate huge profits instead of local investments on home country. 
(vi) Log of GDP per capita: This indicator proxies the level of economic development and 
renders some implications on the change in GDP per capita on the financialisation of economy. 
It is normally expected that GDP per capita should have adverse effect on financialisation, 
since an increase on GDP per capita construed as economic prosperity and financialisation is 
assumed to trigger income inequality. However, high GDP per capita does not directly mean 
smooth distribution of wealth, thereby it should not be surprising to have positive relationship 
between these two variables. 
(vii) Institutional quality: With an aim of including political economy aspects into the 
robustness analysis, amongst the very limited alternatives, ‘the rule of law’ (RoL) is considered 
as a measure for institutional quality. This is used as part of the effect of non-economic factors 
on employment in the robustness analysis. 
(viii) Unemployment: This variable is considered as dependent variable in the robustness 
analysis. In doing so, potential contributions of conventional and Islamic banks on macro 
dimensions of socioeconomic life (employment area in this case) are examined. 
Based on the variables defined above, the baseline regression model is expressed in the 
following form: 
!"#$%&'( = 	+, + 	./0%&$"'( + 1/0%&'( + 23456!789'( +	:;%<!&'( +	=#<>'( +
?/!04@A'( +	B'(         [3.1] 
where             
DOMCRE stands for financialisation of economy;  
FIRECO is the proxy for financialisation of Islamic banks;  
FIRE is the macroeconomic variable for the degree of sophistication of financial market;  
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logGDPpc is the logarithm of GDP per capita;  
TRADE proxies for trade openness;  
MAN measures value added in manufacturing as a share of GDP;  
FDIout is the foreign direct investment net outflows as a share of GDP;  
B'( is the error term;  
+, is the constant; and  
., 1, 2, :, =, ? are the vectors of coefficient estimates. 
In an attempt to explore the impact of Islamic financialisation on real economy and 
developmentalist trajectories broadly, this study employs a quantitative methodology and 
makes use of historical statistical data with an unbalanced panel data analysis. A range of 
econometric techniques are utilised including pooled OLS, random effect and system-GMM 
estimators to address heterogeneity, over-identification and endogeneity issues. Next 
subsection provides rationale for applying each of these estimation techniques, their advantages 
and limitations and also interpretation of regression results in a comprehensive manner. 
Before proceeding with the regression results, it should be noted that conducting a panel study 
on Islamic financialisation poses several challenges. First, unlike discursive approach, 
empirical evidence requires measurable explanations of Islamic financialisation. In doing so, 
appropriate indicators should be accessible and available as disclosed information by selected 
countries. Although there are commonly used indicators for Islamic banking performance, 
financialisation indicators such as ‘value added in finance as a percentage of total value added’, 
‘the size of the financial sector as a percentage of GDP’ and ‘financial sector’s share of profits’ 
are only available for advanced countries. This necessarily leads us to make a careful selection 
of variables, and hence countries.  
Another challenge is related to the difficulty in interpreting developing economies’ 
financialisation trajectory, since it exhibits a subordinate character in Lapavitsas’ terms. 
Despite the nexus of advanced economies and their financialisation process is relatively well-
known phenomenon which has been a subject matter of many academic studies in the literature 
with regularly used variables, financialisation in developing economies have rarely been 
examined, hence appropriate variables for subordinate financialisation have not been agreed 
upon.  
With an acknowledgement of these challenges, this study should be considered an original 
attempt in identifying the facets and distinctive features of financialisation of Islamic finance. 
Not limited with this, it should also be accepted as an authentic attempt since it elucidates 
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developing countries’ financialisation trends with an empirical evidence including appropriate 
indicators. 
3.7.3.2. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
As part of the initial empirical process, Table 3.6 reports descriptive statistics for 14 countries 
observed during the period of 2002-201437. The model has medium sample size of 182 
observations that can be considered sufficient to reveal reliable results. Amongst the variables 
used, only ‘GDP per capita’ is transformed into log values to reduce wide variation across the 
sample. It is clear that only the indicators of financialisation of economy and trade openness 
have high variation amongst its values due to relatively big gap between minimum and 
maximum values.  
Table 3.6: Descriptive Statistics (2002-2014) 
 
Variable   Obs.           Mean           Std. Dev.            Min                     Max 
 
DOMCRE     182         60.29231            32.79725           -10.15183              143.6417 
FIREGDP     182       13.47465         4.805953              6.3692                  24.2 
FIRECO     182       .4145947         .2334022                       0          .9113519 
FDIout     182       1.521616         2.651049         -10.35987          9.734888 
TRADE     182       88.61905         45.63663          26.85823          210.3738 
MAN                 182         15.5127         6.184187          4.427057          36.76302 
logGDPpc     182         3.80746         .6426834          2.728554          4.861361 
 
Table 3.7: Correlation Matrix 
 DOMCRE FIREGDP FIRECO FDIout TRADE MAN logGDPpc 
DOMCRE 1.0000       
FIREGDP 0.1678 1.0000      
FIRECO 0.2145 0.4217 1.0000     
FDIout 0.1311 0.1855 0.3285 1.0000    
TRADE 0.4802 0.6389 0.6092 0.3928 1.0000   
MAN 0.3180 -0.2626 -0.2593 -0.1291 0.0605 1.0000  
logGDPpc 0.0634 0.4658 0.5822 0.4245 0.5238 -0.2315 1.0000 
 
Examining the correlation matrix in Table 3.7, the dataset shows that Islamic financialisation 
has positive correlation with all variables in the model except manufacturing sector. The 
                                                        
37 The empirical results can be examined as to whether they give biased implications due to the potential outliers 
used in the dataset. Based on such a consideration, the data is winsorised by removing the potential outliers, and 
the regression is repeated. However, it is empirically evidenced that the results did not change after winsorisation. 
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correlation values and signs are almost in line with our expectations since we assume positive 
relationship between Islamic financialisation and all other variables except manufacturing and 
GDP per capita. As there is no significantly high correlation amongst variables, the model can 
be considered trustable in the sense of delivering reliable results. 
3.7.3.3. Main results: Pooled OLS, random effect and system-GMM 
Table 3.8 depicts the regression results of pooled OLS model, random effect and system-GMM 
estimators together at a single glance. Before interpreting the results, it should be stated that 
we do not expect pooled OLS to be an appropriate technique for our panel data model, since it 
completely ignores country specific effects and does not account for simultaneity bias, instead 
it pools the entire data in one basket and runs the regression accordingly. Furthermore, this 
technique violates some basic assumptions including that of error terms. However, with a 
rationale of rendering comparison with other methods, pooled OLS results shall be interpreted 
and taken into account with mentioned cautions. 
Random effect, on the other hand, reckons with individual specific effects, which is treated to 
be uncorrelated with explanatory variables. It also assumes no correlation between time-
invariant heterogeneity between groups and the error term (Bhargava and Sargan 1983). The 
choice between fixed and random effect estimation depends on the results of Hausman test, the 
null hypothesis of which suggests using random effect model. As we ran Hausman test and 
failed to reject the null hypothesis, and in line with our assumptions over the model, random 
effect estimation seemed relatively more appropriate technique for our dynamic panel data 
model. Overall, the model with random effect helps explain 88% of the variability in 
financialisation values. 
Since random effect model does not address endogeneity issues and behaves full exogeneity of 
the model, system-GMM technique would give much reliable results, for it deals with some 
essential issues including endogeneity and autocorrelation. This study, accordingly, trusts 
panel system-GMM estimator38 developed by Blundell and Bond (1998), which uses both the 
difference panel data and the data from the original levels specification that eventually enables 
to produce dramatic increases in both consistency and efficiency. As an alternative to system-
GMM estimator, difference-GMM could have been adopted. However, it raises serious 
problems within its estimation that includes “(i) the elimination of the cross-country 
                                                        
38  A useful guide for the application of the system-GMM estimator on growth models can be found in Bond, 
Hoffler and Temple (2001). 
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relationship and focusing only on time differences, (ii) the suffer from imprecision and 
potentially biased estimates in small samples, and (iii) exacerbating biases by decreasing the 
signal-to-noise ratio” (Beck and Levine 2004:432).  
Mostly, two main variants of the system panel estimator, one-step and two-step system-GMM, 
are preferred in econometric studies. While one-step system estimator assumes homoscedastic 
errors, two-step estimator constructs heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, and thus 
asymptotically accepted to be more efficient relative to the former. Nonetheless, two-step 
estimator becomes a poor guide for small samples that has large number of instruments, as it 
raises overfitting problem and may produce standard errors that are biased downwards, which 
is evident in most of the Monte Carlo experiments. Therefore, one-step system estimator is 
opted for and robust standard errors are used as common in most studies. 
The consistency of system-GMM estimator hinges on the validity of two main assumptions: (i) 
the error terms do not exhibit serial correlation, and (ii) the instruments must be valid. In 
addressing these issues, we use two common specification tests suggested by Arellano and 
Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). The first is the 
Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions, which tests the validity of instruments used in the 
regression. It should be noted that instead of using Sargan test to address the validity of 
instruments, Hansen test is applied when robust standard errors are chosen to take place in the 
regression. 
The second test, AR2 test, examines whether the error terms are serially correlated or not. 
Similarly, Wald test, known as F-test in small samples, examines the joint significance of 
whether two or more variables should be included in the regression jointly. The p-values of 
Hansen, AR2 and F test results are given at the bottom of Table 3.8. As the p-values of Hansen 
and AR2 tests are quite high, 0.843 and 0.454 respectively, we cannot reject the null hypothesis, 
which means that the model with system-GMM does not pose over-identification and serial 
correlation issues. F test result, similarly, suggests that the regression model with joint selection 
of indicators are appropriate. 
Following the rationale for each estimation methods explained above, the model presented in 
Table 3.8 covers the period of 2002-2014 for 14 countries in a cross-sectional manner. As can 
be seen from the results, the effect and significance of Islamic financialisation on 
financialisation of economy entirely differs in three estimation techniques. The pooled-OLS 
and random effect both suggest positive impact, while only the latter is significant at 5%. On 
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the other hand, system-GMM results yield a negative but insignificant effect of Islamic 
financialisation on dependent variable. It should be noted that, in applying the system-GMM, 
the variables of FIRE sector to GDP, FDI net outflows, trade openness and manufacturing are 
treated as endogenous. 
These findings are in line with our theoretical premises, for a positive and significant impact 
in the Model 2 and a negative but insignificant impact in the Model 3 implying that Islamic 
financialisation either fosters overall financialisation in the sample countries (Model 2) or fails 
to dilute financialisation trend significantly (Model 3) due to a wide range of reasons including 
its failure on strengthening real economy. Similarly, system-GMM results invalidate the 
counter argument that claims Islamic finance to be in no association with financialisation, since 
it is an asset backed financial proposition that significantly increases trading in goods with real 
assets, hence giving more weight on real side of economy rather than mere financial 
sophistication. However, in econometrics terms, the findings cannot clearly imply that the 
results are robust in terms of rendering same significance and sign. Therefore, the findings must 
be read within such caveats.  
Table 3.8: Pooled OLS, Random Effect, and One-step system-GMM Estimates of 
Islamic Financialisation on Country Financialisation, 2002–2014 
                                                      [1]                                  [2]                                   [3]    
                                            Pooled_OLS                Random_effect                 System_GMM    
Islamic financialisation                9.806                             16.069**                         -0.912    
                                                   [0.434]                            [0.034]                           [0.929]    
FIRE sector to GDP                    -0.501                              1.343**                          0.964*    
                                                   [0.416]                            [0.046]                           [0.091]    
Log of GDP                                 -9.556**                       -20.810*                           -0.367  
per capita                                    [0.026]                           [0.054]                           [0.938]    
Trade                                             0.405***                        0.199***                      -0.147*    
                                                   [0.000]                            [0.001]                           [0.069]    
Manufacturing                              1.277***                       -0.586*                           -0.555   
                                                   [0.001]                            [0.070]                           [0.571]    
FDI                                                0.135                            -1.057**                           0.820    
net outflows                               [0.879]                            [0.014]                           [0.460]    
Constant                                      43.445***                    107.876**                          7.379  
                                                   [0.008]                            [0.012]                           [0.810]    
Observations                                    182                                  182                                182  
Countries                                           14                                    14                                  14 
R-squared/rho                               0.340                               0.881            - 
F_Test/Wald test p-value             0.000                               0.000                              0.000 
Hansen p-value                                   -                      -                               0.843 
AR2 p-value                       -               -                              0.454 
Notes: p-values in brackets; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; The null hypothesis of Hansen test: the 
instruments used are not correlated with the residuals; The null hypothesis of AR2 test: The null 
hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. 
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Our theoretical model assumes ‘the ratio of FIRE sector in GDP’ to deepen financialisation 
even further since the proliferation of these sectors’ share in GDP should lead financial system 
to move at the centre of economic system. Consistent with this assumption, the variable of 
FIRE has positive significance over financialisation, with its coefficients 1.343 and 0.964 in 
random effect and system-GMM respectively. Amongst other macroeconomic variables, per 
capita GDP, not surprisingly, renders negative effect on financialisation significantly except in 
the Model 3. Similar to this, manufacturing shows an adverse effect on financialisation 
basically due to its close relationship with industrialisation that hampers the flourishing of 
financial investment at the expense of real economic investment. 
The impact of globalisation, identified with ‘FDI outflows as a share of GDP’, on 
financialisation is ambiguous once looking at three different models. While random effect 
results suggest that globalisation decreases the degree of financialisation, as FDI outflows 
target not global financial sectors but rather catch real investment opportunities, findings from 
system-GMM, contrarily, treats globalisation to be worsening factor for financialisation. Both 
interpretations make sense, since the real effect of globalisation on developing countries’ 
economic performance has not still been unanimously identified. 
Having strong affinities with globalisation, trade openness is located under the general theme 
of subordinate financialisation, and hence expected to stimulate financialisation. The findings 
in the first two models yield support to this idea with positive significance at 1%, yet the sign 
of the coefficient turns out to be negative in system-GMM, meaning that open trade paves the 
way for increasing real economic activities globally instead of facilitating the reach of global 
financial operations through financialisation. 
3.7.3.4. Robustness analysis 
In this subsection, robustness check is applied to examine whether the results are robust to 
alterations in the conditioning information set and also to changes in the measure of 
financialisation of Islamic banks. The model aims to examine the impact of financialisation 
(both Islamic and conventional finance) on unemployment, which is accepted to reflect an 
important socioeconomic dimension. As mentioned before, the sample consists of 13 countries 
and covers the period 2003-2014, as data unavailability further limits us with the addition of 
new variable of unemployment. 
We use following model for robustness analysis: 
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?/!04@A'( + 	F%4G'( +	B'(        [3.2] 
where  
UNEMP denotes unemployment;  
SVO is the proxy for Islamic financialisation;  
FIRE represents financialisation of economy;  
logGDPpc is the logarithm of gross domestic product per capita;  
TRADE proxies for trade openness;  
MAN measures value added in manufacturing as a share of GDP;  
FDIout is the foreign direct investment net outflows as a share of GDP;  
RoL is the proxy for institutional quality;  
B'( is the error term;  
+, is the constant; and  ., 1, 2, :, =, ?, F are the vectors of coefficient estimates. 
Table 3.9: Pooled OLS, Random Effect, and One-step System-GMM Estimates of 
Financialisation on Unemployment, 2003–2014 
                                                      [1]                                  [2]                                   [3]    
                                            Pooled_OLS                Random_effect                 System_GMM    
Islamic financialisation             -17.371***                        2.277                             -0.711    
                                                   [0.001]                            [0.305]                           [0.912]    
Country financialisation               0.155*                           -0.083                            -0.034    
                                                   [0.096]                            [0.157]                           [0.742]    
Log of GDP                                 -3.487***                       -6.030***                      -2.389**  
per capita                                   [0.000]                            [0.000]                           [0.041]    
Trade                                           -0.004                             -0.006                              0.007    
                                                   [0.661]                            [0.257]                           [0.394]    
Manufacturing                             -0.055                              0.150***                       -0.174*   
                                                   [0.363]                            [0.000]                           [0.081]    
FDI                                              -0.332**                           0.046                            -0.134    
net outflows                               [0.011]                            [0.213]                           [0.272]    
Rule of law                                   0.005                              -0.035**                         0.020    
                                                   [0.764]                            [0.035]                           [0.412]    
Constant                                      21.598***                      30.297***                      13.429**  
                                                   [0.000]                            [0.000]                           [0.015]    
Observations                                   156                                  156                                 156  
Countries                                           13                                    13                                   13 
R-squared/rho                               0.447                              0.956             - 
F_Test/Wald test p-value             0.000                              0.000                               0.000 
Hansen p-value                                    -                     -                               0.523 
AR2 p-value                        -              -                               0.746 
Notes: (i) p-values in brackets; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; (ii) the null hypothesis of Hansen test: 
the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals; (iii) The null hypothesis of AR2 test: The 
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Presenting the results of robustness check, Table 3.9 depicts a similar view and categorisation 
of estimation techniques with Table 3.8. Leaving pooled-OLS results aside because of the 
reasons explained before, random effect results show that both Islamic and conventional 
financialisation does not exhibit significant impact on unemployment. This might be due to the 
pre-mature nature of financial system in developing economies, which have not penetrated into 
the entire economic system yet; hence, it is unable to influence employment significantly. Other 
variables such as institutional quality (RoL) and GDP per capita, not surprisingly, reveal 
negative effect on unemployment. 
The results of system-GMM renders negative but insignificant effects of Islamic and 
conventional financialisation on unemployment, which can help to suggest that subordinate 
financialisation in developing countries, contrary to the role of financialisation in advanced 
economies, does not hold a significant influential role yet on macroeconomic indicators, such 
as unemployment. 
3.8. CONCLUSION 
Islamic finance and financialisation phenomenon have barely been associated in the literature 
of Islamic economics due mainly to ignorance, or at best, an unwitting negligence of the term 
by practitioners and theoreticians. Despite the introduction of ‘financialisation of Islamic 
finance’ presumably sparks off a perplexing situation in such an environment, it is worth to 
shed light on the failure of Islamic finance project from the perspective of financialisation since 
the failure roots in, to a large extent, the adopted financial logic borrowed from mainstream 
economics whereby the utmost importance is given to financial sector to take place and 
substantialise at the core of economic activities.  
In the meantime, the scope of failure is controversially multifaceted, while this study identifies 
it with the Polanyian notion of embeddedness. Accordingly, the participatory and sharing-
based values embedded in the Islamic financial contracts throughout the ages has faded away 
in the modern times by giving way to efficiency oriented and market driven understanding of 
Islamic finance, which cherishes shareholder value maximisation in its operations and favours 
more on debt-based financial instruments as part of capitalism based institutional logic that are 
both observed in the empirical analysis in this study. Thus, the practical applications of Islamic 
banking subordinated Islamic economic theory in the service of converging towards 
conventional financial system, which, in return, created a disembedded feature of Islamic 
financial industry. While in an aspirational sense, Islamic banking is considered as a disruptive 
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financing force, the emergence of financialisation of Islamic banking should, accordingly, be 
understood as an attempt of disembedding shared norms, values and beliefs from economic 
realm that eventually leads up to create a self-regulated and standalone industry of Islamic 
finance. As in the case of financialisation in advanced economies where financial markets 
dominate entire economic system with the pursuit of generating profit at the expense of 
engendering social inequality and distributional problems, financialisation of Islamic finance, 
far from conceiving developmentalist outcomes, helps create a financialised commercial 
society within Muslim domain. The disenchantment with Islamic finance is, hence, pertain to 
such a process of disembeddedness, which therefore has led to the emergence of ‘Shari’ah 
compliant vs Islam based’ financing debate. 
Ideally speaking, Islamic finance should have emerged as a bottom-up demand from society to 
meet financial needs of individuals under a simple but functional role of ‘financing’ vis-à-vis 
a self-proclaimed ‘finance’ understanding constructed by mainstream economics. 
Nevertheless, Islamic finance could not position itself with a moral economy understanding 
and has always targeted to shine out as an alternative market segment within global financial 
system. The gradual process of diverging from moral economy perspective is elucidated 
through historical facts and conditions of Muslim world surrounded by a new regulation of 
world financial system in the post-war period. 
In a general sense, discursive aspect of Islamic financialisation is located throughout the study, 
to constitute the theoretical ground, with a moral economy understanding under the rubric of 
Polanyian embeddedness debate. In addition, the general idea of financialisation of Islamic 
finance is supported with the evidence provided through empirical analyses, which 
demonstrates that Islamic finance exacerbates financialisation process of economy in which it 
has some level of presence, or, as other estimation technique suggests, it fails to bolster real 
economy by lessening the degree of financialisation. It implies, therefore, that Islamic financial 
area, not different than the conventional design, failed to evade the dominance of capital 
fundamentalism and lost its position as an instrument to contribute to social good rather than 
as an end itself. Even worse, Islamic banking seems to be serving the proliferation of capital 
by creating tension with other stakeholders such as labour, land and money. In other words, the 
evidence suggests that financial process can be maintained for the accumulation of capital and 
profit maximisation of those who maintain capital-intensive investment activities through 
fictitious commodities. 
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While the explanation of historical and hegemonic social formational factors clarifies the 
rationale for the convergence of Islamic finance towards financialisation, the scope and 
dimensions of the convergence are further crystallised in light of different views on 
financialisation categorised under six approaches as discussed in the initial section above. 
Accordingly, the theoretical debate and empirical evidence on financialisation of Islamic 
finance, developed throughout the chapter, unravelled broad affinities with each approach and 
their main emphasis on and features of financialisation. Firstly, the failure of Islamic banking 
operations in promoting real economy confirms the post-Keynesian emphasis on slowdown of 
real economic activities due to the ascendance of financial sector. In addition, in examining 
short-run and long-run orientation of financial activities in the post-Keynesian approach, the 
figures on the distribution of the modes of Islamic finance above ensure that the logic of 
generating profits through short-termist contracts dominates and permeates through Islamic 
banking sector, as evident in the small share of long-run project financing contracts such as 
mudarabah and musharakah based project financing. The empirical evidence produced by this 
study confirms the Marxian and varieties of capitalism approach, too, in the sense that the 
expansion of Islamic finance in all over the world seem to create an accumulation crisis through 
shareholder value orientation in the near future, since the capital accumulation within Islamic 
banking cannot expand into different categories of society, as participation, profit and loss as 
well as risk sharing features are very limitedly applied in different Islamic contracts. 
Furthermore, the implications of the observed and evidenced financialisation of Islamic finance 
influence everyday life of Muslims similar to cultural economy approach, such that the 
expansion of the prevailing understanding of Islamic banking encourages to construct a new 
form of debt-based society, albeit motivated by religious concern. In other words, financing no 
longer become an ordinary instrument to fulfil everyday necessities, but it leads to create, under 
Islamic finance, a temptation to continuously search for financial ways to sustain individual 
and social life. 
The results, in a nutshell, show that developmentalism as a social objective could not be 
revealed due to heavy financialisation of Islamic finance. What leads it to such a situation 
called ‘social failure’ is highly related to methodological obscurity in defining the objectives 
of Islamic economics. Objectivist and teleological perspective on Islamic economics and 
finance necessitates a moral economy understanding, which is extensively scrutinised in this 
chapter. Islamic finance, in this sense, should settle its instrumental role of ‘financing’ as an 
objective to help creating an economic system based on Islamic principles. However, it went 
the other way around and created further disembeddness. In this regard, Islamic financialisation 
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denotes one of the reflections of social formation of contemporary Muslim societies through 
which economy gains an autonomous sphere from other social layers by disembedding widely 
shared values, norms, and other non-economic factors from the economic realm. It also creates 
commodifying social relations that no longer embraces its traditional role of reciprocity, but 
rather replaces with transactions under the whole objective of efficiency some of which are 
fictitious as the practice of organised tawarruq demonstrates. In this sense, commodifying 
social relations removes the reciprocity between individuals, and relegates economic 
interactions between individuals to transactional level. For instance, there can be no objections 
towards organisational tawarruq while looking at transactional perspective; however, its 
legitimacy should be criticised when the reciprocal consequences are considered. Thus, 
commodifying social relations is necessarily an outcome of relegating everything into 
transactional level without reckoning with individual and social implications. This brings us 
Oscar Wilde’s famous quote in summarising the debate: “Nowadays people know the price of 
everything and the value of nothing” (Wild 2015). 
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CHAPTER 4 
RE-EMBEDDING MAQASID AL-SHARI’AH IN THE ESSENTIAL 




The idea of Islamic economics burgeoned as a post-colonial counter-hegemonic attempt to 
address the observed developmentalist failures of Muslim societies in a period where old 
colonial legacies had remained overwhelmingly shaping socioeconomic institutions in 
decolonized Muslim lands. Since the prevailing legacies are considered to impede 
emancipation and empowerment of Muslim identity, obliterating their traces was seen an 
essential concern in developing an authentic meaning of economy and society as part of identity 
search. Islamic economics, thus, emerged as a project to develop an Islamic system of 
economics based on Islamic normative principles and substantive morality.  
This project has aimed at coming to terms with the challenges Muslim individuals and societies 
facing with the mainstream materialistic understanding of the economy in such a way to rescue 
the meaning and function of human agency, land, labor and capital as well as the extended 
stakeholders in the Islamic social formation to generate a participatory and sharing economy. 
Consequently, considering the ideational mismatches between Islamic and secular worldviews, 
Islamic economics envisaged to function in eliminating the dependence upon capitalist 
formation of economic life and help to construct a new social formation of Muslim societies in 
the light of Islamic ontology and epistemology. In achieving this, in the short-run, utmost 
importance is given to public policy oriented developmentalist agenda with the objective of 
eliminating underdevelopment, eradicating poverty and weak politico-economic structures, 
while in the long-run an attempt is considered in developing Islamic social formation.  
The theoretically defined aspirations of Islamic economics are invariably welcomed and 
encouraged to put into practice, yet the historical experience has shown that the institutionalisation 
process has been limited to banking and financial activities with an unsophisticated and non-
theoretical making of Islamic finance. General trend of Islamic economic studies has, thus, been 
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moving towards finance and bank centred view of Islamic economics in which financial operations 
constitute the pivot of economic activities. 
As the developmentalist aspirations were hedged around Islamic financial sphere, the performance 
of Islamic banks and non-bank financial institutions in regard to their contribution to social and 
economic development became more significant. Thus, the emergent phenomenon of Islamic 
finance and its nexus with developmentalism is examined by considering its moral articulations 
and outcomes through essentialising value-based mode of financing. In line with this, it was 
evidenced empirically in Chapter 2 in this research that Islamic banks failed to establish a 
development-centred view of financial activity envisaged in theory of Islamic moral economy 
(IME), but they have rather opted for strategies of homogenisation in global financial system as an 
alternative market segment operating not differently from conventional finance understanding by 
replicating the prevailing frame. This is considered as divergence from ideals to the mimicry of 
conventional finance through representing hybrid financial services (Asutay 2007b, 2012). 
After the recognition that the divergence of Islamic finance culminates in mimicry and hybridity, 
it is worth to shed light on the failure of Islamic finance project from the perspective of 
‘financialisation’ since the failure roots in, to a large extent, the adopted financial logic borrowed 
from mainstream economics whereby the utmost importance is given to financial sector to take 
place and substantialise at the core of economic activities. This approach necessarily raises the 
notion of ‘financialisation of Islamic finance’ and its discursive power to explain the rationale 
behind the failure of social performance of Islamic banks. The emergence of financialisation of 
Islamic finance should, accordingly, be understood as the attempt of disembedding shared norms, 
values and beliefs from economic and financing realm that eventually leads up to create a self-
regulated and standalone sector of Islamic finance. 
As in the case of financialisation in advanced economies where financial markets dominate entire 
economic system with the pursuit of generating profit at the expense of engendering social 
inequality and distributional problems, financialisation of Islamic finance, far from conceiving 
developmentalist outcomes, sparks off a sort of financialised commercial society within Muslim 
domain. The disenchantment with Islamic finance, hence, pertains to such a process of 
disembeddedness. Financialisation of Islamic finance, therefore, denotes one of the reflections 
of social formation of contemporary Muslim societies through which economy gains an 
autonomous sphere from other social layers by commodifying social relations that no longer 
embraces its traditional role of transforming the society through moral economy objectives such 
as reciprocity and participatory economy, but rather is replaced by transactional paradigm under 
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the neoclassical objective of efficiency. The empirical analysis in Chapter 3, in parallel with this 
assertion, evidenced that Islamic finance exacerbates financialisation process of economy, or, 
similarly, it fails to bolster real economy by lessening the degree of financialisation. 
While non-developmentalism and financialisation together help develop a strong argument in 
explaining the rationale behind the social failure of Islamic finance, they can be considered as 
the articulations of methodological obscurity in defining the objectives of Islamic economics. In 
this manner, both the developmentalist failure of Islamic finance and the financialisation process 
ascertain that the initial concern with theory making should be on methodological issues, for 
knowledge can only be authenticated through a rigorous methodology. This essay, therefore, 
turns the focus on methodological issues by opening a discussion on maqasid al-Shari’ah, which 
constitutes the fundamental base in Islamic finance related methodology. 
4.1.1. Problem Statement 
Methodological approaches within Islamic economics has scarcely been debated in academic 
studies and it has brought to the surface two opposing views on the right methodology to be 
followed in theory building of Islamic economics. The first view grounds its basic argument on 
the idea of ‘Islamization of knowledge’ (IOK) devised by al-Faruqi (1921-1986). Although 
Faruqi’s IOK paradigm is highly sophisticated and hence deserves careful evaluation for its 
articulation, in their fiqhi and modern construct of Islamic finance, most Islamic finance experts 
have made pragmatic references to the IOK paradigm in their attempt to replicate conventional 
financial practices in disguise of ‘Islamization’ process by locating Islam as pre-fixes or ‘form’ 
but not necessarily in ‘substance’. Thus, IOK was simplified in the hands of Islamic finance 
practitioners, academics and Shari’ah scholars as a method, and it has been instrumentalised to 
espouse mainstream and Islamic understanding of finance with eschewing philosophical 
contributions of al-Faruqi.  
The second view suggests having recourse to the original scripts and reinterpret them in order to 
fathom out ontologically authenticated and epistemologically substantiated Islamic paradigm of 
economic system. The practitioners of the former approach mostly applied fiqhi or juridical 
methods including tricks (al-hiyal al-fiqhiyyah) in justifying controversial issues and 
legitimatising applications within Islamic finance sector, which was seen and hence criticised by 
many including Ibn al-Qayyim (1292-1350) many centuries ago. The proponents of the latter 
approach, on the other hand, have harshly criticised the Islamization process within Islamic 
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finance and stipulated a bottom-up and ontologically referenced authentic reconstruction of 
economic institutions by rejecting Western economic models as reference. 
Interestingly enough, both trends have been involved in a revived discourse on maqasid al-
Shari’ah in supporting their arguments, which is interpreted as the higher objectives and intents 
of Islamic law implying that every action should be conducted by leading to human well-being. 
For instance, it is widely advocated by some Shari’ah scholars in the first view that Islamic 
finance should be seen as a market driven sector. Thus, potential disputes on Shari’ah compliancy 
during the interaction between Islamic financial operations and conventional market design can 
be resolved in the light of maslahah (public interest) and maqasid.39 This expedites the process 
of integrating Islamic finance into the global financial system resulting into Muslim societies 
prospering and developing.  
On the contrary, critiques of this approach reject such an understanding of maqasid, which is 
believed to blur the content of the term and pave the way for embracing toxic products and 
practices in the name of maslahah in the simple meaning that ‘there is a public interest in such 
transactions’. Instead, they suggest using maqasid al-Shari’ah as a particular framework, which 
is mainly located in the theoretical expression of al-Ghazalian understanding, to identify and 
articulate developmentalism40 with the objective of Shari’ah. Grounded on such endeavour, 
various maqasid indices based on the Ghazalian five necessities41 were developed to evaluate 
performances of Islamic banks and economies in general. In doing so, maqasid is identified and 
interlinked with some popular concepts including corporate social responsibility (CSR), 
corporate governance (CG), environmental, social and governance (ESG), sustainable 
development goals (SDGs), and human development (HDI). Furthermore, these concepts were 
appropriated and transferred into Islamic economics literature to show that maqasid already 
incorporates them all; thereby these initiatives represent only one aspect of Shari’ah objectives. 
In line with this, empirical studies on the nexus of maqasid and Islamic finance started to 
                                                        
39 Typical examples are evident in the legitimization of highly controversial Islamic financial instruments such as 
tawarruq, bay’al-‘inah and specific sukuk applications. 
40 This study recognizes the value-loaded definition of ‘developmentalism’. However, it also recognizes that Islamic 
aim is not only economic development but multi-faceted development within the parameters of adalah, ihsan, 
rububiyah and tazkiyah in the context of tawhidi paradigm (Asutay 2013). Hence, developmentalism is redefined within 
Islamic normativeness by essentialising human-centered development by re-defining individual as Islamic economics 
“aims at the study of human falah achieved by organizing the resources of earth on the basis of cooperation and 
participation” (Khan 1984:54). In this context, re-defined developmentalism is objected towards emancipation and 
empowerment in every aspect of life within the ihsani social formation. 
41 These consist in the preservation of faith, self, intellect, posterity, and wealth. Al-Ghazali was the first to enumerate 
them as making up the category of universal necessary (daruri) maslahah whose safeguarding is intended by the Divine 
Law (shar’) and which constitute the foundation of human society (see: Ghazali 1997: 417). 
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proliferate through following the popularisation of abovementioned concepts under maqasid 
terminology. 
As can be seen, theoreticians and practitioners on both sides tend to make use of maqasid 
merely as a ‘floating signifier’42, since the term is wittingly used for absorbing desired 
meanings into the concept of maqasid. At best, thus, maqasid al-Shari’ah has been assigned 
the task of bestowing legitimacy in an instrumental manner for Shari’ah-compliant products 
and practices in a formalistic way. Developmentalism, on the other hand, could not be 
reformulated with maqasid al-Shari’ah perspective in neither way, albeit the latter approach 
claims to reach it through developing some maqasid indices. Thus, what happens at the end is 
a pragmatic, instrumental and eclectic use of maqasid that eventually has led to the malaise of 
Islamic banking and finance (henceforth; IBF) and diminished the close link between 
developmentalism and maqasid al-Shari’ah for the sake of yielding efficiency in the practices 
of IBF. Due to such a failure, the current practice of Islamic finance has to be considered as the 
‘second best solution’ (Asutay 2012:109) in relation to developmentalist objectives. 
4.1.2. Aims, Objectives and Research Questions 
This study argues that the social failure of Islamic finance in relations to realising developmentalist 
outcomes and its negations of moral expectations is highly a methodological problem, not just an 
issue bounded with practical realities of the field. Therefore, this research aims to suggest maqasid 
al-Shari’ah as the fundamental knowledge creation methodology for the theorisation of Islamic 
economics through which Islamic developmentalism conceptualised and transformed into public 
policy making. However, it criticises market-oriented understanding and practice of maqasid, 
which is extensively applied in Islamic finance as an instrumentalization of morality and legitimacy 
gaining tool leading up to a new moral code of conduct for economic activities. In responding to 
this, this study aims to develop an authentic approach towards maqasid al-Shari’ah based on 
substantive morality that shapes the behaviour in an embedded manner, and proactivity in the sense 
of dynamic application to the realm of economics and finance. 
Beyond instrumental and eclectic approaches, this study argues that the theoretical grounds of 
Islamic economics should be re-examined in light of the proactive and substantive morality 
articulated maqasid al-Shari’ah framework with its nine dimensions, beyond the traditional 
Ghazalian maqasid, as elaborated later. By doing so, the rationale behind the failure of realising 
                                                        
42 According to the Oxford Reference dictionary, the term means: “A signifier without a specific signified. Also 
known as an ‘empty signifier’, it is a signifier that absorbs rather than emits meaning.” For the historical use of 
the concept, see: Mehlman (1972). 
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Islamic developmentalism in post-colonial Muslim nations can better be explained, since proactive 
maqasid envisages an effective methodology in articulating moral consequences of economics and 
finance, and, consequently, suggests a different approach towards developmentalist considerations 
when compared to existing applications of maqasid based on methodological individualism.  
Based on these aims, the following objectives are developed: 
(i) to conduct a critical review of the maqasid al-Shari’ah from historical contenders to the 
contemporary applications;  
(ii) to present a critical review of maqasid al-Shari’ah related empirical studies;  
(iii) to identify the shortcomings of the existing frame and application of maqasid al-Shari’ah; 
(iv) to propose a new understanding and constituting a practice of maqasid al-Shari’ah through 
re-embedding Islamic morality to produce development consequences.  
In accordance with the identified aims and objectives, this study raises the following research 
questions: 
RQ1: How should maqasid be designed in order to deliver an authentic and functional methodology 
for Islamic economics? 
RQ2: In what sense the prevailing maqasid perspective in Islamic finance diverges from the 
aspirations of Islamic economics? 
RQ3: What are the consequences of the prevailing Ghazalian maqasid framework in relation to 
Islamic moral economy expectations? 
RQ4: What is the nature and constituents of an effective maqasid to embed Islamic morality in 
definition and operations of Islamic economics and finance? 
The following section aims, initially, to provide a foundational ground for the concept of maqasid 
al-Shari’ah through dissecting its historical evolution with special contributions by Islamic 
scholars. After that, maqasid is contextualised within the theoretical aspects of Islamic economics 
and practical field of Islamic finance. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 presents conceptual and historical 
perspective in maqasid al-Shari’ah as well as its evolution throughout the centuries within Muslim 
intellectual domain, while Section 4.3 discusses the approaches towards maqasid and its 
classification. Section 4 delves into the theoretical association between maqasid and Islamic 
developmentalism whereby particular attention is given to the literature of Islamic economics and 
maqasid nexus. Section 5, lastly, elaborates on the nature, dimensions and functionality of 
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constructing a proactive maqasid-based development model that envisages re-embedding maqasid 
into the theory making of Islamic economics. 
4.2. MAQASID AL-SHARI’AH: A CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Based on the fundamental principle that every act in practice or idea in mind emanates to actualise 
certain intention or objective in the real life; maqasid al-Shari’ah, in a similar vein, aims to 
discern what Allah commands, through His revelations, to achieve in this world and in the 
hereafter by the hands of human beings and other creatures. Once this is ascertained, the whole 
idea of banking and finance is then canalised into the fulfilment of this objective. In the case of 
IBF, maqasid al-Shari’ah is believed to formulate entire functioning of Islamic modes of finance 
so that it should serve human wellbeing and ensure social welfare through an extended stake-
holding paradigm due to the tawhid axiom. Practical applications of IBF would, then, be 
examined with reference to the maqasid al-Shari’ah. Thus, it is crucial to identify maqasid al-
Shari’ah and its theoretical and philosophical foundations and practical implications under the 
developmentalism subject, as the articulation of maqasid in a consequentialist manner refers to 
developmentalist objectives. 
4.2.1. Maqasid al-Shari’ah: A Conceptual Exploration 
Although it is all agreed that ‘Islamicity’ of IBF is recognized by its compliance to the Islamic 
law, very few people discuss as to what constitutes the Islamic law. Is it referred to fiqh, Shari’ah, 
qanun or something else with the Islamic law? This question has tremendous importance in the 
sense of making a pure distinction between fiqh and Shari’ah, which allows us to go beyond 
confining ourselves to what Muslim scholars understand from the scriptural texts while searching 
for their purposes. Fundamentally, fiqh is the “knowledge of practical revealed rulings extracted 
from detailed evidence”, hence it “represents the ‘cognitive’ part of the Islamic Law … while 
Shari’ah, by definition, represents the ‘heavenly’ part of this law” (Auda 2007:57). It is due to 
this reason that faqih is used for human beings dealing with fiqh and al-Shari’ is for Allah. 
Consequently, fiqh must be acknowledged as the reflection of human cognition (idraq) aspect of 
the revealed knowledge. In this respect, maqasid al-Shari’ah must be defined as the higher 
objectives of the revealed way of life, rather than the higher objectives of what fuqaha43 deducing 
it from Qur’an and Sunnah. In the IBF context, this definition helps us to uncover the crux of 
finance related controversies in the Islamic law. 
                                                        
43 It is the plural of, faqih, who is a scholar of Islamic jurisprudence. 
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After clarifying the contrast between fiqh and Shari’ah, now maqasid and its theorisation should 
be incorporated into the analysis. Literally, the term maqasid, singular maqsid, connotes the 
meaning of objectives, ends, purposes, intents or goals. When Shari’ah is attributed to maqasid in 
the compound form maqasid al-Shari’ah, it refers to the wisdom and purposes underlying the 
Divine commands as being intended for the good and well-being of human beings as well as other 
creatures (Ibn Ashur 2006). As discussed in this chapter, maqasid al-Shari’ah have far-reaching 
implications in respect of Islamic banking and finance. 
Ibn Ashur, one of the contemporary Islamic scholars that contributed much to the theory of 
maqasid, emphasises the substantial function of maqasid as “the fact that it answers to inborn 
human nature (al-fitrah)” (taken from Attia 2007:11). This implies that Ibn Ashurian 
conceptualisation of maqasid is attributed to the concept of fitrah as the ground for maqasid. The 
scope of maqasid al-Shari’ah is, then, formulated by al-Shatibi through an inductive method. In 
his view, induction constitutes the principal method in derivation and identification of maqasid 
(Raysuni 2011:282). Similarly, Ibn Ashur stipulated some conditions for the legitimacy of 
maqasid through assigning certain characteristics to it: “(a) thubut: that is to say, they must be 
based on texts which have been narrated and passed down in a reliable manner; (b) zuhur, i.e., 
implying that they must bear a meaning which is clear and self-evident; (c) indibat; that is, they 
must be consistent from one person, place, time and circumstance to the next; and (d) ittirad that 
is, they must be consistent, and regular” (taken from Attia 2007:12). 
Due to the extent of the scope and comprehensiveness of maqasid, some other concepts have 
been interchanged with maqasid in identifying a particular phenomenon. This conceptual 
resemblance between maqasid and other concepts (such as illah and maslahah), especially for 
the controversial issues in Islamic law, leads to some perplexities amongst contemporary Islamic 
scholars such that the investigation of maqasid for certain rulings, in the Qur’an or in historical 
evidences, becomes difficult owing to mixing up maqasid with other terms as discussed below. 
Reflection of this problem in the Islamic economics and finance field implies that 
developmentalist objectives of societies are wrongly identified and applied over its institutions. 
Since the differentiation of these concepts from maqasid does play a vital role on the construction 
of maqasid theory, some of such fundamental concepts are briefly alluded here. One of them is 
the concept of maslahah, which basically means ‘public interest’. While some of the early legal 
theorists like al-Juwayni (1028-1085), especially in the period when maqasid was not thought to 
be a standalone discipline, used these two terms interchangeably, some others including al-
Ghazali differentiated both terms by placing maqasid under maslahah domain. A more 
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favourable explanation was rendered by al-Tufi (1259-1316), who defined maslahah as “what 
fulfils the purpose of the Legislator” (taken from Auda 2007:2). On the same line, the validity of 
maqasid is stipulated by al-Qarafi (1228-1285) such that maqasid has to reveal some benefit 
(maslahah) or avoid some harm (mafsada) in the individual and societal level. It is concluded 
with these two approaches, that maslahah should be seen as the entire process of realising, or the 
ways which fulfil, that maqasid. This implies that maqasid provides the framework in which 
maslahah should be located. 
Another important misconception stems from the understanding that highlights causes or ‘illah’, 
over maqasid while searching for objectives of scriptural rulings. A famous narration about one 
of Khalifah Umar’s ijtihads or independent reasoning can be a good example to crystalize the 
issue. According to the narration, Umar made an ijtihad of disapplying Qur’anic punishment for 
cases of theft that occurred in the period when Muslims were suffering from a devastating famine. 
The illah-based interpretation of Umar’s ijtihad necessitates that if those who are in need during 
the famine times engage in theft, the Qur’anic punishment should not be applied. When it is 
misunderstood by ascribing that Umar made this ijtihad just by considering the cause for theft, 
then his maqasidi perspective would be easily overlooked. His ijtihad, then, benefits for 
contemporary Muslim Ummah once exclusively the same illah comes into existence again. 
However, his maqasidi interpretation goes beyond the mere concentration of illah for a specific 
ruling, which is already subject to change in every circumstance, and renders a more extensive 
and persistent approach within which wisdoms and objectives that are applicable in all times can 
be deduced from that ruling. By the same token, challenges in IBF, which are impossible to be 
tackled through an illah-based approach can be dealt with a sound maqasidi way. 
The causation-based way of thinking in Islamic law, in fact, hinders the flourishing dynamicity, 
creativity and flexibility of Islamic philosophy, and also the potential of benefiting from historical 
evidences in dealing with current problems, especially in IBF. In other words, the dynamic nature 
of Islamic law has been made dysfunctional by the shift of maqasid-based approach towards 
causation based one through the adoption of the view that we cannot think of an action without 
its causes rather than without its purposes. Similarly, every action is explained in terms of cause 
and effect interaction. This approach is quite reminiscent to the disengagement process of 
Western thought from teleology to causation since the birth of Western science predicated its 
ontology to the adoption of causality paradigm. In short, a holistic and purpose-oriented 
understanding is essential in order to evolve causation into holism and expand maqasid into the 
core of contemporary Islamic jurisprudence. 
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4.2.2. Ontological Approaches and Historical Contributions towards Maqasid al-Shari’ah 
The basic motivation for getting involved in the maqasid al-Shari’ah stems from the fact that 
Muslims seek to know wisdom, bases or purposes of the Islamic rulings through which they 
would able to uphold an Islamic way of life. This overarching nature of maqasid paved the way 
for it to be a widely appealed method that is utilised at any time in the history, from the first 
Prophetic times to the postmodern era, namely the current times. However, the study of maqasid 
as a theoretical discourse under certain subjects or disciplines, and its theorisation can be traced 
back to the first Islamic centuries after the Prophet Muhammad’s Companions’ era including the 
followers of the Companions (tabeen). 
While maqasid issues were dealt in the Companions’ era in a practical way through consulting 
with the Prophet, it was first used as a concept in the works of Al-Tirmidhi (820-869), al-Qummi 
(918-991) and others during the first three Islamic centuries. Systematic studies on the theory of 
maqasid, however, were believed to start with al-Juwayni. Despite the fact that maqasid was 
considered to be a subject under usul al-fiqh or methodology of fiqh in a traditional manner, it 
was by the 5th century onwards, with the great contributions of al-Ghazali and al-Shatibi, that 
maqasid as a substantial methodology for usul al-fiqh was emerged (Auda 2007:xxv; Kamali 
2008:9). This section hence aims to present the contribution of the contenders in the development 
trajectory of the maqasid knowledge and methodology. 
4.2.2.1. Abu al-Ma’ali al-Juwayni (d. 478/1085) 
Juwayni is the first Islamic jurist who pioneered the systematisation of maqasid theory by 
introducing five levels of maqasid. In his novel attempt, he did not only identified the levels as 
“[essentials] (darurat), public needs (al-hajah al-‘amah), moral behaviour (al-makrumat), 
recommendations (al-mandubat), and ‘what cannot be attributed to a specific reason’” (Auda 
2007:17), but also formulated the principal essentials as the preservation of (i) faith, (ii) human 
life, (iii) faculty of reason, (iv) progeny, and (v) material wealth’. His five levels of maqasid was, 
then, reduced to three levels of necessities, ‘essentials (daruriyyat), exigencies (hajiyyat), and 
embellishments (tahsiniyyat)’, due to his conclusion that the third and fourth levels can be 
combined into one, and the last level does not fit none of the three levels (Kamali 2008:10; 
Raysuni 2011:15).  
With the embedment of levels of necessity into the maqasid theory, his successors and disciples 
are indebted to him for his contributions, and thanks to these contributions, Juwayni has hitherto 
been commemorated. 
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4.2.2.2. Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d.505/1111) 
Al-Ghazali, a disciple of al-Juwayni, developed the theory of maqasid in such a way that his 
descendants have availed themselves of his contributions significantly. His ideas were influenced 
and shaped, with a great degree, by Greek logic, albeit he generally rejected Greek philosophy 
for its pagan character.44 In particular, al-Ghazali adopted Aristo’s ‘logical tool’ to use as a 
methodology for the derivation of knowledge and concluded that the logical tool should be 
treated as the starting point for all ‘branches of knowledge’. In doing so, he “internalised Greek 
logic as a way of thinking” (Auda 2007:208), and, for this reason, he was exposed to critics raised 
by al-Taymiyyah and other scholars. Putting these critics aside for now, one of the most 
significant contributions of al-Ghazali to the theory of maqasid would be the introduction of 
‘syllogistic deduction’ as a method for the methodology of analogical reasoning (Auda 
2007:208). 
As al-Ghazali did not consider maqasid as a standalone discipline, he located it under the concept 
of maslahah. His definition of maslahah basically refers to any ‘interest’ that leads to the 
achievement of benefit and prevention of harm (Al-Ghazali 1997). Therefore, the principal 
function of maslahah is the preservation of objectives of Islamic law, in other words, preservation 
of maqasid al-Shari’ah (Attia 2007:97). Here, Ghazalian maslahah dissociates itself from 
maqasid, in terms of functionality, through undertaking the role of preservation in realising 
maqasid.  
An important feature of the theoretical frame of Ghazalian maqasid is that it embodies a holistic 
approach, which does not allow assigning single causes for Islamic rulings, and which 
necessitates multiple evidences from Qur’an, Sunnah and other secondary sources to reckon 
maqasid as legitimate (see: Attia 2007:115; Auda 2007:217). However, beyond these, al-Ghazali 
is mainly remembered with his contribution of ordering the essentials as (i) al-Din (faith), (ii) al-
Nafs (human life), (iii) al-’Aql (faculty of reason), (iv) al-Nasl (progeny), and (v) al-Mal (material 
wealth).  
It is important also to note that al-Ghazali never limited the essentials into a particular bundle of 
numbers, rather he laid stress on the most important ones among them. At first, he categorised 
objectives of Islamic law, in his first book Shifa’ al-Ghalil, under maqasid of worldly interests 
and that of religious affairs. After recognising the serious problems of creating this duality, later 
                                                        
44 For further discussion on Ghazali and his ideas interacting with Greek philosophy throughout history, see: 
Griffel (2009). 
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he combined the two categories, in his famous book al-Mustasfa, into one, and established the 
ultimate structure of essentials (Raysuni 2011:19). Nevertheless, he did not clarify why he had 
chosen this ordering apart from putting the preservation of faith at top since he considers it to 
function as an umbrella over the rest. However, he gives priority to one essential over another in 
the circumstance that if any of the consequences of two or more essentials contradict each other 
or create opposite implications, one must suggest the one which has the higher order necessity to 
assign priority (Attia 2007:21; Auda 2007:18). 
Some of the modern maqasid theorists who aim to embody popular contemporary issues - such 
as freedom, justice, women’s rights, democracy, economic development etc. - into their maqasid 
theories criticise al-Ghazali by claiming that his maqasid understanding is no longer sufficing to 
meet the objectives mentioned above in his maqasid framework (see: al-Khamlishi, quoted in 
Attia 2007:84). These indeed should not be neglected and the maqasidi perspective should 
internalise such matters as well. However, they should be considered as the means (wasa’il) 
leading to the fulfilment of certain objectives. This gives rise to a heated debate about the 
differentiation of means (wasa’il) from the intents (maqasid) as some contemporary Islamic legal 
jurists fall into mistake due to their inability to differentiate means from intents. This issue is 
discussed at length later. 
4.2.2.3. Sayf al-Din al-Amidi (d.631/1234) 
al-Amidi assigned the primary function of maqasid to be the distinguishing criteria for the 
rationale of giving preference, namely al-tarjih, to certain rulings against another. His maqasidi 
way, by prioritising one ruling amongst others, has been utilised particularly in the resolution of 
conflicting analogies. Furthermore, through benefiting from the methodology of al-tarjih, he 
attempted to give an ultimate internal ordering for the essential maqasid coupled with his general 
ordering of unanimously and traditionally accepted maqasid. In doing so, first he confined the 
essential maqasid to five by stating that there is no other essential objective of Islamic law (Attia 
2007:77), and then ordered the essential maqasid in such a way that the top priority is given to 
the preservation of religion (Kamali 2008:11; Raysuni 2011:23). Usul scholars, following al-
Amidi, interiorized the confinement of essential maqasid into five, and explicitly applied this 
rule in their writings. 
4.2.2.4. Al-Izz ibn Abd al-Salam (d.660/1209) 
al-Izz developed his theory of maqasid by coupling maqasid with maslahah and illah aspects 
(Kamali 2008:11). In his renowned work and seminal book Qawa’id al-Ahkam, al-Izz devoted 
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his entire book to the objectives of Islamic law. His approach to these objectives is based on 
maslahah methodology, which pays particular attention to the achievement of benefit/interest 
and prevention of harm/mischief. Thus, his core understanding by maslahah and maqasid relates 
to the verse (16:90) in Qur’an, which roughly states that ‘God enjoins doing good deeds and 
forbids all that are shameful’. In this respect, al-Izz considers the ultimate objective of the Islamic 
law to be warding off harm and achievement of benefit (Attia 2007:99; Raysuni 2011:32). Within 
his considerable contributions through introducing the concepts of interest and mischief at the 
heart of maqasid theory, al-Izz expanded the horizons of the theory of maqasid, and maslahah in 
general. 
Through such a lens of benefit/harm cross-purpose, it can be stated that al-Izz adopted ‘objective 
criterion’ (Attia 2007:47), as contrast to the formalistic criterion that is explained later, which 
basically functions as a filtering mechanism over deciding about how rulings should be 
associated with one of the three categories – essentials, exigencies and embellishments. In 
particular, objective criterion necessitates the categorisation of objectives based on their degree 
of benefit or harm reflected within the rulings. In other words, if the legal ruling stimulates a 
significant benefit or leads to warding off serious harm, then, objective criterion puts that ruling 
into one of the categories of higher necessities - exigencies or embellishments. 
In line with his extensive investigation of benefit and harm, al-Izz stated that the validity of 
rulings hinges upon their purposes. If a ruling, one way or another, does not meet its purpose, it 
should be treated as void (see: Auda 2007:19). Lastly, al-Izz influenced the thoughts of al-Qarafi, 
one of his followers, though al-Qarafi critically approached al-Izz’s views and theory. 
4.2.4.5. Shihab al-Din al-Qarafi (d. 684/1285) 
As the title of his book, al-Furuq (The Difference), clearly mentions, al-Qarafi’s theory of 
maqasid adopts certain methodology that differentiates the intents of Prophet Mohammad’s 
actions with a certain manner. His theory entails that some actions of the Prophet is due to him 
being the conveyer of the message/revelation, and some other actions associated with his role in 
the society as a governor, leader or judge. Therefore, the intents of his actions under the former 
capacity, that is to be the conveyer of the message, must be separated from the intents that are 
associated with what he does or says as a governor, leader or judge. The intents with the first one 
must be accepted as a ‘general and permanent ruling’, while the second one must be categorized 
under his capacity of being a leader (Auda 2007:19).  
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As can be seen, al-Qarafi reiterates the distinction between the intents of Prophet that are 
independent from time and place, and those intents that are specific for certain decisions as a 
result of particular circumstances. It is for this reason “the Companions used to make a clear 
distinction between the commands of God’s Messenger that ensued from his position as legislator 
(maqasid al-tashri’) and those that did not. When they were not sure about a certain matter, they 
sought clarification about it” (Ibn Ashur 2006:33). 
Al-Qarafi also expands his theory of maqasid by introducing ‘opening the means’ discourse into 
the maqasid agenda. Traditional maqasid theories mostly use the idea of ‘blocking the means’ 
(sadd al-dhara’i) in order to investigate wisdom or purposes of rulings, but al-Qarafi goes beyond 
the negative side of ‘blocking’ and incorporates the positive side of ‘opening’ into the 
methodology. Thus, his methodology entails that while such means that pose unlawful or 
prohibited consequences must be blocked out of the maqasid agenda, those means that bring out 
lawful and good ends must be opened (Auda 2007:19). In other words, the rationale for this 
statement comes from the fact that if the paths are obstructed once they lead to harm, the paths 
that generate benefit must be opened. This approach is vital in the sense of producing theoretical 
underpinnings of a proper maqasid theory, and maqasidi methodology for IBF sector, in 
particular, for conducting ‘opening the means’ methodology can lead to solve much-debated 
deadlocks of IBF sector. 
Some scholars claim that al-Qarafi, different from the orthodox tendency of designating essential 
maqasid with five necessities, adds a sixth essential as honor (al-‘ird) (see: Attia 2007:117; 
Kamali 2008:11). In fact, this attribution is under dispute, since some other scholars ascribed that 
al-Qarafi just mentioned, in his writings, that some jurists added the sixth dimension as the 
preservation of honor, without this being his personal view (see: Ibn Ashur 2006:118; Raysuni 
2011). The second view seems more accurate after reading his passage about honour (see: 
Raysuni 2011:28). 
Lastly, al-Qarafi’s views on the importance of knowledge of maqasid al-Shari’ah are quite worth 
stressing. He advocates that not only those who give ijtihad, independent reasoning, have to 
acquire the knowledge of maqasid, but also those jurisprudents that prefer imitation or emulation 
of their ancestors must also have such knowledge, lest these jurisprudents issue fatawa45 with a 
lack of maqasidi knowledge (Raysuni 2011:330). 
                                                        
45 Singular: fatwa; it is a legal opinion issued by a highly qualified scholar of Islamic law, or by mufti.  
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4.2.4.6. Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi (d.790/1388) 
Together with the contributions of Islamic legal theorists such as al-Juwayni, al-Ghazali and al-
Qarafi, the theory of maqasid is indebted to al-Shatibi for his great contributions to the 
theorisation of it. In the first instance, he expanded the horizon of maqasid by introducing ‘three 
substantial ways’ (Auda 2007:12) that gave rise to the systematisation of maqasid theory and 
enabled scholars to ponder upon maqasid in a coherent way. First way is to think the scope of 
maqasid out of the maslahah realm and take maqasid into the context of ‘fundamentals of law’ 
in its own right. Accordingly, he advocated that a high priority should be given to maqasid al-
Shari’ah over usul al-fiqh, since the former has basic roles and characteristics. In the second way, 
al-Shatibi considers maqasid to be the base for the ruling rather than the wisdom behind that 
ruling. Lastly, he placed the ‘certainty’ criterion for the derivation of maqasid in his authentic 
inductive process. These three novel ways in developing maqasid theory have been utilised by 
many scholars up until now. 
In an attempt to approach to the primary and secondary sources of Islam with the lens of purpose 
orientedness, Al-Shatibi makes a clear distinction between acts of worship (ibadat) and worldly 
transactions (mu’amalat). According to him, ‘literal compliance’ should be adopted as a 
methodology in the space of ibadat – as Prophet’s command about jogging around Ka’ba with 
unclothed shoulders is an example of this assertion, but the consideration of intents or purposes 
or, namely, consequentialism orientedness should be the exclusive methodology in mu’amalat 
area (Auda 2007:12). This distinction is quite sound and can be employed into the methodology 
of maqasid based economic development index, as vital for the evaluation of IBF performance 
in an attempt to redefine the meaning and objectives of IBF. 
Along such important matters, al-Shatibi also delved into some other main issues in tandem with 
the theory of maqasid, which is extensively scrutinised by Ahmad al-Raysuni in his book: ‘Imam 
al-Shatibi’s Theory of the Higher Objectives and Intents of Islamic Law’ (2011). Al-Shatibi’s 
authentic approach and methodology to maqasid al Shari’ah discourse has become the most 
referenced source for contemporary Muslim jurists. 
4.2.4.7. Muhammad al-Tahir Ibn Ashur (d.1325/1907) 
Ibn Ashur, one of the significant maqasid theorists in the modern reformist stream, is presumably 
the first scholar who developed his theory of maqasid al-Shari’ah as a standalone discipline or 
an independent science (ilm maqasid al-Shari’ah) that must be approached outside the realm of 
usul al-fiqh. Ashur’s stance with regard to the revival of Islamic law in the modern period renders 
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less emphasis on usul al-fiqh but aims to achieve an authentic methodology that finds its 
theoretical roots in the theory of maqasid. In doing so, he severely criticised the traditional 
schools of Islamic law, since, according to him, these schools could not conceive maqasid al-
Shari’ah in a purposeful way, but rather treated it as the by-product of usul al-fiqh (see: Ibn Ashur 
2006:xv).  
Some modern scholars’ responses to this assertion are severe, but to mention Raysuni and Attia 
briefly, Raysuni (2011:366) is indifferent between tackling maqasid as an independent discipline 
and considering it under the theme of usul al-fiqh as long as everyone gives the ‘utmost care’ to 
the theory of maqasid. However, Attia (2007:244) eschews this tendency of separating maqasid 
from the realm of usul al-fiqh and asserts that both usul al-fiqh and maqasid would be harmed 
from the consequences of such a divergence, as usul al-fiqh forfeits ‘the spirit of maqasid’, while 
maqasid would, in turn, be relegated to have a lesser degree of functionality without any practical 
role it has. 
Under his conceptualisation of ilm maqasid al-Shari’ah, Ibn Ashur proposes a universal maqasid, 
which aims to resolve the individuality drawback and ‘preservation’ restraint in the Ghazalian 
notion of maqasid understanding. In order to disentangle from the individuality drawback, he 
widens the scope of maqasid by introducing society, nation, and Ummah as the determining 
parameters in the objectives of Islamic law. Thus, he gives higher priority to the objectives that 
are closely concerned with the Ummah at macro level rather than the objectives that remain its 
context at individual level (Ibn Ashur 2006). Ghazalian motto of ‘preservation’, Ibn Ashur 
renders, does not suffice to reflect the overall objectives of Islamic law, hence social dimension 
of maqasid al-Shari’ah must be articulated through delineating maqasid as both preservation of 
Ummah’s order and also substantial ‘perpetuation’ of its wellbeing (Attia 2007:81). Ibn Ashur, 
hence, develops his maqasid discourse in such a way that authenticates ‘value’ and ‘system’ vis-
à-vis al-Amiri’s theory of ‘punishment’ and Ghazalian notion of ‘preservation’ (Auda 2007:22). 
Ibn Ashur utilised al-Qarafi’s theory of maqasid in a way to develop al-Qarafi’s 
conceptualisation of ‘difference’ in the intents of Prophet’s actions (see: Ibn Ashur 2006: Section 
6). By using the same logic, he substantiated the ‘thematic interpretation’ as the primary 
methodology in his theory through scrutinising the Qur’anic stories and other verses under 
particular themes. Therefore, he adopted “contextual interpretation as a new methodology of 
exegesis” (Auda 2007:254). It is a clear fact that Ibn Ashur had pioneered developing maqasid 
al Shari’ah in new ways which contemporary jurists and scholars to follow. 
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While Ibn Ashur’ - and others’ contributions to the maqasid theory are essential, in the 
postmodern era there is no unanimous method for maqasid to be implemented on the scriptural 
rulings. Disputes on methodological issues and even on the characterisation of maqasid 
necessitates that the theory of maqasid has to be dealt with a systems approach. 
4.3. METHODS IN MAQASID AL-SHARI’AH POSITIONING 
As discussed above, prominent scholars of Islam in the early centuries of Islam conceptualised 
and constructed their maqasid al-Shari’ah frameworks within authentic frame. Their application 
of certain methodologies, at the same time, inherited a vast array of literature on methodology to 
the modern maqasid theorists. Since the Ghazalian maqasidi understanding, amongst others, has 
gained the utmost importance in the theorisation of maqasid al Shari’ah, the categorisation and 
establishment of the order of maqasid within the frontiers of Ghazalian viewpoint has remained 
the principal methodological objective throughout the centuries. Thus, the articulation of 
maqasid into the Islamic philosophical sciences has paramountly been attempted with the 
Ghazalian description.  
Islamic economics’ argument for developing solutions to the so-called backwardness of Muslim 
countries and to the state of lack of intellectual acumen relates to bringing the proper 
methodology of maqasid into the modern social sciences. In doing so, most Muslim scholars 
repeated the traditional maqasid methodology, yet some other modernist reformists - including, 
Mohammad Abduh, Rashid Rida, Ibn Ashur and Yusuf al-Qaradawi - have opened new ways 
for the articulation of maqasidi understanding vis-à-vis the modern social sciences.  
This section, hence, first elaborates on widely used categorisations of maqasid and then vitalises 
the function of ijtihad in energising and renewal of Islamic thought through reflecting on the 
modern methodological positioning in the maqasid discourse. By doing this, it is aimed to 
introduce both the traditional and modern approaches to maqasid methodologies so that a 
substantial and distinctive methodology of maqasid al-Shari’ah can be essentialised in 
harmonising them within the Islamic moral economy approach. 
4.3.1. Categorisation of Maqasid 
Gamal el-Din Attia (2007), one of the seminal contributors in the modern period, differentiates 
between the intents of creation (maqasid al-khalq) and the higher intents of the Islamic law 
(maqasid al-Shari’ah al-‘aliyah) by referring to the view of al-Shatibi, which states that these 
two intents should be considered under separate titles (Attia 2007:92). However, Attia also 
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provides evidence from certain verses in the Qur’an in order to highlight the inseparability of 
these two intents. Thus, while his categorisation of maqasid puts special emphasis on the 
differentiation of the two intents, he does not imply to consider them in totally different realms. 
In considering the legal intents, Attia (2007) identifies ‘higher or general intents’ which can 
roughly be identified, as those intents that have the highest ranking and priority amongst other 
legal intents. His extensive conceptualisation of the higher intents can be explained as follows 
(Attia 2007:105):46  
The higher intents of the Law are embodied in the worship of God [Tawhid and Rububiyyah], 
acting as His vicegerents on earth [Khilafah], and populating and developing the earth through 
faith and its requirements [Imaar, Islah, and Fard]. Such requirements of faith include righteous 
action which achieves happiness both in this life and the next [Falah], which encompasses both 
the material and spiritual aspects of existence [Amanah], and which strikes a balance between 
the interests of the individual and those of society, between particular national interests and the 
interests of humanity at large, and between the interests of the current generations and those of 
generations to come [Rububiyyah and Tazkiyah]. All such intents, moreover, find their 
expression on the respective levels of the individual, the family, the Ummah and all of humanity.  
We can infer some Islamic axioms from Attia (2007) as expressed above, namely Tawhid, 
Khilafah, Islah, Fard, Amanah, Falah, Rububiyyah, and Tazkiyah. Thus, this conceptualisation 
is quite favourable to utilise for implementing maqasid on the IBF institutions in constructivist 
manner within Islamic ontology. 
Attia’s (2007) higher maqasid framework has three subthemes, which are universal intents 
(maqasid al-Shari’ah al-kulliyyah), special intents (maqasid al-Shari’ah al-khassah), and 
particular intents (maqasid al-Shari’ah al-juz’iyyah). The universal maqasid takes the broadest 
place in the scope of the intents of Islamic legal rulings. In this sense, it embodies the Ghazalian 
five level maqasid, and, in comparison with the higher intents, universal maqasid is considered 
to be clearer and ‘less abstract’ (Attia 2007:107). Specific maqasid, on the other hand, deals with 
‘particular divisions’ of the Islamic legal rulings as can be exampled by al-Tirmidhi’s writings 
on the secrets and intents of prayer, pilgrimage, zakah etc. (Attia 2007:113). Lastly, particular 
maqasid refers to the exploration of those intents in the ‘particular legal rulings’, which is 
identified as wisdoms, causes or basis of that ruling (Attia 2007:115). It is clear that Attia’s 
framework of maqasid classification is a variant of the orthodox binary classifications; however, 
his definition of higher intents, in the theoretical sense, can be embedded into the institutional 
bodies of IBF sector. 
                                                        
46 The axioms between brackets are introduced by the author to highlight the axiomatic articulation of the 
statements. 
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In relation to the traditional categorisation of maqasid, known as the five essentials, Attia 
(2007:64) approaches to this popular tendency in a critical manner by stating that the dynamic 
categorisation of means (wasa’il), in which persons, time, place and circumstances are 
concurrently considered as determining dimensions of constructing a level based maqasid 
framework, must be established in the scope of maqasid; which can, in turn, provide the 
‘relativity of application’ that leads to obviate adopting a fixed categorisation scheme. This 
multidimensional approach eventually leads him to shift from the five universals to what he 
develops as ‘four realms’, namely the expansion of five-limited essentials to a broader twenty-
four essentials, which are clustered and distributed under four realms: that is the realm of (i) 
individual, (ii) family, (iii) the Ummah, and (iv) wider humanity (Attia 2007). Although it seems, 
at first sight, that the expansion of the four realms were arranged one dimensionally, that is the 
reflection of the mere consideration of the scope of people, in fact, each essential accompanies 
and embodies with the fundamental issues such as the institutional organisation of the Ummah, 
establishment of justice, preservation of morals, cooperation, solidarity and shared responsibility, 
dissemination of knowledge, populating and developing the earth and etc. Since the elucidation 
of the twenty-four essentials goes beyond the scope of this research, it is pertinent, here, to 
mention the essentials.  
In rendering a synthesis for the postmodern times, Kamali (2008) blends the historical 
approaches to maqasid categorisation and introduces three types of categorisation within a binary 
classification method, each having certain mutual contexts. Apart from the classical classification 
of daruriyyat, hajiyyat, and tahsiniyyat, which is discussed thoroughly in the next subsection, 
Kamali (2008:6) first classifies maqasid into two divisions: general purposes (al-maqasid al-
ammah) and particular goals (al-maqasid al-khassah); where the former functions to characterise 
the overall Shari’ah principles with its most comprehensiveness, while the latter relates to certain 
subjects and is considered under specific themes such as financial transactions and family issues. 
Second classification of maqasid, Kamali (2008:7) states, reveals definitive goals (al-maqasid 
al-qattiyyah) and speculative purposes (al-maqasid al-zanniyyah). Accordingly, definitive goals 
are deduced from the explicit evidences in the fundamental sources that are Qur’an and Sunnah. 
These maqasid are definite in terms of scholars’ agreement and being almost no dispute on them; 
whereas speculative maqasid, hence the name implies, lead to some controversies amongst 
scholars owing to its ambiguity in reflecting the rulings or its derivation from the secondary 
sources. Kamali (2008) gives the example of al-Shatibi’s categorisation, which similarly brings 
out ‘the purposes of the Lawgiver’ (maqasid al-shari’) and ‘human goals’ (maqasid al-mukallaf), 
to provide further clarity for this type of classification. The third binary classification aims to 
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differentiate between the ‘primary objectives’ (maqasid al-asliyyah) and ‘subsidiary goals’ 
(maqasid al-tab’iyyah) (Kamali 2008:7). The former maqasid refers to the basic and fundamental 
purposes of a certain ruling such as it is intended, with marriage, to prevent degeneration of 
family ties and grow progenies to sustain human life. The ‘subsidiary goals’, then, features to 
complement the primary objective of the ruling, as with the example of marriage it also leads to 
personal gratification. 
Being a main contender in the theory of maqasid in the contemporary times, Auda (2007) 
presents a thorough synopsis of various maqasid categorisations. He, first, identifies some 
dimensions within which maqasid classification is constructed. These are (Auda 2007:3): 
(i) Levels of necessity, which is the traditional classification; 
(ii) Scope of the rulings aiming to achieve purposes; 
(iii) Scope of people included in purposes; 
(iv) Level of universality of the purposes. 
Although three levels of necessities are embraced, to a large extent, to be consisting of daruriyyat, 
hajiyyat, and tahsiniyyat, Attia (2007:42) proposes a ‘five level necessities framework’ in which 
he introduces, as a result of his interpretation of Suyuti’s relevant views, ‘utter necessity 
(darurah), need (hajah), benefit (al-manfa’ah), embellishment (al-zinah), and surfeit (al-fudul)’ 
as more proper and all-embracing maqasid framework. This framework, in the sense of 
identifying levels of necessities, would be more explicative than the prevailing identification of 
necessities. However, as mentioned briefly before, traditional classification of maqasid provides 
three levels of necessities: daruriyyat, hajiyyat, and tahsiniyyat. Each necessity has a hierarchical 
relationship in its own right in which daruriyyat embodies the most essential part to be fulfilled; 
then hajiyyat, and tahsiniyyat are satisfied respectively. In critically reflecting, rather than 
considering it as an entire paradigm, Ghazalian five level maqasid falls under the daruriyyat 
category in which preservation of faith, human life, faculty of reason, progeny, and material 
wealth are recognised as the fundamental objectives that the Islamic scriptural sources aims to 
fulfil. However, contemporary legal theorists argue that the traditional classification has some 
substantial drawbacks, which fall short of producing robust solutions especially in contemporary 
times. Some of the criticisms levelled are as follows (Auda 2007:4):  
(i)  the scope of traditional maqasid might remain incapable to reflect specific intents of 
particular rulings due to the adaptation of revealing general maqasid;  
(ii) the individuality drawback which is mostly referred to the Ghazalian maqasid 
framework, as it claimed that the existent five level maqasid does not include societal 
or Ummah level objectives;  
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(iii) traditional maqasid lacks ‘the most universal objectives’ such as ‘justice’, 
‘development’ and ‘freedom’;  
(iv) traditional maqasid is constructed based on ‘the fiqhi literature, rather than original 
sources. 
In addition, ‘safeguarding’ as opposed to ‘proactivity of development’ should also be considered 
as an important handicap of Ghazalian frame in developing a developmentalist outlook within 
IBF. 
Based on these criticisms, modern scholarship has opened new ways to rediscover and enhance 
the existent classification of maqasid, which would ideally overcome the inherent flaws of 
traditional categorisation. One of the ways in constructing proper maqasid refers to the scope of 
the rulings; that is the general, specific and partial maqasid. ‘General maqasid’ identifies itself 
with the entire sources of Islamic law, which embrace the five level necessities together with the 
newly introduced concepts such as justice, human rights and freedom. ‘Specific maqasid’, with 
a narrower sense, pertains to those maqasid that is induced from certain chapters of sources of 
Islamic law; for instance, the prime issues in the family and inheritance law and etc. Lastly, 
‘partial maqasid’ is concerned with the intents that specific scriptural rulings aim to reveal out. 
This can be exemplified with the allowance of breaking one’s fasting due to specific personal 
circumstances. 
In an attempt to challenge the individual-based theorisation of maqasid, some scholars in the 
modern period attempted to incorporate societal or wider aspects of Islamic rulings into the scope 
of maqasid to avoid individualistic nature as a drawback. In this manner, Ibn Ashur gave 
precedence to Ummah-concerned maqasid against individual-concerned maqasid; by the same 
token, Rashid Rida introduced the concerns of women’s rights and reform in theorising maqasid, 
and lastly, Qaradawi reiterated the importance of freedom, social welfare and human dignity as 
important concerns for maqasid (Auda 2007:5). 
The third categorisation aims to circumvent ‘the historicity of fiqh literature’ on maqasid al-
Shari’ah and introduces new universal objectives that are induced directly from original sources, 
rather than from the fiqhi knowledge repository. These universal objectives attach itself basically 
to such issues of social welfare, development, human rights, improving the quality of research 
and development, human fraternity and etc. 
After his clarification, Auda (2007) reiterates the one-dimensional nature of each of these 
categorisations. Instead, he urges a multidimensional structure, as part of the systems philosophy, 
which encompasses all the aspects mentioned above. In other words, a multidimensional 
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approach essentialises the “levels of necessity, scope of rulings, scope of people and levels of 
universality” (Auda 2007:8) all together in order to structure maqasid al-Shari’ah substantively. 
Such a comprehensive multidimensionality is discussed later, as one of the main foundations in 
articulating maqasid into IME within the systems approach. 
Lastly, as reported by Attia (2007:87), Yahya Muhammad makes a distinction between the 
ta’abbudi rulings that is “rulings for which there is no rationally discernible purpose” and the 
rulings about judicial interests (al-masalih al-huquqiyyah). In this lens, he criticises the 
Ghazalian five universals and urges the ultimate intents (al-maqasid al-gha’iyyah) instead. 
Accordingly, he claims that the five universals are concerned with ‘peoples’ material interests’, 
while the ultimate intents are the ‘true intents’ that incorporates such distinctive objectives of 
“worship and devotion (al-ta’abbud), prudence (al-ta’aqqul), emancipation (al-taharrur), 
assuming the traits [of the Divine] (al-takhalluq), unification (al-tawahhud), and perfection (al-
takammul)” (taken from Attia 2007:87). While Muhammad’s proposition conceptually addresses 
the straight objectives, the chief question still remains as to how these objectives can be 
substantiated within a socioeconomic base thereby their articulations in socio-economic life can 
fulfill maqasid al-Shari’ah. 
4.3.2. The Role of Ijtihad as the Catalyst in the Making of Maqasid al-Shari’ah 
The articulation of ijtihad with the concept of maqasid reveals the maqasid-based ijtihad, which 
is a recent conceptualisation that has been used to enlarge the scope of maqasidi thinking. In the 
modern period, maqasid-based ijtihad has been given special importance by Raysuni (2011) who 
attaches four principles in order for it to function smoothly. These principles, respectively, are 
(Raysuni 2011:Chapter 4-Section 2):  
(i) inseparability of texts and rulings from their objectives;  
(ii) combining universal principles and evidence applicable to particular cases;  
(iii) achieving benefit and preventing harm; and lastly  
(iv) consideration of outcomes.  
As can be inferred directly, the first principal rejects the literalist or textualist approach to the 
sources of Islamic law by bringing the dynamism of independent reasoning (ijtihad) especially 
for the circumstances in which literalist methodology does not suffice in deducing the objective 
from certain ruling. In addition, the fourth principle evokes the consequentialist adaptation in the 
sense that the consequents as the outcome of maqasid-based ijtihad must also comply with the 
substance of Shari’ah. 
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It is argued that ijtihad, as a mechanism functioning for the renewal of Islamic legal thought, 
would also sweep away the inclination of arbitrariness or the unbridled intellectual reasoning in 
the identification of maqasid (Attia 2007:161). Precisely, the scope of maqasid is exposed to 
biased interpretations and identifications, which would result in arbitrary justifications that are 
far from the substance of maqasid al-Shari’ah understanding. Thus, collective ijtihad would 
ensure the eschewal of this arbitrariness. To generalise, there is a bidirectional relationship 
between ijtihad mechanism and the knowledge of maqasid, which feeds upon each other. Thus, 
producing certain ijtihad necessitates the deep knowledge of maqasid, for ijtihad functions at the 
core of the maqasid theorisation. 
Similar to any other discipline, in the IBF field, decision-making process through ijtihad 
mechanism primarily requires the knowledge of maqasid amongst decision makers. Since the 
knowledge of maqasid has not been acquired properly or narrow construction of maqasid 
adopted among the Islamic scholars in the contemporary times, pseudo-ijtihadi decisions are 
being relied upon though it does not produce substantial outcomes. Thus, the embedment of 
maqasidi thinking into the social sciences, such as Islamic economics and finance, would be the 
principal objective. 
4.4. MAQASID AL-SHARI’AH AND DEVELOPMENTALISM IN ISLAMIC 
POLITICAL ECONOMY FRAMEWORK 
With the aim of reconstructing social formation of post-colonial Muslim societies through 
establishing advanced institutions and creating an authentic Muslim identity in the post war 
period, the idea of Islamic economics was essentialised and theorised within a developmentalist 
agenda. By doing so, developmentalism with public policy orientation has taken principal 
position in the constitution of Islamic economics paradigm with the objective of eliminating 
underdevelopment, impoverishment and weak politico economic elbowroom that are drastically 
suffered in the Muslim societies.  
Since IBF emerged as the main institutions of Islamic economics paradigm beyond the traditional 
social welfare institutions, IBF, as discussed in Chapter 2, has been attributed the role of 
financing development in the Muslim societies. However, despite the unprecedent growth in IBF 
assets and transactional size in recent years, one of the main debates has been the substantive 
failure of IBF in terms of failing to contribute to socioeconomic development or societal 
transformation due to various reasons including opting for financialisation as discussed in 
Chapter 3. This chapter, as stated previously, considers maqasid al-Shari’ah related 
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understanding as another reason for the observed developmentalist failure (see: Asutay 2007, 
2012). Therefore, this section aims to bring the methodological debate to the surface around 
maqasid al-Shari’ah in line with the theoretical debate presented above. 
4.4.1. The Failure of Maqasid-based Approach to Developmentalism 
In tandem with developmentalism objective, founding fathers of Islamic economics utilised 
certain maqasid al-Shari’ah framework, which is mainly located in the theoretical expression of 
al-Ghazali’s structure, in order to identify and articulate developmentalism with the objectives of 
Shari’ah. Consequently, in that imagination, Islamic economics would achieve and sustain 
developmentalism through a structured maqasid methodology. However, due to the prevailing 
financialisation trend across the world and the urgent need for the enhancement of financial 
institutions in the Muslim world, the orientation of theoretical studies in Islamic economics gave 
way to the quest for institutionalisation process of IBF sector. In this pragmatic positioning, 
maqasid al-Shari’ah has been relegated to render legitimacy in an instrumental manner for 
Shari’ah compliancy in a formalistic way at best. In the wake of a shift from the ideals of Islamic 
economics to the realities of IBF, the close link between developmentalism and maqasid al-
Shari’ah has been broken for the sake of yielding efficiency in the practices of IBF institutions. 
In contrast to the expectations, these institutions eventually led to the malaise of IBF, and 
considered to be the ‘second best solution’ (Asutay 2007b, 2012) in relation to developmentalist 
objectives. 
Despite the fact that the general trend of Islamic economic studies has been moving towards 
unsophisticated and non-theoretical making of Islamic finance, Islamic moral economy, on the 
other hand, reiterates the indissociably strong nature nature between developmentalism and 
maqasid al-Shari’ah, such that the latter functions as the substantial methodology for the former 
in identifying the mechanism and methods of achieving the particularities of Islamic economics 
by delivering Islamic moral economy in the end. Otherwise, promoting the prevailing 
understanding of maqasid shaped by the impositions of market driven economic system would 
not generate the desired structural transformation in the societal level. Thus, it is argued by this 
research that the authenticity of institutions including IBF and the reformulation of Muslim 
identity can be accomplished through a proactive maqasid understanding. To achieve this, the 
embedment of maqasid al-Shari’ah into Islamic economics has to be fulfilled to substantiate the 
formation of Islamic moral economy beyond the fiqhi or maslahah-based Islamic 
financialisation, which is an objective pursued and explored in this study. 
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4.4.2. Maqasid in Islamic Economics and Finance: A Review of Literature  
It seems at first glance that maqasid al-Shari’ah has always been treated as an essential concept 
around which the theory of Islamic economics has been constructed, and IBF services have 
been put into practice. While it is true that the founding fathers of Islamic economics, such as 
Chapra (2008), among others, put great emphasis on maqasid from the very beginning to 
provide a methodological base for theory construction; subsequent contenders, practitioners 
and policy-makers of Islamic finance have given recognition to its significance quite recently. 
A quick survey of the relevant literature affirms this observation, as the majority of maqasid-
related articles and books were written in the last ten years, leaving a great gap between mid-
1980s to 2000s. 
Comparing the initial expressions by the founding fathers and the recent understanding 
developed, it is evident that maqasid has been wrested from the wider arena of Islamic economics 
to be downsized to the sphere of Islamic finance. In this section, a survey of the maqasid related 
literature on Islamic economics and finance is presented in two subsections. The first subsection 
depicts quite extensively the emergence and essentialisation of maqasid al-Shari’ah within 
Islamic economics in the works of the founding fathers, while the second focuses on the espousal 
of maqasid in the prevailing applications of Islamic finance. Thus, the divergence between 
theoretical and empirical studies is brought to the fore by showing how the theoretical articulation 
of maqasid is projected in practice. 
4.4.2.1. Maqasid al-Shari’ah and Islamic economics: early contributions 
With the rise, expansion and institutionalisation of modern sciences since the 17th century, 
Western philosophy experienced a radical shift from teleology to causality, which crystallised 
causal reasoning as the core of modern sciences in the face of teleology that basically explains 
a phenomenon in terms of its function and ‘purpose’. More precisely, modern Western 
philosophy, with its dominant positivist inclination, has been constructed exclusively within 
the ‘cause-and-effect’ dialectic within the framework of mechanistic explanations of natural 
and social phenomena, which entails causality and causal explanation as the central logic of 
thinking. Therefore, teleological orientation in any theory or idea has been regarded as 
metaphysical, nonsensical, and hence completely rejected (for an extensive discussion on this, 
see: Auda 2007:27).  
In contradistinction to positivist understanding, and in the context of Islamic philosophy and 
worldview, maqasid al-Shari’ah suggests a different understanding through its purposefulness 
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and goal-seeking approach by embedding ‘theologically’ defined developmentalist ends in the 
relevant knowledge development process and practice. In this respect, the founding fathers of 
Islamic economics attempted to detach themselves not only from the modern positivistic 
scientific methodology engulfed in the cause-effect nexus and mode of thinking, but also from 
the postmodern understanding, which proposes deconstruction of any sort of centrism (de-
centring) and universal truth constructions revolving around rationality assumptions.  
Of the pioneering scholars of Islamic economics, Chapra’s (2008) contributions in particular 
have played a significant role in guiding and inspiring following generations by emphasising the 
concept of falah or real well-being which constitutes the ultimate goal of the teachings of Islam. 
Such well-being, Chapra (2008) maintains, cannot be attained merely by the satisfaction of just 
the material needs of the human beings, a matter that depends on the level of income and wealth. 
Rather, there are other needs that have to be fulfilled, most of which are spiritual and non-material 
in character and need not necessarily become satisfied as a result of increase in income (Chapra 
2008:1). Placing individual falah at the centre of his theorisation, Chapra (2008) adopts the 
essential taxonomy of maqasid articulated by al-Ghazali and upheld by subsequent Muslim 
scholars and jurists, especially the five universal necessities which consist of the safeguarding of 
faith (din), the human self (nafs), intellect (‘aql), posterity (nasl) and wealth (mal). Within the 
framework of these core values, spiritual and non-material needs of the individual are given 
essential consideration in determining the goals of the Islamic economic system.  
Chapra (2008), however, admits that these five taxonomy as delineated by al-Ghazali are not 
the only maqasid aimed at ensuring human well-being; there are many others stated in the 
Qur’an and the Sunnah or inferred from them by many scholars. For Chapra (2008), while 
these five can be seen as primary maqasid (asliyyah), the others may be considered as their 
corollaries (tabi’ah). The realisation of the corollary maqasid is necessary as means to the 
realisation of the primary ones. Furthermore, the primary maqasid are unchanging and 
constitute ends in themselves, whereas their corollaries are flexible “and may keep on 
expanding and changing with the passage of time” (Chapra 2008:4).  In Chapra’s 
categorisation, the corollaries reflect the inherent dynamism of the Shari’ah and they are such 
that enable us “to ensure that all human rights are duly honoured and that all the different 
human needs are adequately satisfied” (Chapra 2008:5).  Both categories are constituted in 
such a manner that human beings are seen as “the end as well as the means of development” 
process. 
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Chapra’s restructuring of maqasid into the real economy and economic development realm, relies 
basically on strengthening the five universal necessities or essentials, namely the human self, faith, 
intellect, posterity and wealth, through fulfilling a set of corollary objectives. For example, Chapra 
(2008) underlines the cruciality of policy goals geared towards attaining security of life and 
property, removal of poverty, employment and self-employment, equitable distribution of income 
and wealth, education, good governance and development and expansion of wealth, all of which 
should result in the invigoration of the human self (nafs) which is one of the five primary objectives 
of the Shari’ah. Similarly, the enrichment of faith requires the establishment of certain ‘rules of 
behaviour (values)’ and ‘proper motivation’ within Islamic worldview. Significantly, Chapra’s 
reformulation of the theory of maqasid brings forward two very important features: one has to do 
with his espousal of the notion of ‘enrichment’ or ‘invigoration’ instead of the classical scholars’ 
idea of ‘preservation’ or ‘safeguarding’ in delineating the five essentials; the other aims to 
incorporate societal aspects of maqasid, through corollaries, in relation to its economic dimension.  
It can be deduced from the foregoing exposition that Chapra (2008) purposes a reformulation and 
extension of the notion of maqasid grounded in the Ghazalian basic structure whereby special 
emphasis is put on the social and development dimension giving it a wider scope and more 
dynamic character expressed by such terms like ‘enrichment’ and ‘invigoration’.  
Siddiqi (2010), another eminent figure of Islamic economics, approaches to the objectives of 
Shari’ah in a comprehensive manner in his quite recent book Maqasid e Shariet: Ek Asri Mutala47, 
in which he mainly argues that contemporary Islamic scholars have mixed up Shari’ah objectives 
with the objectives of fiqh, as the intense academic debate evidences this fact in their writings. 
Thus, he suggests that those scholars confine entire objectives to fiqhi rulings vis-à-vis Shari’ah. 
In addition to this, contemporary maqasid theories appropriated the renowned Ghazalian 
maqasid structure, which, according to Siddiqi, must be enriched by incorporating the insights 
of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah. The views of these two scholars constitute an 
important element in Siddiqi’s maqasid-oriented thinking: Ibn Taymiyyah suggests considering 
securing benefits (masalih) as one of the main goals of the Shari’ah, to which Ibn al-Qayyim 
adds justice as essential objective. By invoking these two scholars and incorporating their views 
in his conception of maqasid, Siddiqi (2004a) makes it clear that he rejects the idea of capturing 
the objectives into a finite list. 
                                                        
47 The book is written in Urdu language and has not been rendered into English yet. Despite this limitation, it is possible to 
have an overview of the book thanks to its scholarly review by Abdul Azim Islahi (2010). 
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Favoring Ibn al-Qayyim’s ideas, Siddiqi (2010:239) expands maqasid through embedding such 
objectives of “cooperation at the world level, justice and equity, poverty alleviation, bridging gap 
between the poor and the rich, sustenance for all, peace and progress, moderation and balance, 
growth (tazkiyah), and justice (qist)” into the five essentials. Particularly, in evaluating the state of 
the IBF sector, Siddiqi (2004b) sees the crux of the problem as the general failure of examining the 
findings of IBF according to maqasid al-Shari’ah criterion. In this manner, Islamic finance 
operations evidence that fuqaha mostly tackles the newly introduced financial products within a 
narrow perspective as to what their return could be to the supplier, rather than putting their broader 
consequences into the agenda (as suggested by tawhid) and issuing their fatwas accordingly. 
However, as Siddiqi (2010, 2004a) suggests, the principal objective of using maqasid al-Shari’ah 
as the methodology for IBF sector must produce new public policies that reflect the substance of 
the theory of Islamic economics, and not just mere forms of hybrid products. The ideal maqasid 
methodology, Siddiqi further argues, must fulfil the specific objectives related to IBF sector. 
Among them, utmost importance should be given to “encouraging businessmen and 
establishments for taking risks”. Further, “justice, equity and benevolence should be necessary 
ingredients of finance so that not only one party would bear all the negative effects of the 
partnership and investment” (Siddiqi 2010:239). Otherwise, any process of economic 
development based on financial operations that are oblivious to justice and benevolence would 
only lead to “bad consequences” (Siddiqi 2010:239). 
Besides the contributions of Chapra and Siddiqi who attempted to develop a wider maqasid 
framework that aims to make maqasid al-Shari’ah essential to the methodology and substance of 
Islamic economics, there are other scholars who took it upon themselves to examine particular 
subjects in Islamic economics and finance through a general maqasid approach. Kahf (2006), for 
instance, focuses on the Shari’ah goals intended by the prohibition of interest (riba) and identifies 
their implications for IBF sector. In light of an explication of the rationale behind the prohibition 
of riba based on evidence from the Quran (2:279) and the Prophet’s sayings that strictly urge upon 
forbidding riba, Kahf (2006:9–10) proceeds to discuss some certain characteristics that should be 
observed in IBF products and have to do with their moral soundness, namely avoiding harmful 
products, Shari’ah permissibility of the products, establishing obligational balance between each 
parties, founding all financing contracts on real exchanges and assets. He, then, elucidates the 
primary objectives pertaining to the prohibition of riba by determining eight objectives, some of 
which listed below (Kahf 2006:9–10): 
(i) Preventing return from being assigned to an asset that does not produce return; 
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(ii) Avoiding distribution of anything except the real value added or value created in 
an asset; 
(iii) Upholding the sanctity of property rights; 
(iv) Disallowing debts trade and exchange along with similarly unrealistic purely 
speculative transactions that are not based on real production; 
(v) ‘Preventing’ debt discounting and rescheduling for increment. 
In Kahf’s delineation of the Shari’ah objectives in the prohibition of riba there is an undeniable 
protectionist approach that is clearly expressed by such terms as prevention, avoiding, 
disallowing and upholding have been chosen for the articulation of maqasid al-Shari’ah. This 
approach is indebted, not surprisingly, to the Ghazalian formulation and structuring maqasid, 
which is critically examined in this study in detail in a later section. However, Kahf’s maqasidi 
interpretation of riba constitutes a novel attempt to the critique of modern IBF practices. 
Ahmad (2011), similarly, critically approaches to the role of IBF in fulfilling Ghazalian taxonomy 
of maqasid. His maqasid oriented theorisation focuses mainly on ‘protection of human life’ and 
‘protection of Islamic religion’; the other three objectives are conceived to support these two cores 
and complement them. The former objective is built on two complementary maqasid; that is 
‘education’ and ‘justice’ which ultimately pave the way for developing halal productive activities, 
educational and training programs in the financial capacity of markets (Ahmad 2011:6–7). The 
undertaking of these activities mainly requires the prohibition of ‘riba trade in debt, and gharar’ 
so that halal ways of production can be established. As for the second objective, it is essential to 
develop judicial and educational institutions in order to maintain and promote justice. Respect of 
private property rights, in the same vein, functions for protecting wealth, which plays a 
complementary role in achieving these objectives. 
Ahmad (2011) determines, without much explanation, the chief targets of Islamic finance in its 
relation to realising maqasid through incorporating them into Shatibian three-level classification. 
Amongst them, the first target, namely low levels of development expressed as daruriyyat or essential 
needs, is addressed by the alleviation of poverty mainly through mobilizing resources and directing 
them towards sound projects. Second target, medium stage of development in the form of hajiyyat or 
complementary can be achieved through facilitating, for example, better health systems and 
education and schooling system, and improving infrastructure. Lastly, the high stage of development 
or tahsiniyyat implying embellishment aims at satisfying luxurious necessities of individuals and 
society as long as it does not produce waste, consumerism and inequality; as having tahsiniyyat 
related consequences leads to improvement and the attainment in individual lives. 
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Under this structure, Ahmad (2011:15–16) presents some policy recommendations pertaining 
to the applications of Islamic finance: 
(i) Giving up over-dependence on murabahah contract; 
(ii) Following and even developing the use of new types of contracts that have been first 
launched by countries such as Sudan, the Gulf states and Malaysia; 
(iii) Putting the objective of financing the poor at the core; 
(iv) Finding some authentic benchmarks other than interest rates for determining the profit 
margin; 
(v) Expanding sukuk operations, but through avoiding some standards of it which have 
toxic nature; 
(vi) Discontinuing tawarruq contracts, which, in reality, does not differ much from interest-
based loans. 
It must be stated that maqasid al-Shari’ah has an extensive sphere in terms of shaping IBF; 
thereby its penetration area can hardly be explained by only protection of wealth, human life 
and religion. In addition, Ahmad’s (2011) structure falls short of articulation of maqasid as a 
methodology, while he well diagnosed the flaws in its applications with IBF. For instance, the 
way of alleviating poverty, as being one of the objectives of Islamic economics, was explained 
in an abstract way by using classical suggestions in relation to the role of IBF, such as 
mobilising resources and directing them into related projects. However, system approach 
necessitates much broader view on this maqasid by surfacing the causes of poverty specific to 
that society and suggesting proper ways to eliminate it within a political economy perspective.  
Ahmed (2011) elaborated a more comprehensive view on Islamic financial products and 
maqasid al-Shari’ah nexus through utilising, what can be identified as, an Ibn Qayyimian 
maqasidi understanding by determining the general objective of Islamic law as promoting or 
enhancing welfare of mankind as well as preventing and protecting from harm. This implies 
that “other than fulfilling the legal requirements, an Islamic financial system should also cater 
to the social needs of a society” (Ahmed 2011:149). Ahmed (2011) suggests two sets of 
Shari’ah requirements – legal and social requirements – as the chief implications of maqasid 
regarding the IBF sector; however, at the same time, he urges acknowledging the difference 
between these two. Of the legal requirements, Ahmed (2011:151) stresses on ‘abiding with the 
relevant legal maxims’ wherein, according to Majallah rules, “attention is given to the objects 
and meanings, not to the words and form” (Majallah, 2001; cited by Ahmed 2011:151), ‘form-
substance harmony’ which aims to preclude focusing on form and ignoring substance of 
Islamic law, ‘using ruses (hilah)’ to produce Pseudo-Islamic products that are unlawful in 
substance, and lastly ‘considering outcomes of the transaction’ in a consequentialist manner. It 
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is evident that the legal requirements identified by Ahmed (2011) are in harmony with the spirit 
of maqasid al-Shari’ah with its all-embracing context and complementarity role with social 
requirements, since it goes beyond narrowed fiqhi considerations and substantiates the 
extensiveness and dynamism of Islamic law with respect to Islamic financial products. 
As being complement to the former one, Ahmed (2011) emphasizes the social requirements, 
which embrace two important dimensions as ‘market segment’ and ‘needs/purposes’ that are 
served by financial products. Market segment mainly functions for serving basic and advanced 
financial needs of all stakes in the society including household and business sector, small and 
micro enterprises, and poor and middle-class groups. Needs, on the other hand, has to be 
satisfied as part of the objectives of IBF; hence, to make it concrete, they are divided into 
survival needs, security needs, and growth needs (for further discussion, see: Ahmed 2011:154) 
within the scope of IBF. Thus, the realisation of maqasid in the IBF field requires the 
satisfaction of each need in tandem with the market segment concerns and legal requirements 
in general.  
Ahmed (2011), furthermore, identifies three types of products that play a vital role on the 
realisation of maqasid. Amongst them, ‘pseudo-Islamic products’ are those, which conform to 
the legal form, but fail to substantiate the substance of Islamic law. Applying ruses (hilah) not 
for exceptional cases, but rather for general practices and contracts (such as organized 
tawarruq) is the obvious example reflecting this kind of products. Shari’ah compliant products; 
secondly, are unable to incorporate social objectives explicated in the social requirements, 
despite the fact that they fulfil the form-substance considerations. The best practice reflecting 
the Shari’ah compliant products can be of those, which disregard the poor or middle sections 
of society, because their transaction costs and risks bearings are high, and investment returns 
are low. Proliferation of these products amongst markets mainly stems from the lack of Ibn 
Qayyimian understanding within which IBF is constructed and operated, and through which 
societal consequences are vitalised. Distinct from these two kinds of products, Shari’ah based 
products, thirdly, aim to reach all segments of society and satisfy both survival and security 
needs of individuals without causing any form-substance dilemma. In this manner, maqasid al-
Shari’ah can be achieved by endowing Shari’ah based products entirely in the financial 
services. Overall, while it can be further developed in a systematic manner, Ahmed’s (2011) 
approach to maqasid and its articulation on product development in the IBF sector has a novel 
character in methodological senses. 
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In further exploring the articulation of maqasid al-Shari’ah in IBF, corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) can be considered, as CSR issues have become a central concern for 
modern corporations and middle scale businesses – as well as for management and finance 
theorists – in both conventional and Islamic financial institutions. The vitality and functionality 
of CSR in such institutions is reinterpreted from the maqasid al-Shari’ah perspective by Dusuki 
and Abdullah (2007). They considered fulfilling CSR requirements to be one of the utmost 
objectives in financial sphere. In doing so, Dusuki and Abdullah (2007) framed their CSR 
modelling around the Ghazalian maqasidi structure, which they believe functions as preserving 
the public good, through essentialising the five essentials and regarded the notion of 
‘preventing harm’ as significant, since, they thought, Islamic legal maxims were all derived 
from this principle. Therefore, as the implications of maqasid on CSR necessitates, individuals 
and groups in corporations must behave in a manner that does not undermine their role of being 
vicegerents (khalifah) of, and responsible to the Almighty. In addition, another implication 
invokes a ‘taqwa-based business paradigm’, which does not limit the entrepreneur to seek his 
profit maximisation, but also requires the fulfilment of moral and social responsibilities that 
can be realised through considering the wellbeing of all stakeholders in his business (Dusuki 
and Abdullah 2007:34); thereby Islamic reward system transcends orthodox applications by 
bringing the other world into analysis. 
Dusuki and Abdullah (2007) also reckoned the concept of maslahah into the CSR issues by 
constructing a maslahah pyramid that has three levels of necessities. While the first level being 
daruriyyat level requires the preservation and protection of the essential needs of all 
stakeholders such as protecting employees’ welfare, safety and health, hajiyyat and tahsiniyyat 
respectively has a role of removing difficulties and hardship (such as offering fair pay and safe 
workplace, and initiating human quality programs), and engaging social activities that lead to 
perfect public life such as offering financial help for poor and successful students. 
Although the importance of CSR has been popularised among academic disciplines, it has also 
accompanied with some cogent criticisms within a political economy approach (see: Banerjee 
2008; Blowfield and Frynas 2005; Vogel 2007; Wang, Choi, and Li 2008). Thus, beyond the 
idealisation of CSR as the rectifying or consequence moderating instrumental policy over CSR, 
practical applications evidence capitalist interests in disguise of CSR. Similarly, it is 
questionable as to which extent CSR is capable of serving both the interest of corporations and 
that of individuals and society at length, since the modus operandi of capitalist system works 
within the rules of zero sum game and Pareto optimality. Thus, embedding maqasid al-Shari’ah 
into CSR could consider these politico-economic aspects and endeavour to eliminate the zero-
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sum nature of financial dealings through bringing tazkiyah as an axiom under the tawhidi 
framework, which inherently considers the wellbeing all stakeholders of society concurrently 
due to the rububiyah axiom. 
Another issue in IBF is the relegation of maqasid al-Shari’ah to the objective of preservation 
of wealth. In this sight, Dusuki and Bouheraoua (2011) determines five main dimensions in 
which preservation of wealth is achieved through; (i) the protection of ownership, (ii) 
acquisition and development, (iii) preventing damage, (iv) its circulation, and (v) its value 
protection. Similarly, Laldin and Furqani (2013) specify three ends in particular for IBF, which 
are circulation of wealth smoothly, fair and transparent financial practices and justice and 
equity at both micro and macro levels. These two views among many others unearth the old 
and inherent debate about the basic role of IBF. Accordingly, one stream argues that the 
structure of IBF must be regarded similar to conventional banking and finance with respect to 
functions and basic operations, that is fulfilling financial needs of individuals and channelling 
individual savings into most efficient investment opportunities, but additionally IBF must 
embrace and operationalise legal maxims of Shari’ah about contractual rules and regulations. 
Therefore, this view implies that the structure and operational nature of banking and finance is 
universal, which display the same function due to the nature of a bank being a business entity, 
hence expecting public policy outcomes from IBF activities is no more than a ‘romantic; and 
‘delusional’ view (see, for instance, El-Din 2013). Nonetheless, public policy can occasionally 
result as an outcome, but in an instrumental manner. The reflection of this view in the maqasid 
al-Shari’ah debate necessarily limits itself with the objective of preservation of wealth. 
However, expanding or, more precisely, shifting the scope of IBF beyond orthodox stereotypes 
would encapsulate the extensive objectives clarified in both al-Ghazali’s and other scholars’ 
maqasid frameworks. Otherwise, following the existing structure of banking and finance 
designated by neoclassical economics necessitates the detachment of its objectives from social 
dimensions through being ‘profit-oriented entities’ rather than ‘social based ones’ (Mohammad 
and Shahwan 2013). 
As surveyed above, the long trajectory of theorising Islamic economics displays features of 
homogenous and dilatory development. The founding fathers and subsequent scholars in their 
attempt to construct theories of Islamic economics have benefited from Ghazalian maqasid 
framework, as a methodological framework in defining the objective function, and through non-
substantiated attempts. In doing so, maqasid al-Shari’ah are essentialised within Islamic 
economics on the surface, yet the embedment of it as the substantial methodology is mostly missed, 
and the five-level essentials are favoured with limited articulations. The next section demonstrates 
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how contemporary contenders in Islamic finance have even further narrowed the scope of maqasid 
to the preservation of wealth, which is rather evident in most empirical studies related to IBF. 
4.4.2.2. Maqasid al-Shari’ah and Islamic finance: eclecticism and romanticism 
Even though maqasid al-Shari’ah could not be profoundly embedded in the theoretical framework 
of Islamic economics in the efforts of founding fathers, their contributions were of great importance 
since they established the theoretical base, dimensions and objectives of Islamic economics. It is, 
therefore, expected that the successors would reap the benefits of these contributions in both 
theoretical and practical field by essentialising maqasid as a methodology. However, the political 
economy of the Muslim world under the existing hegemony has not allowed the emergence of 
Islamic economics neither as a theory nor a practice as an economic system to flourish and play a 
central role over leading Islamic financing applications. Thus, the entire institutional authenticity 
search initiated by Islamic economics in the end has been relegated to IBF, as the capital 
accumulation resulting from petro-dollars of the 1970s and 1980s urged and expedited the process 
of establishing Islamic financial industry as an ‘integral’ sector of the global financial system. In 
the initial stage, there was not much debate and intervention on the rise of Islamic finance in order 
to preserve the ongoing profitability. Maqasid related debate in the form of substantive morality, 
therefore, had to wait until 2000s when the social failure of Islamic banking started to be recognised 
(Asutay 2007b:109, 2012; El-Gamal 2007). 
Highly influenced by these historical developments, the infant empirical literature on maqasid 
and IBF nexus basically follows two main trends. The first type of literature stresses the need 
for a maqasidi perspective to remove the social failure of Islamic finance. These studies, hence, 
in a romanticized manner, highlights the debates on ‘form vs substance’, ‘Shari’ah-based vs 
Shari’ah-compliancy’, ‘debt finance vs equity finance’, ‘banks as profit-oriented entities vs 
banks as socially-oriented entity’ (for an overview of these studies, see: Dusuki and Abozaid 
2007; El-Najar 2014; Mohammad and Shahwan 2013; Sairally 2015; Soualhi 2015; Zakariyah 
2015). Although delineating the aspects of failure considerably important, the debate remained 
highly limited in the sense of suggesting authentic solutions with maqasid lens. 
In addition to highlighting the failure in a discursive manner, another step of empirical 
character was made consisting of the efforts aimed at constructing a maqasid index and 
applying it to economic performances of Muslim dominated countries. Such an exercise aims 
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to diagnose to what extent economies perform in line with the objectives of Shari’ah48. In terms 
of measuring economic, social and other performances together, maqasid index resembles 
multidimensional indices such as Human Development Index, Happiness Index, OECD Better 
Life Index and etc.  
Table 4.1: Variables for the Ghazalian Five-Level Dimensions 
Hifz al-Din - Religious freedom 
- Crime rate 
- Corruption rate 
- Peace Index 
Hifz al- Nafs 
- Average life expectancy 
- Human rights index 
- Freedom Index 
Hifz al-‘Aql 
- Education 
- Technology use 
- Number of researches 
- Articles published 
- School enrolment 
- Spending on education 
Hifz al-Mal 
- GDP per capita 
- Household consumption 
- Gini ratio 
Hifz al-Nasl 
- Fertility rate 
- Life expectancy at birth 
- Health expenditure as percentage of GDP 
- Divorce rate 
- Child mortality rate 
Note: Developed from the secondary data-based studies 
By using maqasid index, a number of researches aimed either to measure overall economic 
performance, or specifically Islamic banks’ performance. The common characteristic of the index 
attempts is the adoption of Ghazalian fivefold taxonomy of maqasid framework, which is 
invariably and extensively utilised in the relevant academic studies. Looking at the country level 
maqasid performance studies, both primary and secondary data are selected in determining the 
variables for each dimension. Those selecting primary data mostly conduct questionnaires, in-
depth interviews, surveys or using directly existing primary data such as World Values Survey 
and Gallup Analytics. As for the secondary data, World Bank, IMF, UNESCO and UNDP 
databases are utilised. The most appropriate approximation of the five dimensions are sought in 
these databases, or surveys and questions are intended to meet each dimension. In this manner, 
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 present a selection of the most commonly used proxies for the Ghazalian 
fivefold taxonomy of maqasid (see the most recent related studies by: Ali and Hasan 2014; 
                                                        
48 Malaysian government, in this manner, developed the ‘Malaysian Syariah Index’ as a benchmark to evaluate 
countries’ performance in regards of fulfilling the objectives of Islamic principles. 
 
 201  
Amiruddin 2014; Anto 2011; Batchelor 2013; Esen 2015; Kasri and Ahmed 2015; Mili 2014; 
Mukhtar, Nihal, Rauf, Wasti, and Qureshi 2014; Shaikh 2017). 
The variables in the tables are chosen by many scholars of Islamic finance in an effort to best 
approximate the objectives of Shari’ah for different dimensions. The ultimate maqasid index, 
hence, would measure overall economic performance of countries with respect to its 
conformity to Shari’ah. In achieving this, some valuable indices have been developed 
including Islamicity Index (Askari and Mohammadkhan 2015; Askari and Rehman 2013), 
Hayat-a-Tayyaba Index (Mukhtar et al. 2014), Islamic Human Development Index (Anto 
2011), Maqasid al-Shari’ah based Development Index (Ali and Hasan 2014), and Posterity 
Development Index (Khan, Sulaiman, and Bahari 2015). 
Table 4.2: Variables for the Ghazalian Five-Level Dimensions 
Hifz al-Din 
Attendance in religious services 
Frequency in prayers/fasting 
Charitable giving and Hajj attendance 
Belief in God 
Avoidance from Haram activities 
Hifz al- Nafs 
Freedom of choice 
War or terrorist attacks 
Life satisfaction 
Hifz al-Aql 
High level of education 




Income level / financial situation 
Savings and consumption 
Robbery and theft occurrences 
Hifz al-Nasl 
Frequency of sickness 
Access to health services 
Homosexuality and prostitution 
Abortion and divorce 
Note: Developed from the primary data-based studies 
Apart from country level performance based empirical studies, maqasid has also been employed 
for evaluating the performance of Islamic banks. In such studies, the wisdom and purpose behind 
financial activities are identified so that Islamic banks would observe them in their operations. 
However, constructing maqasid indicators alone is not enough; Islamic finance data must also be 
accessible and disclosed to evaluate Islamic banks’ performances. One way of tackling this issue 
is to apply content analysis over the disclosed information in annual reports of Islamic banks. 
Mainly inspired from the distinguishing works of Islamicity Disclosure Index (Hameed et al. 2004) 
and Ethical Identity Index (Haniffa and Hudaib 2007), content analysis-based maqasid studies 
determine some key concepts for each indicator, and through using the method of codifying text 
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and content, high frequency of reference to the statements assumes much importance for related 
indicators. Table 4.3 depicts a selection of widely used long-listed indicators of maqasid in 
disclosure studies (amongst others, see:Arshad, Ahmad, Fisol, Said, and Haji-Othman 2015; 
Asutay and Harningtyas 2015; Hurayra 2015; Ngalim and Ismail 2014). Despite giving a freedom 
of choice in determining variables, one of the disadvantages of disclosure studies lies in too much 
reliance on the disclosed information in reports. Besides, this evaluation method in fact checks 
maqasid scores of ‘accounting reporting’, not directly of Islamic banks’ maqasid performance in 
reality or in the practical field; as non-disclosure does not imply that Islamic banks do not undertake 
such activities in their everydayness. Since disclosing information is a governance issue; and since 
such governance culture has not being consolidated in the Muslim countries, reliance on disclosed 
information to evaluate the maqasid performance may only provide a proximity to the reality. 
Lastly, it is very hard to reach a comprehensive performance measurement by using content 
analysis, since the validity and reliability will always remain questionable. Despite all these 
shortcomings, the contributions of Bedoui (2012), and Bedoui and Mansour (2015) is amongst the 
meritorious studies, which develops a conceptual measurement method for maqasid performances 
of Islamic financial institutions by extending and augmenting the concept of maqasid through 
introducing Abdel Majid Najjar’s conceptualisation of extended maqasid. By adopting this 
structure, Asutay and Harningtyas (2015) conducted a content-based disclosure analysis and 
evaluated social performances of selected Islamic banks. 
Table 4.3: Selected Variables Used in Disclosure Studies 
Prohibition of riba 
Opening mudarabah account 
Provide maslahah for all 
Microfinance activities 
Profit and loss sharing 
Employee education 
Zakat and Charitable activities 
Environmental responsibility 
Good governance 
Collaboration and sharing within bank staff 
Another method of coping with data access problem is to conduct questionnaires and interviews 
and transform the assembled data into measurable variables through giving particular weights to 
each dimension (amongst the related studies, see: Mohamad, Ali, and Sharif 2016; Shaikh 2017). 
In doing so, interview method of data collection involves directing questions to scholars at 
Shari’ah supervisory boards, staff, managers and directors of Islamic banks. The results are 
interpreted with some maqasid benchmarks, and scores are given accordingly. Similar to content 
analysis, this method is also less reliable, since internal staff or scholars sitting at bank boards 
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are most likely to provide pretentious answer by avoiding negative responses regarding Islamic 
bank’s performances, which hence leads to response bias. 
Lastly, maqasid index is also constructed through determining objectives of Islamic banking 
with some ratio analysis (see, for instance, Mohammed, Tarique, and Islam 2015; Nizam and 
Larbani 2017; Rusydiana and Al Parisi 2016; Shaikh 2017). Table 4.4 presents a set of widely 
used ratios that provide to assess maqasid performance of Islamic banks. As can be seen, it can 
be a terribly difficult task to correlate such items with the whole notion of maqasid al-Shari’ah 
as has been discussed so far. 
Table 4.4: Selected Ratios for Assessing Maqasid Performance 
Interest free income / Total income 
Zakat distribution / Net assets 
SME financing / Total investment 
Training and research expenditures / Total assets 
Employee retention ratio 
Education grant / Total income 
Profit / Total income 
Investment deposit / Total deposit 
Despite these attempts at constructing a maqasid index are appreciated as they provide some 
inferences about economic and financial performances, there are substantial problems inherent 
in developing these indices. First and foremost, it is debatable whether Shari’ah objectives within 
economic and financial sphere can be relegated to a limited number of dimensions. This question 
brings about another issue that concerns the validity of statistics as an adequate method to 
evaluate economic and social performance. As statistical methods require measurable forms of 
knowledge, the naturally immeasurable or unobservable factors are either declined or replaced 
with something different from the original (for a political economy approach towards the 
utilisation of statistical methods in social sciences, see: Bruno, Jany-Catrice, and Touchelay 
2016; Desrosières 2002; Fioramonti 2014; Ziliak and McCloskey, 2008). Taking the example of 
the preservation of al-‘aql as one of the primary maqasid, most performance indices relegate it 
to ‘education’. In order to measure and quantify education, the existing data are sought and 
mostly ‘education expenditure as percentage of GDP’ or ‘school enrolment’ is chosen as they are 
readily accessible in the World Bank and other international databases. As a result, a particular 
country (can be economy or bank) is evaluated for its contribution to the preservation of al-‘aql 
with such proxies of education; and if it gets high score, the country accepted as successful in 
conforming to the objectives of the Shari’ah. However, what happens in reality is nothing, but 
the quantitatively increased education opportunities or funds reserved for it. In the case that the 
education system is quite underdeveloped within a country, these proxies will contrarily imply 
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biased results. More importantly, what al-Ghazali intends with this dimension of maqasid may 
not be equivalent to the proliferation of modern and positivist educational institutions as 
prevailing in the Muslim countries.  
This study does not claim that maqasid index developers are all favouring such an approach; 
rather this is an inevitable route independent from subjective views once the need for measuring 
maqasid is taken for granted. If a particular dimension of maqasid is aimed to be measured, then 
there is no way other than to utilise the existing databases. Thus, even the best index that may be 
developed with appropriate components has to face the limitations imposed by mainstream 
databases. Considering also the data limitation of Muslim economies or even of Islamic banks, 
maqasid indices eventually cannot go beyond a symbolic meaning. Similarly, this approach 
results with falling in the trap of judging advanced countries more Islamic, for the performance 
results give higher ranks for developed countries as evidenced in the study by Askari and 
Mohammadkhan (2015). Although it does not mean that advanced countries are performing less 
from the Islamic point of view, it is like comparing the superiority of apples over oranges. In 
other words, the value-loaded dimensions of maqasid cannot be readily applied over different 
institutions emerged from different worldviews beyond shallow proxies developed from different 
ontologies. Therefore, if education is used for the hifz al-aql, the result would be the fact that a 
European country would always have the highest ranking, which indicates the ‘unbearable 
lightness of the proxies’ used. 
In summarising the transformation of maqasid understanding and its application in Islamic finance 
throughout the decades, it can be stated that founding fathers’ attempt of considering maqasid al-
Shari’ah as the methodology for Islamic economics in defining its consequences has not paved the 
way for the emergence of an authentic financial system based on Islamic values and norms.  
In light of the foregoing critical survey of the contributions made by the founding fathers of Islamic 
economics and those who came after them, the remaining sections of this study explores the 
question as to how maqasid al-Shari’ah can function as an essential methodology for Islamic 
economics. In doing so, problems pertaining to the adoption of al-Ghazali’s maqasid framework 
and its use by Islamic finance scholars are addressed. Then, an attempt is made to bring to the fore 
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4.5. MAQASID AL-SHARI’AH: TOWARDS AN ESSENTIAL ‘METHODOLOGY’ 
Methodological issues have always been the moot point, particularly in economic theorisation, 
for they constitute the theory of knowledge or epistemological aspect of it. The methodology of 
economics, following the Western Enlightenment process, has mostly been developed around 
national interests, and the political economy of it evidences that such a methodology is 
subordinated to the legitimisation and theorisation of the real objectives of nation states.49  
Methodology of (conventional) economics suggests that economic theory is part of the scientific 
knowledge and hence it must be verified by using empirical procedure in deriving objective facts 
and reason. Popper (1968), the main exponent in this area, entails empirical methods for validating 
economic theorisation through what he identifies ‘falsification’50 process. Together with much 
emphasis on empiricism, mainstream economic methodology also adopts the Darwinian principle 
of survival of the fittest in the market, a priori reasoning, utility maximization, and deriving 
economic theory ‘from realities to doctrine’ (Addas 2008:29). 
In responding to the ‘poverty of economics’ resulting from scientific take up of neo-classical 
economics, and with the emergence of post-modernism, the scope of economic analysis has 
gone beyond the traditional borders of ‘pure scientific’ approach by also considering 
institutions, political economy, values, cultures and religious behaviour albeit as an exogenous 
variable. The emergence of institutional economics, new political economy and public choice, 
environmental economics among others heterogenous approaches, aim at expanding the 
horizon of economics by re-discovering the old wisdom of political economy by 
acknowledging the intersectionality of social sciences, which is also essential for Islamic 
economics, as it has always remained a moral and political economy in its broadest sense along 
with being ‘sourced’ from ‘revealed knowledge’ (Asutay 2018). 
As regards to Islamic economics, with all these developments have been taking place in 
economics science, contenders in the field have not systematically pay attention to 
methodological issues in theorizing Islamic economics, yet they oscillated between two opposite 
poles: the ‘step-by-step approach’ and the ‘all-or-nothing approach’ (Hasan 1998) where the 
former approach exploits the IOK with a realist and pragmatist manner and believes an 
                                                        
49 For example, Adam Smith’s seminal work on ‘the Wealth of Nations’, far from being universally suggestible 
to every nation, aims to investigate the ways that leads advanced countries in the Western world to the achievement 
of prosperity. 
50 The term ‘falsification’ is used, in methodological sense, that since truth can never be known, scientific progress 
must be maintained by falsification of economic propositions. 
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evolutionary construction of Islamic theory of economics thereto, and the latter approach – 
advocated mainly by Attas (1989) – necessitates the assumption of practicing Muslim society 
within its pure economic theory making, beyond evolving economics into Islamic framework as 
part of the tawhidi IOK paradigm developed by Faruqi. These two ramifications of 
methodological strategy pioneered in the literature, and maqasid al-Shari’ah, as mentioned 
above, is yet to burgeon to develop as a third alternative for the methodology of Islamic 
economics. 
In light of the definition and function of methodology mentioned above, this study, beyond the 
two oscillations, suggests recourse to maqasid al-Shari’ah as the fundamental methodology for 
the theorisation of Islamic economics through which Islamic developmentalism can be 
conceptualised and transformed into public policy making. When methodology is adjusted to the 
ambit of Islamic economics, maqasid functions to explain:  
(i) the way that the sources and origins of knowledge, that is primarily Qur’an and Sunnah, 
is articulated into the base of its economic theorisation;  
(ii) the way that the Islamic axiomatic approach is substantiated and instituted to articulate 
these sources into everyday socioeconomic life,  
(iii) the way that the Islamicity of the institutional and non-institutional forms of these 
articulations are verified in both intentionalist and consequentialist manners.  
To further elaborate on these two approaches, owing to the intentionalist adoption, maqasid can 
provide theoretical, philosophical and also practical reference point to develop socioeconomic 
policies. Consequentialist approach, on the other hand, functions to identify morally acceptable 
outcomes among others, which, hence provides a methodological framework to measure the 
policy outcomes in relation to intentionally established maqasid scheme. Despite the fact that 
consequentialism or substantivism has traditionally been ruled out as part of methodology in 
Islamic economics by the proponents of fiqhi approach due to the adoption of ‘intentionalist’ or 
form approach, this study suggests that tawhid in the form of complementarity leading to unitarity 
necessitates ‘intention’ and ‘consequence’ to be considered together as part of the methodology 
of IME (Asutay 2018). 
Adhering to this conception, together with the intentionalist and consequentialist approaches, 
maqasid can embed its distinctive epistemological spirit and methodological characteristics into 
economic system in such a way that the role of ‘individual faculty, reason and rationality’ in 
deriving knowledge, ‘self-interest and utility maximization motives’ in shaping economic 
behaviour in line with homoeconomicus, ‘market exchange and price mechanism’ in establishing 
justice and equity through allocation of resources, and ‘the harsh competition and craving for 
efficiency’ as the overall modus operandi are all examined critically, as these have influenced 
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Islamic economics and finance theory and practice. Instead, the revealed knowledge as the source 
of epistemological knowledge, falah (salvation), ihsan (beneficence), altruism, and cooperative 
and sharing behaviour through expanded stakeholding understanding, substantive morality 
beyond instrumental reasoning, efficiency with equity, and ethico-economic relationship within 
Islamic order are located into the construction of authentic Islamic theory of iqtisad (Islamic 
economics) or IME through the methodology of maqasid al-Shari’ah. At the end of this process, 
it is expected that maqasid embedded Islamic theory of iqtisad should generate a particular social 
formation that is distinct from capitalist social formation and capitalist modes of production, as 
tawhidi governance mechanism suggests an extended stake holding and the interests of all 
stakeholders are considered equal. Hence, this process should lead to ihsani or ‘good society’ as 
opposed to capitalist commercial society.  
This study, accordingly, reconsiders maqasid al-Shari’ah to constitute the fundamental 
methodology in respect of Islamic developmentalism that encompasses the entire process 
through which knowledge relating to economic phenomena is authenticated. This can, in turn, 
lead to establish a substantive IME understanding wherein interpersonal and social relations are 
not merely relegated to economic relations, but economic system is embedded into norms and 
values of society through locating ethico-economic relationship across each system so that 
morality can be articulated beyond impersonal market environment. 
4.5.1. Re-embedding Maqasid al-Shari’ah into the Theory of Development    
As has been shown in the survey of the relevant literature in the preceding section, the existing 
contributions on theoretical construction of Islamic economics limitedly dealt with the notion of 
maqasid al-Shari’ah and its essential role in constituting a fundamental methodology. However 
later, ironically, maqasid has been accommodated into Islamic finance, which is one of the 
institutional constructs of Islamic economics, such that the Islamic financial transactions and the 
operations of IBF institutions have implicitly been legitimised through maqasid. In addition, 
maqasid has also been used by the critics of Islamic finance to identify its social failures. For 
example, financialisation of Islamic finance today, increasingly switching into the orbit of global 
financial gear, is being evaluated positively through various maqasid indices developed by 
contemporary empirical studies based on econometrics method.  
The rationale for the exclusive interaction of maqasid with Islamic economics in such a way 
mainly stems from the pursuit of recalling the well-formulated objectives in the Islamic 
intellectual history in today’s environment, especially after recognising the failure of Islamic 
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finance project due to its mimicry of conventional finance. Thus, it is believed that severe 
criticisms raised against Islamic finance could be obviated through a re-examination process over 
IBF applications by introducing maqasid al-Shari’ah51. Accordingly, since al-Ghazali’s maqasid 
framework was ready to be adopted, Shari’ah scholars at Shari’ah boards of IBF institutions 
used this particular frame to legitimise their product regardless of its divergence from the ideal 
position. This study, nevertheless, suggests that the Ghazalian approach to maqasid in producing 
an ideal methodology for Islamic economics is inadequate on the grounds of its inherent flaws in 
revealing developmentalism as identified above. 
Deficiencies in the Ghazalian framework with respect to its methodological functionality can be 
identified and explored under two main points. The first one, ‘individual orientedness’ 
(fardiyyah), is characterised by lacking explicit emphasis on societal aspects within each 
objective. For instance; the objectives determined through preservation of faith, soul, wealth, 
mind, offspring (and honour) all embraces individual preference, perspective and scope, hence 
the derivation of social consequences from these individually expressed five essentials is not 
plausible as the social dimension must be embedded in maqasid al-Shari’ah per se beyond 
instrumental or indirect ways. Indeed, the argument that the satisfaction of individual needs 
would, in return, lead to prosperity in societal level is an arguable method in many aspects. In 
theorising the capitalist system, Adam Smith (1976) [originally published in 1776] had adopted 
a similar method, which can be termed as handicap of individuality, albeit the objectified 
consequences are in great contrast to Islamic premises, by claiming that the ‘invisible hand’ 
would establish social welfare and prosperity and lead to society’s opulence so long as every 
single individual seeks the pursuit of his own gains in line with self-interest motives. In other 
words, Smith (1976) argued for a virtuous society in which prosperity and wealth can only be 
established in societal level by setting some goals that confine its scope to individual. This 
inductive method, however far from Smith’s expectations, has not benefited society at large as 
the scattered history of capitalist development evidences.  
It is a methodological problem, hence, that the mere consideration of individual falah does not 
necessarily bring out social justice, welfare, and developmentalism; thereby ihsan 
(beneficence) as a societal objective should be conflated with individual level falah (salvation) 
so that behavioural attitudes can be moulded by these two elements in order to reflect upon 
norms and values of society. In other words, societal objectives can be fulfilled through 
                                                        
51 The eclectic approach upon the establishment of maqasid into Islamic economics realm is exemplified in the 
previous sections, which surveyed the emerging literature on Islamic finance and maqasid. Thus, particular 
reference is not rendered here. 
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enhancing falah aiming to expand ihsani social capital. It can, therefore, be argued that the 
rationale for stressing on individual centricity in developing Ghazalian maqasid emanates from 
the fundamental exigency of developing and expanding the capacity and functioning of 
individual. However, notwithstanding the greatness of the ultimate objective, tawhidi 
understanding of Islam essentialises the concept of ihsan in the process of fulfilling this 
fundamental objective so that each individual’s capacity and functioning would harmonically 
contribute to the wellbeing of others. Consequently, such a process invalidates the individually 
acceptable but socially defective objectives and outcomes (or vice versa) through its tawhidi 
framework, which functions to set objectives in a harmonious and complementary way. Thus, 
eventually, human beings pursue falah as part of their objectives, on the one hand, but they 
also increase ihsan amongst their fellow citizens to establish socioeconomic justice and equity 
in this world and to reach eternal happiness in the hereafter, as the two-dimensional utility 
function of Islam suggests (Asutay 2007b, 2012). In other words, as Naqvi (1994) identifies, 
ihsan should be considered as an ‘equilibrium’ in the sense that those individuals reaching their 
falah should consider the falah of others through doing and expanding ihsan and hence 
bringing up other less-fortunate ones in the steps of falah ladders.  
Another deficiency is ‘the lack of proactivity’ which becomes obvious with such words of 
‘safeguarding’, ‘preservation’, ‘prevention’ and ‘protection’; all referring to what al-Ghazali 
uses as ‘hifz’. Thus, hifz evokes a closed system of objectives that is far from being dynamic in 
nature and hence unable to be adaptive with and moulder of changing circumstances nor can it 
help to produce public policy as a consequence. However, as a counter argument to this 
statement, Chapra (2008:5) advocates: 
if we wish also to ensure the sustained development and well-being of a society, the word 
'safeguarding' used by al-Ghazali […] need not necessarily be taken to imply preservation of 
just the status quo with respect to the realization of the maqasid. We safeguard when we have 
reached the peak of achievement. However, this is not possible for human beings in this world. 
There is always room for improvement. The verdict of history is that unless there is a 
continuous progress in their realization through a movement in the positive direction, it may 
not be possible to safeguard them and to sustain the society’s well-being in the long-run. 
Stagnation will ultimately set in and lead to decline. 
As can be seen, Chapra (2008) supposes ‘safeguarding’ to be realised when the ‘peak of 
achievement’ is reached. However, since the peak is not reachable in this world, there should 
always be continuous search for, and pursuit of, betterment. Chapra (2008), thus, aims with 
this statement to bring back the dynamic structure of maqasid under hifz. This approach, albeit 
quite optimistic, impels the limits of the concept of safeguarding that is why he prefers using 
‘invigoration’ (Chapra 2008:8) in lieu of this concept. 
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As regards to the ‘prevention orientedness’ being a problematic approach, ‘proactivity’ transcends 
aforementioned prevention based hifzi approach and its variants in the contemporary era and 
sustains its authenticity and vividness in every time and place without any stagnation. The proactive 
maqasid, in this sense, echoes Mawlana Jalal-el-din Rumi’s (1207-1273) ‘metaphor of drawing 
compass’ (Akman 2017) according to which one leg of the compass holds still and rooted in a 
certain spot statically and the other leg arcs the entire surface without causing any translocation in 
the former part. By making use of this metaphor, proactive maqasid framework, in the same vein, 
takes nourishments from the entire historical intellectual pool by utilising numerous philosophical 
contributions, ijtihads and theories, and concurrently reforms and keeps alive itself without any 
disengagement from the ontological foundations of Islam. Nevertheless, if the former leg trends 
multiple shifts from the original spot towards others, then there will be plenty of circles drawn, 
which, in turn, reveal multiple intersection sets. In customising to maqasid al-Shari’ah, 
consequently, the intersection sets hold a composite of various epistemological knowledge 
articulations derived from different ontologies. As a result, there will be a hybrid maqasid 
understanding that is far from being authentic and distinct.  
Rejecting the static and reductionist understanding of maqasid, Ibn al-Qayyim explains the 
spirit of proactive maqasid through his identification of Shari’ah in the following momentous 
words (taken from Auda 2007:xxi): 
The Shari’ah is based on wisdom and achieving people’s welfare in this life and the afterlife. 
Shari’ah is all about justice, mercy, wisdom, and good. Thus, any ruling that replaces justice 
with injustice, mercy with its opposite, common good with mischief, or wisdom with 
nonsense, is a ruling that does not belong to the Shari’ah, even if it is claimed to be so 
according to some interpretation. 
In line with this elucidation, maqasid as the essential methodology of Islamic economics should 
be imbibed and moulded by the moral principles and values discussed above in order to sustain 
its proactive nature and applicability down the ages. 
While the two main deficiencies, fardiyyah and the lack of proactivity, should be dealt through the 
lens of proactive maqasid understanding, it should also be acknowledged that modern critiques to 
al-Ghazali claiming lack of universal objectives in his maqasid framework such as justice and 
freedom (Al-Ghazali 1996), socioeconomic reform, women rights, and abolishing slavery (Ibrahim 
2006), research and development (Kamali 2008), environment and poverty alleviation mostly 
overlook current inclusion of these elements into Ghazalian maqasid as absorbed and permeated 
through the theoretical foundations of his maqasid insight. Leaving aside the notion of justice that 
saliently connotes social dimension, other notions are, to a large extent, gathered into maqasid 
discourse by some reformist Muslim scholars with the aim of universalising the modern problems 
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of Western world. This is a major fallacy in terms of being adaptive and responsive such that 
specific problems that appeared in different formations of societies in the same timeframe has been 
transmitted into Muslim intellectual world with the same context and form.  
The concern is to judge predecessor Muslim scholars, with anachronistic reasoning, as if they 
neglected or omitted such imported issues in their theorisation. To give an example, environmental 
concerns from public policy aspect, when compared to the embracement of the term in the modern 
period, has not been emphasised in such a manner during the intellectual debates in the Muslim 
history, since both Muslim governors and philosophers dealt with the protection of environment 
under the broader theme of socioeconomic justice and equity. When environmental problems 
emerged in a particular society, then it used to be considered under the more general objective of 
establishing justice for future generations, as adl or justice relates to inter-and intra-generational 
justice (Naqvi 1994). Thus, coming back to the main debate, ‘thinking beyond the box’ entails an 
approach that transcends the ambit of conjectural considerations of maqasidi thinking; thereby 
maqasid has to be cleared from politically or economically biased conjectural and expediential 
expositions. However, it does not mean that such issues, which are free from bias, would not be 
located and evaluated within maqasid framework. 
Besides the two main deficiencies in al-Ghazali’s maqasid frame itself and the reformist Muslim 
scholars’ misinterpretation of the overall Ghazalian maqasid framework, hedging maqasid around 
the essential levels of traditional classification is another problematic that must be avoided. Ihsan, 
here, as this study essentialises, has a great impact on all three levels of necessities to realise 
maqasid in every sphere of life. Instead of hierarchically classifying maqasid as essentials 
(daruriyyat), exigencies or complementary (hajiyyat), and embellishments (tahsiniyyat), it should 
be considered as the complete process at the end of which real and eternal happiness is achieved in 
both individual and societal level, as Islamic process relates to ‘becoming process’52 permeates 
around ongoing development in every aspect including ihsan-oriented development, as Chapra 
(2008) suggests that reaching perfection is not possible in this world and therefore there always 
exists an ‘ongoing room for development’. Through this, ihsan makes everything embellished, as 
the term connotes, and this everlasting embellishment process is nestled, instituted and expanded 
across the society and does not stop with any satisfaction or fulfilment of basic needs.  
Islamic economics, in vitalising embellishment, should aim at developing structures to advance the 
degree of ihsan in every step of individual interaction with his surroundings (with other individuals, 
                                                        
52 See the debate on ‘becoming process’, Jing and de Ven (2016). 
 
 212  
environment, animals, machines, etc.). For instance, the invention of coffee machines that take 
place in every workplace all over the world is quite functional in terms of making life easier 
especially for those who always rush for their jobs or businesses. However, beyond being 
functional and efficient, the ihsani approach also essentialises the existence of embellishment and 
aestheticism in every sphere through making things ‘life-enhancing’. In this manner, the famous 
Japanese tea ceremony reflected the aesthetic and life-enhancing nature of Japanese culture, which 
coheres with the ihsan-based perspective. Likewise, the articulation of maqasid oriented thinking 
into institutional forms has to be expanded and scattered to the three levels of necessities in a 
holistic way without strict lines thereto, and transitivity of each level should be yielded easily within 
ihsan approach so that the ultimate objective can be achieved in an interacted manner. This will fit 
into the tawhidi methodology’s unitarity and complementarity expectation, as all these three level 
will be considered simultaneously important. 
4.5.2. Distinctive Features of the Proactive Maqasid Framework 
Based on the fundamental principle of proactivity, which entails an embedded and all-
embracing character in identifying and implementing the Shari’ah objectives, maqasid al-
Shari’ah as a discourse embraces some distinctive features through which authenticity, 
vividness and dynamism of Islamic developmentalism is realised. Owing to the systems 
approach, these distinct features can be demonstrated, together with comparing that of the 
stationary maqasid understanding, as in Figure 4.1: 
Figure 4.1: Proactive vs. Stationary Maqasid al-Shari’ah 
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As can be seen in Figure 4.1, each feature demarcates and sheds light on the scope and 
substance of the proactive maqasid framework. In doing so, complementarity between each 
feature provides interdependency such that the scantiness of some features in the framework 
fades the strength of maqasid. Multidimensionality, in this sense, requires the existence of 
holistic, multivalued and reconstructionist characters to function smoothly, as opposed to the 
poorness of one-dimensional explanations. Therefore, in the maqasid realm, it entails 
conflating the level of necessities, scope of the rulings and the level of universality 
simultaneously in its framework. In other words, the proactive maqasid approach should reflect 
the traditional classification characterised by an ihsan spirit and orientation as explained above 
and expand its scope to societal levels by eliminating the shortcoming posed by individuality, 
and also should capture universal objectives through which particular and specific maqasid can 
be derived. 
This perspective, explained with multidimensionality, requires expanding the horizon of 
maqasidi thinking by questing for different approaches and suggests pondering upon the 
possibility of more than one maqsid that are inherent in the related epistemological source. 
However, the general tendency in internalising maqasid into Islamic economics is towards 
adopting single evidence for the addressed issue by using maslahah in unsophisticated and 
pragmatic manner. By the same token, the binary character of the orthodox stationary maqasid 
understanding of contemporary times compels choosing between two contrasting alternatives, 
which are mostly the opposite far ends of two edges, such as fard (mandatory)/haram (unlawful), 
sahih (authentic)/fasid (invalid), salafi (traditionalist)/modernist, conservative/reformist and so 
on. However, multivalued aspect urges to go beyond the zero-sum logic or black/white approach 
by introducing some intermediate categories that bring flexibility and transitivity in realising 
maqasid. This problem, meanwhile, is not seen in the history of Islamic law since scholars in 
those periods introduced intermediate categories and developed authentic views by adopting 
multivalued dimension. In the case of IBF, maqasid al-Shari’ah should likewise consider 
financial operations by introducing multi-filters amongst which the compliance to the fiqhi 
rulings, namely negative screening, constitutes only one aspect. Ideally, one would expect to 
achieve this goal more likely in today’s post-modern world since deconstructionist adoption of 
post-modernism would reveal multivalued character in IBF; nevertheless, these approaches, 
when applied to Islamic law, still tend to content with one-dimensional and reductionist 
explanations. As a result, moral objectives within IBF are mostly neglected or mentioned in an 
eclectic way at best; therefore, compliancy process should also consider positive screening by 
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examining and internalising the consequences in the decision-making process in terms of 
achieving substantive morality. 
It is an overwhelming fact that deconstructionist approaches to Islamic law applied by post-
modernist Islamic scholars, contrary to the expectations, have deepened the divergence 
between fiqh and morality. More precisely, in search for maqasid of the rulings and past 
evidences, knowledge has been deconstructed in a right manner to crystalize the objectives, but 
deconstructed knowledge was decoupled from the original whole permanently and 
reconstructive stage has never been reached, as it was before witnessing or experiencing the 
process of disciplinisation of knowledge. However, the basic rationale for deconstructing 
knowledge is to grasp the unseen at first sight in the whole picture with the aim of 
reconstructing it at the end lest it deviates from the original. Realising maqasid, in the same 
vein, essentialises the complete process of deconstruction and reconstruction, as epitomized 
with the metaphor of drawing compass. 
In order to make the entire process of deconstruction and reconstruction acting in concert, holistic 
dimension plays an important role here – remembering the complementarity nature of each feature 
emerged from tawhid – since it reminds the very basic idea that deconstructed and disentangled 
segments cannot display the whole picture in their own right, but these segments rather give 
important expressions and understanding about it. Reductionist/partial or atomistic approach to 
Islamic law, in this sense, neglects the holistic dimension of maqasid al-Shari’ah, hence, it can 
never explain and link partial objective within the main objective due to relegating the entire 
process of deriving maqasid to the partial one.  
The idea of establishing IBF sector, in the same vein, should be considered under the holistic 
objective defined by Islamic economics. In other words, holistic approach explains IBF as an 
important component of Islamic economics that contributes to the realisation of the ultimate 
objectives of falah and ihsan, whereas reductionist approach treats IBF as a self-appointed and 
dis-located field that has its own objectives, which are subject to alter with the changing 
circumstances and not necessarily connected with the ultimate objectives. One of the reflections 
of the latter approach implicitly suggests dealing with IBF as an isolated field, which does not 
necessarily aim to realise social objectives, but rather has its own financial objectives such as the 
everlasting passion to grow its assets and operations and exhibiting similar functions with 
conventional banking through being an important part of the global financial sector. 
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As one of the essential features of proactive maqasid framework, purposefulness stands against the 
liberal notion of instrumentalism, as maqasid al-Shari’ah itself evokes a purposeful character 
beyond attaching an instrumental role to each dealing separately. Therefore, every step in fulfilling 
a particular objective creates interdependent purposes, in a holistic way, complementing one 
another, without considering any of them as an instrumental part. In articulating purposefulness 
into Islamic economics, it is essential to accommodate ‘substantive morality’ at the core of its 
theorisation, for the moral dimension must be embedded by its very nature of being a value-loaded 
system aiming to fulfil a particular objective. However, beyond purposefulness, instrumental 
approach to morality breeds the notion of ‘instrumental morality’, which basically functions to deal 
with things through instrumenting and eroding their essence. A good example of instrumental 
approach to moral dimension in Islamic economics can be given by the role of Shari’ah experts in 
IBF field. Accordingly, moral issues are considered only to be an instrument in the hands of 
Shari’ah experts who can decide on behalf of IBF customers about the compliance of a contract to 
the principles of divine knowledge. 
The purposefulness feature of maqasid al-Shari’ah accompanies with the tension between 
openness and conservativeness in approaching contemporary socioeconomic problems. As 
Muslim intellectuals face the challenges of establishing an authentic Muslim identity with its 
full characteristics in the postmodern world, two alternatives surface as a response to this 
situation. One of them is adopting a conservative approach while confronted with modern 
scientific knowledge and its secular institutions. This approach is unable to construct the 
Muslim worldview in contemporary times, but rather it yearns for the same social formation in 
prophetic times to prevail again in the modern world. The openness approach, however, 
recognizes existing conditions of Muslim world and aims to harmonise Islamic thought by 
proposing new ideas and establishing authentic institutions. In doing so, it adopts the 
aforementioned metaphor of drawing compass. Forming an authentic maqasid framework, 
hence, necessitates the inclusion of openness character in order to get rid of anachronistic 
expectations from the romanticised history and to allow for a dynamic and proactive thinking. 
One of the aspects of conservatist approach is related to literalist or textualist interpretations of 
divine sources, which limits the boundaries of maqasid provisioning and undermines the 
burgeoning of ijtihad process therein. As contrast to literalism, maqasid al-Shari’ah vitalises 
cognitive aspects of Islamic law by suggesting a distinction between revealed knowledge and its 
cognitive part that allows for re-functionalising ijtihad mechanism in contemporary times. 
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A teleology-causality debate reflects another important aspect of proactive maqasid al-Shari’ah 
framework. As mentioned before, modern scientific thinking experienced a serious shift from 
teleology to causality through the essentialisation of causal reasoning by introducing the cause-
and-effect dialect which entails causality as the central logic of thinking. Thus, teleological 
adoption in any theory was regarded as metaphysical and hence completely rejected.  
By acknowledging the distortions of causal positioning, maqasid al-Shari’ah suggests recourse 
to teleology by embedding ‘theologically’ defined developmentalist objectives. In this respect, 
modern scientific methodology that entails causal way of thinking has to be replaced with 
teleology, which explains a phenomenon with the function of its ‘purpose’. 
Lastly, proactivity suggests that the intentionalist limits of presenting maqasid conceptions can 
be overcome by introducing consequentialism. More precisely, intentionalist and 
consequentialist crosschecking simultaneously determines the framework of maqasid through 
establishing harmony between them as suggested by tawhidi methodological frame. In the case 
of IBF, the observed mimicry and hybridisation adopted by Islamic finance can be overcome 
whereby authenticity can be achieved through this crosschecking system, since form-based 
interpretation and evaluation of the practices of Islamic finance cannot go beyond intentionalist 
limits and fails once the consequentialist checking is applied. 
4.6. EMBEDDING MAQASID AL-SHARI’AH IN ISLAMIC FINANCE DECISION 
MAKING: AN ATTEMPT 
The discussion so far essentialises the importance of embedding maqasid al-Shari’ah into 
Islamic economics and finance decisions to yield a substantive morality-oriented outcome. This 
idea is expressed and articulated in Figure 4.2.  
As can be seen in Figure 4.2, IBF responds to the financing and banking needs of their Muslim 
customers through the available Islamic financing contracts. Shari’ah compliancy of products 
and the Islamic legitimacy of contracts are ensured by the Islamic sources in the form of 
Qur’an, Sunnah, Ijma, Qiyas and etc. IBF solutions are produced through such a Shari’ah 
filtering mechanism and the solution as part of the negative screening process has to fulfil the 
conditions or requirements of the Shari’ah compliancy process, which are identified in purple 
boxes in Figure 4.2.  
As the practice of IBF so far demonstrates, such an ‘intention’ oriented process is relegated to 
negative screening. However, maqasid al-Shari’ah does not consider ‘harm’ and ‘unlawful’ to 
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be sufficient criterion; thereby, it suggests that positive consequences should be produced in a 
proactive and dynamic manner to yield an outcome which can essentialise social and human 
development as well as economic development. Therefore, requirements have to reflect such 
positive screening to endogenise IME compliance through evaluating the consequences of the 
process with the objective of ensuring that the consequence is ‘morally Shari’ah compliant’ 
beyond fiqhi compliance. In other words, the ‘green’ box in the right-hand side bottom corner 
of Figure 4.2 should be considered as a substantivist condition in the form of moral and 
developmentalist requirement. In order to produce morally acceptable ‘consequences’ through 
endogenising or embedding process of left-hand side green box, there is a need for moral 
screening process along with fiqhi screening process. Therefore, product development and 
operations related decisions at the IBF has to endogenise the green box located at the top right 
hand-side of Figure 4.2 as part of the larger Shari’ah compliance beyond fiqhi compliance. 
This will ensure tawhidi methodology of intention and consequences to complement each other 
to yield unitarity and a full Shari’ah compliance. 
The product development process in the Islamic finance industry, if pursued by applying 
positive and negative screening processes under fiqhi and moral expectations, should respond 
to and override form-substance, or Shari’ah-compliant vs. Shari’ah-based debates (see: Abbas 
2015). However, in practice, the endogenisation of moral screening into the newly developed 
Islamic financial products is never questioned due to the common belief that ‘fiqh by definition 
embraces morality’. The counter argument and evidence can be simply asserted here that 
morality may not be embedded in the process even though fiqhi requirements are fulfilled, as 
some forms of sukuk, tawarruq and murabahah financing bring the moral failure to the light. 
To further reflect on this, we can think of an Islamic bank, which had previously been operated 
as conventional bank and well-appreciated with its agricultural financing. However, later, it 
has expanded its operation as commercial bank not limited itself in agricultural finance until 
its transformation into Islamic bank. A farmer, who produces wheat in his land, comes to this 
Islamic bank and askes for salam contract. The bank rejects him due mainly to the potential 
risks embedded in the salam contract and the profitability of other forms of contracts that are 
relatively less risky. The farmer, then, has to go to a conventional bank unwillingly and ask for 
interest-based loan as they do not have any alternative financing option. After the credit is used 
for bearing the costs including the cultivation of land and buying the seed, the farmer harvests 
the crops and sells them in the market. Then, the farmer gets money and initially pays back the 
credit with its interest. The rest of money in his hand, then, is deposited in the deposit account 
in the Islamic bank that rejected his application for salam contract-based financing. Not limited 
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with this, other farmers follow the same process with the Islamic bank. Such accumulated 
deposits of these farmers in the Islamic bank, then is pooled in its main branches in big cities 
and used in minimum risky financial contracts such as murabahah, tawarruq and sukuk with 
bigger businesses or consumer durables financing.  
The entire process, in consequence, has no objections with Shari’ah compliancy, but stands at 
odds with moral screening, as it is expected that an agricultural oriented Islamic bank should 
serve the financing needs of its main constituents, namely the farmers. While the farmers’ main 
financing expectation is not fulfilled, their deposits in their Islamic bank are then used to 
finance bigger and larger businesses resulting into a transfer of economic power in the interest 
of the wealthier despite the farmers religiously oriented behaviour. This example evidences 
how Islamic banks can produce morally deficient outcomes by conforming to Islamic legal 
requirements. Thus, the developed maqasid al-Shari’ah framework is essential for Islamic 
financial decision making. 
Based on these experiences, the model developed in Figure 4.2 suggests a reconsideration of 
the existing pattern applied not just product development but also the established institutions 
together with their working system. Accordingly, it goes beyond stationary perspectives on 
enhancing Islamic financial area and develops a proactive maqasidi framework to be applied 
for the theory making of Islamic economics and practical implications of Islamic finance on 
the basis of removing fiqh-morality dilemma by suggesting morally driven and fiqhi compliant 
knowledge articulations. 
The historical origins of such a decision-making process rendered in Figure 4.2 can be found 
in various institutional examples in the Muslim lands in different eras of history. The 
institutions of hisbah and ahilik, for instance, were established to address particular needs of 
society with the harmonisation of morality and fiqh. Hisbah institution, in this manner, takes 
account of intentionist and consequentialist implications of market system; thereby, market is 
regulated to forestall unjust operations, which may cause monopolistic or oligopolistic power 
structures within market system. Therefore, the Shari’ah filtering mechanism, there, was 
applied to produce and ensure social justice in the overall economy and society. 
The attempt with the depiction of Figure 4.2, in brief, aims to recall the old wisdom of maqasid-
based knowledge creation methodology that should be applied in the entire economic system 
including financial sphere so that social justice expands and can be articulated into societal and 
economic institutions in an embedded manner.  
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4.7. CONCLUSION 
Establishing authentic institutions to redesign prevailing social formation of a society is not a 
fledgling phenomenon peculiar to post-modern era. Contrarily, every society somehow has faced 
the challenge of finding out the ways to embed shared norms, values and principles into its social, 
economic and political institutions. The idea of Islamic economics is such an attempt that was 
emerged in the post-modern atmosphere with an aim of establishing economic institutions, which 
are subordinated to the whole objective of achieving a good life (hayat tayyibah) from an Islamic 
perspective (Arif 1985). Succeeded or not, the experience with and discussions under Islamic 
economics and finance ascertained that the initial concern with theory making should be on 
methodological issues, for knowledge can only be authenticated through a rigorous methodology, 
which has been the main underlying shortcomings of Islamic economics and finance related studies 
and practices. 
In search for addressing methodological dimension, despite being mentioned often in everyday 
practice, maqasid al-Shari’ah has almost been neglected beyond paying ‘lip-service’ in Islamic 
economics and finance literature, although it has great potential to function as an essential 
methodology. Instead, it was made subservient to a justification mechanism maintained with 
Islamic finance sector. Controversial and disputable issues within the sector have been resolved 
through a symbolical use of maqasid and maslahah, thereby Islamic finance has displayed a 
smooth parallel with mainstream financial progress. It is not surprising, in this regard, that 
maqasid perceptions of governments, Shari’ah scholars and some academics favouring self-
regulated market economy system are all homogenous through the prevailing form-based 
understanding with the neglect of substance. Therefore, an economic system which is conceived 
to reflect Islamic notions but in fact not much different than capitalist framework can only 
reveal a form-based understanding bounded with methodological individualism, and hence 
fails to go beyond concerning utility maximisation, essentialisation of price mechanism, market 
exchange and efficient use of resources. However, proactive maqasid understanding removes 
such a dilemma by channelling both form and substance in the service of social good in a 
harmonious way. 
With the recognition of failed attempts of instrumentality and eclecticism in maqasid, it is of 
special importance that theoretical grounds of Islamic economics should be re-examined in light 
of the proactive maqasid al-Shari’ah framework with its dimensions expanding the horizons of 
established understanding. In doing so, the flourishing of Islamic developmentalism in post-
colonial Muslim nations would have been possible, since proactive maqasid envisages a totally  
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Figure 4.2: The Decision-Making Process in Islamic Banking and Finance 
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endogenised methodology and approach towards developmentalist considerations when 
compared to existing applications of maqasid based on methodological individualism.  
Morality plays a pivotal role on the entire process of knowledge authentication through maqasid 
al-Shari’ah, while the current use of maqasid in IBF demonstrates that it has been relegated to fiqhi 
injunctions and used as an instrument to legalise particular product and operation in a legalistically 
rational manner. This runs against the expectation that maqasid al-Shari’ah should constitute the 
essential base of methodology for IME, as deductive reasoning based on Islamic ontology and also 
historical practice suggests that we should constitute IME beyond the narrowly defined Islamic 
economics as latter refers to fiqh, while the former is constituted through essential and pro-active 
maqasid. Thus, substantive morality should be embedded through maqasid in the theoretical 
underpinnings of Islamic economics to generate IME to fit into maqasid expectations as a distinct 
system of economics, so that maqasid objective of ‘whatever is done should be essentialising and 
in accordance with human well-being’ can be achieved. This requires interpersonal and social 
relations not to be merely relegated to economic relations, but economics and finance should be 
embedded by the norms and values of society through locating ethico-economic relationship across 
each system so that morality would be articulated beyond impersonal market environment. Thus, 
maqasid or essentialisation of human well-being in economic and financial activities takes place 
by motivating economic forces for economic, social and human development, which constitutes a 
base for the articulations of economic and financial choices to be linked to their ‘consequences’ 
beyond mere ‘intentions’. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION: AN INTERPRETATIVE ATTEMPT  
 
 
5. 1. SUMMARY  
The idea of Islamic economics emerged and developed as a response to post-colonial redesign 
of world political economy with the objective of constructing an authentic economic system 
based on Islamic values system and normative world. It is expected that such a paradigm would 
extinguish inferior situation of Muslim world and pave the way for social and economic 
development. The emphasis on the notion of development stems from the fact that Islamic 
economics has always envisaged establishing social justice and social good through 
developmentalist perspective. Thus, by nature, it should generate development-based policies 
and institutions. Nevertheless, it is hard to claim that Islamic economics has successfully 
articulated developmentalism during the last few decades and hence failed to become an 
ambitious alternative to mainstream economic understanding by achieving paradigmatic 
change through its ontological and epistemological distinctiveness. 
Considering the historical experience with the diffusion and expansion of Islamic finance, this 
study aimed at gaining a new insight on the idea of Islamic economics, its development 
throughout the last few decades and challenges in realising its aspirations. For this, first, it was 
important to revisit and examine developmentalist promises of Islamic economics, which was 
one of the main thrusts in the emergence phase, and the extent of its implementation in the 
policy level. By doing so, it is possible to see the extend by which the practices diverged from 
the developmentalist aspirations.  
Acknowledging that Islamic finance is the sole institutional articulation emerged from the 
theoretical base, empirical evaluation of Islamic banks’ performances is a meaningful attempt 
to examine the divergence. As we assume, the divergence is serious and leads to observed 
social and developmentalist failure, in the second stage, it is worth to shed light on the failure 
of Islamic finance project from the perspective of financialisation, since the failure roots in, to 
a large extent, the adopted ‘financial logic’ borrowed from mainstream economics whereby the 
utmost importance is given to financial sector to take place and substantialise at the core of 
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economic activities. Lastly, this study argued that developmentalist failure and the resulting 
financialisation mainly stem from the lack of a proactive methodology that can be applied over 
theorisation of Islamic economics. It is therefore suggested that maqasid al-Shari’ah must be 
incorporated into the theory making of Islamic economics as a proactive methodology so that 
Islamic finance and banking practice can also articulate such values and outcomes. 
5.2. WHITHERING AWAY ISLAMIC FINANCE OR A NEW FORM BASED ON OLD 
NORMS: A DISCURSIVE DISCUSSION  
The entire debate on the relationship between finance and growth –together with the 
contributions of empirical studies aiming to explore the nature of this nexus- has dramatically 
shown up two important inferences as to how Western economic orthodoxy approaches human 
wellbeing, growth and development issues particularly in a world where finance is drastically 
being disembedded from economy and from the objectives of society. The first inference 
pertains to the incontestable prevalence of the concept of growth against development in the 
whole theoretical discussions and empirical studies such that almost every discursive study and 
quantitatively empirical research refer to growth in order to elucidate the impact of finance-
related institutional and non-institutional effects on individual, society and economy.  
In a similar vein, the second inference urges upon the evolvement of economies into a heavy 
financialisation pattern, which necessarily accompanies with a substantial change in the goal 
of economic activities. This approach argues that finance is no longer considered to be a tool 
for improving individual’s capabilities and functions through enhancing economic 
performance, but rather the aim with financialisation process is to employ an opportunity space, 
independent from the objectives above, where various incumbents, pressure groups and rent 
seekers aim to financiate and commodificate values and ‘things’ through various financial 
institutions (multinational companies, stock markets, banks and etc.) and instruments, thereby 
these can be sold in the market as a commodity which allows for the interest groups to make 
private gains from them. 
Through comprehension of the great divergence between economy and finance, it becomes 
more understandable why financial development and its impacts on socioeconomic life are 
narrowly dealt, by mainstream economists with such indicators of capital, savings, investment, 
technology and so on. These indicators incommensurately show one side of the coin, which 
explains finance-based economic growth models neglecting social, political and cultural 
dimensions of economic activities. A distinction between growth and development, hence, does 
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not make any sense from the conventional point of view when considering the effects of finance 
on different aspects of social life. The only concern is the growth of investment activities and 
the proliferation of capital as reflected through the idea of ‘capital fundamentalism’ (King and 
Levine 1994), so that finance would become more widespread all over the world, which 
consecutively leads to spurn developmentalist aims of economic activities. 
Beyond growth orientedness, development transcends economic considerations and stimulates 
a substantial change in the existing functioning of economic, social, legal and political 
institutions. Thus, development can be defined as a continuous process which paves the way 
for an equilibrium amongst improvements in different structures (social, economic, political, 
cultural and etc.) through the embedment of morality at the core of whole development agenda, 
so that any potential of a contradictory situation between these structures is nipped in the bud 
by the moral mechanism. This approach necessitates that financial structure of an economy 
should be substantiated with developmentalist perspective, which also reflects the aspirations 
of Islamic developmentalism, as rububiyah and tazkiyah concepts essentialise development as 
a core objective within emancipation and empowerment dimensions of Islam. Thus, finance-
development nexus, which is essential to be explored from this point of view, has not been 
undertaken neither in conventional nor in heterodox economic systems in a systematic manner 
yet. What have already been studied in the entire literature is finance-growth nexus as response 
to the basic question about the role of finance on the development of human, society and 
economy; therefore, hardly any study has attempted to ‘go beyond the box’ in delving into 
‘finance-development nexus’, which, hence, created a significant gap in the mentioned 
literature.  
This study uncovered that Islamic finance industry has experienced a similar transformation in 
its objectives through the influences of conventional theoretical underpinnings and practices of 
financing, although the emergence and existence of Islamic finance initially relates to 
‘developmentalist’ objectives and ‘substantive morality’ of Islamic moral economy as 
advanced, in a modern meaning, since 1960s. This argument is evidenced empirically (in the 
Chapter 2) by examining the relationship between Islamic banking and economic development. 
Accordingly, the results show that Islamic banking fails to demonstrate positive impact on 
economic development, thereby implying a poor performance in terms of contributing to 
developmentalist trajectories of the sampled countries, albeit in the imagination of founding 
fathers, Islamic economics has envisaged and institutionalised Islamic banking to serve for 
both financial and social development in a harmony as tazkiyah axiom suggests. As Islamic 
finance could not fulfil such an objective due to the gradual convergence towards mainstream 
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finance, it is concluded that as long as Islamic finance mimics the conventional financialisation 
trend, empirical studies that examine Islamic banking-development nexus would not have any 
word other than stating the failure and evidencing this through different estimation models. 
This study, therefore, fills this gap by incorporating Islamic developmentalism into the debate 
within expanding and growing Islamic finance. By the same token, it suggests a re-examination 
of the role of Islamic finance on economic, social, legal and political structures through 
breaking ‘finance-growth link’ and offering a ‘finance-development relationship’ by 
considering ‘financing’ as part of embeddedness. In doing so, this study argues that financial 
sphere can evade the dominance of capital fundamentalism by considering its position as an 
instrument to contribute to social good rather than as an end itself. However, what neoclassical 
economics dictates is the superiority of capital against other factors of production such as 
labour, land and natural environment. Conventional finance, in this sense, is designed to serve 
for the proliferation of capital by creating tension with other stakeholders; thereby, financial 
process can be maintained for the accumulation of capital and profit maximisation of those 
who maintain capital-intensive investment activities through fictitious commodities. The 
superiority, in consequence, culminates in the absolute predominance of capital such that 
individual and social life, factors of production and economic relations all are subordinated to 
the hegemony of capital with the negligence of developmental outcomes as an objective to 
accomplish in the policy level. 
Islamic economics movement, in contrast to this, aims to decentre the hegemony of capital by 
rescuing human well-being, land, labour, capital, extended stakeholders and the resulting social 
formation through giving equal shares and responsibilities for each constituent so that a 
harmonious growth amongst different stakeholders occurs and develops towards their 
perfection as suggested by tawhid, rububiyah, tazkiyah, adalah and ihsan axiom. This 
understanding is also reflected in the financial sphere, as the principle of the prohibition of 
interest is nothing but the rule against the domination of capital in terms of unfair return of 
capital leading to preserve each stakeholder’s right in the production process and financial area. 
However, as opposed to such an imagination, in the current practice, Islamic finance is 
criticised on the ground that it invariably favours capital domination within Islamic banks as 
evidenced in its operational areas including modes of finance, sectorial distribution of 
financing, and governance structure. For this reason, Islamic banks has never brought about 
momentous changes in development trajectories of countries wherein they keep operating. 
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Islamic banks, for instance, intensify their financing modes on fictitious products that resemble 
conventional financial transactions such as the case with organised tawarruq, which is 
considered to be both un-lawful and immoral as the fatwa of International Fiqh Academy of 
OIC states; however, organised tawarruq practised by Islamic banks under market pressure 
and capital efficiency. In a similar manner, in the corporate level, Islamic banks’ shareholder 
value-oriented governance structure is at odds with the ideal Islamic corporate governance, as 
the statistical records measured for shareholder value orientation evidence. These examples 
blatantly demonstrate that market system and price mechanism push its own self-regulated 
nature on Islamic finance and shape its current and future practices to remain with the capital-
oriented activities of finance capitalism whereby it gains global recognition. More broadly, 
Islamic finance is kept within the boundaries of old norms shaped by capital predominance, 
and hence it is not allowed to constitute an alternative to the prevailing financial system by 
submitting to the established capital forms and norms rather than re-defining capital as Islamic 
economics suggests. 
This research expands the scope of non-developmental expansion of Islamic finance and its 
capital fundamentalism through the introduction of the notion of Islamic financialisation, 
which has barely been associated in the literature of Islamic economics due to an unwitting 
negligence of the term by practitioners and theoreticians. It is, therefore, argued that the social 
failure roots in, to a large extent, the adopted financial logic borrowed from mainstream 
economics whereby the utmost importance is given to financial sector to take place and 
substantialise at the core of economic activities.  
In the meantime, the scope of failure is controversially multifaceted; however, this study 
identifies it with the Polanyian notion of embeddedness. The emergence of Islamic 
financialisation should, accordingly, be understood as an attempt of disembedding shared 
norms, values and beliefs from economic realm that eventually leads up to create a self-
regulated and standalone sector of Islamic finance, which in return, paves the way for 
commodifying social relations that no longer embraces its traditional role of sharing and 
participatory economy, but rather replaces with transactions under the whole objective of 
efficiency. As in the case of financialisation in advanced economies where financial markets 
dominate entire economic system with the pursuit of generating profit at the expense of 
engendering social inequality and distributional problems, Islamic financialisation, far from 
conceiving developmentalist outcomes, helps creating a sort of financialised commercial 
society within Muslim domain. The disenchantment with Islamic finance is, hence, pertain to 
such a process of disembeddedness. 
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Ideally speaking, Islamic finance should have emerged as a bottom-up demand from society, 
as parallel to the model developed by Portes (2010), to meet financial needs of individuals 
under a simple but functional role of ‘financing’ vis-à-vis a self-proclaimed ‘finance’ 
understanding constructed by mainstream economics. Nevertheless, it could not position itself 
within a moral economy or to emerge as a system understanding and has always targeted to 
shine out as an alternative market segment within global financial system. The gradual process 
of diverging from moral economy perspective is elucidated through historical facts and 
conditions of Muslim world surrounded by a new regulation of world financial system in the 
post-war period. In this sense, Islamic banks borrowed the existing regulations and standards 
of mainstream financial system to apply over their banking system such as (LIBOR, Basel III, 
etc.); thereby, it was implicitly accepted that the challenges in legal issues, risk natures and 
operational model can be resolved through conventional prescriptions. 
This research associates the elaborated challenges and failures of Islamic finance with 
methodological obscurity in defining the objectives of Islamic economics. In other words, both 
developmentalist failure of Islamic finance and the financialisation process ascertained that the 
initial concern with theory making should be on methodological issues, for knowledge can only 
be authenticated through a rigorous methodology. In search for addressing methodological 
dimension, despite being mentioned often in everyday practice, maqasid al-Shari’ah has 
almost been neglected in Islamic economics literature, although it has great potential to 
function as an essential methodology. Instead, it was made subservient to a justification 
mechanism maintained with Islamic finance sector. Controversial and disputable issues within 
the sector have been resolved through a symbolic use of maqasid al-Shari’ah and maslahah 
(public interest); thereby, Islamic finance would display a smooth parallel with mainstream 
financial progress. It is not surprising, in this regard, that maqasid perceptions of governments, 
Shari’ah scholars and some academics favouring self-regulated market economy system are 
all homogenous through the prevalence of form-based understanding with the neglect of 
substance.  Therefore, an economic system which is conceived to reflect Islamic notions but in 
fact not much different than capitalist framework can only reveal a form-based understanding 
bounded with methodological individualism, and hence fails to go beyond concerning utility 
maximisation, essentialisation of price mechanism, market exchange and efficient use of 
resources. However, proactive maqasid understanding removes such a dilemma by channelling 
both form and substance in the service of social good in a harmonious way. 
Beyond instrumental and eclectic approaches, theoretical grounds of Islamic economics should 
be re-examined in light of the proactive maqasid al-Shari’ah framework. By doing so, the 
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rationale behind the failure of realising Islamic developmentalism in post-colonial Muslim 
nations can better be explained, since proactive maqasid envisages an authentic methodology 
and approach towards developmentalist considerations when compared to existing applications 
of maqasid based on methodological individualism.  
It should be re-iterated that morality plays a central role on the entire process of knowledge 
authentication through maqasid al-Shari’ah, while the current use of maqasid in Islamic 
banking and finance demonstrates that it has been relegated to fiqhi injunctions and used as an 
instrument to legalize particular product and operation in a legalistically rational manner. This 
runs against the expectation that maqasid al-Shari’ah should constitute the essential base of 
methodology for Islamic moral economy, as deductive reasoning based on Islamic ontology 
and also historical practice suggests that we should constitute Islamic moral economy beyond 
the narrowly defined Islamic economics as latter refers to fiqh, while the former is constituted 
through essential and pro-active maqasid. Thus, substantive morality should be embedded 
through maqasid in the theoretical underpinnings of Islamic economics to generate Islamic 
moral economy to fit into pro-active maqasid expectations as a distinct system of economics, 
so that maqasid objective of ‘whatever is done should be in the interest of human well-being 
and social welfare’ can be achieved; otherwise shareholding understanding will not produce 
the structured social good or ihsan as maqasid requires stakeholding based operational form 
and such a political economy. This requires interpersonal and social relations not to be merely 
relegated to economic relations, but economics and finance should be embedded into norms 
and values of society through locating ethico-economic relationship across each system so that 
morality can be articulated beyond impersonal market environment. Thus, maqasid or 
essentialisation of human well-being and social welfare in economic and financial activities 
takes place by motivating economic forces for economic and human development, which 
constitutes a base for the articulations of economic and financial choices to be linked to their 
‘consequences’ beyond mere ‘intentionalism’. 
5.3. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Despite this research aims to develop a new political economy discourse on the idea of Islamic 
economics and the historical rise of Islamic finance with a trilateral study concentrating on the 
notions of development, financialisation and maqasid methodology, it has some limitations 
that need to be addressed.  
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The first limitation is related to the empirical parts conducted in the first two studies. While 
Islamic development and financialisation are critically approached in a discursive manner, 
empirical examination of these two topics requires measurable forms of knowledge. Therefore, 
a thoroughly developed discursive analysis has to meet the challenge of its expression in 
quantifiable form with equal thoroughness. Acknowledging the limited data pool in different 
sources and its availability only for developed countries, it becomes a striving task to locate 
the best indicators for our selected variables and country data. In our case, for instance, Islamic 
concept of development was expressed in human development index as an indicator of Islamic 
developmentalism, although it has many limitations as elaborated in the relevant section in 
Chapter 2.  
In addition to the measurement problem, data availability constitutes another aspect of the 
limitations of empirical analysis. Although mentioned many times in different studies, the 
unavailability of required data is of special importance for the empirical studies on Islamic 
banking and finance. Together with the country specific problems on data access (e.g. due to 
their non-professionalism on disclosure issues), there is no proper database yet, to the best of 
our knowledge, specialised on Islamic banking industry except some naïve attempts or popular 
databases with simple indicators of Islamic banks. Thus, data collection process takes much 
time, if there is, as each country specific data has to be picked out separately from their 
websites. 
Another limitation of this research stems from the lack of research in the newly introduced 
notions of Islamic financialisation, proactive maqasid methodology and Polanyian or moral 
economy perspective towards Islamic finance. Although it shows the authenticity and 
originality of this research, the limitation is about the limited level of references used in this 
research and hence made potential comparison with alternative thoughts difficult while it may 
have contributed to the originality. 
Despite our reservations on the shortcomings of statistical methods used in performance 
measurements, future research may consider constructing an authentic index for Islamic 
development for evaluating performances of Islamic banks; thereby, the results would better 
reflect to what extent Islamic banking sector make contributions to development trajectories of 
countries. In addition, future research can be developed on the dimensions of maqasid al-
Shari’ah as the methodology of Islamic economics and policy-level outcomes would 
accordingly be suggested for Islamic banks in the light of maqasid understanding. Lastly, the 
conceptualisation of Islamic financialisation can be further developed through expanding its 
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dimensions on different spheres of everyday life. Potential indicators can be constructed 
amongst Islamic finance industry outlook for this end. 
5.4. EPILOGUE 
This research aimed at gaining a new insight on the emergence and development of Islamic 
economics and finance based on the challenges in realising its aspirations within Islamic 
political economy understanding. In doing so, it empirically examined development and 
financial performance of Islamic banks to shed light on their potential contributions to the 
development trajectories of the sampled countries. With the recognition of social failure, this 
research approached the development and social failure of Islamic finance project from the 
perspective of financialisation, since the failure, to a large extent, can be explained in the 
adopted financial logic borrowed from mainstream economics and market economy. Lastly, it 
is argued that developmentalist failure and the resulting financialisation mainly stem from the 
lack of a methodological dimension that must be applied over theorisation of Islamic 
economics. In this manner, this research constructed an extended proactive maqasid framework 
to be incorporated into the theory making of Islamic economics. In conclusion, as the discursive 
and empirical analyses in each of the preceding chapter demonstrate, this research has fulfilled 
both its main aim identified in Chapter 1 and the aims of each essays. 
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Table A.2.1: Banking Sector Development and Economic Growth 
Study Sample Method Key Findings 
Goldsmith (1969) Cross section of 35 
countries (19 developed 
and 16 less developed) 
from 1860-1963 
OLS and graphical analysis A clear relationship between financial intermediation and economic 
growth, but the correlation coefficient is weak for developed countries 
King and Levine 
(1993) 
Pooled cross section of 80 
countries over the 1960-
1989 period 
Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) 
Total factor productivity, capital accumulation and real per capita GDP 
have strong association with the defined indicators of financial 
development, which then supports the Schumpeter’s ideas that finance 
is a key for growth 
Demetriades and 
Liuntel (1996) 
Annual observations for 
India 
from 1961 to 1991 
Error-correction model 
(ECM), exogeneity tests and 
principal component analysis 
(PCA) 
Based on the findings it is evidenced that financial development and 
growth are jointly determined. Controlling banking sector undermines 
the process of financial development through inhibiting financial 
deepening 
Odedokun (1996) Times series of 71 
developing countries over 
varying periods between 
the1960s and 1980s 
OLS Financial intermediation has substantial role over growth and it 
promotes economic growth in roughly 85% of the countries 
Rousseau and 
Wachtel (1998) 
Historical evidence from 5 
industrialised countries (the 
USA, the UK, Canada, 
Vector error correction and 
vector auto regression model 
Generally, financial factors accelerate industrialisation process of these 
countries significantly. The activities of real sector are, on the other 















Annual data of 30 
developing and developed 
countries for the period 
1980–1991 
OLS The study shows that large banking sector within the existence of 
efficient legal systems and active stock markets easily provides 
external funds for firms, which, in turn, facilitates firm’s growth. 
Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) 
41 countries with industry-
level data for the period 
1980–1990 
OLS and panel data fixed 
effects 
The results show that industries with a high reliance on external 
finance develop more within their improved financial intermediation 
institutions. External finance, here, enables rapid growing firms 
through easing capital flow. 
Levine (1998) Annual data for 42 
countries covering the 
period 1976–1993 
OLS and generalised method 
of moments (GMM) 
Similar to the study of Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), this 
study finds that if banking sector is supported by strong legal systems, 
it contributes to GDP growth in a faster pattern. 
Harrison, Sussman, 
and Zeira (1999) 
US state level data from 
1965-1995 
Granger causality and two 
stage regressions models 
There is a significant negative relationship between the cost of 
financial intermediation and economic development; 
Ram (1999) Annual data for 95 
countries over the period 
1960–1989 
OLS The results show that the correlation between financial development 
and economic growth in these countries are found to be negligible. 
Even regression analysis on each individual country gives similar 
results. 
Xu (2000) Annual data for 41 
countries over the period 
1960–1993 
VARs and impulse response 
analyses (IRA) 
The results evidences that finance plays a key role for growth through 
channelling investment. In specific, 27 countries out of 41 have 













41 countries of which 36 
industries are all selected 
from the manufacturing 
sector between 1980 and 
1990. 
OLS The empirical evidence indicates that bank concentration has a first-
order negative effect on growth. However, it is also found that sectors 
that are more dependent on external finance enjoy a beneficial effect 
from a concentrated banking sector. 
Beck and Levine 
(2002) 
Annual data from 1980 to 
1990 on a panel of 42 
countries and 36 
manufacturing industries 
OLS and Two Stage Least 
Squares (TSLS) 
Consistent with the findings of the work of Rajan and Zingales (1998), 
this study results that more advanced countries within sound legal 
systems perform fast economic grow through enjoying external 
finance. However, bank based or market based financial system does 
not seem to matter for growth. 
Thangavelu and 
Ang (2004) 
Quarterly data for Australia 
from 1960Q1 to 1999Q4 
VARs and Granger 
causality 
Financial development indicators pertaining to financial intermediaries 
suggest that banking sector reacts to the demand created by economic 
development. Hence, a reverse causality runs from growth to finance. 
Furthermore, the study is in consistence with the Schumpetarian line 
that stock markets are vital in promoting economic growth. 
McCaig and 
Stengos (2005) 
Annual data for 71 
countries from 1960 to 
1995 
GMM The study indicates that if private domestic credit or liquid liabilities is 
used as the measure of financial development, positive effect of 
finance on growth is seen strong. However, if the ratio of commercial 
bank assets to central bank assets is used as the indicator of financial 










Ang (2009) Annual data for Malaysia 
from 1965 to 2004 
VECM, Johansen 
cointegration, Granger 
causality and PCA 
The study examines the FDI-growth nexus in Malaysia by controlling 
for the level of financial development. Financial development is 
measured by a composite index, which is a summary measure of four 
financial development indicators. The results show that FDI and 
financial development are positively related to output in the long run. 




Bank-specific data in Egypt 
during 1992 2007 
The conjectural variation 
(CV), The seemingly 
unrelated 
regression (SUR)  
The results show that financial reforms lead to competitiveness and 
production efficiency of banking sector, which, in turn, yields robust 
economic growth. The study suggests a significant relationship 
between financial bank productive efficiency and economic growth in 
the short run but not in the long run. 
Morck, Yavuz, and 
Yeung (2011) 
2001 global sample of 244 
banks that Caprio, Laeven, 
and Levine (2007) used in 
their studies 
OLS The study concludes that less efficient capital allocation is observed in 
countries whose banking systems are more thoroughly controlled by 
tycoons or families. The magnitude of this effect is similar to that of 
state control over banking industry. Unlike state control, tycoon or 
family control also correlates with slower economic and productivity 
growth, greater financial instability, and worse income inequality. 
Samila and 
Sorenson (2011) 
An unbalanced panel 
covering all 329 
Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas (MSAs) in the United 
States from 1993 to 2002. 
Fixed-effects IV estimates It is found that increases in the supply of venture capital positively 
affect firm starts, employment, and aggregate income. The findings 
are quite consistent with the notion that an expansion in financial 











Chen, Lee, and Lee 
(2012) 
Panel data for a maximum 
of 60 countries covering the 
period 1976–2005 
OLS The article investigates the effect of life insurance on economic 
growth and what conditions affect the insurance-growth nexus. The 
main findings confirm the positive impact of the development of the 
life insurance market on economic growth. 
Beck, Georgiadis, 
and Straub (2014) 
Panel data of 132 countries 
for the period between 1980 
and 2005. 
GMM We find that an expansion of credit has a positive effect on per capita 
output growth only up to a point. Beyond this threshold the impact of 
finance on growth is not statistically significant anymore. 
Cheng, Ho, and 
Hou (2014) 
Annual data from 15 
industrial and 15 emerging 
countries over the period 
from 1976 to 2005 
Pooled mean group 
estimation 
The results suggest that banking development and stock market 
development may have distinct short-and long-run impacts on 
economic growth at various stages of country development. Financial 
development is not always a panacea for economic growth. Most 
importantly, the findings suggest that the fully functional tools to 





A panel of 52 middle 
income countries over the 
1980–2008 period 
Pooled mean group 
estimations 
There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between finance and 
growth in the long run. In the short run, the relationship is 
insignificant. This suggests that too much finance can exert a negative 












Table A.2.2: Causality between Finance and Economic Growth 
Study Sample Method Key Findings 
Gupta (1984) Quarterly time series data 
from 1961Q1 to 1980Q4 
for 14 developing 
countries 
Vector autoregression 
models (VARs) and 
Granger causality 
The results showed that finance leads growth with causality running from 
financial systems to economic sector. Although a case may be argued for a 
reverse causality, there is weak evidence for two-way causality. 
Jung (1986) Times series of 56 
countries from 1950-1980 
VARs and Granger 
causality 
Less developed countries perform a causal relationship which runs from 
financial development to economic growth, but developed countries are 
observed to have a reverse causal pattern. 
Demetriades and 
Hussein (1996) 
Annual data for 16 








and Granger causality 
The causality test results depict weak evidence about finance leading to 
growth, but rather the relationship has a bidirectional pattern where growth 
and finance are jointly determined. 
Neusser and Kugler 
(1998) 
Annual data for 13 OECD 








Through using financial sector GDP and manufacturing GDP as proxies for 
financial development and economic growth, respectively, the causality test 











Luintel and Khan 
(1999) 
10 developing countries 
from 1951-1995 
Multivariate vector auto 
regression model 
There is a bi-directional causality between financial and real sector for all 
countries. 
Calderon and Liu 
(2003) 
Pooled data of 109 
developing and industrial 
countries from 1960 to 
1994 
Panel VAR, Geweke 
decomposition and 
Granger causality 
The empirical evidence indicates a bidirectional causality between financial 
development and economic growth. Finance functions more properly in 
developing countries. Bu generally, it fosters growth through channels of 
capital accumulation and productivity growth. 
Christopoulos and 
Tsionas (2004) 
Annual data for 10 
developing countries, 
from 1970 to 2000 
Panel VECM, panel 
cointegration, threshold 
cointegration and fully 
modified OLS 
The evidence indicates a long-run equilibrium relationship between financial 
development and economic growth. The long-run causality runs from 





Panel data of 74 countries 
for the period 1961–1995 
Semiparametric partial 
linear model 
This study finds that finance–growth nexus appears to be nonlinear when the 
nonlinearities between economic growth and initial per capita income are not 
taken into account. However, when these nonlinearities are neglected the 
relationship can only appear to be linear. 
Handa and Khan 
(2008) 
Time series data on a 
cross-section of 
13 countries from 1960 to 
2002 
Cointegration analysis 
and Granger causality 
The results show that for Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Brazil, Malaysia, Thailand 
and Turkey, causality runs from economic growth to financial development. 
Granger-causality is bi-directional for India, Argentina, Germany, Japan, the 
UK and the USA. There does not exist one-way Granger-causality from 
financial development to economic development for any of the countries 
examined. 
Hassan, Sanchez, 
and Yu (2011) 





There is a two-way causal relationship between finance and growth for most 











Kar, Nazlioglu, and 
Agir (2011) 
Panel data of 15 MENA 
countries for the period 
1980–2007 
Bootstrap panel Granger 
causality analysis 
Empirical results show that the direction of causality between financial 
development and economic growth is sensitive to the measurement of 
financial development in the MENA countries. Therefore, the direction of 
causality seems to be country and financial development indicator specific. 
Hsueh Hu, and Tu 
(2013) 
Panel data of 10 Asian 
countries surveyed during 
period 1980 to 2007 
Bootstrap panel Granger 
causality analysis 
The results show that the direction of causality between financial 
development and economic growth is sensitive to the financial development 
variables used in the ten Asian countries examined in this work. Moreover, 
the findings support the supply-leading hypothesis, as many financial 
development variables lead economic growth in some of the ten Asian 
countries surveyed, especially in China. 
Pradhan, Arvin, 
Hall, and Bahmani 
(2014) 
Panel data of ASEAN 
countries for the period 
1961–2012 
PCA and panel vector 
auto-regressive model 
The study finds the presence of both unidirectional and bidirectional 
causality links between these variables. 
Peia and Roszbach 
(2015) 
Time series analysis of 22 
advanced economies for 
the period between 1973 
and 2011 
Panel cointegration and 
causality 
The results suggest that causality patterns depend on whether countries’ 
financial development stems from the stock market or the banking sector. 
These findings indicate that the direction of causality between finance and 




Cross section of 100 
countries over 1970–2014 
Causality analysis The results confirm that the previous findings of the literature that financial 
deepening, and credit to GDP in particular, could be an ambiguous measure 
of financial development because, although its linear effect is positive, its 













Table A.2.3: Financial Deepening, Repression and Financial Liberalisation 
Study Sample Method Key Findings 
Roubini and  
Sala-i-Martin 
(1992) 
Cross-section of 98 




Various measures of financial repression have negative effects on growth 
De Gregorio and 
Guidotti (1995) 
Annual data of 99 
countries for the period 
1960-1985; and Panel 
data of 12 Latin American 
countries during 1950–
1985 
OLS and panel data 
random effects 
Financial development accelerates economic performance of countries, but 
the example of Latin American countries shows that financial liberalisation 
without proper regulation policies negatively effects the role of finance over 
growth. 
Demetriades and 
Luintel  (1997) 
Annual data for India 




PCA and weak 
exogeneity tests 
Financial repression through repressionist controls is found to have 
substantial negative effects on financial development. Financial development 
and economic growth are jointly determined. 
Demetriades and 
Luintel (2001) 
Annual data for South 
Korea from 1956 to 1994 
ECM and PCA Financial restraint policies functions significantly in the financial 
development process of South Korea. Nonetheless, real interest rate effects 
on financial development are insignificant. 
Deidda and Fattouh 
(2002) 
Cross-country data for 
119 countries over the 
period 1960-1989 
Threshold OLS model The link between financial depth and economic growth is positive only in 
high income subsample. For low income countries, there is no such 
significance. This study concludes that there is nonlinear relationship 














Annual data for six 
developing countries 
for the period 1955–1997 
VECM, Johansen 
cointegration and PCA 
The net effect of financial liberalisation considerably varies across countries. 
Real interest rate, on the other hand, has a positive impact on four out of the 
six countries. 
Braun and Raddatz 
(2008) 
Industry-level data for a 
large cross-section of 41 
countries that liberalised 
trade during 1970 to 2000 
PCM The results show that the strengthening of promoter relative to opponent 
industries resulting from liberalisation is a good predictor of subsequent 
financial development. The benefits of developing the financial system are 
insufficient for financial development, and rents in particular hands appear to 
be necessary to achieve it. 
Amaral and Quintin 
(2010) 
A sample of 137 countries 
with the data for at least 
20 years leading up to 
1994 
OLS It is observed that poor enforcement in an economy direct less capital to the 
production sector and employ less efficient technologies. Also, the average 
scale of production should rise with the quality of enforcement. 
Rousseau and 
Wachtel (2011) 
Cross-sectional and panel 
data on financial and 
macroeconomic indicators 
for 84 countries over the 
period from 1960 to 2004 
Time period fixed 
effects and GMM 
dynamic panel 
estimation 
Excessive financial deepening or too rapid a growth of credit may have led 
to both inflation and weakened banking systems which in turn gave rise to 
growth-inhibiting financial crises. Excessive financial deepening may also 
be a result of widespread financial liberalisations in the late 1980s and early 
1990s in countries that lacked the legal or regulatory infrastructure to exploit 
financial development successfully. However, there is little indication that 












Table A.2.4: Stock Market Development and Growth 
Study Sample Method Key Findings 
Atje and Jovanovic 
(1993) 
Annual observations 
for 94 countries 
during the period 
1960–1985 
OLS Stock markets have large effects in stimulating economic growth. However, 
the study failed to find similar effects of bank lending. 
Harris (1997) Annual data for 39 
countries over the 
period 1980–1988 
Two stages least 
squares (2SLS) 
The results find no evidence about the promoting role of stock market 
activities over growth per capita output. While stock markets have an 
insignificant role in less developed countries, it has some functions in 
developed countries. 
Levine and Zervos 
(1998) 
Cross-section of 47 
countries from 1976 to 
1993 
OLS The study concludes that initial level of stock market liquidity is a good 
predictor for growth, but that of market capitalisation, stock return volatility, 
stock market integration is not robustly linked with growth. 
Rousseau and 
Wachtel (1998) 
Cross-section of 47 
countries from 1980 1995 
(2SLS) and panel 
VAR 
The study evidences for causality running from both stock market indicators 
(per capita value traded and market capitalisation, scaled by a price index) to 
economic activity. Furthermore, the adjustment of the stock market 
indicators with a general price index overstates the effect of market 
capitalisation on economic activity. Finally, the study concludes that 










Henry (2000) Annual data for 11 
developing countries 
spanning the 1970s and 
1990s 
A range of panel data 
techniques 
The study shows that stock market liberalisation accompanies with increased 




Quarterly data for five 
developed countries, 
including Germany, the 
USA, Japan, UK and 




and weak exogeneity 
tests 
While banks and stock markets both foster economic growth, the 
significance of the latter is relatively weak compared to that of banks. 
Furthermore, the results suggest that stock market volatility has negative real 
effects in Japan, France and the UK. 
Caporale, Howells, 
and Soliman (2005) 
Quarterly data from 
1979Q1 to 1998Q4 for 
Chile, Malaysia, Korea and 
the Philippines 
VARs and modified 
WALD (Toda 
Yamamoto) tests 
The study explores the stock market development and growth link. It 
concludes that causality runs from stock market development to growth 












Table A.2.5: Political, Social and Legal Factors, Regulation, Governance 
Study Sample Method Key Findings 
Levine (1999) Annual data for 49 
countries over the period 
1960–1989 
GMM The results show that financial development and economic growth are highly 
associated. Financial systems of those countries which perform sound and 
efficient legal and regulatory framework are much developed. 
Kroszner and 
Strahan (1999) 
Various state level data 
from 1975 to 1991 
OLS panel regression This paper investigates private-interest, public-interest, and political 
institutional theories of regulatory change to analyse state level deregulation 
of bank branching restrictions. Using a hazard model, it is found that interest 
group factors related to the relative strength of potential winners (large banks 
and small, bank-dependent firms) and losers (small banks and the rival 
insurance firms) can explain the timing of branching deregulation across 
states during the last quarter century. Deregulation occurs earlier in states 
with fewer small banks, in states where small banks are financially weaker, 
and in states with smaller, presumably bank-dependent, firms. 
Pagano and Volpin 
(2005) 
Panel data of 47 out of the 






The study analyses the political determinants of investor and employment 
protection which are good indicators for sound financial systems, which, in 
turn, fosters economic growth. The model predicts that proportional electoral 
systems are conducive to weaker investor protection and stronger 
employment protection than majoritarian systems. The proportionality of the 
voting system is significantly and negatively correlated with shareholder 
protection in a panel of 45 countries, and positively correlated with 
employment protection in a panel of 21 OECD countries. Other political 












A maximum of 166 
countries between 1960–
2003 
Fixed effect estimator The study aims to examine ‘within country growth effect of 
democratisation’. Results evidence that democratisation leads to almost a 1% 
increase in real annual per capita GDP growth. 
Cheng and Degryse 
(2010) 
The dataset contains 
annual growth rates of 
real per capita GDP, real 
per capita capital stock, 
and FDI for 27 Chinese 
provinces over the period 
1995–2003 
OLS The study examines whether the financial development of two different 
types of financial institutions — banks and non-banks — have a 
(significantly different) impact on local economic growth. The findings 
indicate that banking development shows a statistically significant and 
economically more pronounced impact on local economic growth. 
Jeanneney and 
Kpodar (2011) 
a large sample of 
developing countries with 
panel data over the period 
1966–2000 
OLS and GMM In regions where financial instability goes along with financial development, 
financial instability is detrimental to growth and poverty alleviation, which 
lowers the beneficial impact of financial development.  
Benmelech and 
Moskowitz (2010) 
33 states with a 40 years 
data of 19th century 
America 
OLS The study examines the political economy of one of the oldest forms of 
financial regulation, usury laws, and links it to financial development in the 
United States in the 19th century. In line with this, it aims to explore whether 
usury laws (as a measure of financial development) have any impact on 
economic development. The evidence suggests that incumbents with 
political power apply stringent usury laws because they impede competition 
from potential new entrants who are credit rationed. 
Körner and 
Schnabel (2011) 
77 countries over the 
period 1970–2007 
OLS The study explores the impact of public ownership in the banking system on 










countries with low financial development and poor political institutions, the 
impact of public ownership of banks on economic growth is strongly 
negative. 
Park (2012) 76 macroeconomic data 
from various countries 




The paper explores the impact of corruption on both the banking sector and 
economic growth. The results evidence that corruption significantly 
aggravates the problems with bad loans in the banking sector. Corruption 
also distorts the allocation of bank funds from normal projects to bad 
projects, which decreases the quality of private investments, hence it 
decreases economic growth. 
Mclean, Zhang, 
and Zhao (2012) 
A sample of firms drawn 
from 44 countries during 
the period 1990 to 2007 
Country-level regression Strong investor protection leads countries to enjoy and benefit from external 
financing more effectively. More generally, this study suggests that investor 
protection promoting accurate share prices, reducing financial constraints, 
and encouraging efficient investment. 
Anwar and Cooray 
(2012) 
Panel data in South Asia 
over the period 1970 to 
2009 
OLS and GMM The paper focuses on the impact of the interaction of (i) financial 
development and foreign direct investment and (ii) financial development 
and the quality of governance on economic growth in South Asia. It founds 
that financial development has contributed to an increase in the benefits of 
FDI in South Asia. In addition, improvement in political rights and civil 
liberties (which are used as a proxy for the quality of governance) has also 
enhanced the benefits of financial development in South Asia. 
Aisen and Veiga 
(2013) 
A sample covering up to 
169 countries, and 5-year 
periods from 1960 to 
2004 
GMM The study explores the effects of political instability on economic growth. 
Results show that higher degrees of political instability are associated with 
lower growth rates of GDP per capita. Political instability adversely affects 
growth by lowering the rates of productivity growth and, to a smaller degree, 










ethnic homogeneity are beneficial to growth, while democracy may have a 




A broad sample of firms 
(approximately 5,300 
firms) across 32 countries 
over the period 1990 to 
2007 
OLS Strong shareholder protections and easing stock market financing lead to 
achieve long-run rates of R&D investment. These findings connect law and 











Table A.2.6: Political Regimes and Growth53 
Author Sample Time Period Key Findings 







1950-1964 authoritarianism helped less and medium developed countries 
Dick (1974) 59 underdeveloped 
countries 
1959-1968  democracies develop slightly faster 
Huntington and 
Dominguez (1975) 
35 poor nations the 1950s authoritarian grew faster 
Marsh (1979) 98 countries 1955-1970 authoritarian grew faster 
Weede (1983) 124 countries 1960-1974 authoritarian grew faster 
Kormendi and 
Meguire (1985) 
47 countries 1950-1977 democracies grew faster 
Kohli (1985) 10 underdeveloped 
countries 
1960-1982 no difference in 1960s; authoritarian slightly better in 1970s 
Landau (1986) 65 countries 1960-1980 authoritarian grew faster 
                                                        










Sloan and Tedin 
(1987) 
20 Latin American 
countries 
1960-1979 bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes do better than democracy; traditional 
dictatorships do worse 
Marsh (1988) 47 countries 1965-1984 no difference between regimes 
Pourgerami (1988) 92 countries 1965-1984 democracies grew faster 
Scully (1988, 1992) 115 countries 1960-1980 democracies grew faster 
Barro (1991) 72 countries 1960-1985 democracies grew faster 
Grier and Tullock 
(1989) 
59 countries 1961-1980 democracy better in Africa and Latin America; no regime difference in Asia 
Remmer  
(1990) 
11 Latin American 
countries 
1982-1988 democracy faster, but result statistically insignificant 
Pourgerami (1991) 106 less developed 
countries 
1986 democracies grow faster 












Table A.2.7: Financial Development and Human Development 
Author Sample Method Key Findings 
Outreville (1999) A cross-sectional analysis 
of 57 developing 
countries 
OLS The empirical results indicate that human capital and socio-political stability 





Panel data of 68 countries 
over 1990-2005 period 
OLS, Difference-GMM 
and 2SLS 
The results suggest that (1) improvements of financial market depth, 
measured by stock market capitalisation to GDP, are robustly correlated with 
changes of HDI; (2) financial policy enhancements are associated to a 
positive HDI variation; (3) the main channels through which financial 
reforms acts are policies connected with: credit controls and excessive 
reserve requirements, interest rate controls, bank privatisation, banking 
supervision and regulation. 
Ostojic (2013) Panel data of European 
Union countries between 
1990-2010 
OLS The results show that financial development has a strong positive 
relationship with human development and that several characteristics of the 
financial system are highly correlated with human development. 
Sehrawat and Giri 
(2014) 
Time series data of India 
from 1980-2012 
Cointegration analysis The results of Granger non-causality indicate that unidirectional causality 
runs from financial development indicators to human development index 
(HDI). The variance decomposition analysis shows that among all the 
financial indicators, broad money supply (M3) has the largest contribution to 












A panel of 38 African 
countries with data for the 
period 1996-2008 
2SLS, Fixed Effects, 
GMM and Tobit 
regressions 
The main finding is that financial dynamics of depth, activity and size 
improve inclusive human development, whereas the inability of banks to 
transform mobilised deposits into credit for financial access negatively 
affects inclusive human development. 
Filippidis and 
Katrakilidis (2015) 
Panel data from 52 
developing economies 
during 1985–2008 
Differenced-GMM The results demonstrate that: (i) institutional quality can explain 
international differences in the level of banking sector development; (ii) 
economic institutions and human development are extremely significant for 
banking sector development; (iii) the legal system is the dominant dimension 
of economic institutions; and (iv) the combined reforms of economic 
institutions matter more than separate institutional reforms. 
Park and Shin 
(2017) 
Sample period spanning 
1960 to 2011, covering 
162 countries 
OLS and Granger 
Causality 
Main findings suggest that financial development contributes to reducing 
inequality up to a point, but as financial development proceeds further, it 
contributes to greater inequality. We also find that when the ratio of primary 
schooling to total schooling increases and law and order improves, financial 












Table A.2.8: Islamic Banking Development and Economic Growth 
Study Sample Method Key Findings 
Bashir (2003) Cross country bank level 
data of 8 Middle Eastern 
countries between 1993 and 
1998 
Pooled OLS The results indicate that high leverage and large loans to asset ratios lead to 
higher profitability. The results also indicate that foreign owned banks are 
more profitable than their domestic counterparts. Everything remaining 
equal, there is evidence that implicit and explicit taxes affect the bank 
performance measures negatively. 
Rosly and Abu 
Bakar (2003) 
IBS banks in Malaysia over 
the period 1992-1999 
OLS The study found that Islamic banking scheme (IBS) banks have recorded 
higher return on assets (ROA) as they are able to utilize existing overheads 
carried by mainstream banks. Although Islamic credit finance products may 
have complied with Shari’ah rules, their lack of ethical content is not 
expected to motivate IBS banks to strive for efficiency through scale and 
scope economies. 




The results suggest that Islamic banks suffer slight inefficiencies during the 
global crisis 1998-9. Efficiency differences across the sample data appear to 












Quarterly time series data 
(1997:1 – 2005:4) of 
Malaysia 
Cointegration test and 
Vector Error Model 
(VECM) 
In the short-run only fixed investment that granger cause Islamic bank to 
develop for 1997:1-2005:4. Whereas in the long-run, there is evidence of a 
bidirectional relationship between Islamic bank and fixed investment and 
there is evidence to support demand following hypothesis of GDP and 
Islamic bank, where increase in GDP causes Islamic banking to develop and 
not vice versa. 
Goaied and Sassi 
(2010) 
Unbalanced panel data 
from 16 MENA region 
countries between 1993-
2006  
GMM The empirical results show no significant relationship between banking and 
growth which reinforce the idea that banks don’t spur economic growth. 
Another finding is that Islamic banks don’t make the exception in the 




The quarterly time-series 
data (Q1:2004 to Q2:2011) 
of Bangladesh 
Cointegration analysis 
and Granger causality 
Islamic bank financing is found to have a positive and significant 
relationship with economic growth both in the long and short run. It implies 
that the development of Islamic banking is one of the policies, which should 
be considered by the government to improve their income. 
Abduh and Omar 
(2012) 
The quarterly time-series 





The results demonstrate a significant relationship in short-run and long-run 
periods between Islamic financial development and economic growth. The 
relationship, however, is neither Schumpeter’s supply-leading nor 













2010:4) of 9 Muslim 
countries 
Panel cointegration The results generally signify that, in the long run, Islamic banks’ financing is 
positive and significantly correlated with economic growth and capital 
accumulation in these countries. The results obtained from the Granger 
causality test reveal a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between economic growth and Islamic banks’ financing in the short run and 
in the long run. 
Gheeraert and 
Weill (2015) 
A sample of 70 countries 
over the period 2000-2005 
Stochastic frontier 
approach 
The results indicate that Islamic banking development favors 
macroeconomic efficiency. Also, Increasing Islamic banking development 
enhances efficiency until a certain point beyond which expansion of Islamic 
banking becomes detrimental for efficiency. 
Yusof and Bahlous 
(2013) 
Annual data of Malaysia, 
Indonesia and the Gulf 





(VDCs) and impulse 
response functions 
Islamic banking is found to contribute to economic growth both in the long 
run and the short run for both GCC countries and the selected East Asia (EA) 
countries. In the short run however, Islamic banking contributes more to 
economic growth in Malaysia and Indonesia compared to the GCC countries. 
Gheeraert (2014) A sample of 32 Muslim 
countries over the period 
2000-2005 
OLS It is found that the development of Islamic banking in Muslim countries 
leads to a higher banking sector development. It is also evidenced that the 
Islamic banking sector acts as a complement to the conventional banking in 
Muslim countries, when both systems co-exist, and the Islamic sector 
reaches a medium penetration in the total banking sector. 
Grassa and Gazdar 
(2014) 
Panel data of five GCC 
countries for the period 
1996-2011 
GLS, OLS and Fixed 
Effect Estimator 
Empirical results strongly support the hypothesis that Islamic finance leads 
to growth in the five GCC countries, however, no significant relationship 












Time series data of Qatar, 
Bahrain and UAE over the 
period 1990-2008 
The unit root, 
Cointegration and 
Granger causality 
Empirical results signify that in the long run Islamic banks’ financing is 
positive and significantly correlated with economic growth in the select 
countries which reinforces the idea that a well-functioning banking system 
promotes economic growth. 
Uddin and Masih 
(2015) 
Time series data of 
Malaysia over the period 
1973-2013 
Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag model 
(ARDL) 
The study finds that there is a long-term relationship between finance, 
growth and human development. Human development is found significantly 
correlated with the growth in the long run. However, oil price is found not 
correlated with growth in the long run for the Malaysian economy. 
Imam and Kpodar 
(2016) 
A sample of 52 developing 
economies, using data over 
the period 1990-2010 
System-GMM, Pooled 
OLS, Fixed Effect 
estimator 
The results show that, notwithstanding its relatively small size compared to 
the economy and the overall size of the financial system, Islamic banking is 
positively associated with economic growth even after controlling for 













Table A.2.9: Generally Used Financial Development and Economic Growth Indicators 
Study - Sample Financial Development (FD) and Economic Growth (EG) Indicators Methods 
(Estrada et al. 2010) 
 
a cross-country panel 
data set covering 116 
economies (of which 22 
are ADB members) 
with four 
nonoverlapping 5-year 
periods from 1987 to 
2008. 
FD Indicators: 
1- Total liquid liabilities relative to GDP 
2- Total liquid liabilities relative to GDP 
3- Stock market capitalisation relative to GDP 
4- capital inflows relative to GDP (financial openness) 
Control Variables: 
1- Initial GDP per capita 
2- Years of schooling 
3- quality of governance by including the executive constraint indicator from 
Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2009), which measures the extent of 
institutionalised constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives 
4- trade openness, inflation, and government consumption 
EG Indicator: 
-average of GDP per capita growth 
Fixed Effect 
(Goaied and Sassi 
2010) 
Islamic Financial Development Indicator: 
1- the amount of credit issued to the private sector by Islamic banks 
FD Indicators: 











an unbalanced panel 
data from 16 MENA 
region countries 
observed from 1962 to 
2006 
1- M3/GDP 
2- the value of loans made by deposit money banks and other financial institutions 
to the private sector 
Control Variables: 
1- the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP (as a measure of trade openness of the 
economy) 
2- the inflation rate (INF) 
3- the ratio of government consumption to GDP 
EG Indicator: 
-GDP per capita growth 
(Wu et al. 2010) 
a panel data set 
comprised of 13 
countries in European 
Union (EU) over the 
period of 1976–2005 
Banking development: 
1- financial depth measured by the ratio of liquid liabilities of the financial system 
to gross domestic product (GDP), 
2- the ratio of deposit money banks’ domestic assets to the sum of domestic assets 
in deposit money banks and the central bank 
Stock market development: 
1- the ratio of market value of domestic shares listed on domestic exchanges to 
GDP, 
2- the value of the trades of domestic shares on domestic exchanges divided by 








Panel unit-root tests 











-real GDP in which nominal GDP is expressed by the US dollar 
(Hye 2011) 
Indian Economy from 
1978 to 2008 
Quoted FD Indicators: 
1- liquid liabilities to nominal GDP; 
2- commercial bank assets to commercial bank assets plus central bank assets and 
3- domestic credit to private sectors divided by nominal GDP 
4- the ratio of total bank deposit liabilities to GDP; the ratio of clearing house 
amount to GDP;  
5- the ratio of the private credit to GDP, 
6- the ratio of the stock market capitalisation to GDP 
FD indicators in this study: 
1- market capitalisation of listed companies as a percentage of GDP, 
2- liquid liabilities (M3) as a percentage of GDP,  
3- domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP 
4- ratio of broad money (M2) to narrow money (M1) 
Augment Dickey Fuller, 
Phillips Perron and 






auto-regressive distributed lag 
approach 
(Hassan et al. 2011) 
 
Panel data of 168 




1- domestic credit provided by the banking sector as a percentage of GDP 
(DCBS) 
2- domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP (DCPS) 
3- the broadest definition of money (M3) – as a proportion 
of GDP 
Panel regressions: 
OLS and WLS 
 
Multivariate time-series models: 













4- the ratio of gross domestic savings to GDP (GDS). 
5- the ratio of trade to GDP (TRADE) 
6- the ratio of general government final consumption expenditure to GDP (GOV) 
EG Indicator:  
-GDP per capita growth rates 
(Yilmazkuday 2011) 
 
A panel of five-year 
averages of standard 
variables for 84 
countries from 1965 to 
2004. 
FD Indicators: 
1- log initial per capita GDP 
2- log initial secondary enrollment rate (SEC) 
3- the ratio of liquid liabilities (i.e., M3) to GDP 
4- the ratio of M3 less M1 to GDP 
5- inflation rate (average annual growth rate of the consumer price index (CPI)), 
Control variables: 
1- Openness (measured as residuals from a regression of international trade (the 
sum of exports and imports) as a percentage of GDP on country size (measured 
by log GDP) and income level (measured by log per capita GDP) 
2- government size 
EG Indicator: 
growth rate of real per capita output 





1- the ratio of the liquid liabilities to GDP (M2) 
2- private bank credit over bank deposits 










panel time-series data of 
four Latin American 
countries (Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil and 
Peru) between 1980 and 
2007 
3- deposit money bank claims over deposit money bank and central bank claims 
4- stock market capitalisation over GDP 
Control variables: 
1- government’s share in the real GDP (GOV) 
2- the ratio of exports and imports to real GDP (OPEN) 
3- the ratio of investment to real GDP (INV) 
4- average years of schooling of those aged 25 and over with urbanisation rates 
(from the World Development Indicators files) to construct an index for structural 
development (DEV) 
EG Indicator: 
The growth rates of the real GDP per capita (GROW) 
(Yusof and Bahlous 
2013) 
 
Malaysia, Indonesia and 
the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) 
countries for annual data 
for period of 2000-2009 
Economic growth: GDP per capita (GDPPC) growth 
Islamic banking system development: Total financing of Islamic banks as a 
percentage of GDP 
Stock market development: Total value of stocks traded as a percentage of GDP 
Gross fixed capital formation: Gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of 
GDP as an economic indicator for investment 
Control economic variable: Volume of trade as a percentage of GDP as an 
indicator of the economic variable 
 
 
panel cointegration analysis, 
variance decompositions 
(VDCs) and 










(Hsueh et al. 2013) 
 A panel data for the 
causality between FD 
and EG among ten 
Asian countries 
surveyed during period 
1980 to 2007 
FD indicators: 
1- DC/GDP: the ratio of domestic claims to GDP 
2- M1/GDP: the ratio of money supply M1 to GDP  
3- M2/GDP: the ratio of money supply M2 to GDP  
4- M3/GDP: the ratio of money supply M3 to GDP 
EG Indicator:  
-real GDP 





panel data of four 
countries of the North 
African region (Algeria, 
Egypt, Morocco and 
Tunisia), 1964 to 2009 
when financial 
development is proxy by 
the banking system, the 
period 1988–2009 for 
the second proxy related 
to the stock market. 
FD indicators: 
Regarding the banking system: 
1- the ratio of the bank deposit to nominal GDP 
2- private sector credit to nominal GDP 
Regarding the stock market: 
1- Market capitalisation to GDP 
2- The ratio of value shares traded to GDP turnover value 
EG Indicator: 




1- panel unit root tests 
2- Pedroni panel cointegration test 
3- panel fully modified ordinary 











and Horvath 2015) 
 
1334 estimates from 67 
studies 
FD Indicators: 
1- Financial Depth: 
* the ratio of liquid liabilities of the financial system to GDP 
* the ratio of M3 to GDP 
2- Bank Ratio: 
* the ratio of bank credit to the sum of bank credit and domestic assets of the 
central bank 
3- Financial Activity 
* the ratio of private domestic credit provided by deposit money banks to GDP 
* the ratio of private domestic credit provided by deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions to GDP 
* the ratio of credit allocated to private enterprises to total domestic credit 
4- Stock market development: 
* the market capitalisation ratio (the total value of listed shares relative to GDP) 
* stock market activity (he total value of traded shares relative to GDP) 
* the turnover ratio (the total value of traded shares relative to the total value of 
listed shares) 
FD Indicators (alternative measures): 
* the aggregate measure of overall stock market development 
* the share of resources that the society devotes to its financial system 












* the ratio of bank credit to bank deposits 
(Akinci, Akinci, and 
Yilmaz 2014) 
 
Panel data of OECD 
member countries for 
the period 1980-2011 
FD Indicators: 
1- domestic credits (DC) by the banking sector as a percentage of GDP 
2- the ratio of broad measure of money, namely M2, to GDP 
3- the ratio of total bank deposits to GDP 
4- the ratio of financial system deposits to the GDP 
EG Indicator: 
The percentage change of GDP in constant prices 
 
 
unbalanced panel cointegration 
and causality analysis 
the Pedroni and Kao 
Cointegration Analysis 
Vector Error Correction Model 
(VECM) 
(Grassa and Gazdar 
2014) 
 
five GCC countries 
(Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Qatar Saudi Arabia and 
UAE) over the period of 
1996-2011 
EG Indicator: 
real per capita GDP growth 
FD Indicators: 
1- private credit (CRE); equals banking institution credit to private sector as a 
percentage of GDP 
2- Deposit money banks (DEPO); equals the ratio of the total assets of deposit 
money banks divided by GDP 








generalised least squares, 










1- Initial level of development (IIC): equals the logarithm of initial income per 
capita, 
2- Trade openness (TO): the ratio of the sum of exports and imports over GDP 
3- Secondary school enrollments (SSCE)  
4- Government consumption (GC): the ratio of GC to GDP. 
(Tabash and Dhankar 
2014) 
 
Time series data from 
1990 to 2008 of Qatar, 
Bahrain, and United 
Arab Emirates 
(UAE), are selected for 
the study. 
FD Indicators: 
1- Islamic banks’ financing credited to private sector through modes of financing 
EG Indicator: 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
the unit root test,  
co-integration test and 
Granger causality tests 
(Hachicha and Ben 
Amar 2015) 
 
 Malaysia from 2000Q1 
to 2011Q4. 
Control Variables: 
1- Capital and labour 
FD indicators: 
1- the ratio of the outstanding loans granted by the Islamic banks to the total 
outstanding bank loans (Islamic and non-Islamic) granted to the private sector 
















3- the ratio of the loans granted by the Islamic Financial Intermediaries to private 
investments 
EG Indicators: 
the real GDP (on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)) 
(Samargandi et al. 
2015) 
 
a panel of 52 middle-
income countries over 
the 1980–2008 period 
 
Control variables: 
1- initial real GDP, 2- gross fixed capital formation 
3- population growth, 4- openness to trade 
5- government expenditure as a share of GDP, 6- life expectancy 
7- inflation 
FD indicators: 
1- the ratio of liquid liabilities (or M3) to nominal GDP;  
2- the ratio of commercial bank assets to the sum of commercial bank assets and 
central bank assets, 
3- the ratio of bank credit to the private sector to GDP. 
EG Indicator:  
growth rate of real GDP 
The error-correction model using 




The use of a panel ARDL model 
based on the use of three 
alternative estimators:  
1- mean group estimator (MG) of 
Pesaran and Smith (1995),  
2- pooled mean group estimator 
(PMG), 
3- dynamic fixed effects (DFE) 












Table A.2.10 Report for Hausman Test Results 
--- Coefficients ---- 
 (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
 fixed Random difference S.E. 
gdppcg -.0004048 -.0004589 .0000541 . 
trade -.0000248 .0000256 -.0000504 . 
oilrent -.0009648 -.0007754 -.0001894 . 
indusgdp .2919914 .2500222 .0419692 .0348617 
rol .0001775 .0004375 -.0002601 .0000436 
polsta -.0003972 -.0002596 -.0001376 . 
cbankcrdt .0003506 .0004516 -.000101 . 
istfin .0568732 .0566393 .0002339 . 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(8)        = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
         = 198.93 
Prob>chi2  = 0.0000   (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
